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NO. COA12-399
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  2 October  2012
BARBARA R. DUNCAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.                                                                           Macon County
                                                                             No.  05-CVD  338
JOHN H. DUNCAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal  and  Error  —  interlocutory  order  —  alimony  —  attorney  fees
— failure to argue substantial right
Defendant’s    appeal    from    an    interlocutory    order
awarding  alimony  but  reserving  the  issue  of  attorney  fees
was   dismissed.                                                             Defendant   failed   to   acknowledge   the
interlocutory  nature  of  his  appeal  or  argue  that  some
substantial   right   would   be   affected   absent   immediate
appeal.




NO. COA12-399
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  2 October  2012
BARBARA R. DUNCAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.                                                                            Macon County
                                                                              No.  05-CVD  338
JOHN H. DUNCAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
                                                                              Appeal  by  Defendant  from  the  following  orders  and  judgment
                                                                              entered   in   District   Court,   Macon   County:   order   entered                                          15
                                                                              October  2007  by  Judge  Monica  Leslie;  orders  entered  31  March  and
4  September                                                                  2008  by  Judge  Richard  K.  Walker;  order  entered                                                         18
September                                                                     2009  and  judgment  entered                                                 2  September   2010  by  Judge
                                                                              Steven  J.  Bryant;  and  orders  entered                                    14  April      2011  and         18
January  2012  by  Judge  Richard  K.  Walker.    Heard  in  the  Court  of
Appeals  11 September  2012.
Siemens  Family  Law  Group,  by  Jim  Siemens;  and  Ruley  Law
Offices, by Douglas A. Ruley, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Hyler  &  Lopez,  by  Stephen  P.  Agan  and  George  B.  Hyler,  Jr.,
for Defendant-Appellant.
McGEE, Judge.
John   H.   Duncan                                                            (Defendant)   and   Barbara   R.   Duncan
(Plaintiff)  participated  in  a  wedding  ceremony  presided  over  by




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Hawk   Littlejohn                                                            (Littlejohn),   a   Cherokee   medicine   man,   in
October  1989.    This  traditional  Cherokee  ceremony  lasted  several
days  and  culminated  on                                                    15  October                                                                 1989,  whereupon  the  parties
signed  a  marriage  certificate  that  was  then  filed  with  the  Macon
County  Register  of  Deeds.    Plaintiff  and  Defendant  believed  they
were  lawfully  married,  and  acted  in  all  ways  as  husband  and
wife.                                                                        In                                                                          2001,   an   estate   planning   attorney   brought   to
                                                                             Plaintiff's  and  Defendant's  attention  a  possible  problem  with
their                                                                        1989  wedding  ceremony.     As  a  precaution,  on                         14  October
                                                                             2001,  Plaintiff  and  Defendant  "renewed"  their  vows  at  a  ceremony
                                                                             at the First Presbyterian Church in Franklin, North Carolina.
                                                                             Plaintiff  filed  an  action  for  divorce  on                              27  June                                                   2005.
                                                                             Defendant  filed  an  answer  and  counterclaim  on                         8  July                                                    2005,
alleging  that  he  and  Plaintiff  were  not  legally  married  until
their                                                                        14  October                                                                 2001  ceremony.    A  hearing  was  conducted  on          12
September  2006  to  address  the  issue  of  whether  the  October  1989
wedding  ceremony  had  resulted  in  a  valid  marriage.     The  trial
court  entered  an  order  on                                                15  October                                                                 2007,  concluding  that  the
October  1989  ceremony  had  resulted  in  a  valid  marriage,  and  that
Defendant  was  estopped  from  arguing  that  15  October  1989  was  not
the date of marriage.
                                                                             Defendant  attempted  to  appeal  from  the  trial  court's                 15
October                                                                      2007  order.    However,  this  Court  held  that  Defendant's




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appeal  was  an  improper  interlocutory  appeal,  and  dismissed  it.
Duncan  v.  Duncan,                                                                                   193  N.C.  App.                                      752,                                        671  S.E.2d    71,                   2008  WL
4911807                                                                    (2008)                     (unpublished   opinion).                                                                                        The   trial   court
subsequently   entered   additional   orders   and   an   equitable
distribution  judgment,  from  which  Defendant  now  attempts  to
appeal.
The  last  order  of  the  trial  court,  an  "Order  for  Alimony,"
was  entered                                                               18  January                2012.    In  that  alimony  order,  the  trial
court,  inter  alia,  ordered  Defendant  to  pay  Plaintiff  alimony
but,  in  its  findings,  held  open  the  issue  of  attorney's  fees,
stating:  "[T]he  issue  of  attorney's  fees  must  be  reserved  for
further  hearing  .  .  . at  which  time  the                             [c]ourt  will  receive[]
evidence[.]"
The  dispositive  issue  is  the  timeliness  of  Defendant's
appeal.    Because  we  hold  that  Defendant  has  improperly  appealed
from interlocutory orders, we dismiss.
Previously,   this   Court   has   held   that   an
appeal   from   an   alimony   order   must   be
dismissed   as   interlocutory   when   there   is
still  pending  a  claim  for  attorneys'  fees.
                                                                           See  Webb  v.  Webb,                                                            196  N.C.  App.                             770,           774,
677  S.E.2d                                                                462,                       465                                                  (2009).                                     Our  Supreme
                                                                                                      Court,  however,  in  Bumpers  v.  Cmty.  Bank  of
N.  Va.,                                                                   364  N.C.                  195,                                                 202,                                        695  S.E.2d    442,
447                                                                                                                                                        (2010),   questioned   Webb,   which   it
described    as    following    a    case-by-case
approach,   and   adopted   a   new   rule   for
determining  whether  an  appeal  may  proceed
when  the  only  remaining  claim  is  one  for
attorneys' fees.




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Lucas  v.  Lucas,                                                              ___  N.C.  App.   ___,         ___,   706  S.E.2d   270,     273
(2011).
In  Bumpers  v.  Community  Bank  of  N.  Va.,  196  N.C.  App.  713,
675  S.E.2d  697  (2009)  (Bumpers  I),  rev'd  in  part,  364  N.C.  195,
695  S.E.2d  442  (2010)  (Bumpers  II),  this  Court,  in  an  action  for
unfair  and  deceptive  trade  practices,  considered  whether  the
trial  court  could  certify  an  interlocutory  order  for  immediate
appeal  when  the  issue  of  attorney's  fees  remained  outstanding.
Relevant  facts  underlying  the  Bumpers  I  and  Bumpers  II  opinions
were as follows:
[T]he  trial  court  entered  summary  judgment
rulings   on   the   issues   of   liability   and
damages.    The  only  issue  left  for  resolution
by   the   trial   court   was   the   amount   of
attorney's  fees  to  be  awarded  pursuant  to
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  75-16.1.    The  trial  court
certified  defendant's  appeal  as  immediately
appealable  pursuant  to  Rule                                                 54(b)  of  the
North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.
Bumpers I,  196 N.C. App. at  716,  675 S.E.2d at  699.
"An  interlocutory  order  is  one  made  during  the  pendency  of
an  action,  which  does  not  dispose  of  the  case,  but  leaves  it  for
further  action  by  the  trial  court  in  order  to  settle  and
determine  the  entire  controversy."    Veazey  v.  Durham,                   231  N.C.
357,                                                                           362,              57  S.E.2d   377,   381           (1950)   (citation  omitted).     In
Bumpers I, this Court stated:
Because   the   trial   court's   order   did   not




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dispose  of  the  entire  case  and  left  the
matter  of  attorney's  fees  unresolved,  it  was
an    interlocutory    order.                                                 Interlocutory
orders  are  "immediately  appealable  in  only
two   instances:                                                              (1)   if   the   trial   court
certifies  that  there  is  no  just  reason  to
delay  the  appeal  pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.
§                                                                             1A-1,   Rule                                        54(b)   or        (2)   when   the
challenged  order  affects  a  substantial  right
the  appellant  would  lose  without  immediate
review."
Bumpers  I,                                                                   196  N.C.  App.  at                                 716,              675  S.E.2d  at    699       (citations
omitted).     In  Bumpers  I,  this  Court  determined  that  appellant
had  not  argued  that  any  substantial  right  would  be  affected          —
only  that  the  trial  court's  Rule                                         54(b)  certification  entitled
appellant  to  an  immediate  appeal.     Id.  at                             717,                                                675  S.E.2d  at
699.    This  Court  reasoned:  "[Rule  54(b)]  contemplates  the  entry
of  a  judgment  as  to  fewer  than  all  claims  or  parties.    It  does
not  contemplate  the  fragmentation  of  the  claims  themselves  or
provide  for  the  immediate  appeal  of  less  than  the  entire  claim."
Id. at  717,  675 S.E.2d at  700  (citation omitted).
Our  Supreme  Court  rejected  the  reasoning  of  Bumpers  I  and
reversed, holding:
In  the  instant  case,  there  is  no  dispute
that  the  superior  court's                                                                                                      15  May           2008  order
resolved                                                                      all                                                 substantive       issues             of
plaintiff's   claims   under   section                                                                                                                                 75-1.1.
                                                                              Consequently,  this  order  constituted  a  final
                                                                              judgment   even   though   the   superior   court
                                                                              expressly   reserved   ruling   on   plaintiff's
request  for  attorney  fees.                                                                                                                       The  superior
court  properly  certified  its                                                                                                                     15  May            2008
                                                                              order  for  immediate  appeal  under  Rule                                               54(b)




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because    that    order    was    final    as    to
plaintiff's claims under section  75-1.1.
A  judgment  ruling  on  all  substantive  issues
of  a  claim  under  N.C.G.S.  §  75-1.1  is  final
and  appealable  regardless  of  any  unresolved
                                                                               request  for  attorney  fees  under  N.C.G.S.             §
                                                                               75-16.1.    In  appropriate  cases,  such  a  final
                                                                               judgment   may   be   certified   for   immediate
appeal   under   Rule                                                          54(b).                                                    Because   the
superior  court's                                                              15  May                                                   2008  order  ruled  on
all  substantive  issues  of  plaintiff's  claims
under  N.C.G.S.                                                                §                                                         75-1.1,  the  superior  court
properly  certified  that  order  for  immediate
appeal under Rule  54(b).
Bumpers  II,  364  N.C.  at  204,  695  S.E.2d  at  448.    This  Court  has
demonstrated   some   uncertainty   concerning   the   scope   of   the
                                                                                                                                         holding  in  Bumpers  II.     See  Lucas,                                                                                          ___  N.C.  App.  at                   ___,                      706
S.E.2d  at                                                                                                                                                                                             273-74;  Dafford  v.  JP  Steakhouse  LLC,                                                                 ___  N.C.  App.
___,                                                                           ___  n.3,                                                                                             709  S.E.2d       402,                                                      407  n.3                                         (2011);  Triad  Women's
                                                                               Ctr.,  P.A.  v.  Rogers,                                                                                                207  N.C.  App.                                           353,       357,                                  699  S.E.2d               657,
660                                                                                                                                                                                                    (2010);  see  also  Engell  v.  Bayside  Realty,  Inc.,                                                                              __  N.C.
App.                                                                           __,                                                       711  S.E.2d                                 530               (2011)                                                               (unpublished  opinion).    We  note
that  the  language  used  in  Bumpers  II  is  specific:  "[W]e  adopt
the  bright-line  rule  that  an  unresolved  claim  for  attorney  fees
under  section                                                                 75-16.1  does  not  preclude  finality  of  a  judgment
resolving  all  substantive  issues  of  a  claim  under  section              75-
1.1."     Bumpers  II,                                                         364  N.C.  at                                             204,                                        695  S.E.2d  at   448.                                                      The
analysis  in  Bumpers  II,  however,  seems  to  apply  beyond  section




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75.    We  need  not  address  the  full  applicability  of  Bumpers  II  to
the  facts  in  the  present  case  because  the  trial  court  in  the
present  case  did  not  certify  the  order  for  immediate  appeal,  as
required by Bumpers II.
There  were  only  two  issues  before  the  trial  court  in
Bumpers  I  and  II,                                                           (1)  the  merits  of  plaintiff's  unfair  and
deceptive  trade  practices  claim  and  (2)  the  issue  of  attorney's
fees.     The  trial  court  decided  the  unfair  and  deceptive  trade
practices  claim,  and  left  the  attorney's  fees  claim  for  future
consideration.     In  Bumpers  II,  our  Supreme  Court  made  clear
that,  because  of  the  outstanding  attorney's  fees  claim,  the
appeal  before  it  was  interlocutory  but  that  the  appeal  was
proper  because  the  trial  court  had  certified  the  order  for
immediate  appeal  pursuant  to  Rule                                          54(b).    Bumpers  II,                           364  N.C.
at  204,  695 S.E.2d at  448.
In   the   present   case,   Defendant   has   failed   to   even
acknowledge  the  interlocutory  nature  of  his  appeal,  much  less
argue  that  some  substantial  right  of  his  will  be  affected  absent
immediate    appeal.                                                           Defendant    cannot    argue    that    this
interlocutory  appeal  is  properly  before  us  pursuant  to  Rule
54(b)  because  the  trial  court  did  not  certify  its                      18  January
2012  order  for  immediate  appeal.     Defendant's  appeal  from  the




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interlocutory  orders  of  the  trial  court  is  improper,  and  we
dismiss.
Dismissed.
Judges BEASLEY and THIGPEN concur.

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