(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued January 7, l997 -- Decided March 20, 1997
COLEMAN, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
The issue in this appeal is whether it was error to admit evidence of defendant's other crimes,
wrongs, or acts against a third party in a trial for purposeful or knowing murder to prove that the homicide
was neither accidental nor in self-defense.
Lyle Nance was tried for the purposeful or knowing murder of Michael Snow, second-degree
burglary of the apartment of Donnelle Williams, felony murder, two counts of endangering the welfare of
children, and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. During the trial, Nance admitted shooting
Michael Snow but testified that the shooting was accidental and in self-defense. The State's theory was that
Nance had shot Snow intentionally in a jealous rage related to Donnelle Williams. In support of its theory,
the State offered the testimony of Donnelle Williams regarding Nance's conduct toward her to establish his
jealousy. The trial court ruled that some bad-conduct evidence was admissible, but ruled that such evidence
should not include any act of violence by Nance against Williams.
At trial, the judge specifically charged the jury that it could not consider the bad-conduct evidence to
conclude that Nance had a general propensity to commit the crimes with which he was charged. The jury
acquitted defendant of purposeful or knowing murder, but convicted him on the remaining charges.
The Appellate Division reversed the convictions, holding that it was reversible error to admit the
bad-conduct evidence because it was fundamentally irrelevant to the issues the jury had to decide.
The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for certification.
HELD: The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the other-conduct evidence because it was
not too prejudicial to defendant; the limiting instruction given by the trial court regarding the jury's use of
the other-conduct evidence was sufficient.
1. Courts should exclude evidence of other crimes, civil wrongs, or acts when such evidence is offered solely
to establish the forbidden inference of propensity or predisposition. However, even when the evidence is
probative of a material disputed fact in the case, the risk of prejudice may outweigh the probative worth of
the evidence. (pp. 9-11).
2. In determining when other-crime evidence is admissible, a four-part test designed to avoid the misuse of
that evidence should be applied. That same test should be applied to the admission of other-conduct
evidence. (p. 12)
3. Determinations on the admissibility of other-crime evidence are to be left to the discretion of the trial
court and its decisions are entitled to deference and are to be reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard. (p. 13)
4. Nance's state of mind was a relevant issue, and the motive of jealousy was a proper basis upon which the
jury could conclude that Nance did or did not intend to shoot Snow. (pp. 13-14)
5. Evidence of other conduct toward a third person, who is not the victim of the crime, is admissible to show
motive or intent. (pp. 14-15)
6. The admission of other-conduct evidence should not be reversed unless the danger of undue prejudice
outweighs probative value so as to divert jurors from a reasonable and fair evaluation of the basic issue of
guilt or innocence. (p. 16)
7. When a trial court admits evidence of other conduct to show the defendant's motive, intent, or absence
of accident, the court must instruct the jury on the limited use of the evidence, which instruction should be
formulated carefully to explain precisely the permitted and prohibited purposes of the evidence. (pp. 17-19)
Judgment of the Appellate Division vacating the convictions and ordering a new trial is REVERSED.
The matter is REMANDED to the Appellate Division for consideration of the prosecutorial misconduct and
sentencing issues.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI and
STEIN join in JUSTICE COLEMAN's opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
67 September Term 1996
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LYLE NANCE, a/k/a LYLE D. NANCE,
Defendant-Respondent.
Argued January 7, 1997 -- Decided March 20, 1997
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division.
Raymond W. Hoffman, Assistant Prosecutor,
argued the cause for appellant (Clifford J.
Minor, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney).
Francis J. Hartman argued the cause for
respondent (Hartman, Nugent & Zamost,
attorneys; Deirdre K. Hartman, on the
briefs).
Nancy A. Hulett, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney
General of New Jersey (Peter G. Verniero,
Attorney General, attorney).
David A. Ruhnke argued the cause for amicus
curiae Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers of New Jersey (Ruhnke & Barrett,
attorneys).
Lyle D. Nance submitted a supplemental brief,
pro se.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
COLEMAN, J.
The issue in this appeal is whether it was error to admit
evidence of defendant's "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" against a
third party in a purposeful or knowing murder trial to prove that
the homicide was neither accidental nor in self-defense. The
Appellate Division in an unpublished opinion concluded that it
was reversible error to admit that evidence. We granted the
State's petition for certification,
145 N.J. 375 (1996), and now
reverse.
Defendant was tried for the purposeful or knowing murder of Michael Snow, second-degree burglary of the apartment of Donnelle Williams, felony murder, two counts of endangering the welfare of children, and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. A jury acquitted defendant of purposeful or knowing murder, but it found him guilty of a lesser-included offense of aggravated manslaughter. The jury also convicted defendant on the remaining charges. Defendant was sentenced on the felony murder to a custodial term of thirty years without parole eligibility, and two four-year terms with two years of parole ineligibility on the two endangerment charges, one term to be served consecutive and the other concurrent to the felony-murder and manslaughter terms. He was sentenced on the aggravated manslaughter to a concurrent custodial term of twenty-one years with seven years of parole
ineligibility. The burglary and weapon offenses were merged with
other convictions.
During the trial defendant admitted shooting Michael Snow on
September 5, 1992, but testified that the shooting was
accidental. The State's theory was that defendant had shot Snow
intentionally in a jealous rage related to Donnelle Williams.
Defendant, a corrections officer, and Williams began a
romantic relationship in January 1992. The relationship ended
after approximately six months when Williams learned that
defendant had another girlfriend.
Williams resided in Newark and worked as a secretary at
Irvington High School. She was the mother of three children,
ages eleven, five, and seven months. Michael Snow was the
godfather of the children; he had never been romantically
involved with Williams.
On the morning of the homicide, Snow went to Williams's
apartment to visit her children after taking Williams to a
laundromat. After watching television with the children for a
brief period, Snow decided to leave at around noon. When he
opened the door of the apartment, defendant was standing outside.
The evidence is in dispute regarding what transpired thereafter.
Williams testified that she told defendant to leave, but
that defendant forced his way into the apartment. Although
defendant had previously met Snow, he angrily asked who he was.
When defendant refused to leave, Williams asked her son to call
the police, but defendant took the phone out of the child's hand.
A short time later, Williams picked up a butter knife that was on
top of her stereo. Defendant twisted the knife away from
Williams, grabbed Snow's keys from an end table, and left the
apartment. Snow followed defendant into the hallway outside
Williams's apartment in an attempt to get his keys, but defendant
refused to return them.
Defendant pulled his service revolver, a .357 Smith and
Wesson magnum, from his holster. Williams tried to get between
Snow and defendant, but she was pushed aside. A tussle ensued,
during which defendant struck Snow two times in the side of his
face with the gun. Snow tried to run back into the apartment,
but defendant followed him. Snow tried to close the apartment
door, but defendant had braced the door open with his foot and
his arm that was holding the gun. Unable to close the door, Snow
tried to keep defendant's arm with the gun in the air, but
defendant pushed his way into the apartment, causing Snow to lose
his balance and his grip on defendant's arm. As Snow tried to
get up, defendant shot him in the chest.
Defendant's testimony was quite different. According to
him, Snow approached him from behind as he was leaving the
apartment and punched him in the left cheek, almost knocking him
unconscious. Defendant testified that Snow punched him
repeatedly, and that he told Snow to back off because he was a
police officer. Defendant reached for his gun, hoping that Snow
would stop his attack so that defendant could effectuate an
arrest. Defendant testified that he struck Snow in the head with
the gun when Snow tried to grab him. During the ensuing
struggle, Snow grabbed defendant's arm and tried to point the gun
at defendant's face. Defendant then placed his finger behind the
trigger to prevent the gun from firing. When defendant moved
away, Snow grabbed him and the gun accidentally discharged.
To prove that the killing was intentional rather than
accidental, the State proceeded on the theory that defendant was
jealous of Williams and that he had killed Snow in a jealous
rage. The State offered Williams's testimony regarding
defendant's conduct toward her to establish his jealousy.
The trial court ruled that some bad-conduct evidence was
admissible. However, the court ruled that the bad-conduct
evidence should not include any acts of violence by defendant
against Williams.
The first episode of bad conduct related to flowers that
Williams received at work on Valentine's Day 1992. While
Williams was on the phone with defendant, her co-worker told her
that flowers had been delivered for her. Defendant apparently
heard Williams's co-worker and asked Williams if she had received
flowers. Williams replied that she had not received flowers
because she was not sure whether the flowers in the office were
for her. Williams eventually discovered that the flowers had
been sent to her and her daughter, from her daughter's father.
According to Williams, defendant came to her apartment that night
and questioned her about the flowers. When Williams told
defendant that the flowers were from her daughter's father, he
became upset. Defendant grabbed the roses, tore them apart, and
threw the remains in the garbage.
The second episode of bad conduct involved a black telephone
book that contained the name "Robert." A few days after the
flowers incident, defendant confronted Williams with the
telephone book and asked her who Robert was. Williams told
defendant that the book did not belong to her, and that she did
not know who Robert was. Defendant accused her of lying and
became very upset.
The third episode occurred on May 9, 1992, when Williams
received a "crank" telephone call. Williams testified that when
she realized it was a crank call, she asked defendant to hang up
the phone. Defendant demanded that she tell him who was on the
phone. When Williams insisted that she did not know who the
caller was, defendant grabbed the phone and tried to ascertain
the caller's identity. After defendant hung up the telephone, he
became angry, asking Williams who had called.
Following the crank call, Williams and defendant agreed to
end their relationship for some time so that they could talk and
resolve their problems. However, Williams and defendant resumed
their relationship in June because defendant convinced Williams
that things had gotten out of control because he had been under
extreme pressure. The relationship resumed after defendant
repeatedly apologized and promised not to have any further
outbursts.
The fourth episode occurred in July 1992, when Lisa Owens,
defendant's girlfriend, called Williams and told her that she was
seven months pregnant with defendant's baby. When defendant came
to Williams's apartment that evening, Williams told him that she
had learned about Lisa Owens and that she wanted to be left
alone. Williams left her apartment and went to her sister's
house. When she returned with her sister and other members of
her family, defendant was still in her apartment. A
confrontation ensued between defendant and one of Williams's
brothers. Williams told defendant that their relationship was
over and asked him not to call her anymore.
On August 16, 1992, which was Williams's birthday, she met
with defendant because he promised that he would leave her alone
if she agreed to meet him. After that meeting, defendant
persisted in contacting Williams. Later in August, defendant
followed Williams to her sister's house. When Williams stopped
her car to get out, defendant took her keys. He later accused
her of bringing another man, who turned out to be her son, home
in her car earlier in August.
The Appellate Division held that the bad-conduct evidence
was "fundamentally irrelevant to the issues [the] jury had to
decide. There was no dispute that defendant killed Snow. The
issue before the jury was whether the shooting was knowing or
purposeful, as the State contended, or accidental, as Nance
contended."
The State argues that the Appellate Division erred by
concluding that defendant's relationship with Williams was
irrelevant to the issue of whether the shooting was accidental or
in self-defense. The State argues that the evidence clearly
demonstrated that defendant's obsession with Williams and his
jealousy motivated him to shoot Snow.
Defendant maintains that jealousy is not expressly included
as one of the bases for which other-crime or other-conduct
evidence can be admitted under Rule of Evidence 404(b). The
Attorney General, as amicus curiae, agrees with the State's
position. The Attorney General maintains that the Appellate
Division's conclusion that the evidence complained of is
irrelevant is erroneous because it is common for a defendant to
interpose an accident defense in a homicide case involving the
use of a firearm. The Attorney General urges that because the
State had to prove that defendant possessed the mental state
required for each offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, the
evidence was both probative and relevant to show defendant's
motive and state of mind in an attempt to prove that the homicide
was purposeful or knowing rather than accidental.
The Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers has also filed
an amicus curiae brief, raising an issue that the State did not
raise in its petition for certification. The Association asks
the Court to adopt a rule requiring pretrial notice of an
intention to introduce Rule 404(b) evidence. Because that issue
was not raised by either of the parties, we have disregarded it.
Tice v. Cramer,
133 N.J. 347, 355 (1993).
The admission of other-conduct evidence in this case is
controlled by New Jersey Rule of Evidence 404(b). That rule
states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the disposition of a
person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. Such evidence may be
admitted for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity or absence of
mistake or accident when such matters are
relevant to a material issue in dispute.
[N.J.R.E. 404(b) (emphasis added).]
That rule is the successor to Evidence Rule 55 which provided:
Subject to Rule 47, evidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion, is inadmissible to prove his disposition to commit crime or civil wrong as the basis for an inference that he committed a crime or civil wrong on another
specified occasion but, subject to Rule 48,
such evidence is admissible to prove some
other fact in issue including motive, intent,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.
[Evid. R. 55.]
A comparison of the language of the two rules reflects that
Rule 404(b) is broader in scope than Evidence Rule 55 in
circumscribing what evidence is inadmissible. Rule 404(b)
excludes "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts" unless one
of the exceptions applies. Evidence Rule 55, on the other hand,
excludes only evidence of another "crime or civil wrong" unless
one of the exceptions is involved. Rule 404(b), as did Evidence
Rule 55, generally excludes evidence of other civil wrongs when
offered for the purpose of showing a person's disposition to
prove that the person acted in conformity therewith. Such
evidence may not be admitted simply to reflect negatively on a
defendant before a jury in a criminal case.
The exclusionary scope of Rule 404(b) is significant in this
case because the trial judge determined that only bad acts or
conduct toward Williams would be admissible at trial. He ruled
that evidence of criminal conduct or civil wrongs toward Williams
was inadmissible. Thus, if Evidence Rule 55 had been in effect
at the time of the trial in the present case, the other-conduct
evidence admitted would have fallen outside the scope of that
rule. See State v. Brown,
138 N.J. 481, 534 (1994) (holding
evidence that did not constitute either a criminal or civil wrong
did not implicate Evidence Rule 55); State v. Ribalta, 277 N.J.
Super. 277, 290-93 (App. Div. 1994) (holding that handing large
wad of currency to a known drug dealer was not excludable under
Evidence Rule 55 because handing money to someone was not a
crime), certif. denied,
139 N.J. 442 (1995); State v. Porambo,
226 N.J. Super. 416, 424-25 (App. Div. 1988) (holding that
because possession of a handgun is not in itself a crime,
evidence that defendant had two loaded handguns may not be
excluded under Evidence Rule 55).
Although the formulation and scope of the two rules are
somewhat different, the principle behind both rules is the same:
courts should exclude evidence of other crimes, civil wrongs, or
acts enumerated in the respective rule when such evidence is
offered solely to establish the forbidden inference of propensity
or predisposition. State v. Stevens,
115 N.J. 289, 299 (1989);
State v. Kociolek,
23 N.J. 400, 418-20 (1957). Because such
evidence tends to be so prejudicial, Rule 404(b) and Evidence
Rule 55 are viewed as rules of exclusion rather than rules of
inclusion. State v. Marrero, ___ N.J. ___ (slip op. at 13-14)
(1997); State v. Cofield,
127 N.J. 328, 337-38 (1992). Despite
its prejudicial nature in some contexts, Rule 404(b) does not
exclude evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts under all
circumstances. The rule recognizes that there are times when
that evidence is probative of a material disputed fact in the
case. Even then, the risk of prejudice may outweigh the
probative worth of the evidence. Because of this tension, trial
courts must conduct a balancing test pursuant to New Jersey Rule
of Evidence 403 and then give the jury a proper limiting
instruction. N.J.R.E. 105.
Next, we focus on whether the other-conduct evidence offered
by the State was properly admitted to establish defendant's
motive or intent in killing Snow. As noted, the State contended
that defendant purposefully or knowingly shot Snow because
defendant was jealous over Williams's relationship with Snow.
Defendant contended that the killing was accidental and in self-defense. Consequently, material factual issues regarding
defendant's motive and intent, as well as the absence of an
accident at the time of the killing, were in dispute.
A four-part test has been established for determining when
other-crime and civil-wrong evidence is admissible to avoid the
misuse of that evidence. Cofield, supra, 127 N.J. at 338. We
hold that the same test is to be applied to the admission of
other-conduct evidence. The test is as follows:
1. The evidence of the other crime must be
admissible as relevant to a material issue;
2. It must be similar in kind and
reasonably close in time to the offense
charged;
3. The evidence of the other crime must be
clear and convincing; and
4. The probative value of the evidence must
not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice.
[Ibid. (quoting Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing
The Presumptions Of Guilt And Innocence:
Rules 404(b), 608(b), And 609(a),
38 Emory
L.J. 135, 160 (1989)).]
In Marrero we observed that:
Determinations on the admissibility of other-crime evidence are left to the discretion of
the trial court: "The trial court, because
of its intimate knowledge of the case, is in
the best position to engage in this balancing
process. Its decisions are entitled to
deference and are to be reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard." State v.
Ramseur,
106 N.J. 123, 266 (1987); see also
State v. DiFrisco,
137 N.J. 434, 496 (1994)
(noting that "[w]e accord trial judges broad
discretion in applying the balancing test"),
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
116 S. Ct. 949,
133 L. Ed.2d 873 (1996); State v. Atkins,
78 N.J. 454, 462 (1979) (refusing to reverse
admission of prior conviction where trial
judge balanced probative value against
potential for prejudice and noting that
"particularly in view of his feel of the
case, we do not find [that the trial judge's]
judgment constituted an abuse of the
discretion vested in him"); State v. Sands,
76 N.J. 127, 144 (1978). Only where there is
a "clear error of judgment" should the "trial
court's conclusion with respect to that
balancing test" be disturbed. DiFrisco,
supra, 137 N.J. at 496-97; see also State v.
Koedatich,
112 N.J. 225, 313 (1988) (noting
that "[a] trial court's ruling will not be
upset unless there has been an abuse of that
discretion, i.e., there has been a clear
error of judgment"), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 1017,
109 S. Ct. 813,
102 L. Ed.2d 803
(1989).
[Marrero, supra, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at
14-15).]
Under the first prong of the Cofield test, defendant's
motive, intent, and absence of an accidental shooting were
relevant and disputed issues. Thus, Williams's testimony to
establish jealousy was relevant and probative.
The State charged defendant with knowing or purposeful
murder; therefore, the State had to negate the claim of an
accident or self-defense to establish that crime. There was no
other evidence available through which the State could establish
motive because, while defendant conceded his involvement in the
shooting, he claimed that it was accidental and in self-defense.
By relying on those defenses, defendant "put[] his own state of
mind in issue." State v. Oliver,
133 N.J. 141, 155 (1993).
Thus, defendant's state of mind was a relevant issue, and the
motive of jealousy was a proper basis upon which the jury could
conclude that defendant did or did not intend to shoot Snow.
Contrary to defendant's contention, jealousy need not be
expressly enumerated in Rule 404(b) as one of the issues in a
given case for which other-conduct evidence is admissible to
establish its existence. Rule 404(b), as did Evidence Rule 55,
represents the prevailing common-law rule throughout the United
States. Stevens, supra, 115 N.J. at 299. "The examples set
forth in the Rule . . . are not intended to be exclusive." Id.
at 300. Because of the non-exclusivity of the examples listed in
Rule 404(b) and Evidence Rule 55, we conclude that other-conduct
evidence may be admitted to prove jealousy when it is probative
of a genuine issue in the case. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 267;
State v. Breakiron,
210 N.J. Super. 442, 460-61 (App. Div. 1986),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
108 N.J. 591
(1987). Here, it was probative of intent, motive, and the
absence of an accident, all of which are enumerated exceptions to
the rule.
We agree with the Attorney General's argument that, although
Williams was not the victim of the homicide, defendant's jealousy
toward her can establish a proper motive to explain why defendant
acted the way he did against Snow, who had a good relationship
with Williams. Indeed, in both State v. Wright,
66 N.J. 466
(1975), and State v. Mulero,
51 N.J. 224 (1968), this Court
allowed evidence of abuse of a third person who was not the
victim of the crime to be admitted to show motive or intent. In
Wright, the Court found that the defendant's act of starving one
child to near death was relevant to the issue of the defendant's
wilful state of mind regarding the starvation death of a second
child. Wright, supra, 66 N.J. at 468-69.
In Mulero, the Court held that the defendant's alleged
physical abuse of his wife was admissible to establish intent in
the trial of the defendant for allegedly murdering his
stepdaughter. Mulero, supra, 51 N.J. at 228-29. The Appellate
Division's attempt to distinguish Mulero from the facts in this
case is unavailing. The court stated that unlike defendant in
the present case, the defendant in Mulero denied administering
the fatal beating. In both Mulero and the present case, the
other-conduct evidence was offered not to establish that the
defendant inflicted the mortal injuries, but rather to establish
the defendant's state of mind at the time he inflicted the mortal
wounds. Although defendant in this case concedes that he did the
shooting, he claims that it was accidental or in self-defense.
Therefore, he denies that this was a knowing or purposeful
killing as charged in the indictment. The other-conduct evidence
was offered to establish the motive for the shooting.
Similarly, the other-conduct evidence of defendant's
jealousy satisfies the second and third prongs of the Cofield
test. The evidence that was presented through Williams's
testimony was very recent because the conduct about which she
testified had occurred within six or seven months of the killing,
and her relationship with defendant lasted only six or seven
months. In addition, if the jury believed Williams, her
testimony constituted more than enough evidence for the jury to
have found that her testimony clearly and convincingly
established that jealousy was the motive for the shooting.
In compliance with the fourth prong of Cofield, the trial
court weighed the evidence and determined that its probative
value exceeded its prejudicial impact. Although this Court has
maintained a high standard for admitting evidence of other crimes
and civil wrongs, and that standard also applies to other-conduct
evidence, the admission of other-conduct evidence should not be
reversed unless "`the danger of undue prejudice . . . outweigh[s]
probative value so as to divert jurors from a reasonable and fair
evaluation of the basic issue of guilt or innocence.'" Marrero,
supra, N.J. at (slip op. at 24) (quoting State v. Moore,
122 N.J. 420, 467 (1991)).
The trial court excluded certain evidence that the State
would otherwise have introduced. The court also required, in
effect, a redaction of some of the evidence to prevent placing
before the jury evidence that the trial court regarded as too
prejudicial. For example, when the State offered evidence of the
fact that as a result of the telephone book incident, Williams
tried to get a restraining order, and of the fact that defendant
tried to strike her, the court ruled that that evidence was
inadmissible. The trial court gave a curative instruction
immediately when some of that evidence was mentioned. The court
also precluded Williams from telling the jury about defendant
stealing the telephone book from her apartment or defendant
throwing the book at her. Nor was the State allowed to insinuate
that defendant had restrained Williams or kidnapped her during
that incident. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by admitting the other-conduct evidence because it
was not too prejudicial to defendant.
Although the Appellate Division did not reach the issue of
the sufficiency of the limiting jury instruction because it
reversed on other grounds, we have reviewed that instruction and
conclude that it was sufficient.
When a trial court admits evidence of other conduct to show
the defendant's motive, intent, or absence of an accident, "the
court must instruct the jury on the limited use of the evidence."
Cofield, supra, 127 N.J. at 340-41. To satisfy that standard, a
court's instruction must "`be formulated carefully to explain
precisely the permitted and prohibited purposes of the
evidence.'" Id. at 341 (quoting Stevens, supra, 115 N.J. at
304). In this case, the trial court instructed the jury as
follows:
This evidence was offered for a very limited
and specific purpose. As I told you
repeatedly during the course of the trial,
evidence that a person committed a prior
wrong on a specific occasion is inadmissible
to prove his disposition to commit the crimes
for which he has been indicted and for which
he is presently being tried. In other words,
such evidence cannot be considered by you,
must not be considered by you as disclosing
any general propensity or predisposition on
the part of the defendant to commit a crime
or to commit these crimes for which he is now
charged. You may only consider the evidence
in this case of alleged arguments, alleged
theft of keys, taking -- alleged taking of a
phone book, alleged harassing telephone calls
and visits, alleged trespass at work and
threats allegedly committed by [defendant]
against Donnelle Williams if you believe that
they were, in fact made and done by
[defendant] solely to determine [defendant's]
motive, his intent, his state of mind and the
relationship between the parties and the
effect on their credibility. That is,
whether these words and actions disclosed a
hostility, a jealousy, a malice, an ill-will
arising out of the relationship of
[defendant], Donnelle Williams and in fact
the victim of this offense. You may consider
such evidence solely for this purpose, that
is in determining a possible motive, intent,
state of mind or relationship between
Donnelle Williams and the defendant. You
cannot, you must not consider it for any
other purpose for what I have just indicated
to you.
As the foregoing charge reflects, the jury was instructed on
how it could and could not use the other-conduct evidence,
assuming they believed it to be true. Its use was limited to
deciding only defendant's motive, intent, and state of mind, as
well as the credibility of the witnesses. The court instructed
the jury not to consider the other-conduct evidence for any other
purpose. Finally, the court specifically prohibited the jury
from using that evidence to infer that because of defendant's bad
conduct toward Williams, he had a propensity or a predisposition
to murder Snow. Furthermore, during their summations, all of the
attorneys told the jury how to use the other-conduct evidence.
In addition to the thorough limiting instruction given at
the end of the case, the trial court gave a limiting instruction
following the introduction of each piece of other-conduct
evidence. This is a case in which the risk of misuse was not
nearly as great as in some cases that involve other-crime
evidence. Most of the other-conduct evidence here did not
portray defendant as a bad person.
The Appellate Division reversed defendant's convictions on the ground that the trial court improperly admitted the other-conduct evidence. For that reason, the court did not decide whether alleged prosecutorial misconduct during the trial also required a new trial. Nor did the court decide all of the sentencing issues raised. We reverse the Appellate Division's decision vacating the convictions and ordering a new trial. We
remand the matter to that court for consideration of the
prosecutorial misconduct and sentencing issues.
Reversed and remanded.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN join in JUSTICE COLEMAN's opinion.
NO. A-67 SEPTEMBER TERM 1996
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LYLE NANCE, a/k/a LYLE D. NANCE,
Defendant-Respondent.
DECIDED March 20, 1997
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Coleman
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY