(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of
the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity,
portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued January 4, 2000 -- Decided April 5, 2000
STEIN, J., writing for a majority of the Court.
In this appeal, the Court considers the extent to which the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of
1995 (ICCTA) preempts the state regulation of railroads.
In 1992, New York Susquehanna & Western Railway Corporation (Railroad) began construction on a train
maintenance facility in the Village of Ridgefield Park (Village). The Railroad has maintained a right-of-way through the
Village for over a century. The maintenance facility is located in a light-industrial area that is near a residential area and
park. The facility is used primarily to refuel locomotives, add oil to crankcases, and for other maintenance functions. At
the facility, there are up to thirteen diesel locomotives idling for hours at a time. The facility has prompted complaints
from Village officials and residents about noise, fumes, soot, and ground vibrations.
The Railroad began construction at the Village site without applying for zoning or construction permits or
otherwise informing the Village of its plans. The Village contacted the Railroad in May 1992 to request information about
the ongoing construction and to inform the Railroad that it was required to apply for permits. The Railroad responded with
certain information and further assured the Village that it would inform the Village and apply for permits if it decided on
any further construction in the future.
In June and July 1992, the Village and the Railroad discussed plans for the Railroad's construction of an engine
house to minimize noise and air pollution. Throughout those discussions, construction on the maintenance facility
continued, without application by the Railroad for zoning or construction permits. Between June 1992 and early 1993, the
maintenance facility became operational, but the plans for the engine house had not progressed. The Village received no
response to its subsequent inquiries in respect of construction of the engine house, which was never built.
In November 1993, the Village filed suit against the Railroad seeking a determination requiring it to obtain
municipal permits, to permit municipal inspections, to cease the maintenance of a public nuisance, and to cease operations
at the maintenance facility until the municipal requirements were met. The Village alleged that the facility threatened the
public health, safety, and welfare.
In February 1998, the trial court granted the Railroad's motion for summary judgment, finding that pursuant to the
ICCTA, the Surface Transportation Board (STB) exercises exclusive regulatory jurisdiction over matters relating to
authorization of construction of railroad facilities. The trial court noted that a contrary ruling would allow the Village to
interfere with railroad activity in contravention of the ICCTA's stated purpose of decreasing regulation of railroads.
The Appellate Division affirmed, with modifications, the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Railroad.
The panel concluded that all state action with any economic impact on railroads was preempted by the ICCTA and that the
states retained a certain residuum of historic police powers, but not those related to railroad service, operations and physical
properties or structures.
The Supreme Court granted the Village's petition for certification. Thereafter, but prior to argument before the
Court, the STB preliminarily interpreted the preemptive effect of the ICCTA in the matter. In its decision, the STB stated
that the ICCTA preempts all municipal zoning regulations as applied to railroads. The STB further found that local land
use restrictions are preempted because they can be used to frustrate transportation-related activities and interfere with
interstate commerce. However, because the manner in which land-use restrictions interfere with interstate commerce is a
“fact-bound question,” the STB declined to decide the issue comprehensively without the participation of the Railroad. It
therefore deferred its decision in that respect.
In respect of public health and safety matters, the STB determined that although state and local government
entities retain certain police powers and may apply non-discriminatory regulation to protect public health and safety, their
actions must not have the effect of foreclosing or restricting the railroad's ability to conduct its operations. In respect of
building codes, the STB determined that railroads are exempt from the traditional permitting process but not from most
other generally applicable laws, such as certain local fire, health, safety, and construction regulations and inspections.
The STB retained jurisdiction in the matter and will issue a final opinion after submissions from the parties in that
case, noting specifically that there may be additional unresolved preemption issues on which the Village and the Railroad
may need clarification.
HELD: Although the village of Ridgefield Park may not require permits of the New York Susquehanna & Western
Railway Corporation, the Railroad must notify the Village when it is undertaking an activity for which another entity
would require a permit; the Village may enforce its local fire, health, plumbing, safety and construction regulations to the
Railroad's maintenance facility, and the Railroad may not deny the Village access for reasonable inspection of its
maintenance facility.
1. Preemption is not to be lightly presumed and the historic police powers of the States are not to be superseded by federal
law unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. (pp. 8-9)
2. The STB's preliminary decision is analytically consistent with the Appellate Division's interpretation of the ICCTA.
(pp. 19-20)
3. State courts generally have jurisdiction to enforce rights deriving from federal statutory law. (pp. 20-21)
4. The Village may enforce its local fire, health, plumbing, safety and construction regulations to the extent that they are
applicable to the existing maintenance facility, and the Railroad may not deny the Village access for reasonable inspection
of that facility. (pp. 20-21)
5. Because the parties voluntarily commenced the site plan review process before the litigation commenced, the Railroad's
ability to conduct its operations will not be foreclosed or restricted by requiring it to submit again to the site plan review.
(pp. 22-23)
6. Our courts cannot adjudicate common law nuisance claims against the Railroad because to do so would infringe on the
STB's exclusive jurisdiction over the location and operations of railroad facilities. (p. 24)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is MODIFIED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for such
further proceedings as may be required to implement the Court's disposition.
JUSTICE LONG filed a separate dissenting opinion. Justice Long would affirm the decision of the Appellate
Division requiring the matter to proceed before the STB. She believed that the Court's ruling in the matter was premature
and out of conformity with the principles of preemption and the well-established rule that litigation is to proceed in a
cohesive, and not piecemeal, manner.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES O'HERN and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE STEIN's opinion.
JUSTICE LONG filed a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICES GARIBALDI and VERNIERO joined.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
101 September Term 1999
VILLAGE OF RIDGEFIELD PARK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NEW YORK SUSQUEHANNA & WESTERN
RAILWAY CORPORATION, A
Corporation authorized to do
business in New Jersey,
Defendant-Respondent.
Argued January 4, 2000-- Decided April 5, 2000
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division.
Martin T. Durkin and Lewis P. Goldshore
argued the cause for appellant (Durkin &
Boggia and Goldshore & Wolf, attorneys).
J.S. Lee Cohen argued the cause for
respondent (DeCotiis, Fitzpatrick & Gluck,
attorneys; Kevin M. Kinsella, on the brief).
Thomas W. Dunn submitted a letter in lieu of
brief on behalf of amici curiae, New Jersey
State League of Municipalities and New
Jersey Institute of Municipal Attorneys
(William John Kearns, Jr., General Counsel,
attorney).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
STEIN, J.
This appeal requires the Court to decide the extent to which
the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995
(ICCTA),
49 U.S.C.A.
§§701 to 727 and §§ 10101 to 16106,
preempts the state regulation of railroads. Plaintiff Village of
Ridgefield Park (Village) alleges that Defendant New York,
Susquehanna and Western Railway Corporation (Railroad) is
maintaining a nuisance at its facility in the Village. The
Village seeks to enjoin that nuisance and to regulate the
Railroad facility pursuant to generally applicable health,
safety, zoning, and land use laws. The Appellate Division held
that the ICCTA preemption of state economic regulation of
railroads includes state regulations with any economic impact on
the Railroad, including state health, safety, zoning, and land
use laws.
318 N.J. Super. 385 (App. Div. 1999). Although the
Appellate Division acknowledged that a regulatory "no-man's land"
would be intolerable, it held that the Village must first seek
relief from the Surface Transportation Board (STB), the federal
agency charged with regulating the economic aspects of
railroading. Id. at 404.
Subsequent to the filing of the Appellate Division's
opinion, the STB addressed the preemptive effect of the ICCTA and
concluded that local municipalities were permitted to exercise
more extensive regulatory authority over railroads than was
contemplated by the Appellate Division's disposition. In view of
the STB's interpretation of the ICCTA, we modify the judgment of
the Appellate Division and remand the matter to the Law Division
for further proceedings in conformance with this opinion.
In 1992 the Railroad began construction on a train maintenance facility in the Village. Previously, the Railroad operated another maintenance facility, “the Little Ferry Yard,” in the nearby Borough of Ridgefield, moving its present site after selling the Borough facility to another railroad. The Railroad and its predecessors have maintained a right-of-way through the Village for over a century. The present facility is located in a light-industrial area that is near a residential area and a park. The facility is used primarily to refuel locomotives, add oil to crankcases, water to radiators, and sand to on-board reservoirs for traction in wet rail conditions. At the facility, there are up to thirteen diesel locomotives idling for hours at a time. The facility has elicited complaints from Village officials and residents about noise, fumes, soot, and ground vibrations.
The Railroad began construction at the Village site without applying for zoning or construction permits or otherwise informing the Village of its plans. The Village contacted the Railroad in May 1992 to request information about the ongoing construction at the site and to inform the Railroad that it was required to apply for permits. On June 1, 1992, Robert A. Kurdock, Vice President of the Railroad, responded, stating that the newly installed sidetrack would be used as “a location to perform Federal Railroad Administration required services and inspections on our locomotives.” Kurdock assured the Village that if the railroad decided “to build any more” it would inform the Village and apply for any required permits.
In June and July 1992, the Railroad and Village officials discussed the Railroad's plans to build an engine house at the site to minimize noise and air pollution, and the Railroad delivered a rendering of the proposed engine house. In a July 24, 1992 letter, counsel for the Railroad described the Railroad's plans to build the engine house at the maintenance facility “as soon as practicable” in response to the Village's concerns. The engine house was intended to hold trains during cold weather and to contain toilet and office facilities. The letter further stated that the maintenance facility would be operated primarily during daylight and early evening hours.
Throughout the discussions between the Railroad and Village about the engine house, construction on the maintenance facility was continuing, but the Railroad had not yet applied for zoning or construction permits. When the construction was complete, the Railroad had added a sidetrack adjacent to the main railway and placed on it five rail cars, consisting of three boxcars that allegedly house offices, shops and bathroom facilities, and two permanent 20,000 gallon diesel tank cars with pumping equipment. The Railroad also erected a sand tower to facilitate the loading of sand into locomotive holding tanks. It installed drip pans in the ground adjacent to the fueling area to catch fuel that drips during the refueling process. It also installed a hand-pumped septic system because the Village had not given the Railroad permission to connect to the municipal sewer line.
Between June 1992 and early 1993, the maintenance facility became operational, but the plans for the engine house had not progressed. In March and May 1993, the Village wrote to the Railroad in an attempt to learn when construction on the engine house would begin. In a May 12, 1993 letter, George D. Fosdick, the mayor of the Village, again wrote concerning the Village's growing concerns:
We mutually agreed not to pursue litigation over the location of this facility . . . and in return, New York, Susquehanna and Western Railway agreed to commence construction of the engine house this spring. . . .
Within the past year, the situation has continued to become progressively worse. In fact, during several public municipal meetings, numerous Ridgefield Park residents that reside in the affected area have complained that the noise emanating from the idling trains, coupled with the unpleasant odor of diesel fuel is unbearable.
The Village received no response to its March and May letters to the Railroad, and the proposed engine house was never built.
The Village instituted this action in November 1993, seeking a determination requiring the Railroad to obtain municipal permits, to permit municipal inspections, to cease the maintenance of a public nuisance, and to cease operations at the maintenance facility until the municipal requirements were met. The Village alleged that the Railroad was in violation of local zoning ordinances and that the Railroad had breached an implied contract to construct an engine house designed to minimize noise and air pollution. The Village further alleged that the “excessive noise and noxious fumes have destroyed the peace and quiet enjoyment of a residential neighborhood,” and that the public health, safety, and welfare were threatened. The Village supported its request for equitable relief with affidavits of neighbors affected by the maintenance facility and of Village officials who were refused entry in their efforts to inspect the maintenance facility.
In February 1998 the trial court granted the Railroad's summary judgment motion because it found that pursuant to the ICCTA the STB exercises exclusive regulatory jurisdiction over matters relating to authorization of construction of railroad facilities. The court noted that a contrary holding would allow the Village to interfere with railroad activity in contravention of the ICCTA's stated purpose of decreasing regulation of railroads.
The Appellate Division affirmed, with modifications, the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the Railroad. Village of Ridgefield Park v. New York, Susquehanna and Western Railway Corp., 318 N.J. Super. 385 (App. Div. 1999). The Appellate Division concluded “that all state action with any economic impact on railroads was preempted by the Act and that the states retained a certain residuum of historic police powers, but presumably those not related to railroad service, operations and physical properties or structures.” Id. at 399.
We granted the Village's petition for certification. 160 N.J. 476 (1999). On September 9, 1999, prior to argument before this Court, the STB preliminarily interpreted the preemptive effect of the ICCTA in Borough of Riverdale Petition for Declaratory Order, The New York Susquehanna and Western Railway Corporation, 1 999 WL 715272 (S.T.B. September 9, 1999), available in <http://www.stb.dot.gov>, STB Finance Docket No. 33466. The Riverdale proceeding involved that Borough's attempt to require permits and to otherwise restrict the Railroad's construction and operation of a truck terminal and food processing facility on its property. We now affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division, but modify that judgment to reflect the STB's less preemptive Riverdale decision. We remand to the Law Division for further proceedings in anticipation of the STB's more comprehensive interpretation of the preemptive effect of the ICCTA in its final Riverdale decision.
The ICCTA was passed in late 1995 and became effective January 1, 1996. 49 U.S.C.A. §§701 to 727; §§ 10101 to 16106. It was passed “to abolish the Interstate Commerce Commission” and “to reform economic regulation of transportation.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-311, at 1 (1995), reprinted in 1 995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 793.
Consistent with the nature of federalism, “[w]e begin by noting that pre-emption is not to be lightly presumed and that the historic police powers of the States are not to be superseded by federal law unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v. N.M., 157 N.J. 602, 615 (1999)(brackets and citations omitted). The primary source of Congress' intent is the language of the preemptive statute and the statutory framework surrounding it. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484-85, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2250, 135 L. Ed.2d 700, 715-16 (1996)(citations omitted).
According to the “General Jurisdiction” provision of the ICCTA, the STB has jurisdiction over
transportation by rail carrier that is_
(A) only by railroad; or
(B) by railroad and water, when the transportation is under common control, management, or arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment.
[ 49 U.S.C.A. §10501(a)(1)(A) and (B).]
The “General Jurisdiction” provision further provides:
The jurisdiction of the [STB] over
(1) transportation by rail carriers, and the
remedies provided in this part with respect
to rates, classifications, rules (including
car service, interchange, and other operating
rules), practices, routes, services, and
facilities of such carriers; and
(2) the construction, acquisition, operation,
abandonment, or discontinuance of spur,
industrial, team, switching, or side tracks,
or facilities, even if the tracks are
located, or intended to be located, entirely
in one State, is exclusive. Except as
otherwise provided in this part, the remedies
provided under this part with respect to
regulation of rail transportation are
exclusive and preempt the remedies provided
under Federal or State law.
[
49 U.S.C.A.
§10501(b)(1) and
(2).]
The ICCTA defines “transportation” as
(A) a locomotive, car, vehicle, vessel,
warehouse, wharf, pier, dock, yard, property,
facility, instrumentality, or equipment of
any kind related to the movement of
passengers or property, or both, by rail,
regardless of ownership or an agreement
concerning use; and
(B) services related to that movement . . .
[
49 U.S.C.A.
§10102(9)(A) and
(B).]
The ICCTA defines “railroad” as
(A) a bridge, car float, lighter, ferry, and
intermodal equipment used by or in connection
with a railroad;
(B) the road used by a rail carrier and owned
by it or operated under an agreement; and
(C) a switch, spur, track, terminal, terminal
facility, and a freight depot, yard, and
ground, used or necessary for transportation;
[
49 U.S.C.A.
§10102(6).]
The ICCTA defines “rail carrier” a
a person providing common carrier railroad
transportation for compensation ...
[
49 U.S.C.A.
§10102(5).]
The Appellate Division interpreted that statutory language
as follows:
The language of the statute does not
expressly limit preemption to strictly
“economic regulation” nor does it state that
the states retain historic police powers over
railroads and their property. We are told,
pursuant to the clear language of the
statute, that the “construction” and
“operation" of the railroad's “facilities”
falls within the Board's express and
exclusive jurisdiction.
49 U.S.C.A.
§10501(b)(1) and (2). By definition, a
railroad's “facility,” “warehouse,” “yard,”
"property," "instrumentality," and "equipment
of any kind related to the movement of
passengers or property," "regardless of
ownership or an agreement concerning use" are
all within the scope of the Act's concept of
“transportation.”
49 U.S.C.A.
§10102(9)(A).
Thus, pursuant to the statutory language, the
Board appears to have exclusive jurisdiction
over everything pertaining to the railroad's
facility in the Village mentioned in the
Act's definition of transportation, i.e., the
tracks and sidetracks, the sand tower, the
lube oil and diesel fueling facilities and
tanks, the converted box cars, the yard
bulls, the proposed engine house, and so on.
The legislative history and policy
surrounding the statute may also be
considered in determining the scope of a
statute's preemption. Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. at 494,
116 S.Ct. 2240. The
section-by-section analysis portion of the
congressional "history" to the ICC
Termination Act, entitled Section. 10301.
General Jurisdiction, for example, states,
This provision replaces the
railroad portion of former Section
10501. Conforming changes are made
to reflect the direct and complete
pre-emption of State economic
regulation of railroads. . . . The
former disclaimer regarding
residual State police powers is
eliminated as unnecessary, in view
of the Federal policy of occupying
the entire field of economic
regulation of the interstate rail
transportation. Although States
retain the police powers reserved
by the Constitution, the Federal
scheme of economic regulation and
deregulation is intended to address
and encompass all such regulation
and to be completely exclusive.
[H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-422, Dec.
18, 1995; (emphasis supplied).]
When the Act was adopted, Congress
retained the section entitled general
jurisdiction, delineated as § 10501.
However, the Congressional intent stated
above with regard to the proposed § 10301
readily applies to § 10501. Both sections
cover the same topic, general jurisdiction.
The only distinction is the section number
assigned. From the language in this
legislative history, Congress surely intended
the Act to preempt all State economic
regulation of railroads. But it is also
apparent from the noted history that Congress
intended the states retain certain police
powers reserved by the Constitution. We
conclude that all state action with any
economic impact on railroads was preempted by
the Act and that the states retained a
certain residuum of historic police powers,
but presumably those not related to railroad
service, operations and physical properties
or structures.
A review of the "Rail Transportation
Policy" section of the Act reveals the Act's
focus is on the deregulation of many aspects
of the interstate railroad system, not only
on strictly economic aspects. For example,
one policy stated is to "reduce regulatory
barriers to entry into and exit from the
industry."
49 U.S.C.A.
§10101(7). Another
policy is to "minimize the need for Federal
regulatory control over the rail
transportation system and to require fair and
expeditious regulatory decisions when
regulation is required."
49 U.S.C.A.
§10101(2). Another policy is to increase
"competition and demand for services.”
49 U.S.C.A.
§10101(1). The “Policy” section
also states that "it is the policy of the
United States Government . . . (8) to operate
transportation facilities and equipment
without detriment to the public health and
safety."
49 U.S.C.A.
§10101(8). The policy
section also states that safety, safe and
suitable working conditions, unlawful
discrimination, anti-trust violations, and
energy conservation are policy
considerations. Id. at (3), (11), (12) and
(14). However, the dominant public policy
emphasis is on a very substantial overall
deregulation of the railroad industry. As
aptly stated in CSX Transportation, Inc. v.
Georgia Public Service Commission, 944
F.Supp. 1573, 1583 (N.D. Ga. 1996), "[b]y
preempting state regulation of railroad
operations, and granting exclusive
jurisdiction over the regulation of almost
all aspects of railroad operations to the
[Board], Congress removes the ability of
states to frustrate its policy of
deregulating and reviving the railroad
industry." The Act obviously intended that
national transportation interests dominate
over parochial concerns and impulses.
[Ridgefield Park, supra, 318
N.J. Super. at 398-400.]
Guided by the doctrines of federal preemption and primary
jurisdiction, the Appellate Division found that the Village must
first seek relief from the STB:
"As the agency with authority delegated from
Congress to implement the provisions of the
ICC Termination Act, the STB is uniquely
qualified to determine whether state law
should be preempted." CSX Transportation,
Inc. v. Georgia Public Service Commission,
944 F.Supp. at 1584 (quoting Medtronic, 518
U.S. at 496,
116 S. Ct. 2240.) The STB may
act on the problem and devise a plan which
gives these troubled citizens a measure of
relief. We cannot presume and have no reason
to believe that the STB will ignore
legitimate citizen complaints. The STB may
also choose to spell out the precise contours
of the residual state police powers which it
finds survive the broadly-phrased federal
preemption statute and are compatible with
the national policy of railroad deregulation
and federal primacy. If so, this present
action will be promptly reinstated at the
trial level upon plaintiff's application and
given every priority towards an expedited
resolution.
[Ridgefield Park, supra, 318 N.J.
Super. at 405-07 (footnote
omitted).]
In its September 1999 decision the STB preliminarily
interpreted the preemptive effect of the ICCTA in Riverdale,
supra, 1
999 WL 715272. In that decision the STB stated that the
ICCTA preempts all municipal zoning regulations as applied to
railroads. “[Z]oning regulations that the Borough would impose
clearly could be used to defeat NYSW's maintenance and upgrading
activities, thus interfering with the efficiency of railroad
operations that are part of interstate commerce. . . . [T]his is
the type of interference that Congress sought to avoid in
enacting section 10501(b).” Id. at *7.
According to the STB, local land use restrictions are
preempted because they “can be used to frustrate
transportation-related activities and interfere with interstate
commerce. To the extent that they are used in this way (e.g.,
that restrictions are placed on where a railroad facility can be
located), courts have found that the local regulations are
preempted by the ICCTA.” Id. at *8. Because the manner in which
land-use restrictions interfere with interstate commerce is a
“fact-bound question,” the STB declined to decide the issue
comprehensively without the participation of the Railroad. Ibid.
Accordingly, the STB deferred its decision about whether land-use
restrictions “if applied in such a way as not to discriminate
against railroads, would significantly interfere with NYSW's
railroad operations and interstate commerce.” Ibid.
Regarding public health and safety matters, the STB
observed:
[R]ecent precedent has made it clear that, to
the extent that they set up legal processes
that could frustrate or defeat railroad
operations, state or local laws that would
impose a local permitting or environmental
process as a prerequisite to the railroad's
maintenance, use, or upgrading of its
facilities are preempted because they would,
of necessity, impinge upon the federal
regulation of interstate commerce. That
means that, while state and local government
entities such as the Borough retain certain
police powers and may apply
non-discriminatory regulation to protect
public health and safety, their actions must
not have the effect of foreclosing or
restricting the railroad's ability to conduct
its operations or otherwise unreasonably
burdening interstate commerce. We cannot go
beyond these general principles here without
more information as to the particular police
power issues that may be involved in this
case.
Ibid. (citations and footnotes
omitted)(emphasis added).]
Regarding building codes, the STB determined that railroads
are exempt from the traditional permitting process but not, as
the railroad argues, from most other generally applicable laws:
Given the broad language of
49 U.S.C. 10501(b) and the case law interpreting it,
our preliminary view is that local entities
such as the Borough can not require that
railroads seek building permits prior to
constructing or using railroad facilities
because of the inherent delay and
interference with interstate commerce that
such requirements would cause. At the same
time, we believe local authorities can take
actions that are necessary and appropriate to
address any genuine emergency on railroad
property, and that interstate railroads such
as NYSW are not exempt from certain local
fire, health, safety and construction
regulations and inspections.
[Id. at *8.]
Although railroads may not be forced to submit to a local
permitting process because of the inherent potential for delay,
railroads generally are still subject to state regulation of
their facilities. The STB specifically determined that
state and local entities can enforce in a
non-discriminatory manner electrical and
building codes, or fire and plumbing
regulations, so long as they do not do so by
requiring the obtaining of permits as a
prerequisite to the construction or
improvement of railroad facilities. With
regard to the kinds of inspections that are
permissible on property owned or used by
interstate railroads, the potential for
interference depends on the nature of the
action by the state or local government and
the effect on rail transportation and Board
remedies; we see no simple, clear line of
demarcation that has been or could be drawn,
except that the inspection requirements or
local regulations must be applied and
enforced in a non-discriminatory manner and
that preclearance permitting requirements
plainly are preempted. Again, we cannot go
beyond these general principles here without
more information about particular inspection
and similar requirements that may be at issue
in this case. Parties may file further
information and comment on these issues.
[Id. at *8 (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).]
[Id. at *5 (emphasis added).]
The STB has retained jurisdiction of Riverdale and will issue a final Riverdale opinion after submissions from the parties in that case and other interested persons. See Notice of opening of declaratory order proceeding, 64 Fed. Reg. 51,179-02 (1999). The STB noted that its “preliminary conclusions, of course, could change depending on [its] understanding of the facts after [the STB] ha[s] reviewed the parties' comments, evidence and arguments.” The STB also noted that “there may be additional unresolved preemption issues as to which parties believe the Board should provide clarification that involve the extent to which state and local governments may regulate a railroad's construction plans or the operation of its facilities.” Ibid.
We note that the Hackensack Meadowlands Development Commission (HMDC) has submitted comments in the STB proceeding advocating a narrow interpretation of the preemptive effect of the ICCTA. The HMDC is interested in the outcome of that proceeding because the Railroad has constructed a five-acre parking lot without the approval of the HMDC in an environmentally sensitive area over which the HMDC has jurisdiction. The HMDC argues that that activity contravenes the HMDC's statutorily authorized control over the use of that land pursuant to N.J.S.A. 13:17-11. The HMDC suggested in its comments to the STB that “reasonable procedures can be developed [that] allow railroads to operate and expand their services while at the same time being responsible citizens of the community.”
The Village seeks to enjoin through this suit the alleged public nuisance maintained by the Railroad and to regulate the Railroad's maintenance facility pursuant to generally applicable health, safety, zoning, and land use laws. The Railroad's position to date has been that no regulation whatsoever by the Village is permissible. We anticipate that the Railroad's submission, in whole or in substantial part, to the regulation that we authorize in this opinion will better define any areas of disagreement between the parties. Because on this record we are uncertain about the character and scope of the ultimate preemption issues, if any, that will divide the parties, and taking into account the STB's ongoing effort to describe more specifically the preemptive effect of the ICCTA, we consider it premature to attempt to resolve comprehensively the ICCTA's preemptive effect. Nevertheless, we are prepared to grant the Village some of the relief it seeks.
That state courts generally have jurisdiction to enforce rights deriving from federal statutory law is well settled. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7, 100 S. Ct. 553, 558 n.7, 62 L. Ed.2d 481, 488 n.7 (1980); Maisonet v. Department of Human Serv., Div. of Family Dev., 140 N.J. 214, 221 (1995). We note that that principle is implicated here only indirectly. Although the preemptive effect of the ICCTA is a matter of federal statutory law, the ordinances sought to be applied by the Village are routinely enforced in this state's courts.
Consistent with the STB's opinion in Riverdale, we hold that the Railroad may not deny the Village access for reasonable inspection of its maintenance facility. We further hold that although the Village may not require permits of the Railroad, the Railroad must notify the Village when it is undertaking an activity for which another entity would require a permit. The Village may enforce its local fire, health, plumbing, safety and construction regulations to the extent they are applicable to the existing maintenance facility. Because the “maintenance facilities” consist essentially of two diesel tank cars with pumping equipment, three boxcars containing administrative offices, shops and bathroom facilities, and a hand-pumped septic system, a certain degree of pragmatism on the part of the Village will be necessary in attempting to apply its relevant ordinances and regulations to the Railroad's facilities. Because of the nature of those facilities, literal compliance with all of the requirements of the Village's ordinances and regulations may be impractical, and may not be necessary to protect the public interest. We envision that it will be the rare situation when fairly enforced fire, health, plumbing, safety, or construction regulations interfere with a railroad's operations. In the event that conflicts arise over the Village's attempted enforcement of those regulations, either party is free to apply to the Law Division for such relief consistent with this opinion as may be appropriate.
The Village also seeks to enforce its site plan approval ordinance on the Railroad's maintenance facility. The STB has given us little guidance on this issue as it has not decided whether land use regulations encompassing site plan approval provisions, “if applied in such a way as not to discriminate against railroads, would significantly interfere with . . . railroad operations and interstate commerce.” Riverdale, supra, 1 999 WL 715272 at *8. The STB noted that land use regulations are preempted insofar as they are “used to frustrate transportation-related activities and interfere with interstate commerce.” Ibid. Absent a better-developed record, the STB declined to fully decide the issue. Ibid.
Obviously, the nature of the Railroad's facilities does not make it feasible to subject them to the usual scope of review contemplated by municipal site plan ordinances. See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-41 (authorizing site plan ordinances requiring review of location of structures, vehicle and pedestrian circulation, preservation of natural resources, parking, lighting, screening and landscaping). Nevertheless, the record informs us that in 1992 the Railroad submitted for review by the Village engineer a site plan depicting its facilities, and subsequently forwarded supplemental information requested by the engineer. The Village apparently ceased, at least temporarily, its review of the Railroad's site plan. Because the parties voluntarily commenced the site plan review process before the litigation commenced, we anticipate that to now require the Railroad to submit again to site plan review, tempered by the pragmatic considerations that should guide the Village's review-process, will not foreclose or restrict the Railroad's ability to conduct its operations. Consistent with the STB's disposition in Riverdale, supra, the Village's authority to review the Railroad's site plan does not include the power to require approval of the site plan as a condition of the Railroad's continued use of its maintenance facility.
Because zoning regulations imposed by the Village “clearly could be used to defeat [the Railroad's] maintenance and upgrading activities, thus interfering with the efficiency of railroad operations that are part of interstate commerce,” ibid. at *7, the Village may not dictate the location on its right-of way of the Railroad's maintenance facility. In the event the Village remains of the view that the Railroad's siting decision is arbitrary, unreasonable and contrary to the interests of its citizens, the Village is free to seek relief on that issue from the STB.
Regarding the Village's common law nuisance claim in connection with the noise and air pollution the maintenance facility produces, we agree with the Appellate Division that our courts cannot adjudicate common law nuisance claims against the Railroad because to do so would infringe on the STB's exclusive jurisdiction over the location and operations of railroad facilities. Ridgefield Park, supra, 318 N.J. Super. at 404-05.
We are mindful of the difficulties that the haphazard construction of railroad facilities may cause to a railroad's host community, as when a railroad constructs a facility without involving the neighbors of the facility, the local government, or other interested parties in the decision-making process. We are also mindful, however, of the declaration by Congress that states may not interfere with the operational aspects of railroading and that localized concerns may not burden the nationwide system of railroads. We assume that most of the concerns of communities that host railroad facilities may be resolved without litigation and without sacrificing the Congressional goal of deregulation. Indeed, at oral argument the Court was informed that the Railroad and the Village have not exhausted all efforts at the voluntary reconciliation of their differences.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is modified and the matter remanded to the Law Division for such further proceedings as may be required to implement our disposition of this appeal.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A- 101 September Term 1998
VILLAGE OF RIDGEFIELD PARK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NEW YORK SUSQUEHANNA & WESTERN
RAILWAY CORPORATION, A
Corporation authorized to do
business in New Jersey,
Defendant-Respondent.
LONG, J., dissenting.
I would affirm the decision of the Appellate Division
requiring this matter to proceed before the STB, the agency
authorized by Congress to implement the ICCTA.
49 U.S.C.A.
§10501. Nothing in the after-decided Riverdale case, supra,
justifies a different outcome. 1
999 WL 715272. By its own
terms, the STB's ruling in Riverdale is preliminary only; it is
subject to change depending on a full review of the facts. Id.
at *8. Indeed, as the STB itself acknowledged, there may be
additional unresolved preemption issues in Riverdale. Id. at *1
n.2. Our ruling here is premature and out of conformity, not
only with the principles of preemption, but with the well
established rule that litigation is to proceed in a cohesive,
and not piecemeal, manner.
In Riverdale, the STB acknowledged that state and local
entities “retain certain police powers,” so long as their
actions do not “have the effect of foreclosing or restricting
the railroad's ability to conduct its operations or otherwise
unreasonably burden[ing] interstate commerce.” Id. at *5-6.
That agency refused, however, to detail which powers it retained
and which it ceded “without more information as to the
particular police power issues that may be involved in this
case.” Id. at *6.
This case should be heard in the first instance by the STB.
After a preemption determination by that agency based on these
particularized facts, the actual contours of the state case will
be clear; at that time, meaningful action may be taken by local
authorities subject to state judicial review. In my view, the
majority has created a haphazard scheme for addressing the
difficult issue presented by this case.
JUSTICES GARIBALDI and VERNIERO join in JUSTICE LONG'S opinion.
NO. A-101 SEPTEMBER TERM 1999
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Superior Court, Appellate Division
VILLAGE OF RIDGEFIELD PARK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NEW YORK SUSQUEHANNA & WESTERN
RAILWAY CORPORATION, etc.,
Defendant-Respondent.
DECIDED April 5, 2000
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Stein
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Long