SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
A-3859-95T3
TAMIKA HALL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LEGIOUS MINDER and UNSATISFIED
CLAIM AND JUDGMENT FUND,
Defendants-Respondents,
and
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY
and DEBORAH LOWENSTEIN,
Defendants.
_______________________________________________
Argued February 13, 1997 - Decided March 5, 1997
Before Judges Shebell, Baime and Braithwaite.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Union County.
Thomas E. Hood argued the cause for appellant
(Richard W. Carlson, on the brief).
David G. Hahn argued the cause for respondent,
Unsatisfied Claim And Judgment Fund (Hahn & Howarth,
attorneys; Mr. Hahn, of counsel, and on the
brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHEBELL, P.J.A.D.
Plaintiff, Tamika Hall, appeals the dismissal on summary judgment of her complaint which alleged that, as a result of defendant Legious Minder's negligence while operating the vehicle of Deborah Lowenstein, plaintiff was seriously injured when the vehicle she was riding in struck a parked vehicle. Plaintiff joined the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Board ("Fund") and
Prudential Insurance Company ("Prudential") as defendants and
alleged that she was wrongly denied benefits by them. The
defendants moved for summary judgment, which motions were granted
following oral argument. Plaintiff appeals only from the order
granting summary judgment to the Fund.
On March 26, 1993, plaintiff was an occupant in a vehicle
driven by Minor which, shortly after he picked her up at her
home, was involved in a collision. Plaintiff sustained injuries
to her head and face and was taken to the hospital. Minor fled
the scene, and his whereabouts are unknown. Neither plaintiff,
nor her father, had insurance to cover her injuries, and her
medical bills are alleged to exceed $55,000.
Plaintiff filed an application for Personal Injury
Protection ("PIP") benefits with the Fund. The application was
denied on the assertion that plaintiff was ineligible under
N.J.S.A. 39:6-70(c), since she was an occupant in a stolen
vehicle. Plaintiff also filed a claim with Prudential, since the
vehicle was insured by that company, but that claim was similarly
denied.
The motion judge in granting the Fund's motion for summary
judgment stated:
New Jersey Statute 39:6-70(c)
specifically states that a claimant to the
Fund must be prepared to show that, "he was
not at the time of the accident a person:
(1) operating or riding in a vehicle which he
had stolen or participated in stealing or,
(2) operating or riding in a motor vehicle
without the permission of the owner ....["]
Clearly, section (c)(1) is not
applicable to the case at bar. The primary
issue is whether (c)(2) can operate to bar
plaintiff's claim against the Fund. Because
the car was stolen it is clear that anyone
riding therein would do so without the
owner's permission.
The judge held that plaintiff could not recover from the Fund
under section (c)(2) as she did not have the permission of the
owner to ride in the vehicle.
The sole issue on appeal is the correct application of
N.J.S.A. 39:6-70(c). This section reads in pertinent part, as
follows:
The court shall proceed upon such
application, in a summary manner, and, upon
the hearing thereof, the applicant shall be
required to show:
(c) He was not at the time of the accident a person (1) operating or riding in a motor vehicle which he had stolen or participated in stealing or (2) operating or riding in a motor vehicle without the permission of the owner, and is not the personal representative of such a person[.]
[N.J.S.A. 39:6-70(c).]
The motion judge followed the Law Division decision in Joyner v. Nissan 10 Inc., 253 N.J. Super. 510 (Law Div. 1991). There, the judge held that, notwithstanding plaintiff's lack of knowledge that the vehicle was stolen, she could not recover from the Fund as she was a person riding in or operating a motor vehicle without the permission of the owner. Id. at 513-14. The judge in Joyner stated: "[a] passenger's inaccurate knowledge regarding ownership of a vehicle is not a consideration under N.J.S.A. 39:6-70(c)(2)." Id. at 514 n.2. We disagree.
Our courts have noted numerous times that the purpose of the
Fund Law "is to provide a measure of relief for persons who
sustain losses or injury inflicted by financially irresponsible
or unidentified owners or operators of motor vehicles, where such
persons would otherwise be remediless." Corrigan v. Gassert,
27 N.J. 227, 233 (1958)(citing Dixon v. Gassert,
26 N.J. 1 (1958)).
See also Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Board v. NJ Mfrs.
Ins. Co.,
138 N.J. 185, 189 (1994); Brookins v. Murray,
131 N.J. 141, 145 (1993); Sumner v. Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund
Board,
288 N.J. Super. 384, 386 (App. Div. 1996). "The
Legislature was attempting to `ameliorate the injustice to the
victims resulting from a basic shortcoming of the tort liability
system: the futility or impossibility of prosecuting a civil
damage claim against a financially irresponsible or even unknown
tort feasor.'" Brookins, supra, 131 N.J. at 145 (quoting White
v. Violent Crimes Compensation Bd.,
76 N.J. 368, 380 (1978)).
The Fund is designed to assist innocent accident victims with
their resultant expenses and it must be interpreted in that
light.
N.J.S.A. 39:6-7(c) clearly requires an applicant for
benefits to meet both sections (c)(1) and (c)(2). In Joyner, the
judge first determined that plaintiff did not steal the car and
was not precluded from receiving benefits under N.J.S.A. 39:6-70(c)(1). Joyner, supra, 253 N.J. Super. at 513. However, he
then held that plaintiff was precluded under N.J.S.A. 39:6-70(c)(2) since she did not have permission to ride in the
vehicle. Id. at 513-14. The motion judge in this case proceeded
in the same manner. We believe the Legislature in enacting
N.J.S.A. 39:6-70(c) intended to preclude two different classes of
people from receiving benefits: (1) those who actually stole or
participated in the theft of a motor vehicle and (2) those who
knowingly operated or rode in a motor vehicle without the owner's
permission. In order to effectuate this intent, it is necessary
to read the statute in the conjunctive, i.e., that the applicant
must meet both requirements under N.J.S.A. 39:6-70(c).
Obviously, every use without permission does not constitute
theft. In the usual situation passengers assume that they are
riding in a vehicle with the owner's consent. Although here the
vehicle was stolen, in many cases, the issue of use without the
owner's permission may be indiscernible to the lay person. The
Law Division's decisions preclude recovery to that entire class
of innocent injured persons. We perceive that the public policy
of providing benefits to those innocent persons is as strong as
the public policy to provide insurance coverage to all who use a
vehicle with the owner's permission. See Scott v. Salerno, ___
N.J. Super. ___, ___ (App. Div. 1997) (slip op. at 8).
We conclude that the Legislature intended to disallow
benefits only to persons who, although they may not have stolen
the vehicle, knew that they did not have the permission of the
owner to operate or ride in the vehicle. This is consistent with
the purpose of the statute to provide relief only to innocent
persons injured by the actions of uninsured or unknown motorists.
Corrigan, supra, 27 N.J. at 233. See also NJ Mfrs. Ins. Co.,
supra, 138 N.J. at 189; Brookins, supra, 131 N.J. at 145; Sumner,
supra, 288 N.J. Super. at 386.
The distinction made by the Legislature between stealing and
lack of permission is understandable if knowledge of use without
permission is found to be a requirement under (c)(2). Section
(c)(1) was drafted so as to exclude persons who steal or
participate in the theft of a vehicle. However, (c)(2) is
extended to exclude the operator and passengers who know that
they do not have permission to use the vehicle, even though they
may not have actually stolen it. Thus, any person who uses
another's vehicle knowing it is without permission, but who did
not steal it, would be ineligible for benefits under the statute.
However, the user, who assumed there was permission to operate
the vehicle and was faced with no evidence to the contrary, would
not be denied benefits solely because he/she did not actually
have permission to use the vehicle. We do not perceive that the
Legislature intended to exclude such persons or to view them any
differently than an innocent pedestrian who might be struck by a
stolen vehicle or one being used without the owner's permission.
Our conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the Fund Law
is remedial legislation and "is to be liberally construed to
advance the remedy with due regard to the fulfillment of the
essential legislative design while protecting the Fund against
possible fraud or abuse." Corrigan, supra, 27 N.J. at 237. See
also Young v. Schering Corp.,
141 N.J. 16, 25 (1995).
"Furthermore, a court should avoid a literal interpretation of
individual statutory terms or provisions that would be
inconsistent with the overall purpose of the statute." Young,
supra, 141 N.J. at 25. "`[A] statute is to receive reasonable
construction, to serve the apparent legislative purpose. ....
The language is not to be given a rigid interpretation when it is
apparent that such meaning was not intended. The rule of strict
construction cannot be allowed to defeat the evident legislative
design.'" Seneca v. Bissell,
274 N.J. Super. 613, 617 (App.
Div.)(quoting Alexander v. Power & Light Co.,
21 N.J. 373, 378
(1956)), certif. denied,
138 N.J. 272 (1994).
Although knowledge of lack of permission is not specifically
spelled out in the statute, a literal interpretation "would be
inconsistent with the overall purpose of the statute." Young,
supra, 141 N.J. at 25. As we have noted, in normal
circumstances, most people assume that they are riding in a
vehicle with the owner's permission. If plaintiff knew the car
was stolen, she would not be eligible under N.J.S.A. 39:6-70(c)(2). The requirement that an applicant prove that he/she
did not know the owner of the vehicle had not consented to its
use serves to protect "the Fund against possible fraud or abuse,"
while at the same time advancing the remedy intended by the law
of providing a source of payment to innocent injured parties.
Corrigan, supra, 27 N.J. at 237.
The holding in Joyner, supra, that knowledge regarding the
status of a stolen vehicle is irrelevant under N.J.S.A. 39:6-70(c)(2), opposes both the Legislative intent of the Fund Law and
the remedial nature of the law, and therefore, we disapprove of
its holding. Summary judgment was inappropriate as there is a
fact issue as to whether plaintiff knew the car was stolen or
being operated without the owner's permission. See Brill v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
142 N.J. 520, 530 (1995).
We reverse and remand for a determination of whether
plaintiff had knowledge that the use of the vehicle was without
the permission of the owner.