(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
STATE OF NEW JERSEY V. LOUIS ABRONSKI (A-86-95)
(NOTE: This is a companion case to State of New Jersey v. Curtis Knight, also decided today.)
Argued March 25, 1996 -- Decided July 11, 1996
STEIN, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
As in State v. Knight, also decided today, the primary issue in this case is the retroactivity of a new
rule of criminal procedure.
Louis Abronski was convicted of first-degree aggravated sexual assault and second-degree sexual
assault of his girlfriend's nine-year-old daughter. He was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment for the
first-degree offense and to a concurrent seven-year term for the second-degree offense.
Abronski appealed the convictions, contending that, based on State v. Reed, his tape-recorded
confession was improperly used against him at trial. According to Abronski, an attorney retained by
Abronski's mother immediately after he was arrested was not permitted to speak with Abronski when the
attorney telephoned police headquarters during the interrogation.
In Reed, this Court held that when, to the knowledge of the police, the attorney of a suspect in
custody is present or available, and the attorney has communicated a desire to confer with the suspect, the
police must make that information known to the suspect before custodial interrogation can proceed or
continue. The failure of the police to give the suspect that information renders the suspect's subsequent
waiver of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination invalid per se. Reed was decided after
Abronski's convictions but before the Appellate Division ruled on his appeal.
The Appellate Division affirmed Abronski's convictions, finding that Reed did not apply retroactively
to this case and that, therefore, the trial court properly admitted Abronski's confession into evidence.
The Supreme Court granted certification.
HELD: State v. Reed will not be applied retroactively to this case. Therefore, the trial court properly
admitted Abronski's confession into evidence.
1. Three factors (the Nash factors) are considered in determining whether a new rule of criminal procedure
is to be applied retroactively: 1) the purpose of the rule and whether it would be furthered by a retroactive
application; 2) the degree of reliance placed on the old rule by those who administered it; and 3) the effect
retroactive application would have on the administration of justice. The decision not to afford Reed
retroactive application stems from the analysis of the second and third Nash factors. Because the context in
which the Reed rule is implicated frequently arises, applying Reed retroactively would undermine the validity
of a relatively large number of convictions and, consequently, burden the criminal justice system with
numerous retrials. Moreover, in cases similar to this, state law enforcement agents reasonably could rely on
pre-Reed law in declining to interrupt the questioning of a suspect to inform the suspect that an attorney was
trying to contact him. Here, police justifiably relied on and followed pre-Reed law. (pp. 3-4)
2. The Appellate Division appropriately applied the Nash factors to conclude that Reed should not be
applied retroactively. Reed will apply only to cases in which the defendant's custodial confession occurred
after July 23, 1993, the date on which Reed was decided. (p. 4)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.
JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE
STEIN's opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ did not participate.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
86 September Term 1995
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
LOUIS ABRONSKI,
Defendant-Appellant.
Argued March 25, 1996 -- Decided July 11, 1996
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported
at
281 N.J. Super. 390 (1995).
Marcia H. Blum, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for appellant
(Susan L. Reisner, Public Defender,
attorney).
Robin A. Hamett, Special Deputy Attorney
General, Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued
the cause for respondent (Joseph F. Audino,
Special Deputy Attorney General, Acting
Camden County Prosecutor, attorney).
Carol M. Henderson, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for amicus curiae, Attorney
General of New Jersey (Deborah T. Poritz,
Attorney General, attorney).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
STEIN, J.
Defendant was convicted of first-degree aggravated sexual
assault and second-degree sexual assault. He was sentenced to
fifteen years imprisonment for the first-degree offense and to a
concurrent seven-year term for the second-degree offense. The
Appellate Division affirmed his convictions.
281 N.J. Super. 390, 403 (1995). We affirm the judgment of the Appellate
Division substantially for the reasons stated in its opinion.
As in State v. Knight, ___ N.J. ___ (1996), also decided
today, the primary issue in this case is the retroactivity of a
new rule of criminal procedure. In State v. Reed,
133 N.J. 237,
261-62 (1993), we held that "[w]hen, to the knowledge of the
police, [the attorney of a suspect in custody] is present or
available, and the attorney has communicated a desire to confer
with the suspect, the police must make that information known to
the suspect before custodial interrogation can proceed or
continue." Furthermore, "the failure of the police to give the
suspect that information renders the suspect's subsequent waiver
of the privilege against self-incrimination invalid per se." Id.
at 262. We decided Reed after defendant, Louis Abronski, had
been tried and convicted of sexual assault of his girlfriend's
nine-year-old daughter, but before the Appellate Division ruled
on defendant's appeal. Defendant contends, based on our decision
in Reed, that his tape-recorded confession was improperly used
against him at trial because an attorney, retained by defendant's
mother immediately after defendant was arrested, was not
permitted to speak with defendant when he telephoned police
headquarters during the interrogation. We agree with the
Appellate Division that Reed does not apply retroactively to
defendant's case, and that the trial court therefore properly
admitted the confession into evidence. See 281 N.J. Super. at
402.
Three factors are considered in determining whether a new
rule of criminal procedure is to be applied retroactively: "(1)
the purpose of the rule and whether it would be furthered by a
retroactive application, (2) the degree of reliance placed on the
old rule by those who administered it, and (3) the effect a
retroactive application would have on the administration of
justice." State v. Nash,
64 N.J. 464, 471 (1974). In Knight,
supra, our analysis of those factors led us to conclude that the
rule of State v. Sanchez,
129 N.J. 261 (1992), should be granted
limited retroactivity. ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 27-31). Our
decision not to afford Reed such retrospective effect stems from
our analysis of the second and third Nash factors in this case.
As the Appellate Division recognized, see 281 N.J. Super. at 401-02, the context in which the Reed rule is implicated frequently
arises. See, e.g., People v. McCauley, 645 N.E.2d 923, 928-934
(Ill. 1994) (citing and discussing cases); Reed, supra, 133 N.J.
at 248-49 (citing cases). As a result, applying Reed
retroactively would undermine the validity of a relatively large
number of convictions and consequently burden the criminal
justice system with numerous retrials. Moreover, in cases
similar to this, state law enforcement agents reasonably could
rely on pre-Reed law, see Moran v. Burbine,
475 U.S. 412,
106 S.
Ct. 1135,
89 L. Ed.2d 410 (1986), in declining to interrupt the
interrogation of a suspect to inform the suspect that an attorney
was seeking to contact him. As the Appellate Division observed,
"when the police interrogated Abronski, Moran represented the
applicable law and the police justifiably relied on and followed
it." 281 N.J. Super. at 402.
We concur fully with the Appellate Division's application of
the Nash factors in this case and its conclusion that Reed should
not be applied retroactively. See 281 N.J. Super. at 399-402;
cf. Jones v. State,
528 So.2d 1171, 1175-76 (Fla. 1988)
(declining to give retroactive effect to Haliburton v. State, 514
So.2d 1088 (Fla. 1987), which adopted rule analogous to that set
forth in Reed, supra). Therefore, Reed will apply only to cases
in which the defendant's custodial confession occurred after July
23, 1993, the date on which Reed was decided.
Judgment affirmed.
JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE STEIN's opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ did not participate.
NO. A-86 SEPTEMBER TERM 1995
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
LOUIS ABRONSKI,
Defendant-Appellant.
DECIDED July 11, 1996
Justice Handler PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Stein
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY