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Weir v Hackal
2001 NY Slip Op 30066(U)
December 13, 2001
Supreme Court, Suffolk County
Docket Number: 13503-99
Judge: Peter Fox Cohalan
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SHORT                                                                       ORDER
Index No.:  13503-99
Ret.  Date:  7-24-01
Mot.  Seq.
SUPREME COURT  - STATE OF NEW YORK
IAS PART XXIV, SUFFOLK COUNTY
PRESENT :                                                                   CALENDAR DATE: October  17, 2001
Hon.  PETER  FOX                                                            MNEMONIC: MD
                                                                                                                                ATTY:
JAMES K. WEIR and LISA WEIR,
                                                                                                                                RUSSO, FOX    KARL
Plaintiffs,                                                                 400                                                 Rd.
                                                                                                                                Hauppauge, NY  11787
-against-                                                                                                                       ATTY:
LYNN M. HACKAL,                                                                                                                 MARC  D. SLOANE, ESQ.
                                                                                                                                201 No.  Service Rd.
Defendant.                                                                                                                      Melville, NY  11747
                                                                                                                                                                               Upon the following papers numbered  1 to                                                         read on this motion
for                                                                         iudament
Notice of                                                                                                                                                                                                                 to Show Cause and supporting papers  1-22
                                                                                                                                Notice of Cross Motion and supporting papers                                                                                                                            ; Answering
                                                                            Affidavits and supporting papers                                                                                                              23-32                                                 ; Replying Affidavits
and supporting papers                                                                                                                                                          33-35                                                                                  ; Other                           ;             (and
after hearing counsel in support of and opposed to the motion) it is,
ORDERED  that this motion by the defendant, Lynn M.  Hackal, for
summary judgment and dismissal of plaintiffs'  complaint pursuant to CPLR
and Insurance Law                                                           and  5104 on the ground that the plaintiff,
James K. Weir,   has not sustained a "serious physical injury" as such
term is defined in Insurance Law                                            is hereby denied in its
entirety.
This action was instituted by the plaintiffs for personal
injuries allegedly sustained by James K. Weir  in a motor vehicle
accident occurring on March  18,  1999 at approximately                     am on Main
Street in front of the Riverhead Auto  Parts Store in Riverhead, Suffolk
County on Long  Island, New York.   Plaintiff was stopped and parked to
make a delivery on Main Street and had entered the back of his truck to
pick up a battery  for delivery when the defendant, Lynn M. Hackal,
crashed into the rear of the plaintiff's  truck.  Ms. Hackel was arrested
by the town police  for driving while intoxicated and a blood alcohol
test showed her  level to be a                                              more than twice the legal limit.  The
defendant was subsequently convicted of driving while intoxicated in
violation of Vehicle    Traffic Law                                         (2).  This lawsuit, thereafter,
ensued.
Defendant, Lynn M.  Hackel, now moves  for summary judgment
pursuant to CPLR                                                            dismissing plaintiff James K. Weir's complaint on




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Weir v.       Hackal
Page 2
the grounds that the plaintiff James K. Weir has not sustained a
"serious physical injury" as that term is defined in Insurance Law
Plaintiff James K. Weir opposes the motion.   For the reasons
set forth herein, defendant Lynn M.  Hackel's,  motion for summary
judgment and dismissal of plaintiff James K. Weir's complaint is denied
in its entirety.
The function of the court on a motion  for summary judgment is
issue finding not issue determination.   It is a most drastic remedy
which should not be granted where there is any doubt as to the existence
                                                                                                                                  of a triable issue or where the issue is even arguable.                                                                       Nassau
                                                                            111                                                   212,  489                                                 246  (2nd Dept.  1985); S t e v e n                                 P a r k e r ,
99                                                                          649, 472                                              225  (2nd Dept.  1984); G a e t a                                                                    New  Y o r k  N ew s ,
                                                                            95                                                    325, 466                                                  321  (1st Dept.  1983).  As the New York
                                                                            Court of Appeals noted in                             T w e n t i e t h                                         Fox ,                                      3                        395,
404  (1957):
"TO  grant summary judgment it must
clearly appear that no material and
triable issue of fact is presented
                                                                            S o n s                                               C i t v of New  Y o r k ,                                 301
                                                                                                                                  NY  118.).   This drastic remedy should not
                                                                                                                                  be granted where there is any doubt as to
                                                                            the existence of such issues
C a r e y ,                                                                 280 App.                                                                                                        or where the
                                                                            issue is  'arguable'                                                                                            Jacobs ,
255 NY  520,  522); 'issue finding, rather
than issue determination is the key to the
procedure'                                                                  ( E s t e v e                                         A v a d ,                                                 271 App.
725, 727)
Although the question of the existence of a  "serious injury"
is often left to the jury, where properly raised, the issue of whether a
plaintiff is barred  from recovery in a judicial forum for want of a
                                                                            "serious injury" is, in the first instance, for the                                                                                                        determin-
ation.                                                                      L o u i s  Cab                                        108                                                       378,  489                                  468  (1st
Dept.  1985);                                                               e r                                                   105                                                       476, 480                                   781  (3rd Dept.
1984).   If it can be  said, as a matter of law, that plaintiff suffered
no serious injury within the meaning  of the Insurance Law, then plain-
tiff has no claim to assert and there is nothing  for the jury to decide.
E l l i o t t ,                                                             57                                                    230,  455                                                 570  (1982).
Section 5104 of the Insurance Law provides that an individual
injured in an automobile accident may bring  a negligence cause of action
only upon a showing that the individual has incurred a "serious injury"




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Weir v. Hackal
Page 3
within the meaning of the no-fault law.   Insurance Law                     defines
"serious injury" as a personal injury which results in death; permanent
loss of use of a body organ, member,  function or system; permanent con-
sequential limitation of use of a body organ or member, significant
limitation of use of a body  function or system; or a medically deter-
mined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature which prevents the
injured person from performing substantially all of the material acts
which constitute such person's usual and customary daily activities for
not less than ninety days during the one hundred eighty days immediately
following the occurrence of the injury or impairment.
While defendant's medical authority, Seth B.  Paul, M.D.,
claims no significant limitation or use of a body member, plaintiffs'
submitted medical authority, in a sworn affidavit by Jeffrey M.  Block, a
chiropractor, notes that plaintiff James K. Weir has a significant
limitation of movement and use of the cervical regions of the spine and
provides documented ranges of motion which are restricted or limited by
pain.   These limitation of movements were calculated at  10% or more.
Dr. Block also noted that the plaintiff had sustained a herniated disc
at t'he                                                                     on the right side of the cervical cord as demonstrated in
an MRI taken by  Dr. Albert  Zilkha of Long Island Magnetic Resonance
Imaging on March  29,  1999 and provided to the plaintiff's  treating
physician, John S. Walsh, M.D..   Dr. Block has posited that the injuries
are both consequential to the accident and permanent  in nature.   Thus,
the plaintiff has presented both an affirmation setting forth the
doctor's  observations supported by objective proof, through specific
testing of range motion  limitations and an MRI documenting a herniated
disc sufficient to raise an issue of fact warranting denial of the
                                                                            motion for summary judgment. See,                                                                                                  79, 707
233                                                                         Dept.  2000);                                                         237                                                          492,  655
96                                                                          Dept.  1997).
Generally a soft tissue injury with cervical and low back
sprain does not meet the threshold for serious injury
White,  101                                                                 801,  475                                                             141).  These were the types of injuries
                                                                            which the legislature hoped would no longer burden the court system
                                                                            under the no-fault scheme  (Scheer                                    70                                                           678, 518
                                                                            788).  Neither are subjective complaints of transitory pain due to
                                                                            cervical and lumbar sprains sufficient                                                                                             180
713, 579                                                                                                                                          743).   However, the Second Department, Appellate Division
                                                                            has consistently held that where there is objective proof of the
                                                                            cervical and lumbosacral pain by way of an MRI or x-ray showing a
                                                                            physical injury  (Jackson    United Parcel                            204                                                          605, 612
186;                                                                        212                                                                   756,  624                                                    853; or by a
                                                                            chiropractor's report or affidavit setting forth the degree of any
limitation of movement                                                      (Rut                                                                  214                                                          721,  625      633;




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Weir v.       Hackal
Page  4
                                                                                                                                    1997 WL  214768;  S t e u e r                                                                                                              650
298; Kraemer                                                                 655                                                                                                                                                                                               then the plaintiff has either met
                                                                                                                                    his prima  facie burden or raised a triable issue of fact warranting a
                                                                                                                                    denial of a summary judgment motion on the issue of threshold.
                                                                                                                                                                                                              Although a minor limitation of movement is not consistent with
the threshold                                                                                                                       79                                                                        955, 582                                                                                             the Second
                                                                                                                                    Department has held that a  10% restriction or more in the movement of
                                                                                                                                    the lumbar spine is sufficient to establish a significant permanent
                                                                             limitation of a bodily  function.  ( S c h w a r t z                                                                                                                                              New  Y o r k  C i t v               646
30). See,                                                                                                                                                                                                     160                                                              772, 553                            488
Dept.  1990); P a r k e r                                                    S m i t h ,                                            242                                                                       374,  664                                                        374                                 Dept.
1997).
"The limitation or use of a body member or organ must be
permanent and consequential but the limitation need not be
D e l a c r u z ,                                                            200                                                    707,  474                                                                 850  (1984).  A  'serious
                                                                                                                                    injury' definition should be construed to mean that a person has been
                                                                                                                                    curtailed from performing his usual activities to a great extent rather
than' some slight curtailment.   S o l e                                                                                                                                                                      119                                                              974, 500
872  (4th Dept.  1986)
                                                                                                                                    While permanent loss does not necessitate proof of a total
loss of the                                                                                                                         member,  function or                                                      it must  establish
                                                                             operating in some limited way or only with pain.                                                                                 er                                                               105
4767,  480                                                                                                                          781  (3rd Dept.  1984).                                                   is well settled that
                                                                             pain can form the basis of a serious                                                                                             Moore,                                                           141
806,  529                                                                                                                           876  (2nd Dept.                                                           appeal denied  73                                                704,  537
492  (1989).  See also,                                                                                                             B u s h ,                                                                 109                                                              1001,  486
478  (3rd Dept.  1985).
It is the function of the court on a motion for summary
judgment to consider all the facts in a light most  favorable to the
party opposing the motion,                                                   D r a k e ,                                            145                                                                       687, 535                                                         229
(3rd Dept.  1988) and to determine whether there are any material and
triable issues of fact presented.   The key is issue finding, not issue
determination, and the court should not attempt to determine questions
of credibility.  S.J.  C a p e l i n A s s o c .                             G l o b e ,                                            34                                                                        338,  357
478  (1974).  Questions of credibility between experts on behalf of
plaintiff and defendant are for the jury and not the court to determine
Under the facts and circumstances of the instant case,
considered in a light most  favorable to the plaintiffs, the Court finds
that the plaintiff, James K. Weir, has provided  sufficient medical
evidence to  raise a  factual issue which  requires resolution by  a jury.
It   is well settled that pain can form the basis of a serious injury.




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Weir v.     Hackal
Page  5
                                                                            100                                       702,  474                                                                  618  (3rd Dept.  1984).  Although
                                                                                                                      the defendant submits considerable expert medical proof to the contrary,
                                                                                                                      the Court views the discrepancies between the medical reports and
                                                                                                                      affidavits submitted on behalf of the parties to involve issues of
                                                                            credibility for resolution by the jury.                                                                              135
1073, 523                                                                   211                                       Dept.  1987).
Accordingly, the defendant Lynn  M.   Hackel's  motion for summary
judgment and dismissal of plaintiff James K. Weir's action pursuant to
CPLR  53212 on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to reach the
threshold of a serious physical injury as defined in Insurance Law  55104
is hereby denied.
The foregoing constitutes the decision of the Court.
Date:                                                                       1 3
A
J.S.C.

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