(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued October 21, 1997 -- Decided March 4, 1998
O'HERN, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
The question in this appeal is whether the investigative detention of motorists following a traffic stop
was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to be permitted under the Fourth Amendment.
At 10:36 p.m. on February 12, 1994, Theodore Dickey was a passenger in a car driven by Dion
Parker on I-95 between the New Jersey Turnpike and the George Washington Bridge. Parker was driving 34
miles-per-hour in a 55 mile-per-hour zone. A New Jersey State Police officer pulled the car over.
The trooper approached the driver's side window and requested a driver's license, insurance card,
and registration. Parker turned over his license but did not produce any registration or proof of insurance.
According to the trooper, Parker seemed very nervous, his eyes were bloodshot, and his hands were
trembling. Parker told the officer that the car belonged to a friend named "Leon" but could not provide
Leon's last name or address.
The trooper then asked Dickey to exit the car. Dickey appeared agitated and paced about the rear
of the car. Dickey told the trooper that his cousin Leon owned the car but could not provide Leon's last
name or address. He said that he and Parker were coming from Manhattan.
The trooper asked for consent to search the car. Both Parker and Dickey refused to sign the
consent form. The trooper searched the passenger compartment for the registration or insurance card.
Finding neither, the trooper asked Parker and Dickey to return to the State Police barracks, explaining that
he had to verify the ownership of the car. Parker and Dickey assented, were given their Miranda rights,
handcuffed, and placed in the rear of the trooper's car. (It is State Police practice that when there is no
partition between the front and rear of the car, troopers handcuff any rear-seat passengers.)
After giving Miranda warnings, the trooper asked Parker why he was so nervous. Parker replied,
"Nothing is in the ride. I'm not nervous." The trooper asked why he told him nothing was in the car, and
Parker explained he meant that nothing was in the trunk. Thinking there might be drugs present, the
trooper called a "K-9 unit" to have a narcotics detection dog brought to the barracks. The car was towed
from the highway and arrived at the barracks close to midnight.
At the barracks, the trooper informed Parker and Dickey they were not free to leave until he
finished his investigation. A computer inquiry on the license plates did not report that the car was stolen,
but did reveal it was registered to Leon McCullum, residing in Cincinnati, Ohio. The trooper was unable to
obtain McCullum's phone number.
Sometime between one and two in the morning, the reaction of the dog in the K-9 unit signaled the
presence of narcotics in the trunk of the car. At 2:45 a.m., Dickey signed a consent form to permit a search
of the trunk. The trooper discovered approximately two kilograms of cocaine in the trunk.
Parker and Dickey were charged with first-degree possession with intent to distribute. Before trial, Dickey moved to suppress the cocaine found in the trunk. The motion was denied, the trial court finding that the movement of the car and its occupants to the police barracks was reasonable, since it enabled the trooper to ascertain the owner of the car and whether Parker or Dickey was authorized to operate it. Dickey
pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute and was sentenced to seven years imprisonment with a two-and-one-half-year period of parole ineligibility.
On appeal, the Appellate Division deemed the sole issue to be whether the two-and-one-half to
three-and-one-half-hour detention between the initial stop and the establishment of probable cause was
reasonable. It found that the trooper had a reasonable suspicion that Parker and Dickey had no right to the
car and that something was amiss concerning the contents of the trunk. The Appellate Division held that
because the trooper diligently pursued the investigation, the duration of the detention did not infringe on
Dickey's constitutional rights.
The Supreme Court granted Dickey's petition for certification.
HELD: Applying established principles to the circumstances of this case, the combination of the duration of
the detention and the degree of intrusion on Dickey's liberty exceeded permissible bounds.
1. If an investigative stop is minimally intrusive, the general rule requiring probable cause for a seizure is
replaced by a balancing test. Terry v. Ohio, 392, U.S. 1 (1968). The two-part test to determine the
reasonableness of an investigative stop involves consideration of whether the stop was justified at its inception
and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place. Time is an important factor in distinguishing between an investigative stop and an arrest.
Another factor is the degree of fear and humiliation the police conduct engenders. Additional factors that
may weigh in favor of an arrest are subjecting a suspect to unnecessary delays, handcuffing him, or confining
him. (pp. 6-12)
2. Dickey does not dispute that the initial traffic stop was valid. The failure of Dickey and Parker to provide
registration of the vehicle or the last name of the owner provided grounds for broadening the investigation.
It was reasonable to pursue this investigation for a period of time. If an investigative stop continues
indefinitely, however, it can no longer be justified as an investigative stop. Further, the degree of intrusion
on the liberty of Dickey and Parker was obviously more than that involved in Terry. They were removed
from the place of the original detention, handcuffed as they were transported in a police car, handcuffed at
times in the sation house, and told they were not free to leave. Although Dickey voluntarily accompanied
the trooper to the station, he truly was left with no other option. (pp. 12-18)
3. The State argues that, although the detention of the individuals may not have been justified, the detention
of the vehicle was and the drugs would have inevitably been discovered. In the circumstances of this case,
however, the detention of the vehicle was so intertwined with the detention of the persons as to effect a
seizure of the person. The suspects were not realistically free to leave from the isolated State Police
barracks in the early morning hours -- it is difficult to see to where they were to go. Because the detention
of the automobile here effectively restrained the person of Dickey, the limitations applicable to investigative
detention of a person defined the permissible scope of the detention of the vehicle. (pp. 18-21)
4. Taken together, the duration of detention and degree of intrusion exceeded the bounds of Terry.
Although there are no bright lines, police training methods can hone in on the two prongs of analysis
required to sustain a Terry detention. This may be the rare case when the interests of society and the
individual are no longer in conflict. The defendant has acknowledged that what he did was wrong, and he
has served the parole ineligibility term of his sentence. (pp. 21-22)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law
Division for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, GARIBALDI, and COLEMAN
join in JUSTICE O'HERN's opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
30 September Term 1997
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
THEODORE DICKEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Argued October 21, 1997 -- Decided March 4, 1998
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported
at
294 N.J. Super. 619 (1996).
Jacqueline E. Turner, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for appellant
(Ivelisse Torres, Public Defender, attorney).
Annmarie Cozzi, Acting Assistant Prosecutor,
argued the cause for respondent (William H.
Schmidt, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney).
Daniel I. Bornstein, Deputy Attorney General,
argued the cause for amicus curiae, Attorney
General of New Jersey (Peter Verniero,
Attorney General, attorney).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
O'HERN, J.
The question in this appeal is whether the investigative
detention of motorists following a traffic stop was sufficiently
limited in scope and duration to remain within the bounds
authorized by Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1,
88 S. Ct. 1868,
20 L.
Ed.2d 889 (1968) and United States v. Sharpe,
470 U.S. 675,
105 S. Ct. 1568,
84 L. Ed.2d 605 (1985). We find, in the
circumstances of this case, that the duration of the detention
and the degree of intrusion upon Fourth Amendment interests
exceeded permitted bounds. The evidence that resulted from the
illegal detention is inadmissible in the defendant's criminal
trial. United States v. Ramos,
42 F.3d 1160, 1164 (8th Cir.
1994), cert. denied,
514 U.S. 1134,
115 S. Ct. 2015,
131 L. Ed.2d 1013 (1995).
At 10:36 p.m on February 12, 1994, defendant, Theodore Dickey, was a passenger in a car driven by Dion Parker on I-95, the connection between the New Jersey Turnpike and the George Washington Bridge.See footnote 1 Parker was driving thirty-four miles per hour in a fifty-five mile-per-hour zone. His car was in the middle lane, causing other cars to pass him in the right lane.
A New Jersey State Police officer pulled the car over.
The trooper approached the driver's side window and requested
that Parker produce his license, insurance card, and
registration. Parker turned over his license but did not produce
any registration or proof of insurance. According to the
trooper, Parker seemed very nervous. His eyes were bloodshot,
and his hands were trembling. Parker told the trooper that the
vehicle belonged to a friend named "Leon" but could not furnish
Leon's last name or address. Parker gave the officer only a
vague description of where he was coming from.
The trooper then asked Dickey to exit the car. Dickey
appeared "extremely agitated" and paced about at the rear of the
car. Dickey told the trooper that his cousin Leon owned the car
but could not provide Leon's last name or address. He said that
he (Dickey) and Parker were coming from Manhattan.
The trooper asked for consent to search the car. Both
refused to sign the consent form. The trooper searched the
passenger compartment for the registration or insurance card.
Finding neither, the trooper asked the two to return to the State
Police barracks. He explained that he had to verify the
ownership of the car. They assented, were informed of their
Miranda rights, handcuffed, and placed in the rear of the
trooper's car. (It is State Police practice that when there is
no partition between the front and rear of the car, troopers
handcuff any rear-seat passengers.) After giving Miranda
warnings to the pair, the trooper asked Parker why he was so
nervous. Parker replied, "Nothing is in the ride. I'm not
nervous." The trooper then asked why he told him nothing was in
the car, and Parker stated that nothing was in the trunk.
Thinking that there might be drugs present because of
Parker's reference to the trunk, the trooper called a "K-9 unit"
to have a narcotics detection dog brought to the barracks. The
car was towed from the highway and arrived at the barracks close
to midnight.
At the barracks, the trooper informed defendant and Parker
that they were not free to leave until he had finished his
investigation. A computer inquiry on the license plates did not
disclose any report that the car was stolen, but the trooper did
discover that the car was registered to Leon McCullum, residing
at an address in Cincinnati, Ohio. He was unable to obtain
McCullum's phone number.
Sometime between one and two in the morning, the K-9 Unit's
reaction signalled the presence of narcotics in the trunk of the
car. At 2:45 a.m., Dickey signed a consent form to permit a
search of the trunk. The trooper discovered approximately two
kilograms of cocaine in the trunk.
Parker and Dickey were charged with first-degree possession
of cocaine with intent to distribute and third-degree possession
of cocaine. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the
cocaine found in the trunk. The trial court denied the motion.
[T]he [trial] judge concluded: (i) the stop
was proper, based on the officer's
observation that the car was traveling at a
slow rate of speed; (ii) the search of the
interior compartment of the car was
reasonable, since the defendant had not
produced any form of registration for the
vehicle; (iii) the movement of the vehicle
and its occupants to the police barracks was
reasonable, as it enabled the officers to
ascertain the owner of the car and to
determine whether defendant or codefendant
was authorized to operate it; and (iv) the
sniff was not a search, and the dog's alert
gave the police probable cause to search the
car; thus the subsequent consent given by
defendant was valid.
[State v. Dickey,
294 N.J. Super. 619, 624-25
(App. Div. 1996).]
Reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling, Dickey
pled guilty to the first count. The court sentenced Dickey to
seven years' imprisonment with a two-and-one-half-year period of
parole ineligibility.
The Appellate Division noted that the sole issue before it
was whether the two-and-one-half- to three-and-one-half-hour
detention between the initial stop and the establishment of
probable cause was reasonable. Id. at 625-26. Defendant
conceded, and the panel agreed, that the trooper was justified in
pulling over Dickey and his codefendant. Id. at 625. In
addition, the trooper was justified in detaining the car and the
two individuals because the facts of the case supported a finding
of reasonable suspicion. Ibid.
From the totality of the circumstances, it is
clear that the troopers had reasonable
suspicion that the driver and defendant had
no right to the car and that something was
amiss concerning the contents of the trunk.
The troopers properly continued their attempt
to find the owner, to ascertain the driver's
and defendant's authority to possess the
vehicle, and to bring the drug-sniffing dog
to the station to determine whether drugs
were present in the trunk.
The court observed that the trooper had a duty to investigate the
ownership of the car, whether defendant was authorized to use the
car, and whether the car contained contraband. Id. at 634.
Because the trooper diligently pursued the investigation, the
duration of the detention did not infringe on defendant's
constitutional rights. Id. at 635. Even if the detention did
rise to the level of an improper arrest, that conclusion was not
decisive. Defendant's arrest did not yield any evidence against
defendant; it was the detention of the car that yielded the
evidence. Thus, an arrest, if illegal, would not bar defendant's
prosecution. Id. at 632.
We granted defendant's petition for certification.
148 N.J. 463 (1997).
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. "Temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a `seizure' of `persons' within the meaning of this provision." Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, ___, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L. Ed.2d 89, 95 (1996) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S. Ct. 1391,
1396,
59 L. Ed.2d 660, 667 (1979); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 556,
96 S. Ct. 3074, 3082,
49 L.
Ed.2d 1116, 1127 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 878,
95 S. Ct. 2574, 2578,
45 L. Ed.2d 607, 614
(1975)). An automobile stop is thus subject to the
constitutional imperative that it not be "unreasonable" as that
concept is defined under Fourth Amendment law. Prouse, supra,
440 U.S. at 663, 99 S. Ct. at 1401, 59 L. Ed.
2d at 673. As a
general rule, "the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable
where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic
violation has occurred." Whren, supra, 517 U.S. at ___, 116 S.
Ct. at 1772, 135 L. Ed.
2d at 95-96; see Prouse, supra, 440 U.S.
at 659, 99 S. Ct. at 1399, 59 L. Ed.
2d at 671; Pennsylvania v.
Mimms,
434 U.S. 106, 109,
98 S. Ct. 330, 332,
54 L. Ed.2d 331,
336 (1977) (per curiam).
The Terry Court created a two-part test designed to measure
the reasonableness of an investigative stop against the intrusion
on the detainee's right to be secure from unreasonable searches.
Under this test, we must consider
whether the officer's action was justified at
its inception, and whether it was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first
place.
[Terry, supra, 360 U.S. at 20, 88 S. Ct. at
1879, 20 L. Ed.
2d at 905.]
Courts employ this Terry standard to measure the reasonableness of a detention following a valid traffic stop. See United States v. Barahona, 990 F.2d 412, 416 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying Terry
standards for reasonableness of detention following lawful stop
to probable cause stop for traffic violation); United States v.
Cummins,
920 F.2d 498, 500 (8th Cir. 1990) (same), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 962,
112 S. Ct. 428,
116 L. Ed.2d 448-49 (1991).
Defendant accepts that the State Trooper had probable cause
to believe that provisions of the motor vehicle code had been
violated. Defendant concedes that the initial stop was lawful.
Defendant's sole argument is that the period of the detention
after the traffic stop and prior to the police obtaining probable
cause was excessive and constituted an illegal detention. Thus,
the sole question posed by defendant's extended detention prior
to the search of the trunk of the car is whether the detention
was "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place." Terry, supra,
392 U.S. at 20, 88 S. Ct. at 1879, 20 L. Ed.
2d at 905.
"[T]here is [no] litmus-paper test for . . . determining when a seizure exceeds the bounds of an investigative stop." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1329, 75 L. Ed.2d 229, 242 (1983) (plurality opinion). The Supreme Court has refused to adopt a "hard-and-fast time limit for a permissible Terry stop." Sharpe, supra, 470 U.S. at 686, 105 S. Ct. at 1575, 84 L. Ed. 2d at 615; accord United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 n.10, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2646 n.10, 77 L. Ed.2d 110, 122 n.10 (1983). "Much as a 'bright line' rule would be
desirable, in evaluating whether an investigative detention is
unreasonable, common sense and ordinary human experience must
govern over rigid criteria." Sharpe, supra, 470 U.S. at 685, 105
S. Ct. at 1575, 84 L. Ed.
2d at 615.
In assessing whether a detention is too long in
duration to be justified as an investigative stop,
we consider it appropriate to examine whether the
police diligently pursued a means of investigation
that was likely to confirm or dispel their
suspicions quickly, during which time it was
necessary to detain the defendant.
[Id. at 686, 105 S. Ct. at 1575, 84 L. Ed.
2d
at 615-16.]
Although we focus on the duration of this stop, "common sense and ordinary human experience" require that we take notice of both prongs of the Terry analysis. Terry recognized a "narrowly drawn" exception to the probable-cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment for certain seizures of the person that do not rise to the level of full arrests. Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 909. The Court found that such an intrusion was permissible for two primary reasons. First, a Terry stop--brief and narrowly circumscribed--was said to involve a "wholly different kind of intrusion upon individual freedom" than a traditional arrest. Id. at 26, 88 S. Ct. at 1882, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 909. Second, under such circumstances, the government's interest in preventing imminent criminal activity may be substantial enough to outweigh the still-serious privacy interests implicated by a limited Terry stop. Id. at 22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906-07. Thus, when the intrusion on the individual is minimal, and when law enforcement interests
outweigh the privacy interests infringed in a Terry encounter, a
stop based on objectively reasonable and articulable suspicions,
rather than upon probable cause, is consistent with the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 20-21, 88 S. Ct. at 1879, 20 L. Ed.
2d at 905.
In Dunaway v. New York,
442 U.S. 200, 210,
99 S. Ct. 2248,
2255,
60 L. Ed.2d 824, 834 (1979), the Court elaborated on the
two Terry principles:
First, [Terry] defined a special category of
Fourth Amendment "seizures" so substantially less
intrusive than arrests that the general rule
requiring probable cause to make Fourth Amendment
"seizures" reasonable could be replaced by a
balancing test. Second, the application of this
balancing test led the Court to approve this
narrowly defined less intrusive seizure on grounds
less rigorous than probable cause. . . .
Thus, in Place, supra, 462 U.S. at 703, 103 S. Ct. at 2642, 77 L.
Ed.
2d at 118 (involving the detention of an air traveler's
luggage suspected to contain drugs), the Court held: "When the
nature and extent of the detention are minimally intrusive of the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests, the opposing law
enforcement interests can support a seizure based on less than
probable cause." Refusing to rely on a rigid test, the Court
recognized that "[t]he context of a particular law enforcement
practice, of course, may affect the determination whether a brief
intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests on less than probable
cause is essential to effective criminal investigation." Id. at
704, 103 S. Ct. at 2643, 77 L. Ed.
2d at 119.
Even a stop that lasts no longer than necessary to complete
the investigation for which the stop was made may amount to an
illegal arrest if the stop is more than "minimally intrusive."
In the absence of probable cause, the stop must first be found
not unduly intrusive before any balancing of the government's
interest against the individual's interest becomes appropriate.
See id. at 703, 103 S. Ct. at 2642, 77 L. Ed.
2d at 118. A
detention that is the functional equivalent of an arrest must be
supported by probable cause regardless of its duration. See
United States v. Miller,
974 F.2d 953, 956 (8th Cir. 1992)
(finding that an arrest must be supported by probable cause)
(citing Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 25-31, 88 S. Ct. at 1882-85, 20
L. Ed.
2d at 908-11).
Simply stated, an investigative stop becomes a de facto
arrest when "`the officers' conduct is more intrusive than
necessary for an investigative stop.'" United States v. Jones,
759 F.2d 633, 636 (8th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Rose,
731 F.2d 1337, 1342 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 931,
105 S.
Ct. 326,
83 L. Ed.2d 263 (1984)), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 837,
106 S. Ct. 113,
88 L. Ed.2d 92 (1985). Although there are no
"bright line" tests to guide us, courts have identified several
factors to aid in the analysis.
Time is an important factor in distinguishing
between an investigative stop and a de facto
arrest: There is "no rigid time limitation
on Terry stops," United States v. Sharpe,
470 U.S. 675, 685,
105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575,
84 L.
Ed.2d 605[, 615] (1985), but a stop may be
too long if it involves "delay unnecessary to
the legitimate investigation of the law
enforcement officers," id. at 687, 105 S. Ct.
at 1576 [, 84 L. Ed.
2d at 616]. Another
factor is "the degree of fear and humiliation
that the police conduct engenders." United
States v. Lego,
855 F.2d 542, 544-45 (8th
Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). The courts
have also held that transporting a suspect to
another location or isolating him from others
can create an arrest. See [United States v.]
Rose, 731 F.2d [1337,] 1342 [(8th Cir.),
cert. denied,
469 U.S. 931, 105 S. Ct. 326,
83 L. Ed.2d 263 (1984)]. Additional factors
that may weigh in favor of an arrest are
subjecting a suspect to unnecessary delays,
handcuffing him, or confining him in a police
car. See [United States v.] Willis, 967 F.2d
[1220], 1224 [(8th Cir. 1992)].
[United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910,
917 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
514 U.S. 1113,
115 S. Ct. 1970,
131 L. Ed.2d 859
(1995).]
Applying these principles to the circumstances of this case leads us to conclude that the combination of the duration of the detention and the degree of intrusion upon the liberty of the motorists exceeded that measure authorized by Terry and its progeny.
Was the "detention too long in duration"?
Sharpe, supra, 470 N.J. at 686, 105 S. Ct. at
1575, 84 L. Ed.
2d at 615.
Defendant does not dispute that the initial traffic stop was valid. Whren, supra, expressly authorizes a traffic stop based on probable cause to believe that a driver is violating an applicable motor vehicle law. 517 U.S. at ___, 116 S. Ct. at 1772, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 95-96. "The foremost method of enforcing
traffic and vehicle safety regulations . . . is acting upon
observed violations." Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. at 659, 99 S. Ct.
at 1399, 59 L. Ed.
2d at 671. Of course, the reasonableness of
the detention is not limited to investigating the circumstances
of the traffic stop. If, during the course of the stop or as a
result of the reasonable inquiries initiated by the officer, the
circumstances "give rise to suspicions unrelated to the traffic
offense, an officer may broaden [the] inquiry and satisfy those
suspicions." United States v. Johnson,
58 F.3d 356, 357-58 (8th
Cir.) (quoting Barahona, supra, 990 F.
2d at 416), cert. denied,
___ U.S. ___,
116 S. Ct. 348,
133 L. Ed.2d 245 (1995); see
Ramos, supra, 42 F.
3d at 1163 (holding that inconsistent answers
by occupants or problems with the occupants' licenses or
registration of the vehicle provide grounds for broadening the
inquiry); United States v. White,
42 F.3d 457, 460 (8th Cir.
1994) (holding that reasonable suspicion that there is contraband
in the vehicle justifies "greater intrusion unrelated to the
traffic stop"); Barahona, supra, 990 F.
2d at 416 (holding that
for detention to be reasonable, officer's questions must relate
to purpose of stop, but "if the responses of the detainee and the
circumstances give rise to suspicions unrelated to the traffic
offense, an officer may broaden his inquiry and satisfy those
suspicions").
The failure of Dickey and his codefendant to provide the
registration of the vehicle plainly provided grounds for
broadening the investigation. When Dickey and his companion were
unable to furnish the last name of the owner, those suspicions
were naturally heightened. It may appear counterintuitive that
one not know the last name of an uncle or cousin. In larger
extended families, it may not be unusual to know family members
by more familiar names than their surnames. Still, the officer
cannot be faulted for reacting as he did.
The trooper's natural suspicions would have been eased
somewhat when the license lookup recorded that the car was,
indeed, owned by Leon McCullum of Cincinnati, Ohio, and his
National Crime Information Center (NCIC) search showed that there
was no report that the vehicle had been stolen. But because the
theft may have been recent, and thus not reported to the NCIC,
the trooper sought to contact, through precinct officers in
Cincinnati, the owner of the car. Given that the owner was not
immediately found, it was at least reasonable to pursue this
investigation for a period of time.
Permitting the continued detention of the motorists on the
ground that the trooper was locating the owner of the vehicle
presents the possibility that the trooper would be justified in
continuing the investigation indefinitely. For example, if the
owner of the vehicle had gone away for a weekend, would it be
reasonable to detain the car for the rest of the weekend while
waiting for the owner to return? The trooper's inquiry into the
ownership of the car did not quickly dispel his suspicion that
the car had been stolen; on the other hand, the investigation did
not increase his suspicion.
What, then, are the outer limits of duration of a detention?
In Sharpe, supra, the Court found that a twenty-minute detention
was reasonable when the police acted diligently and defendant
contributed to the delay. 470 U.S. at 686-88, 105 S. Ct. at
1575-77, 84 L. Ed.
2d at 615-17. In Place, supra, the Court
found that a ninety-minute detention of defendant's luggage was
unreasonable when agents did not act diligently to minimize the
delay. 462 U.S. at 709-10, 103 S. Ct. at 2645-46, 77 L. Ed.
2d
at 122-23.
Limonja v. Commonwealth,
383 S.E.2d 476, 482 (Va. Ct. App.
1989), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 905,
110 S. Ct. 1925,
109 L. Ed.2d 288 (1990), provides several instances in which extended
detention has been upheld:
Using the foregoing [Terry/Sharpe] test,
courts have upheld detention of forty-five
minutes, United States v. Davies,
768 F.2d 893, 901 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1008,
106 S. Ct. 533,
88 L. Ed.2d 464
(1985); fifty minutes, United States v.
Alpert,
816 F.2d 958, 964 (4th Cir. 1987);
sixty minutes, United States v. Large,
729 F.2d 636, 639 (8th Cir. 1984); United States
v. Campbell,
627 F.Supp. 320, 325-26 (D.
Alaska 1985), aff'd
810 F.2d 206 (9th Cir.
1987); and seventy-five minutes, United
States v. Borys,
766 F.2d 304, 313 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1082,
106 S.
Ct. 852,
88 L. Ed.2d 893 (1985). Each of
the last four cited cases involved delays
necessitated by efforts to obtain a narcotics
dog for sniffing luggage or packages, as in
this case.
Conversely, Garza v. Lett, No. 87C 4877, 1
988 WL 84742, at 3
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 10, 1988), provides instances when longer
detention has not been upheld:
[O]nce a detention stretches into hours it no
longer can be considered an investigatory
Terry stop. See United States v. Perez-Esparza,
609 F.2d 1284 (9th Cir. 1979)
(three-hours); United States v. Tucker,
610 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1979) ("several" hours).
We have found no case upholding a two-hour
Terry stop. We conclude that the detention
of plaintiffs, which lasted over two hours,
plainly went beyond the "brief" time limit of
a Terry stop.
"Obviously, if an investigative stop continues indefinitely, at
some point it can no longer be justified as an investigative
stop." Sharpe, supra, 470 U.S. at 685, 105 S. Ct. at 1575, 84 L.
Ed.
2d at 615. As the duration of the investigation and
corresponding stop becomes longer, a court is less likely to find
the infringement on the detainee's rights permissible under the
Terry analysis. This is not to say that a stop over two hours
can never be permissible, but any detention of that duration must
be justified by the circumstances.
Was the nature of the detention "minimally
intrusive of the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests"? Place, supra, 462 U.S.
at 703, 103 S. Ct. at 2642, 77 L. Ed.
2d at
118.
The degree of intrusion upon the liberty of the motorists was obviously more than that involved in Terry. In Terry there was a brief street encounter. In this case the motorists were removed from the place of the original detention, handcuffed as they were transported in a police car, albeit voluntarily, to the police station, handcuffed at times in the stationhouse, and told
that they were not free to leave. In many circumstances when
probable cause justifies the stop of an automobile, the police
will also have probable cause to arrest the occupants before
searching a car. Once arrested, suspects may be taken to the
stationhouse for booking. In such circumstances, seizing the
automobile by securing it on the spot or taking it to the
stationhouse would not represent a serious intrusion upon the
occupant's possessory interest in the car. The occupant under
arrest is not free to use the car. In this case, the converse
occurred.
That suspects have been removed to an office or to a police
station are factors that the Supreme Court and other courts have
found significant in distinguishing Terry stops from custodial
arrests. See Royer, supra, 460 U.S. at 502-03,
103 S.Ct. 1327,
75 L. Ed.
2d at 239-40; Dunaway, supra, 442 U.S. at 212, 99 S.
Ct. at 2256, 60 L. Ed.
2d at 835-36; United States v. Espinosa
Guerra, 805 F.
2d at 1502, 1509 (11th Cir. 1986); see United
States v. Berry,
670 F.2d 583, 597 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
Although not establishing the fact of an arrest, see United
States v. Melendez-Garcia,
28 F.3d 1046, 1052 (10th Cir. 1994),
the use of handcuffs heightened the degree of intrusion upon the
liberty of the suspects. The degree of the intrusion on
defendant's Fourth Amendment interests was at the outermost limit
of an investigatory detention. Dickey and Parker were
transported, in handcuffs, a substantial distance to the police
station. At the station they were periodically in handcuffs and
told that they could not leave until the investigation was
completed. Although Dickey voluntarily accompanied the trooper
to the station, he truly was left with no other option. The
trooper would not have permitted Dickey to remain on the highway
and did not offer any additional option that would have permitted
Dickey and his companion to continue on to Ohio without the car.
Before concluding our analysis, we address the State's additional argument that although the detention of the individuals was not justified, the detention of the vehicle was justified and the drugs would have inevitably been discovered in the course of an inventory search of the vehicle.
The State contends that N.J.S.A. 39:5-47 permits the Division of Motor Vehicles to impound a vehicle in such circumstances. That statute reads, in relevant part:
The commissioner may authorize the seizure of a motor vehicle operated over the highways of this state when he has reason to believe that the motor vehicle has been stolen or is otherwise being operated under suspicious circumstances and may retain it in the name of the department until such time as the identity of ownership is established, whereupon he shall order the release of the motor vehicle to its owner.
An inventory search is the search of property lawfully seized and detained, in order to ensure that it is harmless, to secure valuable items (such as might be kept in a towed car), and to protect against false claims of loss or damage. See South Dakota
v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364, 369,
96 S. Ct. 3092, 3097,
49 L. Ed.2d 1000, 1005 (1976); State v. Slockbower,
79 N.J. 1, 15 (1979).
Although N.J.S.A. 39:5-47 authorizes the Commissioner of the
Division of Motor Vehicles to impound a vehicle, the seizure of
the vehicle (like every detention) is subject to constitutional
limitations. For purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the
statute provides justification for investigative detention, not a
forfeiture of the vehicle, for a reasonable period of time when
questions of ownership are involved. Because of the substantial
value of automobiles today, we agree that police should have,
pursuant to statutory authorization, a longer period of time to
detain property in the form of an automobile than would be
permitted under a traditional Terry analysis. In the
circumstances of this case, however, the detention of the
personal property was so intertwined with the detention of the
persons as to effect a seizure of the person. Although the
police officer did not place the motorists under arrest until
after the contraband had been discovered, the suspects were not
realistically free to leave in the early morning hours from an
isolated State Police barracks. It is difficult to see exactly
to where they were free to go. In this case, then, the intrusion
on the Fourth Amendment interests of the person were intertwined
with the detention of the property.
In Place, supra, Justice O'Connor observed that
[t]he premise of the Government's argument is
that seizures of property are generally less
intrusive than seizures of the person. While
true in some circumstances, that premise is
faulty on the facts we address in this case.
The precise type of detention we confront
here is seizure of personal luggage from the
immediate possession of the suspect for the
purpose of arranging exposure to a narcotics
detection dog.[See footnote 2] Particularly in the case
of detention of luggage within the traveler's
immediate possession, the police conduct
intrudes on both the suspect's possessory
interest in his luggage as well as his
liberty interest in proceeding with his
itinerary. The person whose luggage is
detained is technically still free to
continue his travels or carry out other
personal activities pending release of the
luggage. Moreover, he is not subjected to
the coercive atmosphere of the custodial
confinement or to the public indignity of
being personally detained. Nevertheless,
such seizure can effectively restrain the
person since he is subjected to the possible
disruption of his travel plans in order to
remain with his luggage or to arrange for its
return. Therefore, when the police seize
luggage from the suspect's custody, we think
the limitations applicable to investigative
detention of the person should define the
permissible scope of an investigative
detention of the person's luggage on less
than probable cause. Under this standard it
is clear that the police conduct here
exceeded the permissible limits of a Terry-type investigative stop.
[462 U.S. at 708-09, 103 S. Ct. at 2645, 77
L. Ed.
2d at 121-22 (footnote omitted).]
Because detention of the automobile "effectively restrained the person" of the motorists, the limitations applicable to investigative detention of a person defined the permissible scope of the detention of the vehicle. In addition, unlike the traveler at the airport who can retrieve luggage later, these
motorists were not even "technically still free to continue . . .
their travels." They were effectively confined to the police
barracks, disrupting their travel plans.
Because the detention of the vehicle was interrelated with
the detention of persons, the constitutional limits concerning
the detention of the persons will control.
Taken separately, the duration and the detention of the motorists or their vehicle might have been permissible had the nature of the infringement on Fourth Amendment interests been "minimally intrusive." For example, had the motorists been permitted to remain free to continue on their travels by public transit or other means of transportation, or had they not been effectively confined to the stationhouse, the detention of the personal property might have been subject to a less stringent standard. The police knew the identities and whereabouts of Parker and Dickey and with access to computerized databases, such as the Computerized Criminal History (CCH) database, could determine whether the suspects had a criminal history. Taken together, however, the duration of the detention and degree of the intrusion exceed Terry/Sharpe bounds. To our knowledge, no court has upheld so long and so intrusive an investigatory detention.
We recognize the needs of law enforcement for guidelines in this most important area of drug interdiction. Although there
are no bright lines, police training methods can hone in on the
two prongs of analysis required to sustain a Terry/Sharpe
detention. Had the police had articulable suspicion that the
vehicle contained drugs based on discovery of a small amount of
drugs or the presence of drug paraphernalia, beepers or the like,
a detention for sufficient time to bring the K-9 unit to the
scene would not be unreasonable. See Bloomfield, supra, 40 F.
3d
at 918-19 (holding that totality of circumstances supported
reasonable suspicion that defendant was transporting drugs, and,
therefore, officer was justified in seizing truck).
This may be that rare case when the interests of society and
the individual are no longer in conflict. The defendant has paid
a debt to society. He acknowledged at sentencing that what he
did was wrong, although an aberration in an otherwise blameless
life. He has served the parole ineligibility term of his
sentence.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed and the
matter is remanded to the Law Division for further proceedings in
accordance with this opinion.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, GARIBALDI, and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE O'HERN's opinion.
NO. A-30 SEPTEMBER TERM 1997
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
THEODORE DICKEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
DECIDED March 4, 1998
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice O'Hern
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
Footnote: 1Because the trial court focused on the duration of the detention to the exclusion of the degree of intrusion, it did not make specific findings on certain disputed factual issues such as whether the motorists were handcuffed at the State Police barracks and whether and when they were told that they were free to leave the barracks. Rather than remand the matter for further factual findings, we will resolve the case on the basis of the facts set forth in the State's Appellate Division brief and those facts acknowledged to be true by the State's witnesses at the suppression hearing. Footnote: 2The Court had emphasized in Terry, supra, "the manner in which the seizure and search were conducted is, of course, as vital a part of the inquiry as whether they were warranted at all." 392 U.S. at 28, 88 S. Ct. at 1883, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 910.