SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
A-6969-94T5
A-6967-94T5
T.S.R.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
J.C.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
THE P.C.U.S.A.; THE P.S. OF
THE N.; THE P. OF E.; THE P.C.
AT P; JANE DOE(S) AND JOHN
DOE(S), MEMBERS OF THE S.
OF THE P.C. AT P.,
Defendants.
____________________________________
H.W.H., Jr. and K.H.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
J.C.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
THE P.C.U.S.A.; THE P. OF E.;
THE P.C. AT P.; JANE DOE(S),
MEMBERS OF THE S. OF THE P.C. AT P.;
THE O.T.P.C.; JANE DOE(S) and
JOHN DOE(S), MEMBERS OF THE S.
OF THE O.T.P.C.,
Defendants.
__________________________________________________
Argued: November 29, 1995 - Decided: February
29, 1996
Before Judges King, Landau and Kleiner.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County.
Robert W. Smith argued the cause for appellant
(Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, attorneys; Mr.
Smith, of counsel and on the brief).
John W. Thatcher argued the cause for
respondents (Thatcher & Lanza, attorneys;
Franklin G. Whittlesey, on the brief).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
KING, P.J.A.D.
These cases involve two claims for compensatory and punitive damages for sexual molestation brought pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1 against a minister, his local church and its hierarchy. The defendants want the case to proceed against them secretly and anonymously, at least to the stage of a ruling on the validity of their statute-of-limitation defense. The plaintiffs want full public disclosure. The Law Division judge ruled against anonymity of the parties or events to any extent. We granted leave to appeal to examine his ruling and now affirm. R. 2:2-3(b).
Plaintiffs H.W.H. and T.S.R. filed separate civil complaints on about February 7, 1995. They alleged that they were "sexually molested and battered," in violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1, by defendant J.C., their former minister. The plaintiffs used the full names of all parties. Both plaintiffs also named as defendants the churches which employed and supervised J.C. as well
as supervising members or officials of those churches and the
church hierarchy. T.S.R. and H.W.H. sought to hold the defendants
"jointly and severally liable for compensatory damages, punitive
damages, interest, costs of suit, attorney fees and such other
relief as the Court or jury may deem proper, in accordance with
N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1," a relatively new statute, L. 1992, c. 109,
providing a cause of action for sexual abuse.
On February 14, 1995 defendant J.C. filed motions for
emergency relief, requesting an order: (1) requiring that the
complaints be dismissed or immediately sealed, (2) prohibiting
plaintiffs from filing any further pleadings or documents
containing names, addresses, or identities, and (3) imposing
sanctions upon plaintiffs' counsel. Judge Nicola entered orders
dated April 17 sealing the filed documents, dismissing the
complaints, and allowing plaintiffs to refile their complaints
using initials or fictitious names. The order also provided that
all depositions, hearings, and court proceedings be conducted in
closed sessions, not open to the public.
On April 28 plaintiffs filed motions for reconsideration.
Judge Nicola then recused himself for undisclosed reasons and Judge
Hamlin heard the motions for reconsideration, reasoning that "given
the weight of the issue, the short notice return date. . . , and
the seriousness of the issue, [] equity requires that the Court
reconsider the issue." See Johnson v. Cyklop Strapping Corp.,
220 N.J. Super. 250, 263 (App. Div. 1987). In orders dated July 7,
1995, Judge Hamlin granted plaintiffs' motions for reconsideration
and rescinded the orders entered by Judge Nicola. Judge Hamlin's
orders also provided for an automatic stay pending J.C.'s motion
for leave to appeal and this court's resolution of that motion. We
granted leave to appeal and consolidated the cases on August 21,
1995.
Plaintiffs allege that J.C. repeatedly sexually molested
T.S.R. and H.W.H. from 1979 through 1982. When these incidents
occurred, plaintiffs were between ages eleven and thirteen. Both
plaintiffs are now in their late twenties. J.C. was the minister
of the church attended by plaintiffs' families, and he allegedly
used their trust in him and the authority of his position to
perpetrate these assaults and to insure the boys' silence.
Plaintiffs also allege that the defendant church officials
conducted an investigation and decided to proceed with formal
church charges against J.C. but that he chose to leave the ministry
and thus to forego a formal inquiry. In contrast, J.C. contends
that he was forced from his ministry by plaintiffs' baseless
accusations.
Though defendants have not yet filed answers to the
complaints, J.C. contends through counsel that he "denies the
substance of any and all allegations of sexual misconduct." He
also considers the claims "frivolous" since he believes them time-barred, as this is not a repressed-memory case. J.C. stresses
that both T.S.R. and H.W.H. would have been well aware of any
offensive conduct from the outset, had it occurred.
The record also discloses that the church has circulated at
least three letters among its congregants during August of 1994
relating to the allegations made by T.S.R. and H.W.H. The letters
do not name T.S.R. and H.W.H. but they do name J.C. Apparently,
the letters were widely circulated within the congregation,
although each contains a caution asking members to keep the matter
within the "church family."
Judge Nicola originally granted the protective orders sought by the defense, holding that N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1 requires that real names not be used for any parties when complaints are brought under the statute. We disagree and find that the statute grants only the plaintiff-victim the option of refusing to disclose identifying information.
N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1(f) L.1992, c. 109, §1. provides:
(1) The name, address, and identity of a
victim or a defendant shall not appear on the
complaint or any other public record as
defined in P.L.1963, c, 73 (C. 47:1A-1 et
seq.). In their place initials or a
fictitious name shall appear.
(2) Any report, statement, photograph, court
document, complaint or any other public record
which states the name, address and identity of
a victim shall be confidential and unavailable
to the public.
(3) The information described in this subsection shall remain confidential and unavailable to the public unless the victim consents to the disclosure or if the court, after a hearing, determines that good cause exists for the disclosure. The hearing shall be held after notice has been made to the
victim and to the defendant and the
defendant's counsel.
(4) Nothing contained herein shall prohibit
the court from imposing further restrictions
with regard to the disclosure of the name,
address, and identity of the victim when it
deems it necessary to prevent trauma or stigma
to the victim. [emphasis supplied.]
When resolving questions of statutory construction, our
function is to implement the intent of the legislature. See, e.g.,
State v. Sutton,
132 N.J. 471, 479 (1993); State v. Maguire,
84 N.J. 508, 514 (1980). If the plain language of the statute is
clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the text to
determine legislative intent. State v. Butler,
89 N.J. 220, 226
(1982). With regard to N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1(f), the clear language of
section f(3) provides for the disclosure of parties' identities in
two circumstances .... if the victim consents or if a judge decides
that good cause exists.
Arguably, however, an ambiguity arises when considering
section f(3) in tandem with section f(1), which simply states that
initials or fictitious names "shall" be used for all parties. When
a statute includes provisions which appear inconsistent, we must
examine the history and purpose of the act in order to ascertain
the underlying or true legislative intent. Sutton, supra, 132 N.J.
at 479. We also must seek an interpretation that will "make the
most consistent whole of the statute." State v. A.N.J.,
98 N.J. 421, 424 (1985).
The legislative history of the statute does not directly
address this seeming conflict. Judge Hamlin concluded that the
"overriding concern" of the statute was to protect the victim.
Though he expressed concern that innocent people might be wrongly
accused of sexual misconduct, he concluded:
It seems to me relatively clear. . . that the
right to secrecy is one that is at the option
of the victim, of the alleged victim. . . .
I am satisfied that given the overall
nature of the language of the statute and the
use of the terms "victim" and "shall," that a
clear reading, even where there is some
ambiguity, must be resolved in favor of the
remedial purpose, to protect the victims of
sexual misconduct.
This is a reasonable conclusion. Sections f(1) and f(2) set out the general rule of non-disclosure. Section f(3) seems clearly intended to provide exceptions to that general rule; the information may be made public if the victim consents or if a judge determines, after a hearing, that good cause exists. Also worth noting .... section f(4) allows for "further restrictions" on disclosure if "necessary to prevent trauma or stigma to the victim." Any possible trauma or stigma to the defendant is conspicuously absent as a factor for consideration. Finally, even the fact that section f(1) provides initially and generally for the anonymity of a defendant may well reflect concern for and an intention to protect the identity of the victim only. In many cases of sexual abuse of children, the perpetrator is a parent or
close relative; in such a case, publicly revealing the defendant's
identity would be tantamount to revealing the victim's identity.
The entire tenor of this 1992 statute is the protection of
victim's rights. See Note, "Damages, Duress and the Discovery
Rules: The Statutory Right of Recovery for Victims of Childhood
Sexual Abuse,"
17 Seton Hall L. J. 505, 507 (1993). There is no
suggestion in the act or any of its extant history of any intent to
shield alleged sexual molesters with anonymity if the victim opts
to proceed publicly.
We turn to the question of whether the judge abused his discretion in refusing the defendants' request to allow the litigation to proceed anonymously. R. 1:4-1(a)(1) provides that, generally, every paper filed in an action should identify all of the parties. Further, R. 1:2-1 provides that all proceedings "shall be conducted in open court unless otherwise provided by rule or statute," and prohibits the sealing of court records except "for good cause shown." Courts have inherent "equitable powers . . . over their own process, to prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices." Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart 467 U.S. 20, 35, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 2209, 81 L. Ed.2d 17 (1984). Our Supreme Court recently explained, on August 2, 1995, after this case before us was decided in the Law Division:
There is a presumption of public access to documents and materials filed with a court in connection with civil litigation. That right exists under the common law as to the litigants and the public. . . But the right of
access is not absolute. Under both the common
law and the First Amendment, a court may craft
a protective order. "[T]he strong common law
presumption of access must be balanced against
the factors militating against access. The
burden is on the person who seeks to overcome
the presumption of access to show that the
interest in secrecy outweighs the
presumption."
[Hammock by Hammock v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc.,
142 N.J. 356, 378 (1995).]
As we have stated, "[U]nder case law and the Rules of Court, a
judge has some discretion to relax R. 1:2-1 and enter an order
limiting or even prohibiting access to certain judicial proceedings
and records." Zukerman v. Piper Pools,
256 N.J. Super. 622, 627
(App. Div. 1992).
Defendant J.C. urges that, even if anonymity is not required
by statute, he has shown sufficient good cause to require that his
anonymity be protected for equitable reasons. Although Judge
Hamlin recognized that he could, for equitable reasons, possibly
allow defendant J.C. to litigate anonymously, he declined. He said
that the equitable power to restrict public access "should be
exercised discretely and with great reservation." He pointed out
that other Middlesex County cases involving church officials
accused of sexual abuse were "uniformly open in nature." He also
pointed to the letters circulated by the church and observed that
"the equitable argument loses much of its vitality when, in fact,
the concerned churches themselves, to their own congregants, [are]
revealed by name." We agree with the judge's sound exercise of
discretion in this regard.
Recently, we considered the standards for whether a case
should proceed in anonymity in A.B.C. v. XYZ Corp.,
282 N.J. Super. 494 (App. Div. 1995). Historically, both civil and criminal trials
have been presumptively open. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia,
448 U.S. 555, 580,
100 S. Ct. 2814,
65 L. Ed.2d 973, 992
n. 17 (1980). The United States Supreme Court has observed that
"[w]hat transpires in a courtroom is public property" and the
judiciary does not possess a right, "as distinguished from other
institutions of democratic government, to suppress, edit, or censor
events which transpire in proceedings before it." Craig v. Harney,
331 U.S. 367,374,
67 S. Ct. 1249, 1254,
91 L. Ed. 1546, 1551
(1947).
As we have explained:
Court proceedings are public proceedings
and the names of the parties and their
addresses are essential not only to identify
the various parties, but also in connection
with aspects of the judicial process such as
discovery, motion practice, jury selection,
and execution to enforce money judgments. As
a corollary, proper identification of a party
assures against misidentification of some
other party as being involved. There is a
constitutional and customary presumption of
openness in all judicial proceedings, except
in juvenile court proceedings.
[A.B.C., supra, 282 N.J. Super. at 499.]
Though this presumption of openness exists, it can be overcome. Our Supreme Court has acknowledged that disguising the identity of litigants "serves a legitimate end where the interests of minor
children are concerned, as well as upon other miscellaneous but
rare occasions." Stern v. Stern,
66 N.J. 340, 343 n.1 (1975).
There is no bright-line rule available for determining whether
specific circumstances present one of these rare occasions. We
observed in A.B.C. that federal courts have used a balancing test,
weighing the public interest in open proceedings against the
particularized injury which a party will suffer if anonymity is
lost. A.B.C., supra, 282 N.J. Super. at 501. In Doe v. Stegall,
653 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1981), for example, the court allowed a
mother and her children to use fictitious names when challenging
the constitutionality of prayer and bible reading in Mississippi
public schools, reasoning that the plaintiffs faced a realistic
fear of harassment and violence. Id. at 186. The Fifth Circuit
stated:
We advance no hard and fast formula for
ascertaining whether a party may sue
anonymously. The decision requires a
balancing of considerations calling for
maintenance of a party's privacy against the
customary and constitutionally-embedded
presumption of openness in judicial
proceedings. [Ibid.]
In Doe v. Frank,
951 F.2d 320 (11th Cir. 1992), the plaintiff
sought to proceed anonymously when prosecuting a claim alleging
that he had been discriminated against because of his alcoholism.
The court concluded that anonymity was not appropriate, stating:
[T]he stigma involved in Doe's disclosure does
not rise to the level necessary to overcome
the presumption of openness in judicial
proceedings. . . .
Lawsuits are public events. A plaintiff
should be permitted to proceed anonymously
only in those exceptional cases involving
matters of a highly sensitive and personal
nature, real danger of physical harm, or where
the injury litigated against would be incurred
as a result of the disclosure of a plaintiff's
identity. The risk that a plaintiff may
suffer some embarrassment is not enough. [Id.
at 324.]
Similarly, the court in Coe v. U.S. District Court for the District
of Colorado,
676 F.2d 411 (10th Cir. 1982), found that the public
interest in open proceedings outweighed the privacy interest of a
physician accused of sexual misconduct with his patients. Id. at
418.
In A.B.C., we considered whether a plaintiff who alleged that
his former employer had violated the Law Against Discrimination by
firing him because he was afflicted with a sexual disorder known as
exhibitionism should be permitted to proceed anonymously. Relying
on the federal cases we have discussed, the A.B.C. panel held that
anonymity was not appropriate, stating:
Common sense dictates that the disclosure of
the identity of this plaintiff is not
protected by any statute or rule of court and
would be no more detrimental than disclosure
of the identity of the doctor accused of
sexual impropriety in Coe v. United States
District Court, or of the alcoholic plaintiff
in Doe v. Frank * * *
Although in certain rare circumstances a
litigant's interest in privacy may overcome
the constitutional presumption in favor of
open court proceedings, mere embarrassment or
a desire to avoid the potential criticism
attendant to litigation will not suffice.
[A.B.C., supra, 282 N.J. Super. at 503, 505.]
J.C. argues that "disclosure will work a clearly defined and
serious injury to [him] and his family." He maintains that "[t]o
allow this case to proceed without a protective order will most
likely result in public dissemination of baseless and/or meritless
allegations of sexual misconduct and further damage the lives,
reputations and dignity of defendant J.C. and his family." If, as
J.C. suggests, these mere accusations are tantamount to an
irreparable injury sufficient to outweigh the public's interest in
open proceedings, then he is really asking us to effectively grant
all defendants accused of sexual abuse in civil cases the right to
defend anonymously, a result which hardly comports with a
philosophy granting anonymity only in rare circumstances.
While public allegations of sexual abuse may embarrass or
stigmatize J.C., his argument does not accord sufficient weight to
the policy reasons underlying the presumption of public access to
court documents and proceedings. J.C. points to the fact that
plaintiffs' counsel has suggested that the possibility of public
disclosure would provide an incentive to settlement and urges us
not to "condone these improper, bad faith motives for requesting
that this matter proceed publicly." But there are other weighty
considerations. The pertinent statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1, does not
favor defendants' position. The defendant church has already
circulated to its membership information identifying the defendant
J.C. and discussing the underlying allegations. The public should
not be excluded from information already widely disseminated.
The public has a strong interest in open access to court
records and proceedings. Our Supreme Court, in deciding whether a
citizen-advocacy group intervening in a products liability action
ought to have access to discovery-related documents which had been
placed under seal, recently examined the strength of the public's
interest in court proceedings. In Hammock by Hammock, supra, 142
N.J. at 356, the Court stated:
Independent of the interests of the parties
and their attorneys in the litigation that
comes before our courts, there is a profound
public interest when matters of health, safety
and consumer fraud are involved. . . That
heightened interest requires that trial courts
be more circumspect when deciding whether to
seal or unseal records used in litigation.
[Id. at 379.]
As one commentator has explained, access to open judicial
proceedings and the parties' identities
tends to sharpen public scrutiny of the
judicial process, to increase confidence in
the administration of the law, to enhance the
therapeutic value of judicial proceedings, and
to serve the structural function of the first
amendment by enabling informed discussion of
judicial operations.
[Joan Steinman, Public Trial, Pseudonymous
Parties: When Should Litigants be Permitted to
Keep Their Identities Confidential?,
37
Hastings L.J. 1, 36 (1985).]
Steinman observes the cases also suggest that sometimes a greater
than ordinary public interest exists in disclosure of a litigant's
identity. Cases that involve public servants such as judges or
members of Congress are often in this category. Individuals who
have professional responsibilities to the public, e.g., doctors and
lawyers, may also be included. "By virtue of their societal roles,
such persons have a reduced expectation of privacy as to some
matters because the public has a legitimate interest in their
activities." Steinman, supra,
37 Hastings L.J. at 84. And
further:
There is also an unusually great public
interest in the litigant's identity when the
litigant poses a threat to the community.
Thus, there is a public interest in knowing
who is likely to be physically dangerous
because of drug addiction or mental illness,
and in knowing who has allegedly acted
criminally or in violation of professional
ethics.
[Ibid.]
A minister such as J.C. might well be considered to have a
responsibility to the public equivalent to a doctor or lawyer, and
if these allegations are true, he also surely "acted criminally or
in violation of professional ethics." Steinman also suggests that
the use of pseudonyms:
may tend to undermine the confidence of the
public in the administration of the law.
Intuitively, one feels less able to judge the
fairness of judicial proceedings pursued by
unknown parties. Even if the record reveals
enough about the plaintiff or defendant to
allow an apparently adequate appraisal of the
proceedings, the record may not quell all
suspicions that the secret identity of a party
or parties influenced the decision. The
appearance of fairness is thus lost.
[Id. at 36.]
We have also observed that disclosure of names may serve a defendant's interests, since "[d]efendant might well be . . .
perceived as a wrongdoer by the very fact of anonymity alone."
A.B.C., supra, 282 N.J. Super. at 504. "Regardless of any
inconvenience defendant may face in these civil proceedings, it
must be remembered that `the law is not compelling the parties to
do anything but disclose the truth.'" Shaw v. Riverdell Hospital,
150 N.J. Super. 585, 591 (Law Div. 1977) (quoting National Freight,
Inc. v. Ostroff,
133 N.J. Super. 554, 559 (Law Div. 1975). If the
allegations are baseless, public records and public proceedings
are, in part, designed to lead to public exoneration.
In addition, disclosure eliminates the danger that individuals
or entities not connected with the litigation might be wrongfully
perceived as involved and damaged by insinuation. A.B.C., supra,
282 N.J. Super. at 504-05. "The potential implications and
complications are virtually limitless." Id. at 505. Absent a
strong showing by the party urging anonymity of particularized
harm, allowing a "proceeding to go forward under a veil of secrecy
. . . would be more like a throw-back to the long-since discarded
star-chamber proceedings." Ibid.
Finally, J.C. contends that his claim for anonymity should
prevail because he invokes it only until resolution of the statute
of limitations issue. If he loses on that issue, the cloak of
anonymity could then be lifted. Since this is not a "repressed
memory" case, the defense is confident that the statute of
limitations defense will prevail.
The claim for "temporary anonymity" pending resolution of the
time-bar issue has a surface appeal but is complicated in this
particular situation by the sexual abuse statute's, N.J.S.A.
2A:61B-1(b) and (c), peculiar period of limitations sections, which
state:
b. In any civil action for injury or
illness based on sexual abuse, the cause of
action shall accrue at the time of reasonable
discovery of the injury and its causal
relationship to the act of sexual abuse. Any
such action shall be brought within two years
after reasonable discovery.
c. Nothing in this act is intended to
preclude the court from finding that the
statute of limitations was tolled in case
because of the plaintiff's mental state,
duress by the defendant, or any other
equitable grounds. Such a finding shall be
made after a plenary hearing, conducted in the
presence of the jury. At the plenary hearing
the court shall hear all credible evidence and
the Rules of Evidence shall not apply, except
for Rule 4 or a valid claim of privilege. The
court may order an independent psychiatric
evaluation of the plaintiff in order to assist
in the determination sa to whether the statute
of limitations was tolled. [Emphasis
supplied.]
The plaintiffs will contend on remand that because of J.C.'s
position of trust and authority and their particular vulnerability
and psychological distress the normal two-year statute of
limitations should be tolled, despite the lapse of about a dozen
years or more since the actionable events, i.e., "because of
plaintiff's mental state, duress by the defendant, or other
equitable grounds." N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1(c).
Resolution of this issue in our practice invariably calls for
a factual hearing and decision, usually in advance of trial, before
a judge, not a jury. See Lopez v. Swyer,
62 N.J. 267, 274-76
(1983); Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, R. 4:5-4, Comment 33.
But the peculiar language of section (c) in N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1 casts
doubt upon whether the customary Lopez procedure applies to cases
brought under this statute which requires that "such a finding [of
tolling] shall be made after a plenary hearing, conducted in the
presence of the jury." This precise question has not been briefed
or argued before us and we hesitate to advance an authoritative
opinion on the point, especially since there may be constitutional
implications concerning a legislative attempt at allocation of
functions between judge and jury in civil damage actions. N.J.
Const., art. VI, § 2, par. 3; see George Seigler Co. v. Norton,
8 N.J. 374, 382-83 (1952) (statute could not mandate submission of
issue of contributory negligence to the jury). The statute before
us clearly contemplates a resolution of the tolling issue only
after a jury is impaneled and listens to the evidence on the issue.
The statute unfortunately does not specify whether the actual
decision on tolling is made by the judge or the jury. There is no
particularly enlightening legislative history on this point.
N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1 seems clearly to contemplate a right to a
jury trial, if demanded. The statute makes several references to
a jury, in addition to subsection (c) quoted above. See N.J.S.A.
2A:61B-1(d)(1) (evidence of victim's previous sexual conduct not
usually available to jury); N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1(e)(1) (use of closed
circuit TV for testimony of victim out of jury's presence).
However, the statute does not specifically confer the right to a
trial by jury for this statutory cause of action, as the Law
Against Discrimination does. N.J.S.A. 10:5-13; L. 1990, c. 2, § 2;
see Shaner v. Horizon Bank Corp.,
116 N.J. 433 (1989). The
Judiciary Committee Statement (Senate No. 257, L. 1992, c. 109),
accompanying N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1 is not helpful. It simply states,
with reference to the supposedly "clarifying amendments" relating
to subsection (c):
In addition, the amendments clarify that
a plenary hearing shall be held in the
presence of the jury when the issue of
"tolling" of the statute of limitations is
raised in a case alleging sexual abuse.
We must suggest that more clarification is needed from the
Legislature. In the meantime, in the absence of any clear evidence
of legislative intent that the jury, not the judge, decide the
tolling issue, trial courts should follow the time-proven technique
of Lopez v. Swyer, supra, and retain their decision-making power on
the tolling issue, including conducting a hearing before the jury
is impaneled, especially if practical and agreeable to the parties.
See Oswin v. Shaw,
129 N.J. 290, 310 (1992) (doubt about the
meaning of statutes resolved in favor of effect which makes the
least rather than the most change in the common law); accord
Dattoli v. Yanelli, __ F. Supp. __ (D.N.J. 1995).
Obviously, as we previously observed in A.B.C. v. XYZ Corp.,
supra, 282 N.J. Super. at 504, cases cannot realistically proceed
to verdict anonymously in a jury trial context.
[I]n order to question potential jurors on voir dire about their knowledge of any of the parties. . . the names of the parties would
have to be disclosed in open court to the
jurors. Even if the jury selection process
was somehow conducted in secret, it is
unlikely that a juror could be precluded from
disclosing the names of the parties.
[A.B.C., supra, 282 N.J. Super. at 504.]
We are satisfied that the judge was justified and did not
abuse his discretion by declining defendants' application to allow
this lawsuit to proceed anonymously, whether or not we are correct
in our ruling that the judge retains decision-making authority on
the tolling issue. We stay this ruling for the time period during
which appellants may apply to the Supreme Court for further review.
Affirmed.