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GROVER V. STECHEL, 2002-NMCA-049, 132 N.M. 140, 45 P.3d 80
JOSEPH GROVER, Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
BARBARA STECHEL, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 21,988
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW MEXICO
2002-NMCA-049, 132 N.M. 140, 45 P.3d 80
March 15, 2002, Filed
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TAOS COUNTY. PEGGY J. NELSON, District Judge.  
Released for Publication April 23, 2002.
COUNSEL
Edmund R. Pitts, Taos, New Mexico, Attorney for Appellant.
D. Vaughn Gangwish, John P. Massey, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Attorneys for Appellee.  

JUDGES
IRA ROBINSON, Judge. WE CONCUR: RICHARD C. BOSSON, Chief Judge, JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge. AUTHOR: IRA ROBINSON

OPINION
{*142}


ROBINSON, Judge.
{1} Plaintiff appeals the trial court's dismissal of his complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. We affirm.  

Factual and Procedural Background
{2} Plaintiff, Joseph Grover, was stabbed by David Stechel (David), the adult son of Defendant, Barbara Stechel. David was twenty-one years old and receiving significant financial support from Defendant at the time of the incident. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant, alleging one count of negligence, one count of negligence per se, and one count of prima facie tort, all based on Defendant's support of David. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's relationship with her son created a duty, and that she should have foreseen that her support would result in Plaintiff's injury. Defendant moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 1-012(B)(2) NMRA 2002, for lack of personal jurisdiction, and (B)(6), for failure to state a claim. The trial court dismissed the complaint on both grounds.  
{3} Plaintiff's complaint alleges the following facts. Plaintiff is a resident of Taos, New Mexico. On February 19, 1998, David stabbed Plaintiff in the torso with a knife. From the time David reached the age of majority until the stabbing incident, Defendant provided financial support to him. She also assisted in David's defense against a criminal charge in New York. Defendant relocated David to Taos, made his travel arrangements, and paid for his move. Defendant arranged to have David live with a friend of hers in Taos.  
{4} Once David arrived in Taos, Defendant continued to send him money, opened a bank account for him, and made deposits into it with trust funds. Defendant traveled to New Mexico to visit David, and bought him a vehicle. David's girlfriend asked that Defendant stop sending money and told her that David was spending the money she sent on  {*143} drugs, but Defendant continued to send money.  
{5} When David relocated to Phoenix, Arizona, Defendant visited him there and intended to buy him a business to operate. David's girlfriend informed Defendant that David was abusing drugs, which caused him to be violent. She told Defendant that David needed treatment. Defendant continued to provide financial support to David, including after he was arrested for assaulting his girlfriend in Phoenix. Once David was released on bail, Defendant sent him to Albuquerque, New Mexico to live, and paid his living expenses. David's girlfriend returned to Taos. The stabbing occurred when David drove to Taos and found his then ex-girlfriend with Plaintiff.  
{6} Based on these facts, Plaintiff argues that a special relationship existed between Defendant and David. Plaintiff alleges that the relationship gave rise to a duty by Defendant to control the dangerous propensities of her adult son, that she breached that duty, that Defendant should have foreseen that David would injure Plaintiff, and that her continued support of David proximately caused Plaintiff's injury.  
{7} The trial court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint, finding that (1) the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendant and (2) even if personal jurisdiction had existed, Plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief, because it was not foreseeable to Defendant that her son would injure Plaintiff, therefore there was no duty. The trial court also held that no liability stemmed from Defendant's parental or financial relationship with her adult son.  
II.
Standard of Review
{8} The determination of whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a party is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Cronin v. Sierra Med. Ctr., 2000-NMCA-82, P10, 129 N.M. 521, 10 P.3d 845. Likewise, the grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 1-012(B)(6) is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Padwa v. Hadley, 1999-NMCA-67, P8, 127 N.M. 416, 981 P.2d 1234. In order to test the sufficiency of the complaint, the reviewing court accepts the facts therein as true. Id.

III. Discussion
{9} Plaintiff maintains that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Defendant based on NMSA 1978, Section 38-1-16(A)(3) (1971). That section confers jurisdiction over a party that commits a tortious act within this state. Therefore, the question on appeal is the same for the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 1-012(B)(2) as it is for the dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 1-012(B)(6): Does the complaint, when its facts are taken as true, state a claim for negligence or prima facie tort? We hold that it does not, and affirm the dismissal of the action.
{10} Plaintiff maintains that a special relationship existed between Defendant and David that imposed a duty on Defendant to control her adult son. In support of the existence of a special relationship, Plaintiff contends that because Defendant continued to bankroll David, and because she was on notice that he was using drugs and acting violently, there was a legal special relationship. A special relationship, however, is recognized only under limited circumstances. The circumstances here, that is, Defendant's payment of David's living expenses at the time of the assault on Plaintiff, do not fit into any recognized special relationship, nor do they present a situation that this Court should add to the recognized relationships. Plaintiff cites no New Mexico authority to support the finding of such a special relationship in this case.  
{11} As a general rule, an individual has no duty to protect another from harm. Davis v. Bd. of County Comm'rs., 1999-NMCA-110, P12, 127 N.M. 785, 987 P.2d 1172; Restatement (Second) of Torts,

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