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Laws-info.com » Cases » New York » Sup Ct, NY County » 2003 » Matter of Roberts v City of New York
Matter of Roberts v City of New York
State: New York
Court: Supreme Court
Docket No: 2003 NY Slip Op 23984
Case Date: 01/29/2003
Plaintiff: Matter of Roberts
Defendant: City of New York
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Supreme Court, New York County, January 29, 2003
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Belson, Campbell & Szuflita (Leonard Shrier of counsel), and Joel Giller (Robin Roach of counsel), for petitioners. Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel, New York City (Celine Mayo of counsel), for respondents.
{**3 Misc 3d at 550} OPINION OF THE COURT
Lewis Bart Stone, J.
These two proceedings commenced separately under article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules were brought by various officers and members of District Council 37, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (collectively DC-37) against the City of New York, its Department of Education (DOE) and other related municipal officials and agencies to challenge certain personnel decisions of the City and DOE which have resulted in layoffs and other changes which DC-{**3 Misc 3d at 551}37 claims are adverse to their interests. The first proceeding, index No. 127943/02, hereafter referred to as Roberts I, was commenced by order to show cause, issued by the Honorable Lucinda Suarez, on December 31, 2002, to challenge the layoff or termination (hereafter, the separation) of about 303 provisional civil service employees of DOE (the employees). The second proceeding, index No. 103953/03, hereafter referred to as Roberts II, was commenced by order to show cause issued by the Honorable Emily Jane Goodman on or about March 5, 2003, relates to certain of the employees, but raises different issues to challenge their separation.
Although there is a significant overlap, the identities of the named petitioners and respondents in the two proceedings are not identical, as the issues raised seem to require the joinder of different parties. Petitioners and respondents in both cases are represented, respectively, by the same counsel and the underlying City action, the separation of the DOE employees, is essentially the same. In neither case has either side moved to consolidate. However, as a matter of efficiency, counsel have agreed with the court that it would be appropriate and in the interests of judicial economy to consider and decide all claims asserted in the two proceedings together.
The parties, by their agreement, have adjourned both proceedings from time to time and have agreed to a briefing schedule resulting in the final submission of these proceedings to this court on December 12, 2003, at which time the parties also made oral statements on the record.
The Parties
In Roberts I, the petitioners are the executive directors of DC-37, the presidents of various locals of DC-37, which locals collectively represent the employees, as well as one of the employees. [*2]In Roberts II, the petitioners are the same union officers (except that Veronica Montgomery-Costa, a petitioner in Roberts I, is not a petitioner in Roberts II) and several of the employees, one of whom is also a petitioner in Roberts I. While Roberts I is brought on behalf of the named petitioners, Roberts II is also brought by the individual employees on behalf of others similarly situated.
Both Roberts I and Roberts II name as respondents the City, the Mayor, the Department of Education, and the Chancellor of the Department of Education. Roberts I also names the City Department of Social Services/Human Resources and its Commissioner,{**3 Misc 3d at 552} while Roberts II also names the City Department of Citywide Administrative Services and its Commissioner.
Cutting through the technicalities, the proceedings are both before the court to resolve the dispute between the City and its agencies, on the one hand, and certain separated employees and DC-37 on the other hand as to the legality of the separations.
Also in dispute is what relief would be appropriate if the City was found to have acted improperly. Thus, as each side is fully aligned in its assertions and interests, this court will refer to the petitioners as DC-37 and the respondents as the City, for ease of reference.
The Facts
At the end of calendar year 2002, approximately 303 provisional clerical employees of DOE who were represented by DC-37[FN1] were separated from service. Some of these employees were in the competitive class and some were not.
Pursuant to the agreement between DC-37 and the City (the union contract), which covered DOE clerical employees, the City gave notice to DC-37 on November 21, 2002 of the separation of certain named employees, effective January 2, 2003, giving their respective titles and certain other information for each. On December 4, 2002, DC-37 advised the City that the November 21 notice did not comply with the applicable notice provisions of the union contract relating to the separation of employees, in that Social Security numbers, title codes, title start dates and City start dates were missing and asserted that the notice was a nullity. The City, on the same day, December 4, 2002, sent DC-37 additional information on the separations, listing three more employees to be separated, and advising that as the identity of these three additional employees were not disclosed in the earlier notice, such three would be separated, effective January 8, 2003. On December 6, 2002, the City advised DC-37 that it was treating DC-37's advice of December 4 as a request for information, and supplied DC-37 with the missing Social Security numbers, title codes, title start dates and City start dates for all 303 employees.
On December 10, 2002, representatives of DC-37 met with representatives of the City further to protest the separations. At that {**3 Misc 3d at 553}meeting DC-37, inter alia, objected specifically to the alleged failure of the City to comply with the procedures of the New York Layoff Procedural Manual for Agencies (the Manual), and presented a white paper which proposed that the City retain the separated workers by replacing certain consultants already hired and in the process of being hired.
On December 26, 2002, DC-37 further advised DOE that it believed there were 212 "WEP" (Work Employment Program) welfare recipients performing clerical duties in DOE and that their presence, under the "anti-displacement provision of the Social Services Law" prevented the separations "when WEP workers are assigned clerical functions."
Proceedings
In Roberts I, the order to show cause temporarily restrained the City from effectuating the separations until the return date of the order, January 3, 2003. The petition sought an order to restrain DOE from proceeding with the separations on various grounds.
On January 3, 2003, the City cross-moved to dismiss Roberts I on the grounds that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, "in whole or in part," that the petition was nonjusticiable and that the petition failed to state a cause of action.
On January 3, 2003, the return date, after hearing arguments of counsel, the court determined that, where municipal separations are challenged, established law relating to preliminary injunctions allows both the separation and the litigation to proceed, with the understanding that success in
litigation would result in reinstatement and back pay for those improperly separated.[FN2] The principle that a preliminary injunction cannot be issued to bar a municipal layoff, which is well established, applies a fortiori to a temporary restraining order. The court thus dissolved the temporary restraining order and rejected DC-37's request for a preliminary injunction. The parties requested, and the court granted, adjournments for possible negotiations to {**3 Misc 3d at 554}resolve the dispute and if that failed, for the City to answer the petition.
During these adjournments, Roberts II was commenced by DC-37 against the City to reverse the separation of certain of the employees who had passed a competitive exam for their titles, on the grounds that DOE continued to employ provisional employees in such titles who had not passed such examinations. Such, DC-37 asserts, was irrational, arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law.
The City responded to Roberts II by cross-moving to dismiss the petition on the grounds that it failed to state a cause of action and was moot, or in the alternative, for leave to file answering papers. The assertion of mootness was based on the City's assertion that the remaining provisionals on the DOE payroll who had not passed the examinations were scheduled for separation shortly in a second round of reduction in forces. Apparently, following such second round, not all remaining provisional employees were separated, and accordingly, after the consent adjournments, the City has answered and issues on this proceeding, too, have been briefed and submitted to this court for determination. [*3]
Issues Presented
DC-37 seeks declaratory relief that the separations were in violation of law, preliminary and
permanent injunctions to forbid the illegal actions allegedly taken and a reversal of the separations with reinstatement with back pay and interest.
DC-37's objection to the separations (which DC-37 thus asserts entitled it to relief) falls into four distinct categories, viz.:
1. The City violated the procedures of the Layoff Manual in effectuating the separations.
2.
The City separated the employees at the time WEP employees remained on the DOE payroll, and displaced regular employees with WEP employees who perform work ordinarily performed by regular employees.

3.
The City has "contracted out services while laying off DOE Civil Service employees in the same comparable positions."

4.
The City has separated provisional employees who have passed the civil service exam for positions (but have not been appointed) while continuing to employ others in provisional status who have not passed the exam.


The first three objections were raised in Roberts I, the fourth, in Roberts II.{**3 Misc 3d at 555}
Background
As a result of the confluence of the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center and a general national economic slowdown, the City found itself at the end of 2002 facing a massive budget gap, which it attempted to address by significant increases in taxes and reductions in expenditures. As payroll is the City's largest expense, the City acted to revise programs and reduce payrolls in a manner consistent with priorities set by the Mayor and the City's legal obligations under contracts and statutory requirements. Virtually each cutback of program and personnel was met with resistance and in many cases legal actions from both those affected by the change and by unions (such as DC-37) representing affected workers and asserting their own interests in response to a specter of fewer members and less dues. These two proceedings are examples of such responses and each seeks to reverse certain City actions at DOE which were part of the City's response to its budget woes. That DC-37 was aware of the extraordinary situation is illustrated by their efforts to suggest alternate methods of cost containment in the white paper. These proceedings attack the City's action to separate the employees to reduce its payroll on various grounds and claim both that
the City had used incorrect procedures in separating them and that because of other acts or failures to act, the City had no right to separate them. Because of the multiple layers of law which encrusts the hiring and firing of municipal workers, the courts and not the City must now decide whether the separations were, as the City contends, proper, or whether they were, as DC-37 contends, improper.
The Layoff Manual
DC-37 contends in Roberts I that the City improperly separated the employees by failing to adhere to the Layoff Manual. To uphold this claim requires the court to resolve a series of issues. The first issue is whether the Layoff Manual creates rights which inure to the benefit of city employees or their unions. If so, the second issue is whether in fact there had been a failure by the City to adhere to its Layoff Manual. If so, a third step is whether remedies are available to those [*4]whose separation was affected by such failure of their unions. If so, a fourth step is what such remedies might be. Because this court has concluded that the Layoff Manual creates no rights which inure to the benefit of city employees or their unions, the court's analysis stops at the first step and the remainder of the steps need and will not be addressed by the court.{**3 Misc 3d at 556}
The court reaches its conclusion on the issue by considering both the function of the Layoff Manual and case law, as no statute requires the City to prepare or maintain such Manual.
DC-37 contends that "Layoff procedures in the DOE are governed by the Layoff Manual." (Emphasis added.) DC-37 in effect asserts that the Layoff Manual creates terms of employment thereby giving employees rights thereunder. No authority is cited for this contention. The City, in response, calls the Layoff Manual an "internal guide for agencies engaged in the Layoff process . . . not intended for use by any person outside of the City" and also cites no authority on this issue.
The characterization of the Layoff Manual by the parties is designed by them as advocates to advance their basic contentions: DC-37, that the Layoff Manual binds the City and creates rights, and the City, that it does not. It is therefore necessary to proceed beyond semantics to resolve this issue. As this issue is one of first impression, this court must analyze the source and functions of the Layoff Manual to determine which party's view prevails.
Employees' rights are legal or contractual. Stated employee policies or employee manuals given to workers in the private sector at the time of employment have often been elevated to a contractual level to determine an employee's rights on grounds that the employee accepted the terms by agreeing to be employed. Thus, the concept advanced by DC-37 that stated policies may affect terms of employment may not be dismissed offhand. However, a further analysis of the actual structure of City employment makes this concept inapplicable to this dispute. The terms of City employees' employment are, as DC-37 otherwise makes clear in its papers, highly regulated by the law, both state and federal and by the State Constitution as well as by various union agreements. In this case, DC-37 cites various provisions of both consolidated and unconsolidated law to make its points most of which do not apply to private sector employment, where courts must look to other sources to resolve disputes over the terms of an employee's employment. Further, in the public sector, where regulations have the force of law, the process of enacting regulations is closely itself regulated so that persons affected by a regulation may only be so affected where the regulation is authorized by law and adopted by proper procedure. To the extent a valid regulation would affect or protect an employee's rights, it would be part of the matrix of law setting the terms of that employee's employment, or as in this case, such employee's separation from employment.{**3 Misc 3d at 557}
In addition, the employment of city employees is subject to collective negotiation rights embedded in state law. In fact, the employees were members of a bargaining unit represented by DC-37, and, as a result, their employment and termination is covered by the union contract. The union contract, entered into under the authority of state law, to the extent it does not violate state law, also creates terms of employment for covered employees, such as the employees. For example, the union contract expressly sets forth certain notice requirements for the separation of employees.
Thus, the rules regulating the terms of employment of municipal employees are complex and are derived from a wide source of applicable law and contracts. As the two instant proceedings make clear, making changes under this multi-rule scheme is not easy, and changes made without dotting every "i" and crossing every "t" can easily result in extensive litigation, which, if appeals are taken, may last years. [*5]
The Layoff Manual was clearly prepared with this background in mind. It is a "how-to" manual, prepared for city managers to enable them to separate employees in a manner consistent with the requirements of law from all sources and contractual rights (which would include in this case the union contract). Because of the complexity of the process, creating the Layoff Manual allows the City to separate employees without researching the law and rules relating to each employee separated in each instance.
The Layoff Manual is therefore not a term of employment given to employees when they become employed; it is meant to be and is an internal document, no different than a memorandum of counsel to a manager as to how to effect an employee's separation. It is not a regulation as it has not been authorized as such by law and the record shows no indication that it has gone through the process necessary to enact a regulation. Moreover, the issue presented here, the notice period, is expressly covered by the union contract. Thus, to the extent the Layoff Manual creates a "contractual" notice period, it would also violate basic policies of collective negotiation, which restrict the City from unilaterally changing the term of a union contract by administrative fiat.
Suggesting to its managers that the City give 30 days' notice, where the union contract
provides for 20, makes sense, as by doing so some glitches in giving notice can be avoided or corrected.{**3 Misc 3d at 558}[FN3] To convert an internal directive to "err on the safe side" to a mandate for additional time, would either continue to expand notice times, or require all notices to be technically perfect as to timing, each an absurd result.
Thus, from a functional analysis, DC-37's claim that the Layoff Manual creates additional notice requirements fails. The absence of precedent is not surprising and reinforces this result. As the separation of municipal employees begets sharply contested litigation, almost as night follows day, the absence of cases on this issue suggests that in the past no one considered the Layoff Manual binding on the City. While the fact that an issue hasn't been raised before is not conclusive, in the context of this litigation, it seems to be a last gasp issue. The City gave at least 20 days' notice, as it was required under the union contract. Even if the first notices were not fully compliant with the contract, DC-37 had all the information it had bargained for in a reasonable form for more than 20 days as required by the union contract.
DC-37's request for a declaration that the City has violated the Layoff Manual, or the time limits therein is therefore denied, and that accordingly, the City's cross motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds that it fails to state a cause of action is granted with respect to these grounds.
The WEP Employees
A second contention in this proceeding relates to the WEP program.
The WEP program is an outgrowth of welfare reform legislation and programs on both the federal and state levels enacted during the 1990's. That legislation required welfare recipients who were capable of work to engage in certain minimum work related activities as a condition of continuing [*6]to receive their benefits.
The WEP program, which contemplated that these work requirements could be fulfilled in part by employment in the public sector, was created as a result of these statutory changes. The federal law (the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, commonly known as the Clinton Welfare Reform Act) reflected the political problem of replacing {**3 Misc 3d at 559}regular governmental employees by welfare workers by including "antidisplacement provisions." These provisions state:
"No adult in a work activity . . . which is funded, in whole or in part, by funds provided by the Federal Government shall be employed or assigned
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