SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
A-258-94T2
THE HOME NEWS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
THE BOROUGH OF SPOTSWOOD,
Defendant-Respondent.
_______________________________________
Argued: May 10, 1995 - Decided: January 17, 1996
Before Judges Baime, Kestin and A.A. Rodríguez.*
On appeal from the Superior Court,
Law Division, Middlesex County.
A. F. McGimpsey Jr. argued the cause
for appellant (McGimpsey & Cafferty,
attorneys; Mr. McGimpsey and
Arlene M. Turinchak on the brief).
Pamela J. Minetto argued the cause
for respondent (Purcell, Ries, Shannon,
Mulcahy & O'Neill, attorneys; Ms. Minetto
on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
_____________________
*Judge Rodríguez did not participate in oral argument.
Counsel have consented to his participation based on the record for
the purpose of decision.
KESTIN, J.A.D.
Plaintiff newspaper appeals from the trial court's dismissal
of its complaint seeking access to certain documents used by
members of defendant Board of Education and certain of its officers
in the budget planning process. Although the complaint
containedfour separate counts, each asserting a different basis for
plaintiff's claim of right to access, only two such grounds are
before us in this appeal. An assertion of right under the United
States and New Jersey Constitutions in the third count of the
complaint was not actively pursued at the trial level. A claim
under the Open Public Meetings Act, N.J.S.A. 10:4-6 to -21,
although pleaded in the fourth count of the complaint and briefed
in the trial court, was not addressed by the trial court in its
decision and has not been argued on appeal. The issues before us,
therefore, are limited to plaintiff's claims under the "Right-to-Know Law", N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -4, and the common law right of
access, see Higg-A-Rella, Inc. v. County of Essex,
141 N.J. 35, 46
(1995). As to these, we affirm.
As stated in the complaint, plaintiff sought access to "copies
of the proposed school district budget and supporting
documentation[]" for the 1994-95 budget year. The record
establishes, however, that plaintiff was never denied access to the
proposed school district budget, but that what it sought
specifically were copies of budget projections and other material
used by Board members and officers in the budget planning process.
In the Fall of 1993, when the planning process for the 1994-95
budget year began, defendant's Superintendent of Schools requested
projections of budgetary need from the district's four school
principals and other officers and supervisors. Once received,
these projections were turned over to the school district's
Business Administrator who compiled them along with other
information into a "budget workbook". A similar workbook had been
prepared annually for more than nine years; and the contents were
discarded at the close of each year's budget planning process. A
different color cover was used each year. The budget workbook for
1994-95 was known as the "green book".
In depositions, the Superintendent and the Business
Administrator described the "green book", its use in the budget
planning process, and how it came to be the subject of this suit.
The book was initially compiled for board members in January, 1994,
and was continually supplemented and revised during the budget
planning process. The book was especially useful at budget
workshop meetings, some of which were open to the public and others
of which were closed. Initially, it contained only expense
estimates because state aid revenue projections had not yet been
provided by the State Department of Education. The format of the
presentation was substantially similar to the "chart of accounts"
provided by the Department that all school districts were obliged
to follow, although some of the accounts were presented in the
"green book" in more detail than was required by the Department.
The budget process in 1994 lasted until April 7 when the Board
voted final approval of the proposed budget after a public hearing
had been held. Tentative approval had occurred on March 17 and the
tentatively approved budget had been made available to the public
on March 22. After one of the budget workshop meetings in late
February, a reporter employed by plaintiff had requested a copy of
the "green book". The Superintendent did not furnish a copy, but
instead prepared a two- page summary of the information to give to
the reporter at a March 8 meeting. The reporter was not present at
the meeting to receive the summary, and it was discarded because,
as a result of the meeting, the figures presented had changed.
Plaintiff's complaint seeking access to the "green book" was filed
on March 23.
In their depositions, the Business Administrator and
Superintendent cited three reasons why the "green book" was not
disclosed.
[I]t lists all the proposed personnel and
their salaries and their names which usually
will change numerous times before the Board
finally adopts a tentative budget. It also
goes into detail with our special ed children
as to who they are and what schools they are
attending and their classifications which are,
from my understanding of the law, prohibited
under federal law that they have the right of
privacy on those.
* * * *
[The] Public is entitled to a complete budget.
That is not a complete budget. And taking
individual items out of the context of the
complete budget is not giving the public the
information that it needs or should have and
it's not a complete picture of the financial
position of the district.
After a hearing on plaintiff's order to show cause, the trial
judge held that plaintiff was not entitled to the relief it sought
under either the Right-to-Know Law or the common law right of
access. In reaching this conclusion, the trial judge had the
benefit of the parties' briefs and oral arguments as well as the
depositions of defendant's Superintendent and Business
Administrator. A ruling declining to hear the oral testimony of
the reporter who sought the information was well within the trial
judge's discretion.
This appeal might be seen as moot because, once the 1994-95
budget process concluded, plaintiff may no longer have had any
stake in the disclosure of materials used in that process.
Defendant, however, has not moved to dismiss on this ground and we
will not do so sua sponte. The appeal involves an issue which,
although typically rendered moot by the passage of time thus
evading review, inevitably recurs, probably on an annual basis, and
should therefore be addressed, Clark v. Degnan,
83 N.J. 393, 397
(1980), especially since it is one of considerable public
importance, Division of Youth & Family Serv. v. J.B.,
120 N.J. 112,
118-19 (1990); Matter of Conroy,
98 N.J. 321, 342 (1985).
Plaintiff has not met the criteria of the "Right to-Know Law",
N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -4, entitling it to access to the disputed
material. Once the statutory standard is satisfied, the right to
access is absolute. Higg-A-Rella, supra, 141 N.J. at 43. "However,
the definition of a public record for purposes of the Right-to-Know
Law is narrow[,]" ibid., limited to "records which are required by
law to be made, maintained or kept on file" by any public body or
officer, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-2. A person or entity seeking access to
a record will succeed by satisfying any one of the three stated
criteria. Plaintiff herein has made no such showing.
We are unaware of any requirement of law that mandates the
preparation or use of a working document such as the "green book"
in the budget planning process that boards of education must
undertake. While the end result of the process is mandated, i.e.,
preparation and submission of a proposed budget, individual boards
of education and their members and officers are free to develop
whatever mechanisms they wish to aid in the process of developing
the budget. Without a legal requirement that the particular
documents sought must be "made, maintained or kept on file",
N.J.S.A. 47:1A-2, they "are...not Right-to-Know documents". Higg-A-Rella, supra, 141 N.J. at 44-45; Atlantic City Conv. Ctr. Auth.
v. South Jersey Publishing Co.,
135 N.J. 53, 63-64 (1994); North
Jersey Newspapers Co. v. Passaic County,
127 N.J. 9, 15-16 (1992);
South Jersey Publishing Co. v. New Jersey Expressway Auth.,
124 N.J. 478, 496 (1991); Southern N.J. Newspapers, Inc. v. Township of
Mt. Laurel,
275 N.J. Super. 465, 478-79 (App. Div. 1994), affirmed
as modified,
141 N.J. 56 (1995); Asbury Park Press v. Department of
Health,
233 N.J. Super 375, 381 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
117 N.J. 646 (1989).
It is, by now, beyond peradventure that the legislative design
in "enacting the Right-to-Know Law was full and unrestricted
citizen access to all the records that would allow public
involvement in most aspects of government," North Jersey
Newspapers, supra, 127 N.J. at 18, to the end of providing
"sufficient information to enable the public to understand and
evaluate the reasonableness of the public body's action," South
Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 494-95. The manner in which
the strict requirements of the Right-to-Know Law and its policy of
citizen access to governmental processes should apply in any given
context, may best be understood by focusing on the nature of the
public involvement anticipated in the particular process at issue.
It is by no means evident that the requirement for publishing a
proposed school budget and conducting a public hearing thereon
before adopting the final budget, does not fully satisfy the
statutory policy of advancing public knowledge and involvement,
without unduly impinging on the constructive efforts of public
officers to balance considerations and make difficult decisions in
the conduct of so sensitive a process as budget development.
Plaintiff has also failed to meet the test for common law
access to the records in question. Although, as defendant
concedes, plaintiff, as a newspaper, meets the threshold condition
for access, i.e., an interest in the subject matter of the
material, South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at 487, the
"green book" involved here was not a public record for common law
access purposes.
Under the common law, a "public record" is
"one required by law to be kept, or necessary
to be kept in the discharge of a duty imposed
by law, or directed by law to serve as a
memorial and evidence of something written,
said, or done, or a written memorial made by a
public officer authorized to perform that
function, or a writing filed in a public
office. The elements essential to constitute
a public record are *** that it be a written
memorial, that it be made by a public officer,
and that the officer be authorized by a law to
make it."[Nero v. Hyland,
76 N.J. 213, 222,
386 A.2d 846 (1978) (quoting Josefowicz v.
Porter,
32 N.J. Super. 585, 591,
108 A.2d 865
(App. Div. 1954)).]
[South Jersey Publishing, supra, 124 N.J. at
487-88.]
The "green book" consisted of proposals for the coming budget
year, financial data from prior years, projections, and notes made
by the members of the Board as they worked through the budget
process. Its form or content was never fixed, but changed from
meeting to meeting, and even more frequently, as information
developed and ideas changed. Although some of the materials
contained in it were undoubtedly available to plaintiff as public
records maintained by Board personnel, the compilation known as the
"green book" became something else with the addition of budget
proposals and requests, the application of new concepts, and the
notes made by individual Board members. It was, in every
significant sense, an accumulation of worksheets reflecting
presentations and analyses of budgetary information, gathered by
the business administrator and others; and it was no more subject
to disclosure than any other papers reflecting work in progress
toward the goal of producing a document that will eventually become
a public record. As a discrete document, the "green book" was no
different from the "spread sheet" at issue in Asbury Park Press v.
Dep't of Health, supra, 233 N.J. Super. at 383:
Although a computer print-out of the spread
sheet may in other contexts be the equivalent
of or constitute a written memorial, it was
not such here. The Commissioner was not
required by law to prepare or keep such a
document. She had no duty to prepare or keep
it as a memorial or evidence of something
written, said or done; it is not a written
memorial made by a public officer "authorized
to perform that function." It is also not a
writing "filed" in a public office.
[Ibid.]
No disclosure rule yet articulated requires the release of drafts
and other tentative formulations created in the process of
developing a document that, in its final form, will unquestionably
be a record to which the public will be entitled to access.
Even if the "green book" were to be considered a public
record, however, plaintiff has not satisfied its burden in
"balancing ... the `interest of the public...' in maintaining the
confidentiality of the document against plaintiff['s] interest in
examining it", id. at 383-84, before access will be granted to it
as a common law right. There is an important public interest in
permitting public officials engaged in the budget planning process
to compile information, consider confidential or sensitive
material, make tentative decisions about priorities and needs,
evaluate competing claims of sub-entities to diminishing fiscal
resources, and freely discuss their respective judgments concerning
budget allocation, before figures are bruited about in public
discourse with the possibility that they will become prematurely
fixed or will raise unfulfillable expectations. As long as the
public and the media are not precluded from access to public record
data underlying the views that develop in the budget planning
process - or that result from the process - it is important, as a
matter of public interest, that officials, in budget planning, be
unhampered in their thought processes and in the discussions that
result in a proposed budget, as well as in the development and use
of resource materials they compile or that may be compiled for them
in aid of that function. Cf. id. at 384-85. To articulate a rule
that might result in imposing limitations on the development of
evolving documents and working positions as the budget planning
process proceeds, even in the cause of maximizing public access to
public business, is to risk rendering ineffectual the best efforts
of those charged with the responsibility of promoting the public
interest in this regard.
From the record before us, we have no reason to apprehend that
plaintiff was, in any way, precluded from obtaining fiscal
information maintained by defendant about prior budgets and
expenditures, or any published reports or recommendations for
future development, so that it might "free[ly] on its own ...
review and analyze the underlying data", id. at 385, in an effort
to develop as full as possible an understanding of the proposed
budget and its implications. Nor is there any reason to believe
that anything tangible was withheld from plaintiff or the public
when the proposed budget was published in preparation for the
legally required public hearings. The "green book" did not
document, express, or represent official action, it was merely a
tool provided for the use of those charged with the budget planning
responsibility.
Affirmed.