(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued May 1, 1995 -- Decided July 17, 1995
POLLOCK, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
The issue on appeal is whether Rule 7:7-4(b) permits private counsel for a complainant to prosecute
a complaint in the municipal court. Under Rule 7:7-4(b), at the request of the prosecutor, or if the
prosecutor does not appear, any attorney may appear on behalf of any complaining witness and prosecute the
action for and on behalf of the State or the municipality.
The Woodbridge Municipal Court permitted Robert Hedesh, Esq., private counsel for complainant,
Pamela Young, to prosecute Young's complaints against Richard Storm for stalking and harassment.
Woodbridge does employ a prosecutor, but he or she does not prosecute private complaints.
While the municipal court charges were pending against him, Storm filed a civil complaint against
Young. The complaint alleged that Young intentionally had issued to Storm a bad check for vacation
expenses. Hedesh represented Young in defending that complaint.
In the municipal court, Storm's attorney, Richard Lehrich, Esq., moved to disqualify Hedesh as a
prosecutor. Lehrich argued that Hedesh's representation of Young in the civil action prevented him from
acting as an impartial prosecutor. The municipal court denied the motion and permitted Hedesh to
prosecute the municipal court complaint. The Law Division denied Storm's motion for leave to appeal.
The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal and reversed, finding that Hedesh had a conflict of
interest that impinged on Storm's right to a fair trial. The Appellate Division directed the municipal court to
order the municipal prosecutor to prosecute the complaints.
The Supreme Court granted the Middlesex County Prosecutor's motion for leave to appeal.
HELD: Whenever an attorney for a private party applies to prosecute a complaint in the municipal court,
the court should determine whether to permit the attorney to proceed. Because Hedesh's
obligations to Young as her private attorney creates at least the appearance that he could not act as
a private prosecutor with impartiality, Hedesh should not be allowed to prosecute Storm.
1. Rule 7:4-4(b) perpetuates the practice of private prosecution, which has its origins in ancient England.
Both this Court and the Legislature continue to recognize the role of private prosecutors. Because of the
heavy caseload, municipal prosecutors cannot prosecute every complaint. By permitting private citizens,
acting either on their own or through private counsel, to appear in municipal court, Rule 7:4-4(b) facilitates
access to municipal courts. Of course, the defendant has a right to a fair trial before an impartial judge and
that need for impartiality extends beyond the judge to the prosecutor. (pp. 4-10)
2. To assist municipal courts in the exercise of their discretion, it is requested that the Committee on Municipal Courts to recommend guidelines governing the appointment of private prosecutors in municipal courts. Until then, an attorney wishing to appear as a private prosecutor should notify the municipal prosecutor and the court. If the municipal prosecutor insists on proceeding with the prosecution, that decision should be final. In all other cases, the private attorney should disclose in a written certification all
facts that foreseeably may affect the fairness of the proceeding. The propriety of appointing a private
prosecutor will vary from case-to-case, depending on the facts of each case. (pp. 10-13)
3. The burden on Storm's right to a fair trial and on the public interest in an impartial proceeding outweighs
any benefit that would accrue from permitting Hedesh to proceed as the prosecutor. (pp. 13-14)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.
CHIEF JUSTICE WILENTZ and JUSTICES, O'HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN and COLEMAN join
in JUSTICE POLLOCK's opinion. JUSTICE HANDLER did not participate.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
150 September Term 1994
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RICHARD STORM,
Defendant-Respondent.
Argued May 1, 1995 -- Decided July 17, 1995
On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate
Division, whose opinion is reported at
278 N.J. Super. 287 (1994).
Simon Louis Rosenbach, Assistant Prosecutor,
argued the cause for appellant (Robert W.
Gluck, Middlesex County Prosecutor,
attorney).
Richard S. Lehrich argued the cause for
respondent.
Anne C. Paskow, Assistant Attorney General,
argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney
General of New Jersey (Deborah T. Poritz,
Attorney General, attorney).
James A. Carey argued the cause for amicus
curiae The Monmouth County Municipal
Prosecutors Association (Carey and Graham,
attorneys).
Carl J. Herman argued the cause for amicus
curiae Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers.
Edward G. Sponzilli submitted a brief on
behalf of amicus curiae Rutgers, The State
University of New Jersey (Dunn, Pashman,
Sponzilli & Finnerty, attorneys).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
POLLOCK, J.
At issue is whether Rule 7:4-4(b) permits private counsel
for a complainant to prosecute a complaint in the municipal
court. The Woodbridge Municipal Court permitted Robert Hedesh,
Esq., private counsel for complainant, Pamela Young, to prosecute
complaints against defendant, Richard Storm, for stalking,
contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10b, and harassment, contrary to
N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. After the Law Division denied Storm's motion
for leave to appeal, the Appellate Division granted leave and
reversed. It held that Hedesh had a conflict of interest that
impinged on Storm's right to a fair trial.
278 N.J. Super. 287
(1994).
We granted the Middlesex County Prosecutor's motion for
leave to appeal,
139 N.J. 437 (1995), and affirm. We hold that
whenever an attorney for a private party applies to prosecute a
complaint in the municipal court, the court should determine
whether to permit the attorney to proceed. We hold further that
Hedesh should not be allowed to prosecute Storm.
This case arises from the volatile relationship between Young and Storm. The record, although sparse, reveals the following facts. Young filed three complaints in the Woodbridge Municipal Court against Storm: two for stalking and one for harassment. After downgrading the stalking charges to harassment and disorderly-persons offenses, the Middlesex County Prosecutor
remanded the charges to the municipal court. The maximum
sentence for each offense is six months, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-8, and a
fine of $1,000, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.
Since the occurrence of the events that gave rise to this
appeal, the hostility between Storm and Young has spread to the
Law Division. At the time of oral argument in the Appellate
Division, Storm had been indicted for stalking Young. 278 N.J.
Super. at 290. Since then, the Law Division has dismissed the
indictment on the motion of the Middlesex County Prosecutor.
More recently, a Morris County Grand Jury has indicted Young for
attempting to murder and conspiring to murder Storm.
Like virtually all other municipalities, Woodbridge employs
a prosecutor. The Woodbridge prosecutor does not prosecute
private complaints. Here, for example, the prosecutor requested
Hedesh to prosecute the complaints against Storm.
While the Municipal Court charges were pending against him,
Storm filed a complaint against Young in the Special Civil Part
of the Superior Court. The complaint alleged that Young
intentionally had issued to Storm a bad check for vacation
expenses. Hedesh represented Young in defending the complaint.
In the municipal court, Storm's attorney, Richard Lehrich, moved to disqualify Hedesh as prosecutor. Lehrich argued that
Hedesh's representation of Young in the civil action prevented
him from acting as an impartial prosecutor. The municipal court
denied the motion and ordered that Hedesh could prosecute the
municipal court complaints.
The Appellate Division reversed and directed the municipal
court to order the municipal prosecutor to prosecute the
complaints. The court held:
R. 7:4-4(b) is to be utilized to permit
private counsel to prosecute only as a last
resort and only in those circumstances where
a full disclosure of possible conflicts does
not disclose so direct and serious a conflict
as to violate due process or otherwise
preclude the defendant from receiving a fair
trial.
Rule 7:4-4(b) states:
Appearance of Prosecution. Whenever in his or her judgment the interests of justice so require, or upon the request of the court, the Attorney General, county prosecutor, municipal court prosecutor, or municipal attorney, as the case may be, may appear in any court on behalf of the State, or of the municipality, and conduct the prosecution of any action, but if the Attorney General, county or municipal court prosecutor or municipal attorney does not appear, any attorney may appear on behalf of any complaining witness and prosecute the action
for and on behalf of the State or the
municipality.
The rule perpetuates the practice of private prosecution,
which traces its origins to ancient England. Private prosecution
derives from the practice of trial by combat, which evolved into
the prosecution of criminal charges by private parties. Sir
James Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 245
(1883). By the early nineteenth century, Britain's system of
private prosecution was in retreat. See Andrew Sidman, Comment,
The Outmoded Concept of Private Prosecution,
25 Am. U. L. Rev.
754, 760 (1976); Judson Hand, Note, Primitive Justice: Private
Prosecutions in Municipal Court Under New Jersey Rule 7:4-4(b),
44 Rutgers L. Rev. 205, 212 (1991). In 1879, Parliament created
the Office of Public Prosecutions, which prosecuted serious
crimes. Twenty-nine years later, Parliament enacted the
Prosecution of Offenses Act, which allows the Director of Public
Prosecutions to supersede a private prosecution. Hand, supra,
44
Rutgers L. Rev. at 212. Although uncommon in England today,
private prosecution survives. Id.
English justice became the dominant influence in the development of New Jersey's criminal justice system. See Newman & Doty, Bench and Bar, in I The Story of New Jersey 363 (William Starr Meyers ed. 1945) (relating history of judicial development
in New Jersey). By the eighteenth century, New Jersey had
established an extensive system of public prosecution. Even so,
in the last century, the former New Jersey Supreme Court
described private prosecution as "the settled practice in this
State . . . ." Gardner v. State,
55 N.J.L. 17, 33 (1892).
Notwithstanding the reforms of the judicial and criminal justice
systems in the 1947 Constitution, the practice of private
prosecution has survived.
Both this Court and the Legislature continue to recognize
the role of private prosecutors. In addition to the recognition
of private prosecutors in municipal courts contained in Rule
7:4-4(b), Rule 3:23-9(d) of the Rules Governing Criminal Practice
defines a prosecuting attorney: "With the consent of the court,
the attorney for a complaining witness or other person interested
in the prosecution may be permitted to act for the prosecuting
attorney."
In addition, N.J.S.A. 19:34-63, relating to election law,
provides in part: "Any citizen may employ an attorney to assist
the prosecutor of the pleas to perform his duties under this
title, and such attorney shall be recognized by the prosecutor of
the pleas and the court as associate counsel in the proceedings."
Our evaluation of private prosecutions begins with the role of municipal courts. As the late Chief Justice Vanderbilt once wrote:
On them rests the primary responsibility for
the maintenance of peace in the various
communities of the state, for safety on our
streets and highways, and most important of
all, for the development of respect for law
on the part of our citizenry, on which in the
last analysis all of our democratic
institutions depend.
The Most Important Court in New Jersey, 10 Rutgers L. Rev. 647, 650 (1956).]
Apart from cases involving motor vehicles, municipal courts
decide such matters as violations of health or zoning ordinances,
disorderly-persons offenses, and various quasi-criminal cases.
The volume is high. In 1994, for example, municipal courts
disposed of 5.6 million cases. Because of the heavy caseload,
municipal prosecutors cannot prosecute every complaint. "The
general rule is that the prosecutor's involvement is limited to
those complaints signed by police officers." Supreme Court Task
Force on the Improvement of Municipal Courts, Report to the 1985
Judicial Conference 112-13 (1985) (hereinafter "Report").
By permitting private citizens, acting either pro se or through private counsel, to appear in municipal court, Rule
7:4-4(b) facilitates access to municipal courts. Although the
practice of private prosecution in municipal courts remains
useful, the question is whether the benefits of the practice
outweigh its burdens.
Over the centuries, perceptions of justice have evolved.
Trial by combat has yielded to trial in court. Central to a
judicial proceeding is the right to a fair trial before an
impartial judge. In criminal or quasi-criminal cases, the need
for impartiality extends beyond the judge to the prosecutor.
The challenge is to respect the defendant's right to a fair trial while preserving the contribution of private prosecutors to the disposition of complaints in the municipal courts. See John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 47 Ark. L. Rev. 511, 594-601 (1994) (concluding that private prosecution is unethical and violates defendant's constitutional rights); Joan Meier, The Right to a Disinterested Prosecutor of Criminal Contempt, 70 Wash. U.L.Q. 85, 128 (1992) (arguing that states should be free to adopt their own policies on whether disinterested prosecutor of contempt is required); Sidman, supra, 25 Am. U. L. Rev. 754 (evaluating various issues raised by system of private prosecution and arguing practice is outdated, unnecessary, unethical, and perhaps unconstitutional). Without private prosecutors, some cases, such as disorderly-persons offenses, would not be prosecuted, see
State v. Kinder,
701 F. Supp. 486, 491 (D.N.J. 1988); Voytko v.
Ramada Inn of Atlantic City,
445 F. Supp. 315, 328 n.21 (D.N.J.
1978); see also State v. Imperiale,
773 F. Supp. 747, 748 (D.N.J.
1991) (stating that in many instances prosecutor, "because of the
nature of the complaint combined with limited resources, chooses
not to prosecute a particular complaint or category of complaints
. . .). The best argument for continuing private prosecutions is
one of necessity: without private prosecutions some wrongs would
not be set right.
The overarching argument against private prosecutors is the
risk they pose to a defendant's right to a fair trial. Kinder,
supra, 701 F. Supp. at 489. A private prosecutor's dual
responsibilities to the complaining witness and to the State
breed numerous problems. Representation of the complainant in a
related civil action could invest the prosecutor with a monetary
interest in the outcome of the matter. That risk is particularly
high if the prosecutor has agreed to receive a contingent fee in
the civil action. Imperiale, supra, 773 F. Supp. at 750; Kinder,
supra, 701 F. Supp. at 490-91. Even in the absence of actual
conflict, the appointment as prosecutor of an attorney for an
interested party creates the appearance of impropriety. Young v.
United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A.,
481 U.S. 787,
805-06,
107 S. Ct. 2124, 2136-37,
95 L. Ed.2d 740, 757 (1987);
Imperiale, supra, 773 F. Supp. at 751-52.
Conflicting interests, moreover, can undermine a
prosecutor's impartiality. The loss of impartiality can affect
the prosecutor's assessment of probable cause to proceed; the
disclosure of exculpatory evidence, see State v. Cantor,
221 N.J.
Super. 219 (App. Div. 1987) (reversing conviction because private
prosecutor failed to provide exculpatory information), cert.
denied,
110 N.J. 291 (1988); and the willingness to plea bargain,
Imperiale, supra, 773 F. Supp. at 751-52. Also implicated are
the prosecutor's ethical obligation "to see that the defendant is
accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the
basis of sufficient evidence." Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility 3.8, cmt. (1994). In addition, private
prosecutions pose the risk that the complainant will use the
municipal court proceeding to harass the defendant or to obtain
an advantage in a related civil action. Imperiale, supra, 773 F.
Supp. at 748; see also State v. Long,
266 N.J. Super. 716, 726-27
(Law Div. 1993) (noting reasons for Rule 7:4-4(b) and risks of
applying Rule); State v. Harris,
262 N.J. Super. 294 (Law Div.
1992) (holding that private prosecution could proceed because no
potential for unfair conflict of interest existed).
Ten years ago, the Supreme Court Task Force on the Improvement of Municipal Courts concluded that the burdens of private prosecutions outweighed their benefits. It recommended "that every municipal court have a prosecutor, charged with the responsibility of prosecuting every complaint -- whether it is
filed by a police officer, a private citizen or even if it
results in a civilian cross-complaint situation." Report, supra,
at 113-14. Based in part on the Report, the New Jersey Law
Revision Commission submitted a Report and Recommendations that
"modernizes and clarifies the law on municipalities." New Jersey
Law Revision Commission, Report and Recommendations on the
Municipal Courts (1991). Included in the Law Revision Report was
a section requiring every municipality to appoint a prosecutor.
Id. at 13. The section was included in Senate Bill 875, but
eliminated in committee. Consequently, the section was omitted
from N.J.S.A. 2B:12-1 to -31, L. 1993, c. 293. More recently,
the Senate passed Senate Bill 967, which requires a municipal
prosecutor in every municipal court. S-967, 206th Leg. 1st Sess.
(1994). Section 5(b) of the bill, however, permits the
continuation of private prosecutors, providing in relevant part:
"A municipal prosecutor may, with the approval of the court,
authorize private attorneys to prosecute citizen complaints filed
in the municipal court." On September 19, 1994, that bill was
referred to the Assembly Judiciary, Law and Public Safety
Committee, where it awaits action.
A mere list of the arguments for and against private prosecutors fails to capture the valuable, if troublesome, role of municipal courts in resolving private disputes. A municipal court is "the people's court." Municipal courts remain a place in which people, sometimes on the verge of violence, can seek
relief. In effect, municipal courts provide a safety valve for
society. By providing access to impartial judges, municipal
courts forestall violence and encourage the peaceful resolution
of disputes.
For a municipal court to provide an effective forum, both
the complainant and the defendant must trust the impartiality of
the proceedings. To earn that trust, the prosecutor, like the
judge, must be impartial. Inevitably, private prosecutions
undermine confidence in the integrity of the proceedings.
Confronted with an imperfect practice, the judicial task is to preserve the integrity of municipal courts, protect the rights of defendants, and to make the system work. Ultimately, the discharge of those responsibilities rests with municipal court judges. To assist municipal courts in the exercise of their discretion, we request the Committee on Municipal Courts to recommend guidelines governing the appointment of private prosecutors in those courts. Until we adopt such guidelines, an attorney wishing to appear as a private prosecutor should notify the municipal prosecutor and the court. If the municipal prosecutor insists on proceeding with the prosecution, the prosecutor's decision should be final. In all other cases, the private attorney should disclose in a written certification all facts that foreseeably may affect the fairness of the proceedings. The propriety of appointing a private prosecutor
will vary from case-to-case, depending on the facts of each case.
Harris, supra, 262 N.J. Super. at 302.
The relevant facts include the identity of the complainant,
indicating (1) whether the complainant is an individual, a
business (such as a department store), or an entity with its own
police department (such as Rutgers University); (2) any actual
conflict of interest arising from the attorney's representation
of, and fee arrangement with, the complainant; (3) any civil
litigation, existing or anticipated, between the complainant and
the defendant; (4) whether the defendant is, or is expected to
be, represented by counsel; and (5) any other facts that
reasonably could affect the impartiality of the prosecutor and
the fairness of the proceedings or otherwise create the
appearance of impropriety.
We recognize that in certain cases, disqualification of
private counsel as prosecutor will result in a complainant
proceeding pro se. Pursuant to Rule 1:40-7, municipal court
judges can refer many such cases, particularly those involving
minor family or neighborhood disputes, to mediation.
Given the acrimonious relationship between Storm and Young, including their lengthy litigious history, we find that Hedesh's obligations to Young as her private attorney creates at least the appearance that he could not act as a private prosecutor with
impartiality. The burden on defendant's right to a fair trial
and on the public interest in impartial proceedings outweighs any
benefit that would accrue from permitting Hedish to proceed as
the prosecutor.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed.
Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices O'Hern, Garibaldi, Stein and Coleman join in Justice Pollock's opinion. Justice Handler did not participate.
NO. A-150 SEPTEMBER TERM 1994
ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court
ON CERTIFICATION TO
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RICHARD STORM,
Defendant-Respondent.
DECIDED July 17, 1995
Chief Justice Wilentz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Pollock
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY