Preview:

Crenshaw v. Williams
NO. COA10-720
(Filed  1 April  2011)
1.                                                                    Child   Custody   and   Support   -   foreign   support   order               -
improper modification
The  trial  court  lacked  authority  to  modify  a  Michigan
child  support  order,  and  the  portion  of  the  trial  court’s
order  modifying  defendant  mother’s  support  obligation  was
reversed.
2.                                                                    Child   Custody   and   Support                                               -   foreign   custody   order             -
                                                                      modification                      -  substantial  change  in  circumstances                                   -  best
interests of child
The   trial   court   did   not   abuse   its   discretion   by
modifying  a  Michigan  child  custody  order.     The  evidence
revealed  substantial  changes  in  circumstances  affecting  the
welfare  of  the  minor  children  and  that  modification  was  in
the best interests of the children.




NO. COA10-720
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  19 April  2011
REGGIE L. CRENSHAW,
Plaintiff,
v.                                                                          Mecklenburg County
                                                                            No.  08 CVD  24398
ALAINA D. WILLIAMS,
F/K/A ALAINA CRENSHAW,
Defendant.
Appeal  by  defendant  from  order  entered  6  July  2009  by  Judge
Christy  T.  Mann  in  Mecklenburg  County  District  Court.    Heard  in
the Court of Appeals  24 January  2011.
Todd  W.  Cline,  P.A.,  by  Todd  W.  Cline,  for  plaintiff-
appellee.
James,  McElroy  &  Diehl,  P.A.,  by  Preston  O.  Odom  III,  for
defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.
Defendant  Alaina  D.  Williams                                             (formerly  Crenshaw)  appeals
from  the  trial  court's  order  modifying  a  custody  order  entered
in  Michigan  and  granting  plaintiff  Reggie  L.  Crenshaw  primary
custody  of  the  couple's  two  sons,  Jhavon-Gabriel  and  Christian.
After careful review, we reverse in part and affirm in part.
Facts
On                                                                          15  August                      2002,  the  Circuit  Court  for  Wayne  County,




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Michigan  entered  a  "Judgment  of  Divorce"  (the  "Michigan  divorce
judgment"),  which  granted  the  parties  a  divorce  and  awarded  them
"joint  legal  and  joint  physical  custody"  of   the  juveniles.
Under  the  terms  of  the  judgment,  "primar[y]"  custody  of  the
juveniles  was  with  Ms.  Williams  for  the  first  three  years  after
entry  of  the  Michigan  divorce  judgment  (August  2002-August  2005)
and  then  alternated  to  Mr.  Crenshaw  for  the  second  three-year
period                                                                        (August                                                       2005-August   2008).    At  the  time  of  the  couple's
divorce,  Mr.  Crenshaw  was  living  in  Dearborn,  Michigan  and  Ms.
Williams  was  living  in  Norcross,  Georgia,  near  Atlanta.     Mr.
Crenshaw  moved  to  Charlotte,  North  Carolina  shortly  after  the
Michigan divorce judgment was entered.
When  Ms.  Williams  refused  to  "agree  to  the  switch"  in
custody  in                                                                   2005,  Mr.  Crenshaw  filed  a  motion  in  Michigan  state
court   requesting   enforcement   of   the   terms   of   the   Michigan
divorce  judgment.     After  holding  a  hearing  on                         15  August                                                    2005,
the  Michigan  circuit  court  entered  an  "Order  for  Change  of
Custody"  (the  "Michigan  custody  order")  on  6  September  2005,  in
which  the  court  determined  that  "it  was  in  the  best  interests  of
the  minor  children  to  enforce  the  custody  agreement  set  forth  in
the  [Michigan  divorce  judgment]  .  .  .                                   ."    The  custody  order  also
directed  Ms.  Williams  to  pay  child  support  to  Mr.  Crenshaw  while
he  had  primary  custody.     Mr.  Crenshaw  has  retained  custody  of




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Jhavon  and  Christian  since  entry  of  the                               2005  Michigan  custody
order.
Mr.  Crenshaw  married  Myra  McCaskill  on                                 9  June                   2007.
Ms.   McCaskill   helps   parent   Jhavon   and   Christian,   including
helping  them  with  their  homework,  driving  them  to  and  from
activities,  buying  them  clothes,  and  cooking  meals  for  them.
Mr.  Crenshaw  and  Ms.  McCaskill  have  been  members  of  the  PTA
Boards  of  their  sons'  schools  and  have  participated  on  the
schools'  Leadership  Teams.    Ms.  Williams  has  not  volunteered  at
her  sons'  schools  since  they  moved  to  Charlotte  to  live  with
their father.
Mr.  Crenshaw  and  Ms.  McCaskill  also  encourage  and  support
the  children's  participation  in  sports.    Mr.  Crenshaw  has  helped
coach  football  teams  on  which  the  boys  played  and  paid  for
Christian  to  attend  a  football  camp  in  the  Atlanta  area  during
the summer of  2008.
Ms.  Williams  has  had  "sporadic  employment"  since  August
2005,  working  as  an  insurance  adjuster,  substitute  teacher,
waitress,  and  working  for  her  family's  home  renovation  business.
Ms.  Williams  is  currently  unemployed  and  living  off  of  her
savings.    Her  parents  own  the  townhome  in  which  she  lives  and
allow  her  to  live  there  rent-free  in  exchange  for  working  for
the family business.




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Since  August                                                                2005,  Ms.  Williams  has  missed  four  or  five
visits  with  Jhavon  and  Christian.    On  some  weekend  visits,  Ms.
Williams  will  give  up  spending  Friday  nights  with  the  children
because Saturday morning flights typically are less expensive.
Ms.  Williams  is  late  for  "the  majority"  of  exchanges,  often
returning  Jhavon  and  Christian  to  Charlotte  after                      9:00  p.m.  on
Sunday  nights.    When  she  does  not  return  them  on  Sunday  nights,
Ms.  Williams  will  leave  Norcross  around  3:00  a.m.  and  drive  the
children  directly  to  their  schools  in  Charlotte.     When  Jhavon
and  Christian  return  from  visiting  their  mother,  they  typically
are  "exhausted"  and  Mr.  Crenshaw  and  Ms.  McCaskill  are  left  to
"deal with the ramifications of the exhaustion."
Mr.  Crenshaw  and  Ms.  Williams  are  "[r]arely"  able  to  agree
on  issues  involving  their  children.    Because  Ms.  Williams  often
yells  and  curses  at  Mr.  Crenshaw  on  the  telephone,  he  usually
resorts  to  communicating  with  her  through  email.    Although  Mr.
Crenshaw  notifies  Ms.  Williams  through  email  about  Jhavon's  and
Christian's  activities,  she  does  not  fully  participate  in  the
activities.
The  parties  also  differ  regarding  dietary  habits,  health
care,  and  time  spent  with  the  children.    Ms.  Williams  does  not
support  the  children  seeing  medical  doctors  and  they  often  come
home  to  Charlotte  sick.    While  Mr.  Crenshaw  disciplines  Jhavon




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and  Christian  by  taking  away  their  privileges,  Ms.  Williams  does
not  discipline  them  because  they  "see  eye  to  eye"  on  most
issues.
Mr.  Crenshaw's  position  with  Wachovia  was  eliminated  in
November                                                                       2008,  but  he  obtained  employment  that  same  month  with
ServiceMaster,  which  is  headquartered  in  Memphis,  Tennessee.    On
3   November                                                                   2008,   Mr.  Crenshaw  registered  the                          2002   Michigan
divorce  judgment  and                                                         2005  custody  order  in  Mecklenburg  County,
requesting  modification  of  custody  and  child  support.     At  the
time  of  the  6  April  and  17  June  2009  hearings  on  Mr.  Crenshaw's
motions   in   Mecklenburg   County   District   Court,   Mr.   Crenshaw
planned  on  moving  his  family  to  the  Memphis  area  in  late  June  or
early July of  2009.
The   district   court   entered   an   order   on                             6   July                                                        2009,
concluding  that  "Mr.  Crenshaw  ha[d]  met  his  burden  of  showing
that  a  change  in  circumstances  actually  has  occurred,  and  that
the  changes  have  affected  the  welfare  of  Jhavon  and  Christian"
and  awarding  him  "primary  custody"  of  the  children.    The  court
also  concluded  that  Ms.  Williams  should  pay                              $454  per  month  in
child  support;  that  she  was  currently                                     $16,400  in  arrears;  and
that  she  should  pay  an  additional                                         $100   per  month  "towards
retirement  of  the  arrearage."    Ms.  Williams  filed  numerous  post-
trial  motions,  including  a  "Motion  for  New  Trial  and  to  Amend




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Findings  of  Fact,"  a  "Motion  for  Relief  from  Child  Support  Order
and   for   Sanctions,"   and   a   "Motion   to   Extract   Fraudulent
Evidence."    The  trial  court  denied  Ms.  Williams'  motions  on          26
October  2009.    Ms. Williams timely appealed to this Court.
Support
Ms.  Williams  first  contends  that  the  Michigan  child  support
order  was  not  properly  registered  under  the  Uniform  Interstate
Family  Support  Act                                                          ("UIFSA"),  codified  in  Chapter        52C  of  the
North  Carolina  General  Statutes,  and  thus  "the  trial  court
lacked   authority   to   address   the   issue   of   child   support."
Whether   the   trial   court   complied   with   the   registration
procedures  set  out  in  UIFSA  is  a  question  of  law  reviewed  de
novo  on  appeal.    State  ex  rel.  Lively  v.  Berry,                      187  N.C.  App.
459,  462,  653 S.E.2d  192,  194  (2007).
UIFSA,  enacted  in  North  Carolina  in  1995,  was  "promulgated
and  intended  to  be  used  as                                               [a]  procedural  mechanism[]  for  the
establishment,   modification,   and   enforcement   of   child   and
spousal  support  obligations."    Welsher  v.  Rager,                        127  N.C.  App.
521,  524,  491  S.E.2d  661,  663  (1997);  accord  New  Hanover  Cty.  ex
rel.  Mannthey  v.  Kilbourne,                                                157  N.C.  App.                          239,           243,   578  S.E.2d
610,  613-14  (2003)  ("Enacted  by  states  as  a  mechanism  to  reduce
the   multiple,   conflicting   child   support   orders   existing   in
numerous  states,  UIFSA  creates  a  structure  designed  to  provide




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                                                                                                       for only one controlling support order at a time  [.]").
                                                                                                                                                                  Under  UIFSA,  a  child  support  order  is  first  entered  by  the
                                                                                                                                                                  "issuing  tribunal"  in  the  "issuing  state."     N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                       §
                                                                              52C-1-101(9)  and        (10)                                                       (2009);  Hook  v.  Hook,                                                                                                     170  N.C.  App.                138,
                                                                                                                                                                  141,  611  S.E.2d  869,  871,  disc.  review  denied,  359  N.C.  631,  616
S.E.2d                                                                        234                      (2005).                                                    N.C.   Gen.   Stat.                                                           §                                              52C-6-609                      (2009)
                                                                                                                                                                  establishes  that  if  an  obligee  wants  to  modify  an  order  against
                                                                                                                                                                  an  obligor  who  resides  in  a  different  state,  the  obligee  must
                                                                                                                                                                  "register"  the  order  in  the  state  in  which  the  obligor  resides.
                                                                              See  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.   §                                                          52C-6-609  cmt.                                                                                                              ("A  petitioner  wishing  to
                                                                                                                                                                  register  a  support  order  of  another  state  for  purposes  of
                                                                              modification  must                                                                                                                                                .  follow  the  procedure  for  registration
                                                                              set  forth  in           [N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                         §                                                                             52C-6-602                                      (2009),]"  which
requires  registration  in  "the  tribunal  for  the  county  in  which
the obligor resides in this State[.]").
It  is  undisputed  in  this  case  that  Ms.  Williams  is  not  a
resident    of    North    Carolina;    she    resides    in    Georgia.
Consequently,  Mr.  Crenshaw,  as  the  party  seeking  modification  in
this  case,  was  required  by  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §§  52C-6-602  and  -609
to  register  the  Michigan  support  order  in  Georgia,  not  North
Carolina:
In  the  overwhelming  majority  of  cases,  the
party  seeking  modification  must  seek  that
relief  in  a  new  forum,  almost  invariably  the
State  of  residence  of  the  other  party.    This




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rule  applies  to  either  obligor  or  obligee,
depending  on  which  of  those  parties  seeks  to
modify.  .  .
.  This  restriction  attempts  to  achieve
a  rough  justice  between  the  parties  in  the
majority  of  cases  by  preventing  a  litigant
from   choosing   to   seek   modification   in   a
local  tribunal  to  the  marked  disadvantage  of
the  other  party.                                                         In  short,  the
obligee  is  required  to  register  the  existing
order  and  seek  modification  of  that  order  in
a  State  which  has  personal  jurisdiction  over
the  obligor  other  than  the  State  of  the
obligee's  residence.                                                      Most  typically  this
will   be   the   State   of   residence   of   the
obligor.  .  .
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                          §                                                             52C-6-611  cmt                                                                                (2009).     As  North  Carolina  is
                                                                                                                                         not  the  proper  forum  for  modifying  the  Michigan  support  order,
                                                                                                                                         the  trial  court  lacked  the  authority  to  modify  that  order.    See
Lacarrubba  v.  Lacarrubba,                                                                                                                                                                                           __  N.C.  App.   __,                                   __,   688  S.E.2d   769,
773  (2010)  (concluding  North  Carolina  court  "lacked  authority  to
modify                                                                     [New  York  child  support]  order  or  reduce  arrearages"
where  obligee,  who  resided  in  Florida,  registered  foreign  order
in  North  Carolina  for  "enforcement  only"  and  obligee  did  not
consent    to    personal    jurisdiction    in    North    Carolina).
Consequently,  the  portion  of  the  trial  court's  order  modifying
Ms. Williams' child support obligations is reversed.
Custody
Ms.  Williams  also  contends  that  the  trial  court  erred  in
modifying  the  Michigan  custody  order.     N.C.  Gen.  Stat.            §                                                             50-




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13.7(b)                                                                        (2009)  provides  that  "when  an  order  for  custody  of  a
minor  child  has  been  entered  by  a  court  of  another  state,  a
court  of  this  State  may,  upon  gaining  jurisdiction,  and  a
showing  of  changed  circumstances,  enter  a  new  order  for  custody
which  modifies  or  supersedes  such  order  for  custody."     As  a
threshold  issue,  we  note  that  the  trial  court  had  subject-matter
jurisdiction  under  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  50A-203(2)  (2009)  to  modify
the  Michigan  custody  order  as  the  record  indicates  that  North
Carolina  was  the  juveniles'  "home  state"  at  the  time  this
custody  action  was  initiated,  see  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                       §                                                               50A-102(7)
(2009),  and  neither  the  juveniles  nor  their  parents  continued  to
reside  in  Michigan.    See  In  re  T.J.D.W.,  182  N.C.  App.  394,  397,
642  S.E.2d                                                                    471,                                                            473          (holding  trial  court  had  jurisdiction  to
modify  South  Carolina  custody  order  where  "the  child  and  a
parent                                                                         .  lived   in   North  Carolina   for  the   six   months
immediately  preceding  the  commencement  of  the  proceeding"  and
"the  child  and  both  parents  had  left  South  Carolina  at  the  time
of  the  commencement  of  the  proceeding"),  aff'd  per  curiam,             362
N.C.  84,  653 S.E.2d  143  (2007).
Our  Courts  have  interpreted  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  50-13.7(b)  as
authorizing  trial  courts  to  modify  a  foreign  custody  order  if
the  party  moving  for  modification  shows  that  "'a  substantial
change  of  circumstances  affecting  the  welfare  of  the  child'"




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                                                                                                                                                                                                               warrants  a  change  in  custody.    Pulliam  v.  Smith,                                                                                                                             348  N.C.                                         616,
619,                                                                       501  S.E.2d                                                     898,                                                                899                                                        (1998)                                                                                                                    (quoting  Blackley  v.  Blackley,
285  N.C.                                                                  358,                                                            362,                                                                204  S.E.2d                                                678,                                                                         681                                          (1974)).                            "The  party
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          seeking   the   custody   change   has   the   burden   of   showing   the
                                                                                                                                           requisite  change."     Metz  v.  Metz,                                                                                                                                                                     138  N.C.  App.                              538,                                540,          530
S.E.2d                                                                     79,           80                                                (2000).                                                                                                                                                                                                     In  determining  whether  modification  is
warranted,  the  trial  court  engages  in  a  two-step  analysis:  the
court  first  determines  whether  there  has  been  a  substantial
change  in  circumstances  affecting  the  welfare  of  the  child
involved,   and,   if   so,   the   court   then   determines   whether
modification   of   custody   is   in   the   child's   best   interest.
Shipman  v.  Shipman,                                                      357  N.C.     471,                                              474,                                                                586  S.E.2d                                                250,                                                                         253
(2003).
When  reviewing  a  trial  court's  order  modifying  custody,  the
appellate   court   must   determine   whether   the   trial   court's
findings  are  supported  by  substantial  evidence  and,  in  turn,
whether  the  court's  findings  support  its  conclusions  of  law.
Id.     If  supported  by  substantial  evidence,  the  trial  court's
findings   are   binding   on   appeal,   despite   the   existence   of
evidence  that  might  support  contrary  findings.     Pulliam,           348
N.C.  at                                                                   625,          501  S.E.2d  at                                   903.                                                                Unchallenged  findings  are
                                                                                                                                           "presumed   to   be   supported   by   competent   evidence   and                                                                                                                                           [are]
                                                                                         binding  on  appeal."     Koufman  v.  Koufman,   330  N.C.                                                           93,                                                        97,                                                                          408




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S.E.2d                                                                        729,                                                               731                                                                      (1991).    The  trial  court's  conclusions  of  law,
                                                                                                                                                               however,  are  reviewed  de  novo.     Scott  v.  Scott,                                                           157  N.C.  App.
382,                                                                          385,                                                               579  S.E.2d   431,                                                       433                                                     (2003).     "'[T]he  trial  court  is
vested  with  broad  discretion  in  cases  involving  child  custody,'
and  its  decision                                                            [to  modify  custody]  will  not  be  reversed  on
appeal  absent  a  clear  showing  of  abuse  of  discretion."    Karger
v.  Wood,                                                                     174  N.C.  App.                                                    703,          705,                                                       622  S.E.2d                                             197,                                    200   (2005)
(quoting  Pulliam,  348  N.C.  at  624-25,  501  S.E.2d  at  902)  (second
alteration added).
Ms.   Williams   first   contends   that   "the   trial   court's
decision  regarding  child  support  tainted  its  concurrent  decision
regarding  custody  modification[.]"    In  support  of  her  argument,
Ms.  Williams  points  to  Lee's  North  Carolina  Family  Law,  where
Professor  Suzanne  Reynolds  explains:  "[I]t  is  the  law  of  child
support,   not   custody,   that   should   address   disparities   in
standards  of  living.    If  the  better  custodian  cannot  provide  for
the  child's  economic  needs,  then  an  award  of  child  support  -  not
a  disposition  of  custody  -  should  address  those  needs."    Suzanne
Reynolds,                                                                     3  Lee's  North  Carolina  Family  Law                             §             13.29                                                      (5th  ed.
2002)                                                                         [hereinafter  Lee's  Family  Law];  see  also  Jolly  v.  Queen,
264  N.C.  711,  715,  142  S.E.2d  592,  596  (1965)  (observing  that  if
a  trial  court  were  permitted  to  base  a  custody  determination  on
comparative  standards  of  living,  "a  judge  might  find  it  to  be  in




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the  best  interest  of  a  legitimate  child  of  poor  but  honest,
industrious    parents,    who    were    providing    him    with    the
necessities,  that  his  custody  be  given  to  a  more  affluent
neighbor or relative who had no child and desired him").
Professor  Reynolds  further  explains,  however,  that,  while
"the  law  of  custody  discourages  the  making  of  custody  decisions
based  on  relative  standards  of  living[,]"  it  is  "not  error  for
the  [court's]  findings  to  include  these  comparisons"  so  long  as
its  findings  "reveal  that  other  factors  were  more  important."
Lee's  Family  Law  §  13.29.    Here,  in  addition  to  making  findings
regarding   the   parties'   respective   incomes   and   standards   of
living,  the  trial  court  also   made  findings  addressing:  Mr.
Crenshaw  (and  Ms.  McCaskill's)  level  of  involvement  in  Jhavon's
and  Christian's  education  and  extra-curricular  activities,  and
Ms.  Williams'  lack  of  "full[]  participat[ion]"  in  the  boys'
activities;  Ms.  Williams'  missing  four  or  five  visits  per  year
with  her  children  and  her  election  to  "forgo"  Friday  nights
during  some  weekend  visits;  Ms.  Williams'  returning  the  boys
"exhausted"   at   the   end   of   weekend   visits;   Ms.   Williams'
disapproval  of  the  children  seeing  medical  doctors  and  her
returning  the  boys  "with  colds";  and  Mr.  Crenshaw's  disciplining
the  boys  by  taking  away  their  privileges  and  Ms.  Williams'  not
disciplining them.




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The  trial  court's  findings  demonstrate  that  it  considered
factors  beyond  the  parties'  relative  incomes  and  standards  of
living  in  determining  whether  there  had  been  a  substantial
change  in  circumstances  affecting  the  children's  welfare.     See
Metz,                                                                         138  N.C.  App.  at                                              541,   530  S.E.2d  at   81            (affirming  trial
court's  order  finding  a  substantial  change  of  circumstances
affecting  the  child's  welfare  where,  in  addition  to  considering
parents'  relative  standards  of  living,  trial  court  made  findings
regarding   other   factors,   including   child's   educational   and
developmental  needs  and  custodial  parent's  work  schedule);  see
also  White  v.  White,                                                       90  N.C.  App.                                                   553,   558,              369  S.E.2d   92,                 95
(1988)                                                                        ("Plaintiff  argues  that  she  is  being  denied  custody  of
her  child  because  defendant  has  a  greater  income.    We  disagree.
Defendant's  income  and  stable  home  environment  simply  provide
part   of   the   basis   for   determining   that   the   child's   best
interests  and  welfare  will  be  promoted  by  awarding  custody  to
defendant.").
Ms.  Williams  next  contends  that  "[s]everal  of  the  trial
court's  findings  of  fact  lack  competent  evidentiary  support."
She  complains  of  various  "nuanced  discrepancies  between  the
evidence  and  factual  findings,"  contending,  for  example,  that
there  is  no  evidentiary  support  for  the  date  stated  in  the  order
regarding  Mr.  Crenshaw's  and  Ms.  McCaskill's  marriage;  that,




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contrary  to  the  court's  characterization  of  the  evidence,  her
written  request  for  an  extension  to  respond  to  Mr.  Crenshaw's
petition   for   registration   constitutes   a   "response";   that,
contrary  to  the  court's  characterization,  she  did  not  "cancel[]"
four  to  five  visits  a  year,  she  simply  "miss[ed]"  four  to  five
visits  a  year;  that  the  court's  description  of  Mr.  Crenshaw  and
Ms.  McCaskill  having  to  "deal"  with  the  boys  being  "exhausted"
when  she  drives  them  directly  to  school  in  Charlotte  from
Atlanta  is  a  "stretch[]";  and,  that,  contrary  to  the  court's
statement  that  the  "present  custody  schedule  is  not  working
well,"  it  is  only  the  "present  exchange  procedure"  that  is
"problematic."
Assuming,  without  deciding,  that  the  challenged  findings
are  not  supported  by  evidence  in  the  record,  Ms.  Williams,  as
the  appellant,  "must  not  only  show  error,  but  also  that  the
error  is  material  and  prejudicial,  amounting  to  a  denial  of  a
substantial  right  and  that  a  different  result  would  have  likely
ensued."    Cook  v.  Southern  Bonded,  Inc.,  82  N.C.  App.  277,  281,
346  S.E.2d                                                                  168,   171       (1986),  disc.  review  denied,          318  N.C.   692,
351  S.E.2d                                                                  741    (1987).   Ms.  Williams  fails  to  provide  any
explanation  as  to  how  any  of  these  "nuanced  discrepancies"  are
material or prejudicial.    This argument is overruled.
Ms.  Williams  also  argues  that  the  trial  court's  findings  do




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not  support  its  conclusion  that  Mr.  Crenshaw  satisfied  his
burden  of  proving  that  a  substantial  change  of  circumstances
affecting  the  children's  welfare  has  occurred.     Ms.  Williams
argues  that  Mr.  Crenshaw  failed  to  demonstrate  a  substantial
change  in  circumstances  because  "the  disparity  in  the  parties'
respective   stability"   was   the   basis   for   the                      2005   Michigan
custody  order  that  "switched"  custody  from  Ms.  Williams  to  Mr.
Crenshaw  and  there  has  been  no  change  in  the  parties'  respective
"financial  and  occupational  stability."     Our  courts  have  held
that  when  the  circumstances  existing  at  the  time  of  the  request
for  modification  are  the  same  as  the  circumstances  at  the  time
of  the  initial  custody  determination,  the  trial  court  lacks  the
                                                                                                                                                   basis  to  modify  the  initial  custody  order.                                                   See  Tucker  v.
Tucker,                                                                      288  N.C.                                                       81,   88,                                                216  S.E.2d   1,    5        (1975)             ("There  is  no
evidence  in  this  record  of  any  substantial  change  in  conditions
affecting  the  welfare  of  Timmy  between  7  June  1974  and  7  August
1974.                                                                        The  friction  between  the  parents  had  existed  from  the
date  of  the  first  custody  order  in  1973.");  Ford  v.  Wright,  170
N.C.  App.                                                                   89,                                                             96,   611  S.E.2d                                        456,          461   (2005)   ("As  the  trial
court  had  already  considered  the  parties'  past  domestic  troubles
and   communication   difficulties   in   the   prior   order,   without
findings  of  additional  changes  in  circumstances  or  conditions,
modification  of  the  prior  custody  order  was  in  error.");  see




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also  Lee's  Family  Law                                                                                                                                 §   13.106(b)   (explaining  that  if  "the
                                                                            existing  facts  are  no  different  from  the  facts  before  the  court
                                                                            at  the  time  of  the  previous  order,  then  the  court  has  no  basis
to modify the order").
As  the  trial  court's  findings  indicate,  the  evidence  in
this  case  reveals  material  changes  in  the  circumstances              —  with
respect  to  the  parties'  comparative  stability  as  well  as  other
considerations                                                              —  between  the  time  of  the  hearing  resulting  in
the  Michigan  custody  order  and  the  modification  proceedings  in
this  case.    Here,  the  court  specifically  found  that  since  entry
of  the  Michigan  custody  order  "Mr.  Crenshaw  and  Ms.  McCaskill,
his  present  spouse,  have  been  members  of  PTA  Boards  at  each
child's  school,  and  they  have  participated  on  the  schools'
Leadership  Teams"  and  that  "Ms.  Williams  has  not  volunteered  at
the  minor  children's  schools";  that  "Mr.  Crenshaw  has  helped
coach  football  teams  on  which  the  boys  played,  and  he  and  Ms.
McCaskill  encourage  and  support  the  sports  in  which  the  children
participate";  that  Ms.  McCaskill  "assists  with  parenting"  the
children,    helps    them    with    their    homework,    provides
transportation,  and  generally  helps  take  care  of  them;  that
although  Mr.  Crenshaw's  position  with  Wachovia  was  eliminated,
he   found   other   employment   and   "[h]is   prospects   for   future
employment  in  the  position  are  good";  that  his  "monthly  income




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totals                                                                       $20,833"  and  that  he  is  able  to  pay  for  the  children's
insurance;  that  Mr.  Crenshaw  has  shown  financial  and  "vocational
stability"  while  Ms.  Williams'  average  monthly  income  over  the
past  three  years  is  $1,584  and  she  is  currently  unemployed;  that
since  August                                                                2005,  Ms.  Williams  misses  roughly  four  or  five
visits  with  her  sons  each  year  and  often  forgoes  the  Friday
night  portion  of  weekend  visits  because  "flights  typically  are
less  expensive  when  the  children  leave  Charlotte  on  a  Saturday";
that  "Ms.  Williams  is  late  for  the  majority  of  exchanges,"  often
not  returning  the  boys  to  Charlotte  until  after                       9:00  p.m.  on
Sunday  nights  before  school  or  leaving  the  Atlanta  area  around
3:00  a.m.  Monday  mornings  and  driving  the  boys  directly  to  their
schools;  that  "[w]hen  the  children  return  from  visiting  Ms.
Williams,  they  typically  are  exhausted,  and  Mr.  Crenshaw  and  Ms.
McCaskill   have   to   deal   with   the   ramifications   of   the
exhaustion";  that  "Ms.  Williams  does  not  support  the  children
seeing  medical  doctors,  and  they  often  return  to  Charlotte  with
colds";   that   while   Mr.   Crenshaw   disciplines   the   boys   by
restricting  their  privileges,  Ms.  Williams  does  not  discipline
them;  that  although  Ms.  Williams  has  "spent  good  quality  time"
with    her    children,    she    has    not    visited    with    them
"consistent[ly]";  that  while  Mr.  Crenshaw  advises  Ms.  Williams
of  the  boy's  activities,  she  "has  not  fully  participated  in




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these  activities";  and,  that  the  "minor  children  are  bright,
well  mannered                                                               [sic]  and  well-adjusted"  and  are  "involved  in
their respective schools, in sports and in the community."
These   unchallenged   findings   support   the   trial   court's
conclusion  that  "Mr.  Crenshaw  has  met  his  burden  of  showing  that
a  change  in  circumstances  actually  has  occurred,  and  that  the
changes  have  affected  the  welfare  of  Jhavon  and  Christian."    See
Shipman,  357  N.C.  at  480-81,  586  S.E.2d  at  257  (concluding  that
"culmination  of  a  series  of  developments  that  occurred  after  the
original   custody   decree"   established   "substantial   change   in
circumstances"  where  father  "secured  new  employment,"  father
owned  a  house  with  girlfriend,  father  and  girlfriend  could
"provide  for  the  child,"  and  girlfriend  helped  take  care  of
child).    This contention is overruled.
Ms.  Williams  further  argues  that  the  trial  court's  findings
fail  to  indicate  that  the  court  considered  the  impact  on  the
children's   welfare   of   Mr.   Crenshaw's   planned   relocation   to
Memphis.    Ms.  Williams  is  correct  that  a  parent's  relocation  is
not,   without   more,   "a   substantial   change   in   circumstances
affecting   the   welfare   of   the   child   which   justifies   a
modification  of  a  custody  decree."     Evans  v.  Evans,                 138  N.C.
App.                                                                         135,                                                  140,   530  S.E.2d   576,   579   (2000).   Rather,  where  a
parent  relocates,  "the  effect  on  the  welfare  of  the  child  must




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be  shown  in  order  for  the  court  to  modify  a  custody  decree  based
on  change  of  circumstance."    Gordon  v.  Gordon,  46  N.C.  App.  495,
500,                                                                           265  S.E.2d                             425,   428   (1980),  overruled  on  other  grounds  by
Pulliam v. Smith,  348 N.C.  616,  501 S.E.2d  898  (1998).
Here,  the  trial  court's  uncontested  findings  establish  that
the  court  considered  the  impact  of  the  relocation  on  the  boys'
welfare.    Specifically,  the  court  found  that  Mr.  Crenshaw  took  a
job  with  ServiceMaster  in  Memphis  after  he  lost  his  job  with
Wachovia  in  Charlotte  and  that  he  plans  to  relocate  his  family
to   the   Memphis   area   because   "[h]is   prospects   for   future
employment  in  this  position  are  good"  and  his  monthly  salary  of
$20,833  allows  him  to  "support  the  children  financially."    This
argument is overruled.
Ms.  Williams  also  argues  that  the  trial  court's  findings
regarding   "the   parties'   purported   difficulties   concerning
communication  and  visitation"  fail  to  support  its  conclusion
that  the  children's  welfare  has  been  affected  by  a  substantial
change  in  circumstances.                                                     With  respect   to  this  issue,  the
court's  findings  indicate  that,  since  entry  of  the  Michigan
custody  order,  Ms.  Williams  has  missed  four  to  five  visits  with
her  children  a  year;  that,  during  weekend  visits,  she  will
"forgo"  having  the  children  on  Friday  nights  because  it  is
cheaper  for  the  children  to  fly  to  Atlanta  on  Saturdays;  that




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she  is  "late  for  the  majority  of  exchanges,  oftentimes  returning
the  children  to  Charlotte  after                                          9  pm  on  a  Sunday  night  before
school  resumes";  that  when  she  fails  to  return  the  children  on
Sundays,  she  will  "leave                                                  [Atlanta]  around                              3  am  and  drive  the
children  directly  to  their  schools  in  Charlotte";  that  the  boys
are  "exhausted"  after  visiting  with  Ms.  Williams  and  it  is  "Mr.
Crenshaw   and   Ms.   McCaskill   that   have   to   deal   with   the
ramifications    of    the    exhaustion";    that    "[t]he    parties'
communication  about  the  children  is  dysfunctional"  and  that  they
are  "[r]arely                                                               .  able  to  resolve  issues  regarding  the
children,"  including  "dietary  habits,  health  care  and  time  with
the  children";  that  "Ms.  Williams  does  not  support  the  children
seeing  medical  doctors,"  and  the  children  often  are  sick  when
they  return  to  Charlotte;  and,  that  Ms.  Williams  does  "not  fully
participate[]"   in   the   children's   activities   despite   being
notified  of  them  by  Mr.  Crenshaw.     Contrary  to  Ms.  Williams'
argument,  these  findings  reveal  how  the  parties'  communication
and visitation "problems" affect the children's welfare.
In  her  final  argument  on  appeal,  Ms.  Williams  challenges
the  trial  court's  conclusion  that  modification  of  the  Michigan
custody  order  and  granting  Mr.  Williams  primary  custody  is  "in
the  best  interests  of  Jhavon  and  Christian."                           Although  Ms.
Williams   asserts   that   the   trial   court's   "best   interests"




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determination  is  not  supported  by  the  evidence  or  its  findings,
where,  as  here,  the  appellate  court  "determine[s]  that  the  trial
court   has   properly   concluded   that   the   facts   show   that   a
substantial  change  of  circumstances  has  affected  the  welfare  of
the  minor  child  and  that  modification  was  in  the  child's  best
interests,  [the  appellate  court]  will  defer  to  the  trial  court's
judgment  and  not  disturb  its  decision  to  modify  an  existing
custody  agreement."     Shipman,                                           357  N.C.  at                                                  475,   586  S.E.2d  at
254.                                                                        Consequently,  that  portion  of  the  trial  court's  order
modifying custody is affirmed.
Reversed in part; affirmed in part.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge THIGPEN concur.




NO. COA10-720
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  19 April  2011
REGGIE L. CRENSHAW,
Plaintiff,
v.                                                                          Mecklenburg County
                                                                            No.  08 CVD  24398
ALAINA D. WILLIAMS,
F/K/A ALAINA CRENSHAW,
Defendant.
Appeal  by  defendant  from  order  entered  6  July  2009  by  Judge
Christy  T.  Mann  in  Mecklenburg  County  District  Court.    Heard  in
the Court of Appeals  24 January  2011.
Todd  W.  Cline,  P.A.,  by  Todd  W.  Cline,  for  plaintiff-
appellee.
James,  McElroy  &  Diehl,  P.A.,  by  Preston  O.  Odom  III,  for
defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.
Defendant  Alaina  D.  Williams                                             (formerly  Crenshaw)  appeals
from  the  trial  court's  order  modifying  a  custody  order  entered
in  Michigan  and  granting  plaintiff  Reggie  L.  Crenshaw  primary
custody  of  the  couple's  two  sons,  Jhavon-Gabriel  and  Christian.
After careful review, we reverse in part and affirm in part.
Facts
On                                                                          15  August                      2002,  the  Circuit  Court  for  Wayne  County,




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Michigan  entered  a  "Judgment  of  Divorce"  (the  "Michigan  divorce
judgment"),  which  granted  the  parties  a  divorce  and  awarded  them
"joint  legal  and  joint  physical  custody"  of   the  juveniles.
Under  the  terms  of  the  judgment,  "primar[y]"  custody  of  the
juveniles  was  with  Ms.  Williams  for  the  first  three  years  after
entry  of  the  Michigan  divorce  judgment  (August  2002-August  2005)
and  then  alternated  to  Mr.  Crenshaw  for  the  second  three-year
period                                                                        (August                                                       2005-August   2008).    At  the  time  of  the  couple's
divorce,  Mr.  Crenshaw  was  living  in  Dearborn,  Michigan  and  Ms.
Williams  was  living  in  Norcross,  Georgia,  near  Atlanta.     Mr.
Crenshaw  moved  to  Charlotte,  North  Carolina  shortly  after  the
Michigan divorce judgment was entered.
When  Ms.  Williams  refused  to  "agree  to  the  switch"  in
custody  in                                                                   2005,  Mr.  Crenshaw  filed  a  motion  in  Michigan  state
court   requesting   enforcement   of   the   terms   of   the   Michigan
divorce  judgment.     After  holding  a  hearing  on                         15  August                                                    2005,
the  Michigan  circuit  court  entered  an  "Order  for  Change  of
Custody"  (the  "Michigan  custody  order")  on  6  September  2005,  in
which  the  court  determined  that  "it  was  in  the  best  interests  of
the  minor  children  to  enforce  the  custody  agreement  set  forth  in
the  [Michigan  divorce  judgment]  .  .  .                                   ."    The  custody  order  also
directed  Ms.  Williams  to  pay  child  support  to  Mr.  Crenshaw  while
he  had  primary  custody.     Mr.  Crenshaw  has  retained  custody  of




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Jhavon  and  Christian  since  entry  of  the                               2005  Michigan  custody
order.
Mr.  Crenshaw  married  Myra  McCaskill  on                                 9  June                   2007.
Ms.   McCaskill   helps   parent   Jhavon   and   Christian,   including
helping  them  with  their  homework,  driving  them  to  and  from
activities,  buying  them  clothes,  and  cooking  meals  for  them.
Mr.  Crenshaw  and  Ms.  McCaskill  have  been  members  of  the  PTA
Boards  of  their  sons'  schools  and  have  participated  on  the
schools'  Leadership  Teams.    Ms.  Williams  has  not  volunteered  at
her  sons'  schools  since  they  moved  to  Charlotte  to  live  with
their father.
Mr.  Crenshaw  and  Ms.  McCaskill  also  encourage  and  support
the  children's  participation  in  sports.    Mr.  Crenshaw  has  helped
coach  football  teams  on  which  the  boys  played  and  paid  for
Christian  to  attend  a  football  camp  in  the  Atlanta  area  during
the summer of  2008.
Ms.  Williams  has  had  "sporadic  employment"  since  August
2005,  working  as  an  insurance  adjuster,  substitute  teacher,
waitress,  and  working  for  her  family's  home  renovation  business.
Ms.  Williams  is  currently  unemployed  and  living  off  of  her
savings.    Her  parents  own  the  townhome  in  which  she  lives  and
allow  her  to  live  there  rent-free  in  exchange  for  working  for
the family business.




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Since  August                                                                2005,  Ms.  Williams  has  missed  four  or  five
visits  with  Jhavon  and  Christian.    On  some  weekend  visits,  Ms.
Williams  will  give  up  spending  Friday  nights  with  the  children
because Saturday morning flights typically are less expensive.
Ms.  Williams  is  late  for  "the  majority"  of  exchanges,  often
returning  Jhavon  and  Christian  to  Charlotte  after                      9:00  p.m.  on
Sunday  nights.    When  she  does  not  return  them  on  Sunday  nights,
Ms.  Williams  will  leave  Norcross  around  3:00  a.m.  and  drive  the
children  directly  to  their  schools  in  Charlotte.     When  Jhavon
and  Christian  return  from  visiting  their  mother,  they  typically
are  "exhausted"  and  Mr.  Crenshaw  and  Ms.  McCaskill  are  left  to
"deal with the ramifications of the exhaustion."
Mr.  Crenshaw  and  Ms.  Williams  are  "[r]arely"  able  to  agree
on  issues  involving  their  children.    Because  Ms.  Williams  often
yells  and  curses  at  Mr.  Crenshaw  on  the  telephone,  he  usually
resorts  to  communicating  with  her  through  email.    Although  Mr.
Crenshaw  notifies  Ms.  Williams  through  email  about  Jhavon's  and
Christian's  activities,  she  does  not  fully  participate  in  the
activities.
The  parties  also  differ  regarding  dietary  habits,  health
care,  and  time  spent  with  the  children.    Ms.  Williams  does  not
support  the  children  seeing  medical  doctors  and  they  often  come
home  to  Charlotte  sick.    While  Mr.  Crenshaw  disciplines  Jhavon




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and  Christian  by  taking  away  their  privileges,  Ms.  Williams  does
not  discipline  them  because  they  "see  eye  to  eye"  on  most
issues.
Mr.  Crenshaw's  position  with  Wachovia  was  eliminated  in
November                                                                       2008,  but  he  obtained  employment  that  same  month  with
ServiceMaster,  which  is  headquartered  in  Memphis,  Tennessee.    On
3   November                                                                   2008,   Mr.  Crenshaw  registered  the                          2002   Michigan
divorce  judgment  and                                                         2005  custody  order  in  Mecklenburg  County,
requesting  modification  of  custody  and  child  support.     At  the
time  of  the  6  April  and  17  June  2009  hearings  on  Mr.  Crenshaw's
motions   in   Mecklenburg   County   District   Court,   Mr.   Crenshaw
planned  on  moving  his  family  to  the  Memphis  area  in  late  June  or
early July of  2009.
The   district   court   entered   an   order   on                             6   July                                                        2009,
concluding  that  "Mr.  Crenshaw  ha[d]  met  his  burden  of  showing
that  a  change  in  circumstances  actually  has  occurred,  and  that
the  changes  have  affected  the  welfare  of  Jhavon  and  Christian"
and  awarding  him  "primary  custody"  of  the  children.    The  court
also  concluded  that  Ms.  Williams  should  pay                              $454  per  month  in
child  support;  that  she  was  currently                                     $16,400  in  arrears;  and
that  she  should  pay  an  additional                                         $100   per  month  "towards
retirement  of  the  arrearage."    Ms.  Williams  filed  numerous  post-
trial  motions,  including  a  "Motion  for  New  Trial  and  to  Amend




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Findings  of  Fact,"  a  "Motion  for  Relief  from  Child  Support  Order
and   for   Sanctions,"   and   a   "Motion   to   Extract   Fraudulent
Evidence."    The  trial  court  denied  Ms.  Williams'  motions  on          26
October  2009.    Ms. Williams timely appealed to this Court.
Support
Ms.  Williams  first  contends  that  the  Michigan  child  support
order  was  not  properly  registered  under  the  Uniform  Interstate
Family  Support  Act                                                          ("UIFSA"),  codified  in  Chapter        52C  of  the
North  Carolina  General  Statutes,  and  thus  "the  trial  court
lacked   authority   to   address   the   issue   of   child   support."
Whether   the   trial   court   complied   with   the   registration
procedures  set  out  in  UIFSA  is  a  question  of  law  reviewed  de
novo  on  appeal.    State  ex  rel.  Lively  v.  Berry,                      187  N.C.  App.
459,  462,  653 S.E.2d  192,  194  (2007).
UIFSA,  enacted  in  North  Carolina  in  1995,  was  "promulgated
and  intended  to  be  used  as                                               [a]  procedural  mechanism[]  for  the
establishment,   modification,   and   enforcement   of   child   and
spousal  support  obligations."    Welsher  v.  Rager,                        127  N.C.  App.
521,  524,  491  S.E.2d  661,  663  (1997);  accord  New  Hanover  Cty.  ex
rel.  Mannthey  v.  Kilbourne,                                                157  N.C.  App.                          239,           243,   578  S.E.2d
610,  613-14  (2003)  ("Enacted  by  states  as  a  mechanism  to  reduce
the   multiple,   conflicting   child   support   orders   existing   in
numerous  states,  UIFSA  creates  a  structure  designed  to  provide




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                                                                                                       for only one controlling support order at a time  [.]").
                                                                                                                                                                  Under  UIFSA,  a  child  support  order  is  first  entered  by  the
                                                                                                                                                                  "issuing  tribunal"  in  the  "issuing  state."     N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                       §
                                                                              52C-1-101(9)  and        (10)                                                       (2009);  Hook  v.  Hook,                                                                                                     170  N.C.  App.                138,
                                                                                                                                                                  141,  611  S.E.2d  869,  871,  disc.  review  denied,  359  N.C.  631,  616
S.E.2d                                                                        234                      (2005).                                                    N.C.   Gen.   Stat.                                                           §                                              52C-6-609                      (2009)
                                                                                                                                                                  establishes  that  if  an  obligee  wants  to  modify  an  order  against
                                                                                                                                                                  an  obligor  who  resides  in  a  different  state,  the  obligee  must
                                                                                                                                                                  "register"  the  order  in  the  state  in  which  the  obligor  resides.
                                                                              See  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.   §                                                          52C-6-609  cmt.                                                                                                              ("A  petitioner  wishing  to
                                                                                                                                                                  register  a  support  order  of  another  state  for  purposes  of
                                                                              modification  must                                                                                                                                                .  follow  the  procedure  for  registration
                                                                              set  forth  in           [N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                         §                                                                             52C-6-602                                      (2009),]"  which
requires  registration  in  "the  tribunal  for  the  county  in  which
the obligor resides in this State[.]").
It  is  undisputed  in  this  case  that  Ms.  Williams  is  not  a
resident    of    North    Carolina;    she    resides    in    Georgia.
Consequently,  Mr.  Crenshaw,  as  the  party  seeking  modification  in
this  case,  was  required  by  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §§  52C-6-602  and  -609
to  register  the  Michigan  support  order  in  Georgia,  not  North
Carolina:
In  the  overwhelming  majority  of  cases,  the
party  seeking  modification  must  seek  that
relief  in  a  new  forum,  almost  invariably  the
State  of  residence  of  the  other  party.    This




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rule  applies  to  either  obligor  or  obligee,
depending  on  which  of  those  parties  seeks  to
modify.  .  .
.  This  restriction  attempts  to  achieve
a  rough  justice  between  the  parties  in  the
majority  of  cases  by  preventing  a  litigant
from   choosing   to   seek   modification   in   a
local  tribunal  to  the  marked  disadvantage  of
the  other  party.                                                         In  short,  the
obligee  is  required  to  register  the  existing
order  and  seek  modification  of  that  order  in
a  State  which  has  personal  jurisdiction  over
the  obligor  other  than  the  State  of  the
obligee's  residence.                                                      Most  typically  this
will   be   the   State   of   residence   of   the
obligor.  .  .
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                          §                                                             52C-6-611  cmt                                                                                (2009).     As  North  Carolina  is
                                                                                                                                         not  the  proper  forum  for  modifying  the  Michigan  support  order,
                                                                                                                                         the  trial  court  lacked  the  authority  to  modify  that  order.    See
Lacarrubba  v.  Lacarrubba,                                                                                                                                                                                           __  N.C.  App.   __,                                   __,   688  S.E.2d   769,
773  (2010)  (concluding  North  Carolina  court  "lacked  authority  to
modify                                                                     [New  York  child  support]  order  or  reduce  arrearages"
where  obligee,  who  resided  in  Florida,  registered  foreign  order
in  North  Carolina  for  "enforcement  only"  and  obligee  did  not
consent    to    personal    jurisdiction    in    North    Carolina).
Consequently,  the  portion  of  the  trial  court's  order  modifying
Ms. Williams' child support obligations is reversed.
Custody
Ms.  Williams  also  contends  that  the  trial  court  erred  in
modifying  the  Michigan  custody  order.     N.C.  Gen.  Stat.            §                                                             50-




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13.7(b)                                                                        (2009)  provides  that  "when  an  order  for  custody  of  a
minor  child  has  been  entered  by  a  court  of  another  state,  a
court  of  this  State  may,  upon  gaining  jurisdiction,  and  a
showing  of  changed  circumstances,  enter  a  new  order  for  custody
which  modifies  or  supersedes  such  order  for  custody."     As  a
threshold  issue,  we  note  that  the  trial  court  had  subject-matter
jurisdiction  under  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  50A-203(2)  (2009)  to  modify
the  Michigan  custody  order  as  the  record  indicates  that  North
Carolina  was  the  juveniles'  "home  state"  at  the  time  this
custody  action  was  initiated,  see  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                       §                                                               50A-102(7)
(2009),  and  neither  the  juveniles  nor  their  parents  continued  to
reside  in  Michigan.    See  In  re  T.J.D.W.,  182  N.C.  App.  394,  397,
642  S.E.2d                                                                    471,                                                            473          (holding  trial  court  had  jurisdiction  to
modify  South  Carolina  custody  order  where  "the  child  and  a
parent                                                                         .  lived   in   North  Carolina   for  the   six   months
immediately  preceding  the  commencement  of  the  proceeding"  and
"the  child  and  both  parents  had  left  South  Carolina  at  the  time
of  the  commencement  of  the  proceeding"),  aff'd  per  curiam,             362
N.C.  84,  653 S.E.2d  143  (2007).
Our  Courts  have  interpreted  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  50-13.7(b)  as
authorizing  trial  courts  to  modify  a  foreign  custody  order  if
the  party  moving  for  modification  shows  that  "'a  substantial
change  of  circumstances  affecting  the  welfare  of  the  child'"




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                                                                                                                                                                                                               warrants  a  change  in  custody.    Pulliam  v.  Smith,                                                                                                                             348  N.C.                                         616,
619,                                                                       501  S.E.2d                                                     898,                                                                899                                                        (1998)                                                                                                                    (quoting  Blackley  v.  Blackley,
285  N.C.                                                                  358,                                                            362,                                                                204  S.E.2d                                                678,                                                                         681                                          (1974)).                            "The  party
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          seeking   the   custody   change   has   the   burden   of   showing   the
                                                                                                                                           requisite  change."     Metz  v.  Metz,                                                                                                                                                                     138  N.C.  App.    

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