(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that,
in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued March 12, 1996 -- Decided May 8, 1996
PER CURIAM
A Somerset County jury found Isaac Wright, Jr., guilty of drug-related offenses involving the sale of
cocaine. His convictions included a charge of being a drug kingpin within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3. On
that charge, Wright was sentenced to a mandatory life term, with a parole-ineligibility provision of twenty-five
years.
Wright appealed his convictions and sentence. The Appellate Division affirmed all of the convictions
except that based on the drug kingpin charge. A majority of the Appellate Division held that the instructions
to the jury were inadequate on the kingpin charge. One judge dissented on that issue. The dissenter concluded
that the conviction should not be reversed because in light of substantial evidence against Wright, the jury was
not misled by the erroneous instruction.
Because of the dissent below, the State appealed as of right to the Supreme Court.
HELD: The failure of the trial court's instructions to the jury to define or explain the role of a drug kingpin and
the necessity for the jury to make a determination that defendant performed such a role requires a reversal of
the conviction.
1. The Supreme Court previously determined in State v. Alexander that a trial court's jury instructions on a drug
kingpin charge had to inform the jury that it must find that the defendant occupied a high-level position of
authority in the drug distribution or manufacture scheme. The defendant had to be found to be a "leader" in
the organization, someone who exercises substantial authority and control over the operation. (pp. 4-6)
2. Wright's trial occurred before Alexander was filed. The trial court essential paraphrased the statutory
provisions with minimal amplification. Without the benefit of Alexander, the trial court failed to include the
statements of legislative policy and purpose that the Court determined were a "material element of the crime."
(pp. 6-7)
3. The adequacy of the evidence did not counteract or overcome the inadequacy of the jury instruction. (p. 7)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.
CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN,
and COLEMAN join in the Court's opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
110 September Term 1995
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ISAAC WRIGHT, JR.,
Defendant-Respondent.
Argued March 12, 1996 -- Decided May 8, 1996
On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate
Division.
James L. McConnell, Special Deputy Attorney
General, Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued
the cause for appellant (Melaine B. Campbell,
Deputy Attorney General, Acting Somerset
County Prosecutor, attorney).
Vito A. Sciancalepore, Designated Counsel,
argued the cause for respondent (Susan L.
Reisner, Public Defender, attorney).
Isaac Wright, Jr. submitted a supplemental
brief pro se.
PER CURIAM
The defendant Isaac Wright, Jr. was found guilty and convicted of the following crimes: leading a narcotics trafficking network, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3 (count one); conspiracy to distribute cocaine, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 (count two); possession of cocaine in a
quantity of five ounces or more with intent to distribute,
contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(1) (counts
three, six and seven); possession of cocaine within 1,000 feet of
school property, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and N.J.S.A.
2C:35-7 (count four); possession of cocaine, contrary to N.J.S.A.
2C:35-10a(1) (count five); possession of cocaine in a quantity of
a half-ounce or more with the intent to distribute, contrary to
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(2) (count eight);
employing a juvenile in a drug distribution scheme, contrary to
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-6 (count eleven); and maintaining or operating a
controlled dangerous substance manufacturing facility, contrary
to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4 (count twelve). These charges were part of
an eighteen count indictment in which defendant and eleven other
individuals were named as defendants.
Defendant was sentenced as follows: for count one, a
mandatory life term with a twenty-five year period of parole
ineligibility and a $25,000 fine; and for count eleven, a
consecutive ten-year custodial term with a five-year period of
parole ineligibility and a $10,000 fine. Count five was merged
with count three, and on counts three, six, seven, and twelve,
defendant received concurrent custodial terms of fifteen years
with a five-year period of parole ineligibility. On count two,
defendant was sentenced to a concurrent ten-year custodial term;
on count eight, a concurrent seven-year custodial term; and on
count four, a concurrent five-year custodial term with a three-year period of parole ineligibility. Defendant was also assessed
DEDR penalties totaling $20,000, a total lab fee of $400, and
Violent Crimes Compensation Board penalties of $270. Defendant's
driver's license was revoked for forty-eight months.
In a per curiam opinion, the Appellate Division below
affirmed all the convictions except the conviction for leading a
narcotics trafficking network. It determined that the jury
instruction regarding the defendant's drug-kingpin status was
inadequate. One judge of the Appellate Division issued a limited
dissent, reasoning that the conviction for leading a narcotics
trafficking network should not be reversed because that charge
was supported by substantial evidence and, in light of that
evidence, the jury was not misled by the inadequate instruction.
The State appealed as of right on the sole issue of the jury
charge regarding the defendant's drug kingpin status.
We concur in the conclusion of the Appellate Division that
would reverse the jury's conviction of defendant under N.J.S.A.
2C:35-3, and agree with the reasoning expressed in its per curiam
opinion. Because that opinion is unreported, we set forth the
relevant portion of the Appellate Division's opinion, viz:
We begin our analysis by specific
reference to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3, which
provides, in pertinent part:
A person is a leader of a narcotics trafficking network if he conspires with others as an organizer, supervisor, financier or manager, to engage for profit in a scheme or course of conduct to unlawfully manufacture, distribute, dispense, bring into or transport in this State . . . any controlled dangerous substance classified in
Schedule I or II, or any controlled
substance analog thereof. Leader
of narcotics trafficking network is
a crime of the first degree and
upon conviction thereof, . . . a
person shall be sentenced to an
ordinary term of life imprisonment
during which the person must serve
25 years before being eligible for
parole. . . .
Notwithstanding the provisions
of N.J.S. 2C:1-8, a conviction of
leader of narcotics trafficking
network shall not merge with the
conviction for any offense which is
the object of the conspiracy. . . .
It shall not be necessary in any
prosecution under this section for
the State to prove that any
intended profit was actually
realized. The trier of fact may
infer that a particular scheme or
course of conduct was undertaken
for profit from all of the
attendant circumstances, including
but not limited to the number of
persons involved in the scheme or
course of conduct, the actor's net
worth and his expenditures in
relation to his legitimate sources
of income, the amount or purity of
the specified controlled dangerous
substance or controlled substance
analog involved, or the amount of
cash or currency involved.
The Supreme Court evaluated this statute
on two occasions. In State v. Afanador,
134 N.J. 162 (1993), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3 was
declared constitutionally valid and
enforceable legislation which was neither
facially vague nor vague as applied to
defendant Afanador.
Thereafter, in State v. Alexander, 136 N.J. 563 (1994), the Court, persuaded by Justice O'Hern's dissent in Afanador, supra, 134 N.J. at 179-86 (O'Hern, J., dissenting),
concluded that a correct jury charge "must
relate the terms of the statute, such as
`organizer, supervisor, financier, or
manager' to the legislative purposes to
target profiteers and kingpins in the upper
echelons of the drug trade." Afanador,
supra, 134 N.J. at 186 (O'Hern, J.,
dissenting). The Alexander decision
specifically outlined the elements of a
proper jury instruction where a defendant is
indicted for a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3:
Thus, a proper instruction should,
in addition to reciting the
statutory language of N.J.S.A.
2C:35-3, at least inform the jury
that it must find that the
defendant occupies a high-level
position of authority in the scheme
of distribution (or manufacture or
dispensing or transporting, as the
evidence may permit). A court
should instruct the jury that a
defendant's position and status
must be at a superior or high level
in relation to other persons in the
drug trafficking network and that
the defendant's role must be that
of a "leader" in the drug
organization or system and, in that
capacity, the defendant exercised
supervisory power or control over
others engaged in the organized
drug-trafficking network.
. . . A "high level" or "upper-echelon" "leader" of such an organization is one who occupies a significant or important position in the organization and exercises substantial authority and control over its operation. Neither the specific elements enumerated in the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3 nor the additional requirements extrapolated from the statute's statement of purpose indicate that a drug operator exercising authority and controlling other people in an organization or network, even at the street level, could not be a "leader" or "drug
kingpin" within the contemplation
of the Legislature. Rather, the
role of a defendant as a leader or
drug kingpin turns more on the
nature of that person's authority,
the magnitude or extent of control,
and the number of persons over whom
that power is exercised.
An appropriate instruction
should also amplify the other
statutory terms that are expressed
as material elements of the crime
under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3. Thus, the
statutory terms "organizer,
supervisor, financier or manager"
should be explained so that the
meaning of those terms is more
fully understood by the jury. For
example, the court might define an
"organizer" as a person who
arranges, devises, or plans a drug-trafficking network; a "supervisor"
as one who oversees the operation
of a drug-trafficking network; a
"financier" as one who is
responsible for providing the funds
or resources necessary to operate a
drug-trafficking network; and a
"manager" as one who directs the
operations of a drug-trafficking
network.
[Alexander, supra, 136
N.J. at 574-75.]
The Supreme Court reversed Alexander's
conviction based on the trial court's failure
to articulate the material elements of the
crime in its jury charge.
The Appellate Division, observing that this trial occurred prior to the decision in Alexander, pointed out that "the trial judge simply read N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3" and essentially paraphrased the statutory provisions with minimal amplification. The instruction did not define or explain the role of a leader or
drug kingpin or the necessity for the jury to make a
determination that defendant performed such a role.
The Appellate Division stated further in its opinion:
It is clear that the court, without the
benefit of the Alexander instruction, failed
to incorporate in its charge those statements
of legislative policy and purpose
particularized in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-1.1, which
the Supreme Court deemed a "material element
of the crime." Alexander, supra, 136 N.J. at
570. The absence of a charge which
articulates the material elements of the
crime charged requires reversal of
defendant's conviction on count one of this
indictment.
We are satisfied that, in the circumstances, the adequacy of
the evidence did not counteract or overcome the inadequacy of the
instruction that failed to require the jury to consider and
determine the existence of a critical and material element of the
crime charged. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
Appellate Division.
CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN, and COLEMAN join in the Court's opinion.
NO. A-110 SEPTEMBER TERM 1995
ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court
ON CERTIFICATION TO
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ISAAC WRIGHT, JR.,
Defendant-Respondent.
DECIDED May 8, 1996
Chief Justice Wilentz PRESIDING
OPINION BY PER CURIAM
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY