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NO. COA12-211
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  6 November  2012
MARION S. BRADEN, ADMINISTRATRIX
OF THE ESTATE OF GREGORY ALAN
BRADEN, M.D., DECEASED
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.                                                                Forsyth County
No.  09 CVS  6174
STEPHAN B. LOWE, M.D.; ORTHOPAEDIC
SPECIALISTS OF THE CAROLINAS,
P.A.; NOVANT HEALTH, INC.; FORSYTH
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC.; NOVANT
HEALTH; FORSYTH MEDICAL CENTER;
CAROLINA MEDICORP ENTERPRISES,
INC.; PIEDMONT MEDICAL
SPECIALISTS, P.L.L.C.; and RICHARD
S. MARX, M.D.
Defendants-Appellees.
Medical   Malpractice                                             -   Rule         9(j)   certification   -   expert
qualifications  - reasonable expectation
The trial court erred by granting defendants’ motion to dismiss
in a medical malpractice action.    Plaintiff could have
reasonably expected Dr. Alleyne to qualify as an expert for
purposes of N.C.G.S.  §  1A-1, Rule  9(j).




NO. COA12-211
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  6 November  2012
MARION S. BRADEN, ADMINISTRATRIX
OF THE ESTATE OF GREGORY ALAN
BRADEN, M.D., DECEASED
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.                                                                            Forsyth County
No.  09 CVS  6174
STEPHAN B. LOWE, M.D.; ORTHOPAEDIC
SPECIALISTS OF THE CAROLINAS,
P.A.; NOVANT HEALTH, INC.; FORSYTH
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC.; NOVANT
HEALTH; FORSYTH MEDICAL CENTER;
CAROLINA MEDICORP ENTERPRISES,
INC.; PIEDMONT MEDICAL
SPECIALISTS, P.L.L.C.; and RICHARD
S. MARX, M.D.
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal  by  Plaintiff  from  judgment  entered                                21  July                                                          2011  by
Judge  John  O.  Craig  in  Superior  Court,  Forsyth  County.    Heard  in
the Court of Appeals  25 September  2012.
Cozen  O'Connor,  by  Kimberly  Sullivan  and  Christopher  C.
Fallon, Jr., for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Carruthers  &  Roth,  P.A.,  by  Norman  F.  Klick,  Jr.  and  Robert
N.  Young,  for  Defendants-Appellees  Stephan  B.  Lowe,  M.D.
and Orthopaedic Specialists of the Carolinas, P.A.
McGEE, Judge.
                                                                              Marion   S.   Braden,   Administratrix   of   the   Estate   of
Gregory  Alan  Braden,  M.D.,                                                 (Plaintiff)  filed  a  complaint  on                              3




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August                                                                         2009   against   Stephan   B.   Lowe,   M.D.                  (Dr.   Lowe);
Orthopaedic  Specialists  Of  The  Carolinas,  P.A.                            (OSC);  Novant
Health,  Inc.;  Forsyth  Memorial  Hospital,  Inc.;  Novant  Health;
Forsyth  Medical  Center;  Carolina  Medicorp  Enterprises,  Inc.;
Piedmont  Medical  Specialists,  P.L.L.C.;  and  Richard  S.  Marx,
M.D.                                                                           Plaintiff's  complaint  set  forth  causes  of  action  for
negligence,  wrongful  death,  and  res  ipsa  loquitor  arising  from
treatment  Gregory  Alan  Braden,  M.D.  (Dr.  Braden)  received  during
December  2004  and  early  2005.    Pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  1A-
1,  Rules                                                                      9(j)  and                                                     12,  Dr.  Lowe  and  OSC   (together,  Defendants)
filed  a  motion  to  dismiss  Plaintiff's  complaint  on                      18  April
2011.    The  trial  court  granted  Defendants'  motion  to  dismiss  by
order   entered                                                                21   July                                                     2011.                      Plaintiff   filed   a   voluntary
dismissal  with  prejudice  on  4  August  2011,  dismissing  her  claims
against  Novant  Health,  Inc.;  Forsyth  Memorial  Hospital,  Inc.;
Novant   Health;   Forsyth   Medical   Center;   Carolina   Medicorp
Enterprises,  Inc.;  Piedmont  Medical  Specialists,  P.L.L.C.;  and
Richard S. Marx, M.D.    Plaintiff appeals.
I. Facts
Plaintiff's  complaint  alleged  the  following:     Dr.  Braden
suffered  from  diabetes,  gout,  and  cellulitis,  which  affected  his
extremities.     As  a  result  of  his  condition,  Dr.  Braden  sought
treatment   from   Defendants   on                                             2   December                                                  2004.                      Dr.   Lowe




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performed  an  incision  and  drainage  procedure  on  Dr.  Braden's
left  great  toe.    Dr.  Braden's  toe  became  infected  and  Dr.  Braden
was  later  diagnosed  with  a  MRSA  staph  infection.    Dr.  Braden  was
placed  on  six  weeks  of  intravenous  antibiotic  treatment  on            7
January                                                                       2005.                                              On           15  January   2005,  Dr.  Lowe  amputated  Dr.
Braden's  left  great  toe,  which  had  grown  worse  as  a  result  of
the infection.
In  his  pre-operative  and  post-operative  orders  regarding
the  amputation  of  Dr.  Braden's  toe,  Dr.  Lowe  did  not  include  Dr.
Braden's  intravenous  antibiotic  treatments.     Plaintiff  alleged
that,  as  a  result  of  Dr.  Lowe's  orders,  Dr.  Braden  did  not
receive   his   intravenous   antibiotics   from                              14   January   to                                  23
January.    Plaintiff  alleged  that  Dr.  Lowe  went  to  Dr.  Braden's
hospital   room   and   apologized   for   not   having   continued   Dr.
Braden's  antibiotic  treatment  plan.     On                                 13  August                                         2007,  Dr.
Braden   died   from   respiratory   and   cardiac   conditions   that
Plaintiff  alleged  were  "brought  on  in  part  by  the  ravages  of  the
infections  that                                                              [Dr.  Braden]  had  suffered  and  the  physical
immobility that resulted."
II. Plaintiff's Expert and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's complaint contains the following allegation:
The  medical  care  which  is  the  subject  of
this  Complaint  has  been  reviewed  by  a  health
care    provider    who    Plaintiff    reasonably
believes  will  qualify  as  an  expert  witness




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under  Rule                                                               702  of  the  North  Carolina  Rules
of  Evidence  and  who  is  willing  to  testify
that  the  medical  care  complained  of  did  not
meet the applicable standards of care.
Defendants  filed  an  interrogatory  seeking  the  identification  of
Plaintiff's   expert   witness   and   Plaintiff   filed   a   response
                                                                          identifying  Dr.  William  F.  Alleyne  II                                             (Dr.  Alleyne).         Dr.
Alleyne  was  deposed  on                                                 7  March                                      2011.                                    After  Dr.  Alleyne's
deposition,  Defendants  filed  their  motion  to  dismiss  Plaintiff's
complaint on the following grounds:
4.    Plaintiff's  Complaint  violates  Rule  9(j)
as   Plaintiff's   Rule                                                   9(j)   expert   is   not
reasonably  expected  to  qualify  as  an  expert
witness  pursuant  to  Rule                                               702  of  the  North
Carolina Rules of Evidence.
5.                                                                        Rule                                          702   provides   that   if   a   party
against   whom   testimony   is   offered   as   a
specialist,    the    expert    witness    must
specialize  in  the  same  or  similar  specialty
which   includes   within   its   specialty   the
performance  of  the  procedure  that  is  the
subject   of   the   Complaint   and   have   prior
experience treating similar patients.
6.                                                                        Plaintiff's   Rule                            9(j)   expert,   Dr.
William  Alleyne,  does  not  specialize  in  the
same                                                                      or                                            similar                                  specialty               as  .  .  .
Defendants.
7.                                                                        Specifically,  Defendant  Dr.  Lowe  is  an
orthopedic   surgeon.   However,   Plaintiff's
Rule                                                                      9(j)   expert   specializes   in   internal
medical,   pulmonary   diseases   and   critical
care  medicine.    Dr.  Alleyne  testified  at  his
deposition  that  internal  medicine,  pulmonary
diseases  and  critical  care  are  not  the  same
or  similar  specialty  as  orthopedic  surgery
and  he  has  never  specialized  in  the  practice




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of orthopedics or similar specialty.
The  trial  court's  judgment  granting  Defendants'  motion   to
dismiss contains the following language:
[T]he  Court  finds  as  fact  and  concludes  as
law   that   Defendants'   Motion   shou1d   be
allowed                                                        as                                                 William                                             Alleyne,                        M.D.,
                                                               Plaintiff's   Ru1e                                                                                     9(j)   expert   was   not   a
person   who   cou1d   have   reasonably   been
expected  to  qualify  as  an  expert  witness
under  Ru1e                                                    702  of  the  North  Carolina  Ru1es
of Evidence.
Moreover,  after  the  [c]ourt  communicated  its
decision  in  the  Motion,  the  Plaintiff  filed
a   Motion   for   Reconsideration   pursuant   to
rules  58  and  60  of  the  North  Carolina  Rules
of  Civil  Procedure,  which,  in  the  interest
of  expediency,  the                                                                                              [c]ourt  will  treat  as
timely  filed.                                                 The                                                [c]ourt  has  carefully
considered                                                     .  .  .   Plaintiff's   Motion   for
                                                               Reconsideration,  along  with  the  accompanying
materials  and  affidavit.    The                                                                                 [c]ourt  finds
that                                                           .  .  .  [P]laintiff's   proposed   expert,
Dr.    Alleyne,    practiced    in    a    similar
specialty  to  that  of                                        .  .  .  [D]efendant  Dr.
Lowe,    insofar    as    the    procedure    for
restarting   antibiotics   following   an   auto-
stop,  but  the  record  does  not  establish  that
[Dr.]  Alleyne  participated  in  such  activity
during  the  twelve  months  preceding  January
15,                                                            2005.                                              In  its  discretion,  the                           [c]ourt
                                                                                                                  will  deny  the  Motion  for  Reconsideration.
                                                                                                                  The    Court    will    allow    Dr.    Alleyne's
                                                               supplemental                                       affidavit,                                          which
                                                               accompanied  .  .  .                               [P]laintiff's   motion   for
reconsideration,  to  be  made  a  part  of  the
record  in  this  case,  in  the  event  of  an
appeal.
III. Issues on Appeal




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Plaintiff  raises  on  appeal  the  issues  of  whether:                      (1)  the
trial  court  erred  in  granting  Defendants'  motion  to  dismiss
because  Plaintiff  "met  the  expert  certification  requirements  of
Rule  9(j)  prior  to  the  filing  of  her  complaint[;]"  (2)  the  trial
court  erred  in  granting  Defendants'  motion  to  dismiss  on  the
grounds  that  Plaintiff's  expert  did  not  participate  in  a  similar
procedure  within  the  year  prior  to  the  acts  giving  rise  to
Plaintiff's  complaint  "because  Plaintiff's  expert  did  in  fact
participate  in  such  a  procedure  multiple  times  during  the  prior
year[;]"                                                                      (3)   the  trial  court  erred  in  granting  Defendants'
motion  to  dismiss  because  Rule  9(j)  does  not  actually  contain  a
"one-year   participation   requirement[;]"                                   (4)   the   trial   court
erred  in  granting  Defendants'  motion  to  dismiss  because  the
motion   was   not   timely   filed   and   "any   objections   to   the
qualifications  of  the  Rule                                                 9(j)  expert  should  have  been  deemed
waived[;]"  and  (5)  the  trial  court  erred  in  granting  Defendants'
motion  to  dismiss  because  "Plaintiff  properly  pled  ordinary
negligence[.]"
IV. Standard of Review
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                                                              §   1A-1,  Rule   9(j)  provides  the  following
                                                                              requirements for the pleading of a medical malpractice action:
Medical  malpractice.--Any  complaint  alleging
medical    malpractice    by    a    health    care
provider  pursuant  to  G.S.                                                  90-21.11(2)a.  in
failing   to   comply   with   the   applicable




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standard  of  care  under  G.S.                        90-21.12  shall
be dismissed unless:
(1)  The  pleading  specifically  asserts
that  the  medical  care  and  all  medical
records    pertaining    to    the    alleged
negligence  that  are  available  to  the
plaintiff  after  reasonable  inquiry  have
been   reviewed   by   a   person   who   is
reasonably  expected  to  qualify  as  an
expert  witness  under  Rule                           702  of  the
Rules  of  Evidence  and  who  is  willing  to
testify  that  the  medical  care  did  not
comply  with  the  applicable  standard  of
care;
(2)  The  pleading  specifically  asserts
that  the  medical  care  and  all  medical
records    pertaining    to    the    alleged
negligence  that  are  available  to  the
plaintiff  after  reasonable  inquiry  have
been   reviewed   by   a   person   that   the
complainant  will  seek  to  have  qualified
as  an  expert  witness  by  motion  under
Rule                                                   702(e)  of  the  Rules  of  Evidence
and  who  is  willing  to  testify  that  the
medical  care  did  not  comply  with  the
applicable  standard  of  care,  and  the
motion is filed with the complaint; or
(3)                                                    The    pleading    alleges    facts
establishing    negligence    under    the
existing   common-law   doctrine   of   res
ipsa loquitur.
Upon  motion  by  the  complainant  prior  to  the
expiration   of   the   applicable   statute   of
limitations,    a    resident    judge    of    the
superior  court  for  a  judicial  district  in
which   venue   for   the   cause   of   action   is
appropriate   under   G.S.                             1-82   or,   if   no
resident  judge  for  that  judicial  district  is
physically    present    in    that    judicial
district,  otherwise  available,  or  able  or
willing  to  consider  the  motion,  then  any
presiding  judge  of  the  superior  court  for




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that  judicial  district  may  allow  a  motion  to
extend   the   statute   of   limitations   for   a
period  not  to  exceed                                                        120  days  to  file  a
complaint  in  a  medical  malpractice  action  in
order   to   comply   with   this   Rule,   upon   a
determination  that  good  cause  exists  for  the
granting  of  the  motion  and  that  the  ends  of
justice  would  be  served  by  an  extension.  The
plaintiff  shall  provide,  at  the  request  of
the  defendant,  proof  of  compliance  with  this
subsection    through    up    to    ten    written
interrogatories,  the  answers  to  which  shall
be  verified  by  the  expert  required  under
this   subsection.   These   interrogatories   do
not  count  against  the  interrogatory  limit
under Rule  33.
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  1A-1, Rule  9(j)  (2011)  (emphasis added).
"Whether  the  pleader  could  reasonably  expect  the  witness  to
qualify  as  an  expert  under  Rule                                           702  presents  a  question  of  law
and  is  therefore  reviewable  de  novo  by  this  Court."     Trapp  v.
Maccioli,  129  N.C.  App.  237,  241  n.  2,  497  S.E.2d  708,  711  n.  2
(1998)                                                                         (citation   omitted).                                         See   also   Phillips   v.   Triangle
Women's  Health  Clinic,  Inc.,  155  N.C.  App.  372,  376,  573  S.E.2d
600,  603  (2002)  (citations  omitted)  ("[A]  plaintiff's  compliance
with  Rule                                                                     9(j)  requirements  clearly  presents  a  question  of  law
to  be  decided  by  a  court,  not  a  jury.     A  question  of  law  is
reviewable  by  this  Court  de  novo.").    "This  Court  inquires  as  to
whether                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   [the]  plaintiff  reasonably  expected                                        [the  experts]  to
                                                                                                                                                                                     qualify  as  expert  witnesses  pursuant  to  Rule                                                                                 702,  not  whether
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          they  ultimately  will  qualify."    Grantham  v.  Crawford,                  204  N.C.
App.                                                                           115,                                                          118,                                    693  S.E.2d                                          245,                                                           248   (2010)   (emphasis  added).




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"'In  other  words,  were  the  facts  and  circumstances  known  or
those  which  should  have  been  known  to  the  pleader  such  as  to
cause  a  reasonable  person  to  believe  that  the  witness  would
qualify  as  an  expert  under  Rule                                      702.'"     Id.  at                      118-19,                                              693
S.E.2d  245  (citations omitted).
Further,  "'it  is  also  now  well  established  that  even  when  a
complaint   facially   complies   with   Rule                             9(j)   by   including   a
statement   pursuant   to   Rule                                          9(j),   if   discovery   subsequently
establishes  that  the  statement  is  not  supported  by  the  facts,
then    dismissal    is    likewise    appropriate.'"                     Morris    v.
Southeastern  Orthopedics  Sports  Med.  &  Shoulder  Ctr.,               199  N.C.
App.  425,  437,  681 S.E.2d  840,  849  (2009)  (citation omitted).
What  must  be  established  in  discovery  is  not
whether   the   witness   is   "in   fact   not   an
expert[,]"   but   whether   "there   is   ample
evidence  in  th[e]  record  that  a  reasonable
person   armed   with   the   knowledge   of   the
plaintiff  at  the  time  the  pleading  was  filed
would  have  believed  that  [the  witness]  would
have qualified as an expert under Rule  702."
                                                                                                                  Id.  437-38,  681 S.E.2d  840  (citation omitted).
                                                                          N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                            §                                                                       8C-1,  Rule   702  provides  the  following
                                                                                                                                                                       concerning  the  qualification  of  experts  to  testify  in  medical
malpractice actions:
(b)   In   a   medical   malpractice   action   as
defined  in  G.S.  90-21.11,  a  person  shall  not
give   expert   testimony   on   the   appropriate
standard  of  health  care  as  defined  in  G.S.
90-21.12  unless  the  person  is  a  licensed




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health   care   provider   in   this   State   or
another   state   and   meets   the   following
criteria:
(1)  If  the  party  against  whom  or  on
whose  behalf  the  testimony  is  offered
is   a   specialist,   the   expert   witness
must:
a.    Specialize    in    the    same
specialty   as   the   party   against
whom   or   on   whose   behalf   the
testimony is offered; or
b.    Specialize    in    a    similar
specialty   which   includes   within
its  specialty  the  performance  of
the  procedure  that  is  the  subject
of  the  complaint  and  have  prior
experience                                          treating                               similar
patients.
(2)                                                 During    the    year    immediately
preceding  the  date  of  the  occurrence
that  is  the  basis  for  the  action,  the
expert   witness   must   have   devoted   a
majority   of   his   or   her   professional
time    to    either    or    both    of    the
following:
a.  The  active  clinical  practice  of
the   same   health   profession   in
which  the  party  against  whom  or  on
whose   behalf   the   testimony   is
offered,  and  if  that  party  is  a
specialist,   the   active   clinical
practice  of  the  same  specialty  or
a  similar  specialty  which  includes
within                                              its                                    specialty   the
performance  of  the  procedure  that
is  the  subject  of  the  complaint
and  have  prior  experience  treating
similar patients; or
b.  The  instruction  of  students  in
an  accredited  health  professional




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school  or  accredited  residency  or
clinical  research  program  in  the
same   health   profession   in   which
the  party  against  whom  or  on  whose
behalf  the  testimony  is  offered,
and  if  that  party  is  a  specialist,
an  accredited  health  professional
school  or  accredited  residency  or
clinical  research  program  in  the
same specialty.
(c)  Notwithstanding  subsection                       (b)  of  this
section,  if  the  party  against  whom  or  on
whose  behalf  the  testimony  is  offered  is  a
general   practitioner,   the   expert   witness,
during  the  year  immediately  preceding  the
date  of  the  occurrence  that  is  the  basis  for
the  action,  must  have  devoted  a  majority  of
his  or  her  professional  time  to  either  or
both of the following:
(1)   Active   clinical   practice   as   a
general practitioner; or
(2)   Instruction   of   students   in   an
accredited   health   professional   school
or   accredited   residency   or   clinical
research    program    in    the    general
practice of medicine.
(d)  Notwithstanding  subsection                       (b)  of  this
section,  a  physician  who  qualifies  as  an
expert  under  subsection  (a)  of  this  Rule  and
who  by  reason  of  active  clinical  practice  or
instruction  of  students  has  knowledge  of  the
applicable   standard   of   care   for   nurses,
nurse   practitioners,   certified   registered
nurse   anesthetists,   certified   registered
nurse   midwives,   physician   assistants,   or
other  medical  support  staff  may  give  expert
testimony  in  a  medical  malpractice  action
with  respect  to  the  standard  of  care  of
which  he  is  knowledgeable  of  nurses,  nurse
practitioners,   certified   registered   nurse
anesthetists,   certified   registered   nurse
midwives,    physician    assistants    licensed




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under  Chapter  90  of  the  General  Statutes,  or
other medical support staff.
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  8C-1, Rule  702  (2011).
V. Analysis
In  the  present  case,  Plaintiff's  complaint  contains  a  rule
9(j)  certification.    Thus,  it  remains  to  be  determined  whether
Plaintiff,  at  the  time  of  filing  her  complaint,  could  reasonably
have  had  an  expectation  that  Dr.  Alleyne  would  qualify  as  an
expert  at  a  subsequent  trial.    Plaintiff  contends  that  she  had  a
"reasonable   expectation   of   compliance   with   the   three   basic
elements of Rule  702" because:
1)  Dr.  Alleyne  is  a  licensed  health  care
provider   in   this   State;                                                 2)   Dr.   Alleyne
specializes   in   a   similar   specialty   which
includes                                                                      within                                              its   specialty   the
performance  of  the  procedure  that  is  the
subject  of  the  complaint  and  he  has  prior
experience  treating  similar  patients;  and  3)
during    the    year    immediately    preceding
January  2005,  Dr.  Alleyne  devoted  a  majority
of   his   professional   time   to   the   active
clinical   practice   of   a   similar   specialty
which   includes   within   its   specialty   the
performance  of  the  procedure  that  is  the
subject   of   the   complaint   and   has   prior
experience treating similar patients.
We  first  note  that,  on  appeal,  Plaintiff  and  Defendants
appear   to   have   a   difference   of   opinion   concerning   the
characterization  of  the  procedure  giving  rise  to  this  complaint.
Defendants  argue  that  the  procedure  was  the  amputation  of  Dr.
Braden's  toe.                                                                Plaintiff  argues  that  the  procedure  was  the




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continuance  of  antibiotics  following  Dr.  Braden's  surgery.    The
trial  court  found  that  Dr.  Alleyne  "practiced  in  a  similar
specialty  to  that  of  .  .  .  [D]efendant  Dr.  Lowe,  insofar  as  the
procedure  for  restarting  antibiotics  following  an  auto-stop[.]"
Plaintiff   does   not   contend   the   trial   court   erred   in   that
finding,  nor  do  Defendants.                                                We  conclude  the  trial  court's
determination  that  Drs.  Alleyne  and  Lowe  practiced  in  a  similar
specialty  with  respect  to  the  procedure  governing  antibiotics
was without error.
The  trial  court's  reasoning  for  granting  Defendants'  motion
to  dismiss  turned  not  on  the  specialization  of  the  procedure,
but  rather  on  whether  Dr.  Alleyne  had  participated  in  such  a
procedure  within  the  relevant  time  frame:  "[T]he  record  does  not
establish   that                                                              [Dr.]   Alleyne   participated   in   such   activity
during  the  twelve  months  preceding  January  15,  2005."    Thus,  it
appears  to  this  Court  that  the  trial  court  found  that  Plaintiff
could  not  reasonably  expect  Dr.  Alleyne  to  qualify  as  an  expert
based  solely  on  the  N.C.G.S.                                              §                                                       8C-1,  Rule   702  requirement  that
the  expert  must  have  performed  the  procedure  within  the  year
preceding  the  events  giving  rise  to  Plaintiff's  complaint.    We
disagree with the trial court's conclusion.
Dr. Alleyne's deposition contained the following exchanges:
Q.    Okay.  So  therefore  since  certainly                                  2000
you've  never  been  in  Dr.  Lowe's  position




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where   you   had   a   patient   who   was   on
antibiotics  that  you  took  to  the  OR  whose
antibiotics  were  stopped  because  you  took
them  to  the  OR  and  you  were  then  faced  with
the    decision    whether    to    restart    the
antibiotics; correct?
A. I disagree.
Q. Since  2000?
A.  Since                                              2000  I  have  been  in  a  situation,
several  situations,  where  we  took  a  patient
for                                                    bronchoscopy;                                 following                            the
bronchoscopy,  we  had  to  rewrite  all  of  the
orders   and,   therefore,   had   to   rewrite
antibiotics  that  had  been  stopped  because  I
took a patient to a procedure.
Q.  That's  not  my  question.  My  question  is:
Since                                                  2000  have  you  taken  a  patient  to  the
OR?
A.    That is correct; I have not.
Q.  Okay.  So  since  2000  you've  never  taken  a
patient to the OR; correct?
A. That is correct.
Q.    So  since                                                                                      2000  you  never  took  a  patient
                                                       to the OR who was on antibiotics; correct?
                                                       A. That is correct.
Q.                                                     So  since                                     2000   you've  never  taken  a
patient   who                                                                                        -   to   the   OR   who   is   on
antibiotics  whose  antibiotics  were  stopped
because of your surgical procedure; correct?
A. That is correct.
Q.  So,  therefore,  since                             2000  you've  never
had  a  patient  who  was  on  antibiotics  that
you  took  to  the  OR  whose  antibiotics  were
stopped  because  you  took  them  to  the  OR  and




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you  were  then  faced  with  the  decision  of
whether to restart the antibiotics---
MS. SULLIVAN: Objection.
Q.  ---correct?
MS. SULLIVAN: Objection.
A.     Correct,  to  the  extent  that  "taken  to
the OR."
Dr.  Alleyne  also  submitted  a  supplemental  affidavit,  which
the  trial  court  made  a  part  of  the  record,  in  which  Dr.  Alleyne
stated:
In                                                                            1999  or                                    2000  I  became  the  Director  of
Respiratory   Therapy   at   Piedmont   Medical
Center    and    regularly    performed    various
inpatient   invasive   procedures,   including
bronchoscopies,  which  I  continue  to  do  to
this  day  and  did  in                                                       2004.                                       These  invasive
procedures  brought  into  play  the  automatic
stoppage                                                                      of                                          medications                          including
antibiotics.    In  2004,  I  worked  full  time  in
the   ICU   Department   at   Piedmont   Medical
Center.     As  a  result,  on  a  daily  basis  in
2004                                                                          I    had    to    re-start    intravenous
antibiotics   in   patients   whose   antibiotics
had  been  discontinued  by  hospital  auto-stop
policies  due  to  invasive  procedures  or  other
operative  procedures.     During                                             2004,  on  at
least   a   weekly   basis   I   reordered   the
intravenous  antibiotic  Vancomycin,  which  has
the   same   indication   as   Daptomycin   for
treatment of MRSA infections.
Thus,  it  is  clear  that  Dr.  Alleyne  stated  that                        he                                          had
performed    auto-stop    antibiotic    procedures    "since                  2000,"
including  "on  a  daily  basis  in                                           2004[.]"    We  are  persuaded  that
Dr.  Alleyne's  statements,  "since  2000"  and  "on  a  daily  basis  in




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2004,"  are  sufficient  to  give  Plaintiff  a  reasonable  expectation
that  Dr.  Alleyne  performed  the  procedure  during  the  twelve
months  preceding                                                              15  January           2005  and  thus  would  qualify  as  an
expert  pursuant  to  Rule  702.    Based  on  Dr.  Alleyne's  statements,
we  find  that  Plaintiff  could  have  had  a  reasonable  expectation
that  Dr.  Alleyne  would  qualify  as  an  expert.    We  stress  that  our
ruling  does  not  address  the  actual  qualification  of  Dr.  Alleyne
as  an  expert  under  Rule  702  as  such  a  determination  has  not  yet
been  made  by  the  trial  court;  rather,  our  ruling  strictly
addresses  whether  Plaintiff  could  have  reasonably  expected  Dr.
Alleyne  to  qualify  for  purposes  of  N.C.G.S.                              §                     1A-1,  Rule                               9(j).
Because  the  trial  court  erred  in  determining  that  Plaintiff
could  not  have  had  a  reasonable  expectation  that  Dr.  Alleyne
would  qualify  as  an  expert,  we  hold  the  trial  court  erred  in
granting  Defendants'  motion  to  dismiss.                                    In  light  of  this
holding we do not address Plaintiff's remaining arguments.
Reversed and remanded.
Judges BEASLEY and THIGPEN concur.

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