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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

Opinion Number 2009-NMSC-014 Filing Date: March 31, 2009 Docket No. 30,663 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. RICH HUBBLE, Defendant-Petitioner

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI Sandra A. Price, District Judge Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender Nancy M. Hewitt, Appellate Defender Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender Santa Fe, NM for Petitioner Gary K. King, Attorney General Anita Carlson, Assistant Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Respondent Donna M. Bevacqua-Young John Ward Wheeler, II Santa Fe, NM for Amici Curiae New Mexico District Attorneys' Association and New Mexico Department of Public Safety

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OPINION SERNA, Justice. {1} Defendant Rich Hubble was convicted in magistrate court of Driving Under The Influence of Intoxicating Liquor, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-102 (1953, as amended through 2004), and Improper Turning at Intersection, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-325(A) (1978). Pursuant to Rule 6-703 NMRA, he appealed to the district court. During the district court bench trial, Defendant moved to suppress the evidence that was obtained from the traffic stop, which he claimed was conducted without reasonable suspicion. The district court denied the motion and Defendant was once again convicted of the same two offenses. Defendant appealed the district court's judgment and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted Defendant's petition for writ of certiorari on the issue of whether the initial traffic stop was based upon reasonable suspicion that he violated a traffic law. We hold that the traffic stop was based upon reasonable suspicion and we affirm the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. I. BACKGROUND

{2} On the evening of February 15, 2005, Deputy Phillip Francisco was driving southbound on County Road 6100 when he observed Defendant's vehicle come to a stop at a "T" intersection between County Road 6100 and an unnamed access road. Aside from the vehicles belonging to Deputy Francisco and Defendant, there were no other vehicles on either the county road or the access road. As Deputy Francisco passed through the intersection, he observed that Defendant did not have his turn signal engaged. Deputy Francisco continued to observe the vehicle through his rearview mirror as he proceeded southbound and never saw the turn signal engaged. Deputy Francisco then observed Defendant turn onto County Road 6100 without using his turn signal. Defendant and his passenger both testified that Defendant did turn on his signal before turning right onto Country Road 6100. Deputy Francisco pulled over to the side of the road about one hundred feet past the intersection and waited for Defendant to pass him. Deputy Francisco then proceeded to make the traffic stop on the basis that Defendant turned without using his signal. {3} Deputy Francisco approached the vehicle and detected the odor of alcohol on Defendant's breath and observed that Defendant had bloodshot, watery eyes and slurred speech. Deputy Francisco also observed Defendant act in a slow, impaired, and disoriented manner when he was retrieving his license and registration. Deputy Francisco ordered Defendant to exit his vehicle and observed Defendant swaying and losing his balance when standing. Deputy Francisco asked Defendant if he had been drinking and Defendant responded by saying that he had consumed one beer. Deputy Francisco then had Defendant undergo the horizontal gaze nystagmus, the walk-and-turn, and the one-leg stand tests. Defendant failed all three tests and Deputy Francisco placed him under arrest. Defendant consented to two breath tests and the results indicated that he had a blood alcohol content

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of 0.12 and 0.10, respectively. Deputy Francisco issued Defendant a citation for DWI and for Improper Turning at Intersection. {4} At trial, Deputy Francisco acknowledged that the turn signal statute dictates that a driver use the turn signal in order to indicate to other traffic in which direction the driver intends to travel. Deputy Francisco testified that he considered himself to be traffic that night. II. A. DISCUSSION Standard of Review

{5} "In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, we observe the distinction between factual determinations which are subject to a substantial evidence standard of review and application of law to the facts[,] which is subject to de novo review." State v. Nieto, 2000-NMSC-031,

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