SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
A-3696-01T3
THOMAS J. DOUGLASS and
DEBORAH A. DOUGLASS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
THOMAS P. OBADE, M.D.,
ORTHOPAEDICS AT WOODBURY,
Defendants-Respondents.
________________________________________________________
Argued March 10, 2003 - Decided April 4, 2003
Before Judges Braithwaite ,See footnote 11 Lintner and Parker.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Gloucester County, Docket Number
L-2069-00.
Guy W. Killen argued the cause for appellants
(Mr. Killen, on the brief).
Joseph L. Marczyk argued the cause for
respondents (Reynolds & Drake, attorneys;
Mr. Marczyk, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, J.A.D.
Plaintiffs appeal from dismissal of their medical malpractice
complaint for failure to file a timely affidavit of merit. We
affirm.
It is undisputed that plaintiffs filed the complaint on
December 6, 2000 and defendants filed their answer on July 25,
2001. Plaintiffs failed to serve an affidavit of merit within the
sixty days following defendants' answer as required by the statute,
N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27. On November 21, 2001, almost four months after
the answer was filed, plaintiffs moved to extend the time within
which to file the affidavit.
The motion was argued on January 4, 2002 before Judge Herman,
who denied it on the basis of the statute, Galik v. Clara Maass
Medical Center,
167 N.J. 341 (2001), and Burns v. Belafsky,
166 N.J. 466 (2001). Judge Herman determined that since the statute
required the filing within sixty days and authorized the court to
grant one sixty-day extension, the maximum time during which an
affidavit of merit could be served was 120 days from the date the
answer was filed.
Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, arguing, as they do
here, that as long as they filed the motion for the extension
within the 120 day period from the date the answer was filed, they
should be permitted an extension to serve the affidavit. Judge
Herman denied plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration stating:
"[T]he end of the line ... the drop-dead date, is 120 days." We
agree.
Plaintiffs rely on Burns, supra, 166 N.J. at 471-72, in
support of their argument. In Burns, however, the expert's report
was in the hands of plaintiffs' counsel before the complaint was
filed. Plaintiffs' counsel inadvertently failed to serve it on
defendants within the sixty-day period required by the statute but
did serve it within the sixty-day extension period, albeit he
failed to seek leave to do so. The Supreme Court held "that an
affidavit submitted within the sixty-day extension period should be
considered timely filed so long as good cause is found by the trial
court." Id. at 471-72.
In Galik, plaintiff served an unsworn copy of the expert's
report on defendants' carriers before the complaint was filed and
moved for leave to file the sworn version within 120 days of the
date defendants' answers were filed. Under those circumstances, the
Supreme Court found that plaintiff had substantially complied with
the statute. Id. at 351.
Here, plaintiffs' counsel did not even send the draft
affidavit to plaintiffs' physician until November 7, 2001 -- 105
days after the answer was filed -- and did not have the signed
affidavit in hand when the motion was argued on January 4, 2002 --
160 days after the answer was filed. Moreover, counsel provided no
reasonable explanation other than that the affidavit was not
returned by the doctor before expiration of the 120 days. Judge
Herman inquired how far the physician's office was from counsel's
and counsel responded that it was a half hour away. Under the
circumstances, it was reasonable to expect plaintiffs or counsel to
contact the physician directly in order to obtain the affidavit
within the requisite 120 days.
We are satisfied that Judge Herman correctly interpreted and
applied the law to the undisputed facts. Judson v. Peoples Bank &
Trust Co. of Westfield,
17 N.J. 67, 75 (1954); Brill v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
142 N.J. 520, 530 (1995).; R. 4:46-2.
Affirmed.
Footnote: 1 1 Judge Braithwaite did not participate in oral argument. However, the parties consented to his participation in the decision.