(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for
the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please
note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized).
Argued February 4, 1997 -- Decided May 19, 1997
Coleman, J., writing for a unanimous Court.
The issue raised in this appeal is whether the twenty-three-year limitations period found in N.J.S.A.
9:17-45(b) of the New Jersey Parentage Act applies to an intestacy action filed by a thirty-one-year-old
claimant to prove parentship and heirship under N.J.S.A. 3B:5-10 of the Administration of Estates -
Decedents and Others Act (commonly referred to as the Probate Code).
Joanne Wingate was born on December 15, 1963. Her mother, Rachel M. Parsio, was married to
Willard Wingate at the time of Joanne's birth. Parsio and Willard divorced in 1970. Willard Wingate died
in 1988. John J. Ryan died intestate on February 6, 1995. Until just before Ryan's death, Joanne believed
that Willard Wingate was her natural father. However, ten days prior to Ryan's death, Parsio told Joanne
that Ryan was her natural father.
Ryan had a close relationship with Parsio and Joanne. He purchased gifts for Joanne on holidays
and birthdays and paid for substantial expenses, such as Joanne's braces and her wedding gown. According
to Parsio, Ryan would not publicly acknowledge that he was Joanne's natural father because of the
embarrassment that revelation would cause, particularly in light of Ryan's Catholic faith. Parsio claims that
she did not reveal Ryan's paternity because of his threats to “cut off ties,” including financial support, to
Parsio and Joanne.
On February 7, 1995, Joanne filed a complaint in Chancery Division, Family Part, under the Probate
Code to establish that she and her son are Ryan's heirs. Court ordered blood samples of decedent revealed
that Ryan was in fact Joanne's natural father. His estate has not contested that conclusion.
Joanne filed an amended complaint on February 17, 1995, adding Helen Thomas, both individually
and as Ryan's sister and administratrix of his estate. The Family Part granted summary judgment to the
estate and Thomas dismissing the complaint, reasoning that Joanne had failed to comply with the twenty-three-year limitations period under the Parentage Act by not filing the claim by her twenty-third birthday.
On Joanne's motion for reconsideration, the court vacated its summary judgment and transferred the matter
to the Probate Part.
The Appellate Division granted the estate's motion for leave to appeal and stayed further
proceedings in the Probate Part pending the outcome of the appeal. The Appellate Division reversed the
trial court's denial of the estate's motion for summary judgment, holding that the twenty-three-year
limitations period in the Parentage Act applied to Joanne Wingate's claim.
The Supreme Court granted Joanne Wingate's petition for certification.
HELD: The twenty-three-year limitations period under the New Jersey Parentage Act does not apply to
claims filed under the Probate Code.
1. When the Probate Code was modified in 1982, New Jersey had not yet adopted a Parentage Act. However, in 1983, the Parentage Act was adopted, creating inconsistent methods and standards of proof for establishing parentage under New Jersey's Probate Code and Parentage Act. The Law Revision
Commission was given the responsibility of attempting to reconcile the conflicting methods and standards of
proof in the two Acts. The Commission recommended that the Legislature amend the Probate Code to
reflect New Jersey's adoption of the Parentage Act in 1983, and to allow children born out of wedlock to
prove paternity for hardship purposes by using the more permissive standards of the Parentage Act. The
Legislature followed the Commission's recommendation in 1991 by amending N.J.S.A. 3B:5-10 to permit
parentage to be established as provided under the Parentage Act. (pp. 4-10)
2. The parties disagree on whether Joanne's claim is time-barred. Because different interpretations of the
statutes exist, the Court must ascertain and effectuate the Legislature's intent. The legislative history
demonstrates an intent to change N.J.S.A. 3B:5-10 of the Probate Code to create the same burden of proof
existing under the Parentage Act. Based on the Senate Committee's Statement and the recommendations of
the Law Revision Commission, it is clear that the Legislature intended the 1991 amendment to N.J.S.A. 3B:5-10 to amend only the standard of proof. (pp. 10-14)
3. The Parentage Act and the Probate Code are independent statutes designed to address different primary
rights. The Parentage Act's purpose is to establish the legal relationship between a child and that child's
natural or adoptive parents. On the other hand, the purpose of the Probate Code is to determine who is
entitled to a decedent's real and personal property. These different purposes serve to explain why the
Legislature contemplated different periods of limitations for filing claims under those statutes. (pp. 14-15)
4. In contrast to children who file support claims, which accrue on the date of the child's birth, potential
heirs have no right to share in an estate until the death of the decedent. The purpose of the 1991
amendment was to make it easier, not harder or impossible, for persons born out of wedlock to establish
heirship. Absent some express contrary indication, it is not likely that the Legislature would reduce the
limitations period for filing heirship claims. Thus, the Legislature did not intend its 1991 amendment to
change the Probate Code's limitation on when claims can be filed thereunder for determination of heirship.
(pp. 15-18)
5. The Appellate Division reasoned that the twenty-three-year period of repose should be imposed in order
to guard against spurious claims. That reasoning is rejected because the need to prevent fraudulent claims
has been substantially alleviated by the scientific developments in blood testing used to determine proof of
parentage. (pp. 19-21)
6. N.J.S.A. 3B:23-19 controls because the 1991 amendment to N.J.S.A. 3B:5-10 did not change the Probate
Code's statute of limitations. That statute allows an out-of-wedlock child of a deceased parent to file an
heirship claim with the personal representative of the decedent's estate within the time the court deems
reasonable for the filing of claims. Joanne Wingate filed her claim within a reasonable time -- one day after
the death of John Ryan. (pp. 22)
Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Chancery
Division, Probate Part to dispose of the complaint on the merits.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, GARIBALDI and
STEIN join in JUSTICE COLEMAN'S opinion.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-
83 September Term 1996
JOANNE WINGATE and SALVATORE ERIC
PIRRI, a minor, by his Guardian and
Natural Mother, Joanne Wingate,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
ESTATE OF JOHN J. RYAN and HELEN
THOMAS, Administratrix of the
Estate of John J. Ryan,
Defendants-Respondents.
Argued February 4, 1997 -- Decided May 19, 1997
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported
at
290 N.J. Super. 463 (1996).
Charles H. Jones, IV, argued the cause for
appellants (Gravino, Vittese & Jones,
attorneys).
George G. Rosenberger, Jr., argued the cause
for respondents (Butler, Butler &
Rosenberger, attorneys).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
COLEMAN, J.
The issue raised in this appeal is whether the twenty-three
year limitations period found in N.J.S.A. 9:17-45(b) of the New
Jersey Parentage Act ("Parentage Act"), codified at N.J.S.A.
9:17-38 to -59, applies to an intestacy action filed by a thirty-one-year-old claimant to prove parentage and heirship under
N.J.S.A. 3B:5-10 of the Administration of Estates--Decedents and
Others Act. That statute, commonly referred to as the Probate
Code, is codified at N.J.S.A. 3B:1-1 to 3B:29-1. In 1991, the
Legislature amended section 5-10 of the Probate Code to provide
that a parent and child relationship "may be established as
provided by the `New Jersey Parentage Act,'" by persons born out
of wedlock for purposes of proving heirship. L. 1991, c. 22,
§ 1.
Plaintiff Joanne Wingate filed a complaint under the Probate
Code to establish that she and her son are heirs of John L. Ryan.
The trial court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment to
dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to file the claim by
her twenty-third birthday. On defendants' appeal, the Appellate
Division reversed in a published opinion, holding that the
twenty-three-year limitations period in the Parentage Act,
N.J.S.A. 9:17-45(b), applied to plaintiff's claim.
290 N.J.
Super. 463 (1996). We granted plaintiff's petition for
certification,
146 N.J. 496 (1996), and now reverse. We hold
that the limitations period under the Parentage Act does not
apply to claims filed under the Probate Code.
Plaintiff Joanne Wingate was born on December 15, 1963. Plaintiff's mother, Rachel M. Parsio, was married to Willard Wingate at the time of plaintiff's birth. Parsio and Willard Wingate were divorced in 1970. Willard Wingate died in 1988. On
February 6, 1995, decedent John J. Ryan died intestate. Until
just before Ryan's death, plaintiff had believed that she was
Willard Wingate's natural child. However, ten days before Ryan's
death, plaintiff's mother informed her that Ryan was her natural
father.
Decedent had a close relationship with Parsio and plaintiff.
Parsio asserts that decedent purchased gifts for plaintiff on
holidays and birthdays, and paid for substantial expenses, such
as her braces and her wedding gown. According to Parsio,
decedent acknowledged to her that he was plaintiff's biological
father on several occasions, but decedent repeatedly refused to
publicly acknowledge that fact because he and Parsio were not
married, and such a revelation would cause embarrassment,
particularly in light of his Catholic faith. Parsio claims that
she did not reveal decedent's paternity because Ryan threatened
to "cut off ties," including financial support, to her and
plaintiff.
After filing her complaint on February 7, 1995, in the
Chancery Division, Family Part, plaintiff obtained an order
permitting blood and hair samples to be taken from decedent prior
to embalming. Cellmark Diagnostics performed genetic testing on
samples from decedent, Parsio, and plaintiff.
Cellmark's DNA fingerprint analysis revealed a match between
decedent and plaintiff, the probability of which was one in
twenty-three million for unrelated persons. DNA blood profiles
revealed a 99.99" probability of decedent's paternity, as
compared to that of a random Caucasian male. Cellmark's report
concluded that decedent was plaintiff's natural father, and
decedent's estate has not contested that conclusion.
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on February 17, 1995,
adding Helen Thomas, both individually as decedent's sister and
as administratrix of decedent's estate, as a defendant.
Defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment. The Family
Part granted summary judgment to defendants dismissing the
complaint, reasoning that plaintiff had failed to comply with the
twenty-three-year limitations period under the Parentage Act,
N.J.S.A. 9:17-45(b).
On plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, the Family Part
vacated its summary judgment and transferred the matter to the
Probate Part. The Appellate Division granted defendants' motion
for leave to appeal and stayed further proceedings in the Probate
Part pending disposition of the appeal. The Appellate Division
reversed the trial court's denial of defendants' motion for
summary judgment.
Our analysis must begin with the legislative enactments that will inform our ultimate decision. The Wills, Descent and Simultaneous Death Act was enacted in 1977 and amended in 1979.
The predecessor to the provision that is pertinent to this case
provided:
If, for purposes of intestate succession,
a relationship of parent and child must be
established to determine succession by,
through, or from a person.
a. The relationships and rights of an
adopted minor child shall be those as
provided by section 14 of P.L.1977, c. 367
(C. 9:3-50), and the relationships and rights
of an adopted adult shall be as provided in
N.J.S. 2A:22-3.
b. In cases not covered by a., a person
born out of wedlock is a child of the mother.
That person is also a child of the father,
if:
(1) The natural parents, before or after
the birth of the child, participated in a
ceremonial marriage or shall have consum-mated a common-law marriage where such
marriage is recognized as valid in the manner
authorized by the law of the place where such
marriage took place, even though the
attempted marriage is void; or
(2) The paternity is established by an
adjudication before the death of the father
or is established thereafter by clear and
convincing proof, except that the paternity
established under this subparagraph is
ineffective to qualify the father or his
kindred to inherit from or through the child
unless the father has openly treated the
child as his, and has not refused to support
the child.
[N.J.S.A. 3A:2A-41.]
In 1982, the Legislature revised the Wills, Descent and
Simultaneous Death Act and renamed it an Act for the
Administration of Estates--Decedents and Others, now commonly
known as the Probate Code. L. 1981, c. 405. Pertinent to this
case is N.J.S.A. 3B:5-10, which repealed N.J.S.A. 3A:2A-41 and
became effective in 1982. The 1982 version of N.J.S.A. 3B:5-10
provided:
If, for the purposes of intestate
succession, a relationship of parent and
child must be established to determine
succession by, through or from a person, a
child born out of wedlock is a child of the
mother. That child is also a child of the
father, if:
a. The natural parents, before or after
the birth of the child, participated in a
ceremonial marriage or shall have consummated
a common-law marriage where the marriage is
recognized as valid in the manner authorized
by the law of the place where the marriage
took place, even though the attempted
marriage is void; or
b. The paternity is established by an
adjudication before the death of the father
or is established thereafter by clear and
convincing proof, except that the paternity
established under this subsection is
ineffective to qualify the father or his
kindred to inherit from or through the child
unless the father has openly treated the
child as his, and has not refused to support
the child.
N.J.S.A. 3B:23-19 of the Probate Code provides a general
limitations period for claims brought under that statute. Claims
by persons whose names or addresses are unknown must be brought
"within a reasonable time and after reasonable notice . . . as
may be prescribed by the court." N.J.S.A. 3B:23-19. N.J.S.A.
3B:23-20 provides that a person who fails to file a claim within
the time required by the court pursuant to N.J.S.A. 3B:23-19
"shall be forever thereafter debarred from all right, title or
claim to the decedent's estate."
The 1982 version of N.J.S.A. 3B:5-10(b) is identical to a
provision in the Uniform Probate Code of 1969. Unif. Probate
Code § 2-109(2)(ii),
8 U.L.A. 67 (1983). That section has
alternative provisions, one for jurisdictions that have adopted
the Uniform Parentage Act, and the other, followed by New Jersey,
for those jurisdictions that have not adopted the Uniform
Parentage Act. Id. at 67-68 cmt. Thus, when the Probate Code
was modified in 1982, New Jersey had not yet adopted a Parentage
Act. That, however, was changed the next year, creating
inconsistent methods and standards of proof for establishing
parentage under New Jersey's Probate Code and Parentage Act.
In 1983, the Legislature passed the Parentage Act, which is
modeled after the Uniform Parentage Act of 1973. Assembly
Judiciary, Law, Public Safety and Defense Committee Statement to
Senate Bill No. 888--L. 1983, c. 17. The Legislature enacted the
Parentage Act "to establish the principle that regardless of the
marital status of the parents, all children and parents have
equal rights with respect to each other and to provide a
procedure to establish parentage in disputed cases." Ibid.
Procedurally, the Parentage Act establishes several
presumptions of paternity in N.J.S.A. 9:17-43(a), and sets forth
in section 43(d) the burden of proving paternity absent the
existence of such a presumption. Claims to establish paternity
must be filed timely: "[n]o action shall be brought under this
act more than 5 years after the child attains the age of
majority." N.J.S.A. 9:17-45(b). That section effectively
imposes a twenty-three-year statute of repose for actions under
the Parentage Act, running from the child's date of birth.
N.J.S.A. 9:17-45(b) is analogous to a provision of the
Uniform Parentage Act that requires an action to be brought
within three years of a child's majority. Unif. Parentage Act
§ 7, 9B U.L.A. 306 (1987). The comment to that Uniform Parentage
Act section states that, "[i]n effect, . . . this Section
provides for a twenty-one-year statute of limitations, except
that a late paternity action does not affect laws relating to
distribution and closing of decedents' estates or to the
determination of heirship." Ibid. cmt. Because the Probate Code
and the Parentage Act prior to 1991 provided different methods
and standards for establishing parentage, steps were taken to
resolve the conflicts.
The responsibility for attempting to reconcile the conflicting methods and standards of proof in the two acts fell on the New Jersey Law Revision Commission ("Commission"). N.J.S.A. 1:12A-8. In its 1987 annual report to the Legislature pursuant to N.J.S.A. 1:12A-9, the Commission reported that the methods and standards for proving parentage under the Probate
Code and the Parentage Act were inconsistent. First Annual
Report of the New Jersey Law Revision Commission 3 (1987) ("Law
Revision Commission Report"). The focus of the report was
limited to the inconsistent burdens of proof required by those
two statutes. Ibid. The Commission noted that the Parentage Act
specified several presumptions of paternity that could be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Ibid. If no
presumption of parentage existed, then that issue would be
determined by a preponderance of the evidence. N.J.S.A. 9:17-43(d). The Probate Code, on the other hand, required claimants
to prove paternity by clear and convincing evidence for post-mortem claims under the 1982 version of N.J.S.A. 3B:5-10(b).
The Commission explained that "the version of the [Uniform]
Probate Code chosen for N.J.S. 3B:5-10 was never intended to be
enacted in jurisdictions which accepted the [Uniform] Parentage
Act," and that the Legislature had enacted the version of the
Uniform Probate Code provision that reflected the absence of a
Parentage Act in New Jersey at that time. Law Revision
Commission Report, supra, at 3-4. The Commission recommended
that the Legislature amend the Probate Code to reflect New
Jersey's adoption of the Uniform Parentage Act in 1983, and to
allow children born out of wedlock to prove paternity for
heirship purposes by using the more permissive standards of the
Parentage Act. Id. at 4. The Commission stated that such an
amendment would promote "the modern principle that the parent-child relationship extends equally, irrespective of the marital
state of the parents." Ibid.
Consistent with the Commission's recommendation, in 1991 the
Legislature revised N.J.S.A. 3B:5-10 to provide:
If, for the purposes of intestate
succession, a relationship of parent and
child must be established to determine
succession by, through, or from a person, in
cases not covered by N.J.S. 3B:5-9, [for
adoption,] a person is the child of the
person's parents regardless of the marital
state of the person's parents, and the parent
and child relationship may be established as
provided by the "New Jersey Parentage Act,"
P.L. 1983, c. 17 (C. 9:17-38 et seq.).
[L. 1991, c. 22, § 1 (effective Feb. 19,
1991) (codified at N.J.S.A. 3B:5-10).]
The parties agree that in view of the 1991 amendment,
plaintiff must follow the methods and standards of proof outlined
in the Parentage Act. They also agree that the DNA test results
establish that John Ryan is plaintiff's father. The parties
disagree, however, on whether plaintiff's claim against the
estate is time barred.
Plaintiff argues that the Probate Code's statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 3B:23-19, applies to her claim. That section provides that "the court may require all those persons whose names or addresses are unknown, to appear or file their [intestacy] claims . . . within a reasonable time and after reasonable notice by publication or otherwise, as may be
prescribed by the court." Ibid. Plaintiff contends that the
1991 amendment to the Probate Code was intended to incorporate
only the favorable methods and standards of proof found in the
Parentage Act without altering the limitations period for filing
her claim under N.J.S.A. 3B:23-19.
Defendants argue that the Appellate Division was correct in
applying the limitations provision of the Parentage Act, N.J.S.A.
9:17-45(b), because it is more specific and was enacted more
recently than N.J.S.A. 3B:23-19. 290 N.J. Super. at 471 (citing
3A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction, §
70.03 (5th ed. 1992) ("When two or more statutes of limitation
deal with the same subject matter, the statute which is more
recent and specific will prevail over the older and more general
one.")).
The critical question is whether the Legislature intended in
1991 to change the Probate Code's statute of limitations,
N.J.S.A. 3B:23-19. To answer that question, we must interpret
the amendment. We have consistently held that when interpreting
a statute, "courts must seek to fulfill the statutory objective
`so far as the terms of the legislation and proper consideration
of the interests of those subject to it will fairly permit.'"
State v. Haliski,
140 N.J. 1, 9 (1995) (quoting State v. Gill, 47
N.J. 441, 444 (1966)); Merin v. Maglaki,
126 N.J. 430, 435
(1992). A court should interpret a statute in a way that
advances "the sense and meaning fairly deducible from the
context." Lesniak v. Budzash,
133 N.J. 1, 14 (1993).
The first consideration when interpreting a statute is the
statute's plain meaning. State v. Szemple,
135 N.J. 406, 421
(1994); Merin, supra, 126 N.J. at 434; Town of Morristown v.
Woman's Club,
124 N.J. 605, 610 (1991). If different
interpretations exist, then the statute's meaning is not obvious
or self-evident on its face. Szemple, supra, 135 N.J. at 422; GE
Solid State, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation,
132 N.J. 298,
307 (1993). When a statute is ambiguous, a court's function is
to ascertain and to effectuate the Legislature's intent.
Szemple, supra, 135 N.J. at 422 (citing Cedar Cove, Inc. v.
Stanzione,
122 N.J. 202, 213 (1991)). Extrinsic aids, such as
legislative history, committee reports, and contemporaneous
construction, may be used to help resolve any ambiguity and to
ascertain the true intent of the Legislature. Ibid.
The legislative history regarding the 1991 amendment
includes the Senate Judiciary Committee's Statement that
accompanied the proposed amendment. It provides:
"This bill is intended to resolve a
potential conflict between N.J.S.A. 3B:5-10
part of New Jersey's Probate Code and the
`New Jersey Parentage Act,' P.L. 1983, c. 17
(C. 9:17-38 et seq.) with regard to the
standard for the determination of the
parentage of children born out of wedlock.
. . . .
The Parentage Act which was enacted in 1983 sets procedures and standards for determining parentage of children born out of wedlock. These procedures were intended to be applicable in all actions. In order to insure that a determination of parentage under the Parentage Act would also be applicable in probate matters, this bill
would amend 3B:5-10 to provide that for
purposes of intestate succession the parent-child relationship may be established as
provided in the Parentage Act."
[290 N.J. Super. at 471 (quoting Senate
Judiciary Committee Statement to Senate Bill
No. 1346, L. 1991, c. 22 (1990)).]
As noted earlier, the 1991 amendment to N.J.S.A. 3B:5-10 was
in response to the 1987 report submitted by the Law Revision
Commission that emphasized the different burdens of proof for
establishing parentage under the Parentage Act and under the
Probate Code. The Parentage Act creates rebuttable presumptions
of parentage under some circumstances. N.J.S.A. 9:17-43(a). In
those circumstances, a putative father may overcome that
presumption only by clear and convincing evidence. N.J.S.A.
9:17-43(b). Absent a designated presumption of parentage, the
burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. N.J.S.A.
9:17-43(d). In contrast, under the Probate Code prior to the
1991 amendment, a parentage action to prove heirship after the
decedent's death required a claimant to establish heirship by
clear and convincing proof. N.J.S.A. 3B:5-10(b).
What emerges from a review of the legislative history is an
intent to change the Probate Code's provision, N.J.S.A. 3B:5-10,
to create the same burden of proof existing under the Parentage
Act. Consistent with that intent, the Senate Committee's
Statement reveals that the only articulated purpose of the
amendment was to resolve a potential conflict between the Probate
Code and the Parentage Act regarding "the standard for the
determination of the parentage of children born out of wedlock."
Senate Judiciary Committee Statement to Senate Bill No. 1346--L.
1991, c. 22. The word "standard" most commonly refers to the
burden of proof in a cause of action. See Del Tufo v. Township
of Old Bridge,
147 N.J. 90, 98 (1996) (using term "standard" to
refer to burden of proof); see also SSI Med. Servs., Inc. v.
State,
146 N.J. 614, 617 (1996) (same).
That conclusion is supported by the fact that the Commission
discussed only the inconsistent burden of proof issue. The
Commission recommended changing the burden of proof under the
Probate Code because of the increased reliance on scientific
tests under the Parentage Act to establish paternity. Hence, the
Commission recommended that the Legislature
accept the more clear and specific rules for
the determination of parent-child relation-ships of the Parentage Act and its reflection
of the modern principle that scientific tests
can be used to make an accurate determination
of parentage in the majority of cases.
[Law Revision Commission Report, supra, at 4-5 (footnote omitted).]
We conclude that the Legislature intended the 1991 amendment
to N.J.S.A. 3B:5-10 to amend only the standard of proof. The
Legislature was convinced that, given the reliable scientific
tests used under the Parentage Act to establish parentage, it no
longer made sense to require a higher burden of proof under the
Probate Code to establish the identical fact. Consequently, the
Legislature's use of the terms "standard for the determination of
parentage of children," intended for the word "standard" to have
its common meaning, namely, the burden of proof.
Apart from the legislative history revealing that the 1991
amendment intended to change only the burden of proof for
establishing parentage under the Probate Code, the Parentage Act
and the Probate Code are independent statutes designed to address
different primary rights. The purpose of the Parentage Act is to
establish "the legal relationship . . . between a child and the
child's natural or adoptive parents, incident to which the law
confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obligations."
N.J.S.A. 9:17-39. Child support is the major concern under the
Parentage Act. The purpose of the Probate Code, on the other
hand, is to determine the devolution of a decedent's real and
personal property. N.J.S.A. 3B:1-3. The different purposes the
two statutes serve, help to explain why the Legislature
contemplated different periods of limitations for filing claims
under those statutes.
It is well established in New Jersey that parents have a
duty to support their children from the date of birth until the
children are emancipated, which is presumed to occur upon the age
of majority. Newburgh v. Arrigo,
88 N.J. 529, 543 (1982).
Because the right to support accrues on the date of birth and
ends on emancipation, it is fair to apply N.J.S.A. 9:17-45(b) to
claims for support.
Although plaintiff received financial and emotional support
from decedent for many years before his death, decedent's
parentage was not established before plaintiff reached her
twenty-third birthday as required by N.J.S.A. 9:17-45(b). She
was not told that decedent was her father until she was thirty-one-years old, at which time she was not in need of his support.
Indeed, the law imposed no obligation for him to support her at
that time. Consequently, application of the Parentage Act's
statute of limitations to any support claim that she might have
filed at the age of thirty-one would have been fair because (1)
that period balances a claimant's right to support with the
State's interest in requiring prompt filing of parentage actions,
see Unif. Parentage Act § 7, 9B U.L.A. 306-07 cmt. (1987); and
(2) a parent is relieved of the duty to provide support upon the
child's emancipation. Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 543.
In contrast to children who file support claims, which
accrue on the date of birth, potential heirs have no right to
share in an estate until the death of the decedent. By
definition under the Probate Code, heirs are "those persons . . .
who are entitled under the statutes of intestate succession to
the property of a decedent." N.J.S.A. 3B:1-1. Applying N.J.S.A.
9:17-45(b) to actions under the Probate Code would create a
statute of repose that commences on the birth of a potential
heir, rather than a statute of limitations running from the
decedent's death. Indeed, the Parentage Act provides that it
does not affect the time within which an heirship claim must be
filed. N.J.S.A. 9:17-45(f). That section provides further
evidence that claims under the Probate Code and Parentage Act are
subject to independent limitations periods. To hold otherwise
would grant heirship immunity to parents of children who are born
out of wedlock and do not establish parentage before reaching age
twenty-three. That would terminate many claims before they
accrue. E.A. Williams, Inc. v. Russo Dev. Corp.,
82 N.J. 160,
167 (1980). To allow that to occur would be contrary to the
Legislature's recognition in 1991 that "a person is the child of
the person's parents regardless of the marital state of the
person's parents." N.J.S.A. 3B:5-10.
Furthermore, the purpose of the 1991 amendment was to make
it easier, not harder or impossible, for persons born out of
wedlock to establish heirship. Before the 1991 amendment, a
child's heirship could be established after the death of a
parent, regardless of the age of the child. N.J.S.A. 3A:2A-41(b)(2) (repealed 1982). Absent some express contrary
indication, it is highly unlikely that the Legislature would
reduce the limitations period for filing heirship claims. A
reduction in the limitations period would indeed be anomalous,
given that our society has been moving gradually away from
imposing legal disadvantages on children born out of wedlock who
bear no responsibility for their parents' "irresponsible liaisons
beyond the bonds of marriage." Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164, 175,
92 S. Ct. 1400, 1406,
31 L. Ed.2d 768, 779
(1972). "[P]enalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual--as well as an unjust--way of deterring the parent." Id. at 175,
92 S. Ct. at 1407, 31 L. Ed.
2d at 779. Finally, the comment
to the limitations provision of the Uniform Parentage Act § 7, 9B
U.L.A. 306 (1987), is persuasive. That comment states that,
"[i]n effect, . . . this Section provides for a twenty-one-year
statute of limitations, except that a late paternity action does
not affect laws relating to distribution and closing of
decedents' estates or to the determination of heirship." Ibid.
cmt. (emphasis added). Thus, the Uniform Parentage Act was not
intended to affect the limitations period for actions to prove
heirship. Because our Parentage Act is modeled after the Uniform
Parentage Act, and for the other reasons stated, we hold that the
Legislature did not intend its 1991 amendment to change the
Probate Code's limitation on when claims can be filed thereunder
for determination of heirship.
Our holding that the 1991 amendment changes only the
standard for proving parentage for heirship purposes should have
no effect on estate planning. It is inconceivable that since the
amendment, fathers of children born out of wedlock have made
their estate planning decisions based on whether post-mortem
parentage claims for heirship purposes had to be established by a
preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing
evidence, as was required before the amendment. In the present
case, the social opprobrium associated with having a liaison with
a married woman is more likely to have influenced decedent not to
include plaintiff in his estate planning by publicly
acknowledging her as his daughter or by providing for her in a
will.
We also reject the Appellate Division's reasoning that the
twenty-three-year period of repose should be imposed in order to
guard against spurious claims. 290 N.J. Super. at 476-77. The
need to prevent fraudulent claims has been "substantially
alleviated by recent scientific developments in blood testing
dramatically reducing the possibility that a defendant will be
falsely accused of being the illegitimate child's father." Mills
v. Habluetzel,
456 U.S. 91, 104 n.2,
102 S. Ct. 1549, 1557 n.2,
71 L. Ed.2d 770, 781 n.2 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see
also Pickett v. Brown,
462 U.S. 1, 17,
103 S. Ct. 2199, 2208,
76 L. Ed.2d 372, 385 (1983) (stating that "the relationship between
a statute of limitations and the State's interest in preventing
the litigation of stale or fraudulent paternity claims has become
more attenuated as scientific advances in blood testing have
alleviated the problems of proof surrounding paternity actions");
State v. Marcus, 294 N.J. Super. 267, 279 (App. Div. 1996)
(noting general acceptance of DNA analysis by scientific
community and courts); State v. Williams,
252 N.J. Super. 369,
380 (Law Div. 1991) (stating that "[i]t is generally accepted
that [DNA testing] can limit the spectrum of potential donors of
a blood specimen to one out of every 10 million persons").
Another source has noted that
[j]udicial recognition of the scientific
acceptance of the foundations of DNA analysis
is consistent with our conclusion that the
methods of DNA analysis surveyed in this
report are firmly grounded in molecular
biology. When [DNA] profiling is done with
due care, the results are highly reproducible
. . . . [T]here seems little doubt in the
courtroom, as in the laboratory, that
properly conducted [DNA] profiling is a
scientifically acceptable procedure . . . .
[Committee on DNA Forensic Science, National
Research Council, The Evaluation of Forensic
DNA Evidence 176 (1996) (footnote
omitted).]See footnote 1
In another decision, the United States Supreme Court noted
that "increasingly sophisticated tests for genetic markers permit
the exclusion of over 99% of those who might be accused of
paternity, regardless of the age of the child." Clark v. Jeter,
486 U.S. 456, 465,
108 S. Ct. 1910 , 1916,
100 L. Ed.2d 465, 474
(1988) (emphasis added). Indeed, in the present case, the
Cellmark report has revealed a 99.99" probability of decedent's
paternity and a DNA fingerprint match with decedent, the
probability of which is one in twenty-three million for unrelated
people. In the face of such compelling evidence, few spurious
claims will go undetected.
We hold that N.J.S.A. 3B:23-19 controls and that the 1991
amendment to N.J.S.A. 3B:5-10 did not change the Probate Code's
statute of limitations. That statute allows an out-of-wedlock
child of a deceased parent to file an heirship claim with the
personal representative of the decedent's estate within the time
the court has deemed reasonable for the filing of claims. Here,
there can be no dispute over whether plaintiff filed her claim
within a reasonable time. Ryan died on February 6, 1995, and
plaintiff filed her claim on February 7, 1995.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed. The
matter is remanded to the Chancery Division, Probate Part to
dispose of the complaint on the merits.
CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN,
GARIBALDI and STEIN join in JUSTICE COLEMAN'S opinion.
NO. A-83 SEPTEMBER TERM 1996
ON APPEAL FROM
ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court
JOANNE WINGATE and SALVATORE ERIC
PIRRI, a minor, by his Guardian
and Natural Mother, Joanne Wingate,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
ESTATE OF JOHN J. RYAN and HELEN
THOMAS, Administratrix of the
Estate of John J. Ryan,
Defendants-Respondents.
DECIDED May 19, 1997
Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING
OPINION BY Justice Coleman
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DISSENTING OPINION BY
Footnote: 1The National Research Council ("NRC") is a private, non-profit society of
distinguished scholars that the National Academy of Sciences organized in 1916 at the
request of the President. The NRC is now administered by the National Academy of
Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. See
Exec. Order No. 2,859, as amended by Exec. Order No. 10,668,
21 Fed. Reg. 3155
(1956), and Exec. Order No. 12,832,
58 Fed. Reg. 5905 (1993), reprinted in
36 U.S.C.A.
§253, at 34-35 (Supp. 1997). The NRC formed the Committee on DNA Technology in
Forensic Science to study the use of DNA analysis for forensic purposes, which resulted
in the issuance of the 1992 NRC report. Subsequently, at the request of the Director of
the FBI, the NRC formed a new committee, called the Committee on DNA Forensic
Science, to study recent developments in the field, which resulted in the issuance of the
1996 NRC report. Committee on DNA Forensic Science, National Research Council,
Preface to the Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence v-vi (1996).