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Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County, February 23, 2005
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Milton H. Pachter, New York City (Jordan M. Newman of counsel), for petitioner. Thacher Proffitt & Wood LLP, New York City (James E. Forde of counsel), for respondent.
OPINION OF THE COURT
George J. Silver, J.
In this commercial holdover proceeding, petitioner Port Authority of New York and New Jersey moves for an order restoring the proceeding to the Civil Court calendar. Respondent American Warehousing of New York, Inc. (AWNY) cross-moves for an order staying the proceeding pending the disposition of a Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) action instituted by AWNY pursuant to the Shipping Act of 1984 (the Shipping Act or Act). In the alternative, AWNY cross-moves for an order, pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (4) and (7), dismissing the Port Authority's petition without prejudice.
I. Procedural Posture
This case arises out of a dispute between the Port Authority and AWNY over a marine terminal lease of pier 7 at the Brooklyn Marine Terminal. On July 6, 2004, the Port Authority [*2]filed a petition for business holdover seeking to evict AWNY from the northern half of pier 7. In response, on August 5, 2004 AWNY filed a complaint with the FMC alleging various discriminatory practices by the Port Authority in violation of the Shipping Act. Simultaneously, AWNY removed the Port Authority's action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. However, in an order dated November 10, 2004, the District Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the case and remanded it to this court.
II. The Port Authority's Motion to Restore
In light of the fact that the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York has remanded the instant proceeding to this court, and the fact that AWNY has no opposition to said remand, the Port Authority's motion to restore the proceeding to the Civil Court's calendar is hereby granted.
III. AWNY's Cross Motion to Stay
In cross-moving for an order staying or, in the alternative, dismissing without prejudice the Port Authority's holdover proceeding, AWNY argues that this court does not have jurisdiction over the proceeding because it falls within the exclusive admiralty/maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts. Arguing that the marine terminal lease's involvement with maritime commerce is sufficiently demonstrated by the specific purposes for which the lease was executed, i.e., the loading, unloading and storage from merchant ships of cocoa bound for domestic chocolate factories, and that there is no specific state interest at stake, AWNY contends that the lease for pier 7 is a maritime contract governed by maritime law, which, pursuant to the United States Constitution and federal statute, the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over.
AWNY also contends that Congress, through its enactment of the Shipping Act, granted the FMC exclusive regulatory oversight of maritime leases by and between marine terminal operators. AWNY claims that it and the Port Authority are "marine terminal operators" as defined by the Act, and that the Port Authority, in contravention of the Act, failed to negotiate in good faith with AWNY for a long-term extension or renewal of the pier 7 lease. AWNY further claims that the Port Authority, in an attempt to exert unfair pressure on AWNY during the negotiations for pier 7, instituted multiple landlord-tenant proceedings to evict AWNY from its occupancy of pier 7. Moreover, AWNY argues that the Port Authority's refusal to renew the pier 7 marine terminal lease will not only adversely impact the local New York/New Jersey economy by forcing AWNY to shut down its operations at pier 7 and lay off its workers, but will also both irreparably harm AWNY's ability to compete in the United States for the warehousing of break bulk cocoa and adversely affect the foreign commerce of break bulk cocoa.
Finally, AWNY contends that the instant proceeding should be stayed pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. AWNY claims that the primary jurisdiction doctrine serves as a means of coordinating judicial and administrative machinery, and that said doctrine applies whenever the enforcement of claims on a complaint requires the resolution of issues which have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body. Arguing that the regulatory oversight of harbor leases rests exclusively with the FMC, AWNY claims that a stay of this proceeding would not only enable the FMC to apply its expertise in adjudicating the rights of marine terminal operators in maritime lease disputes, but would also advance Congress' intent that the maritime industry be uniformly regulated by the FMC. AWNY also argues that the Port Authority will not be prejudiced by a stay of this proceeding because AWNY has tendered all [*3]rents and charges owed to the Port Authority pursuant to the terms of the lease, or, in those instances where the Port Authority has refused to accept payment, has deposited such payments in an escrow account for the Port Authority's benefit.
In opposition, the Port Authority contends this holdover proceeding does not arise from a maritime contract because AWNY does not have a lease for the northern half of pier 7. According to the Port Authority, AWNY had a lease for the southern portion of pier 7, which expired on April 30, 2003, but only an option to lease the northern half, which the Port Authority claims AWNY never exercised. Even if AWNY had entered into a lease agreement for the northern half of pier 7, the Port Authority argues, such a lease is one for a wharf, and therefore not a maritime contract. Moreover, the Port Authority claims that the instant proceeding is an inherently local one that is governed not by federal maritime law but by New York real property law.
The Port Authority further contends that nothing in either the language or purpose of the Shipping Act suggests that the FMC has jurisdiction over this eviction proceeding and argues that the purposes of the primary jurisdiction doctrine would not be served by its application here. According to the Port Authority, resolution of the issues raised in this holdover proceeding does not require an administrative agency's specialized expertise, but is instead clearly within the competence of this court. Moreover, the Port Authority argues that it would be severely prejudiced by a stay of the instant proceeding because AWNY's continued occupancy of pier 7 is preventing the Port Authority from completing negotiations with a prospective new tenant for a lease of both the northern and southern halves of pier 7. In the Port Authority's view, a stay of this proceeding would also allow AWNY to continue to unjustly enrich itself through its rent-free use of pier 7.
In reply, AWNY concedes that the lease agreement between it and the Port Authority is for the southern half of pier 7, but argues that both it and its predecessor used the northern half of pier 7 for spillover activities with the express permission of the Port Authority. AWNY further claims that the rent charged in the lease reflects the value of AWNY's occupancy of the entire pier, not merely the southern half. AWNY also reiterates its claim that because the lease requires AWNY to participate in maritime services and transactions, it is a maritime contract that is subject to the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. AWNY contends that the FMC is the proper forum to address the substantive disputes over the lease and argues that a decision by the FMC regarding the Port Authority's alleged violations of the Shipping Act would be frustrated, and possibly rendered moot, if this holdover proceeding was allowed to move forward and AWNY was evicted from pier
7. AWNY further argues that this proceeding should be stayed on the ground that AWNY has satisfied the elements necessary for a Yellowstone injunction to issue.
IV. Analysis
A stay is defined as "a direction of the court, usually embodied in an order, 'freezing' an action or proceeding pending before it at whatever point it has reached and precluding it from going any further" (Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C2201:1, at 7). CPLR 2201 states that "[e]xcept where otherwise prescribed by law, the court in which an action is pending may grant a stay of proceedings in a proper case, upon such terms as may be just." The broad language of CPLR 2201 has, however, been limited by case law (Hope's Windows v Albro Metal Prods. Corp., 93 AD2d 711, 712 [1st Dept [*4]1983]; 660 Riverside Dr. Aldo Assoc. v Marte, 178 Misc 2d 784, 786 [Civ Ct, NY County 1998]). Thus, "[t]o impose a stay in one action pending the resolution of a related action, there must be a complete identity of parties, claims, and reliefs sought in the two actions" (Green Tree Fin. Servicing Corp. v Lewis, 280 AD2d 642, 643 [2d Dept 2001]; see also Rael Automatic Sprinkler Co. v Solow Dev. Corp., 58 AD2d 600 [2d Dept 1977]).
AWNY's first claim, that this proceeding should be stayed because it falls within the exclusive
maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts, lacks merit. Applying the Supreme Court's conceptual approach[FN1] to determining whether a contract is a maritime one, which requires an examination of the contract to determine whether its principal objective is "maritime commerce" (Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v Kirby, 543 US

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