Preview:

NO. COA12-452
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                 4 December  2012
IN THE MATTER OF:
J.L.H.                                                                 Mecklenburg County
No.  10 JT  28
1.                                                                     Termination  of  Parental  Rights  —  willfully  leaving  child  in
foster care  — lack of reasonable progress
The   trial   court   properly   terminated   respondent’s
parental  rights  on  the  basis  of  willfully  leaving  her  child
in  foster  care  for  more  than  twelve  months  without  showing
reasonable    progress.                                                The    trial    court’s    findings
demonstrated  that,  although  respondent  had  participated  in
some  services,  her  failure  to  participate  with  her  own
mental    health    treatment    and    her    inconsistency    in
participating  in  the  child's  therapy  was  not  reasonable
progress under the circumstances.
2.                                                                     Termination  of  Parental  Rights  —  best  interests  of  child  —
written findings required
A  termination  of  parental  rights  order  was  remanded
for  further  findings  concerning  the  best  interests  of  the
child  where  the  trial  court  did  not  make  the  written
findings   required   by   N.C.G.S.                                    §                                                                     7B-1110   (2011).   As
amended,  the  statute  explicitly  requires  written  findings
and  the  prior  cases  approving  evident  consideration  of  the
factors  without  findings  are  no  longer  relevant.    In  this
case  the  issues  of  whether  termination  would  aid  in  the
accomplishment  of  the  permanent  plan  and  the  quality  of  the
bond  between  the  child  and  respondent  were  raised  during
the  termination  hearing,  but  the  trial  court  did  not  make
written findings.




NO. COA12-452
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                       4 December  2012
IN THE MATTER OF:
J.L.H.                                                                       Mecklenburg County
No.  10 JT  28
Appeal  by  respondent-mother  from  order  entered                          1  February
2012   by   Judge   Kimberly   Best-Staton   in   Mecklenburg   County
District Court.    Heard in the Court of Appeals  23 October  2012.
Twyla   Hollingsworth-Richardson,   for   petitioner-appellee
Mecklenburg  County  Department  of  Social  Services,  Youth  and
Family Services.
M. Carridy Bender, for Guardian ad Litem.
Rebekah W. Davis, for respondent-appellant mother.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Respondent-mother                                                            (“respondent”)   appeals   from   the   trial
court’s   order   terminating   her   parental   rights   to   J.L.H.
(“Jennifer”).1    We affirm in part and remand for further findings
in part.
1  A  pseudonym  is  used  to  protect  the  juvenile’s  privacy  and  for
ease of reading.




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On                                                                          13  January                                          2010,  the  Mecklenburg  County  Department  of
                                                                            Social  Services,  Youth  and  Family  Services      (“YFS”)  filed  a
juvenile  petition  alleging  that  Jennifer  was  a  neglected  and
dependent   juvenile.                                                       The   petition   included   allegations   of
improper   supervision,   sexual   abuse,   domestic   violence,   and
substance  abuse.    At  that  time,  the  trial  court  ordered  YFS  to
assume  custody  of  Jennifer  for  placement  in  foster  care.  On        17
February  2010,  the  trial  court  adjudicated  Jennifer  a  neglected
and  dependent  juvenile  pursuant  to  a  mediated  agreement  with
respondent.
In  the  following  months,  the  trial  court  conducted  several
                                                                            review  and  permanency  planning  hearings.    On                                                                              14  February   2011,
                                                                                                                                 the  trial  court  entered  a  written  order,  pursuant  to  a  hearing
on                                                                          3  February                                          2011,  directing  YFS  to  file  a  termination  of
                                                                            parental  rights  petition  within                   60  days.    On                                                            11  February   2011,
YFS  filed  a  petition  to  terminate  respondent’s  parental  rights
on  the  grounds  of  neglect,  willfully  leaving  Jennifer  in  foster
care  for  more  than  twelve  months  without  showing  reasonable
progress  under  the  circumstances,  and  willfully  failing  to  pay  a
reasonable portion of the cost Jennifer’s care.
On                                                                          21  and                                              22  September                                                              2011  and      21  and   22  November   2011,
                                                                                                                                 the   trial   court   conducted   the   termination   hearing.                                                     On      1




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February                                                                      2012,  the  trial  court  entered  an  order  terminating
respondent’s  parental  rights  on  the  basis  of  neglect,  willfully
leaving  Jennifer  in  foster  care  for  more  than  twelve  months
without  showing  reasonable  progress,  and  willfully  failing  to
pay  a  reasonable  portion  of  the  cost  of  care  of  the  children.2
Respondent appeals.
II.    Adjudication
Respondent  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  concluding
that  grounds  existed  to  terminate  her  parental  rights.                 We
disagree.
“The  standard  of  review  in  termination  of  parental  rights
cases  is  whether  the  findings  of  fact  are  supported  by  clear,
cogent  and  convincing  evidence  and  whether  these  findings,  in
turn,  support  the  conclusions  of  law.”  In  re  Clark,  72  N.C.  App.
118,                                                                          124,                                                        323  S.E.2d   754,   758   (1984).   “[T]he  trial  court’s
findings  of  fact  supported  by  clear  and  convincing  competent
evidence   are   deemed   conclusive,   even   where   some   evidence
supports  contrary  findings.”  In  re  Helms,                                127  N.C.  App.                                             505,
511,  491 S.E.2d  672,  676  (1997).
2  The  trial  court’s  order  also  terminated  the  parental  rights  of
Jennifer’s  father.     However,  the  father  neither  attended  the
termination hearing nor appealed the trial court’s order.




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Pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                §                                                              7B-1111(a)(2),  a  court  may
terminate  parental  rights  when                                              “[t]he  parent  has  willfully  left
the  juvenile  in  foster  care  or  placement  outside  the  home  for
more  than                                                                     12  months  without  showing  to  the  satisfaction  of  the
court  that  reasonable  progress  under  the  circumstances  has  been
made  in  correcting  those  conditions  which  led  to  the  removal  of
the  juvenile.”     N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                          §                                                              7B-1111(a)(2)                   (2011).   The
willful  leaving  of  the  juvenile  in  foster  care  is                      “something
less  than  willful  abandonment”  and                                         “does  not  require  a  showing
of  fault  by  the  parent.”    In  re  Oghenekevebe,  123  N.C.  App.  434,
439,  473 S.E.2d  393,  398  (1996)(citations omitted).
Respondent  argues,  in  part,  that  the  trial  court  erred  in
concluding   that   termination   was   appropriate   on   this   ground
because  she  did  everything  she  was  told  to  do  by  petitioner.
However,  this  Court  has  previously  held  that  a  finding  of  this
ground  may  be  made  even  when  the  parent  has  made  some  effort  to
regain  custody  of  the  child  because  the  parent  must  also  show
reasonable  and  positive  progress  in  correcting  the  conditions
which  led  to  the  juvenile’s  removal.    See  In  re  Nolen,  117  N.C.
App.  693,  699-700,  453 S.E.2d  220,  224-25  (1995).
To  support  its  conclusion  that  respondent  willfully  left
Jennifer  in  foster  care  for  more  than  twelve  months  without




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making  reasonable  progress  under  the  circumstances,  the  trial
court  made  the  following  findings  in  the  adjudication  portion  of
the termination order:
11.   The   respondent   mother   is   still   not
participating  in  her  own  therapy.  If  the
mother  cannot  address  her  own  mental  health
needs,    she    cannot    address                                                                                              [Jennifer’s]
                                                                            traumatization.  The  mother  has  expressed  the
                                                                            opinion  during  this  Court’s  involvement  as
it  relates  to                                                             [Jennifer’s]  sexual  abuse  by
her  sibling,                                                               .  that                                             “she  just  needs  to
get  over  it”!  [Respondent]  has  not  taken  the
steps  necessary  to  address  the  issues  which
brought  [Jennifer]  into  custody,  and  has  not
recognized  the  impact  of  [Jennifer’s]  sexual
victimization.
12.  The  respondent  mother  agreed  that  she
would  comply  with  therapy  for  herself  and
[Jennifer].  The  respondent  mother  attended
two  therapy  appointments  with                                                                                                                             [Jennifer]  in
May                                                                         2011,  attended  no  therapy  appointments
in    June                                                                  2011,                                               attended    two    therapy
appointments   in   July                                                                                                        2011,   attended   no
appointments  in  August                                                                                                        2011,  attended  one
therapy  appointment  in  September                                                                                                                          2011,  and
has  not  returned  since  September                                                                                                                         2011  to
therapy.
13.  As  a  part  of  the  respondent  mother’s
family   service   agreement   or   case   plan,
[respondent]    was    ordered    to    complete
domestic    violence    counseling,    substance
abuse  treatment,  parenting  education,  mental
health  treatment,  and  engage  in  therapy  with
[Jennifer] and her sibling.
14.   The   respondent   mother   complied   with
elements   of   her   domestic   violence   family
service   agreement   obligation.                                           [Respondent]
completed  the  Women’s  Commission  program  in




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July                                                                         2010.                          [Respondent]  completed  parenting
                                                                             education in February  2011.
Respondent  specifically  challenges  findings                               11,                            12,  and                             14
as  unsupported  by  the  evidence.3     Since  finding  of  fact                                           13  is
unchallenged,  it  is  presumed  to  be  correct  and  supported  by  the
evidence.    See  In  re  Moore,  306  N.C.  394,                            404,  293  S.E.2d  127,
133  (1982).
The  record  provides  competent  evidence  to  support  findings
of  fact                                                                     11  and                        12.                                  Jennifer’s  therapist,  Denise  Little   (“Ms.
Little”),  testified  to  respondent’s  numerous  missed  appointments
and  failure  to  participate  in  Jennifer’s  therapy.     Ms.  Little
also  testified  that  respondent’s  involvement  was  necessary  to
Jennifer’s  recovery  and  to  respondent’s  understanding  of  the
impact of sexual abuse on her child.
YFS  social  worker  assistant  Leslie  Simmons                              (“Ms.  Simmons”)
testified   that   she   observed   inappropriate   touching   between
Jennifer  and  her  brother  during  visits  and  that  respondent
failed  to  stop  this  behavior.     YFS  senior  social  worker  Lynda
3  We  note  that  respondent  challenges  other  findings  of  fact  made
by  the  trial  court  in  its  order  terminating  her  parental  rights;
however,  we  need  not  address  the  additional  arguments  on  the
trial  court’s  other  findings  of  fact  because  they  are   not
relevant  to  this  ground  for  termination.  Thus,  any  error  in
those  findings  would  not  constitute  reversible  error.    See  In  re
T.M.,  180 N.C. App.  539,  547,  638 S.E.2d  236,  240  (2006).




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Peperak                                                                     (“Ms.  Peperak”)  testified  about  respondent’s  overall
performance  on  her  case  plan  goals  and  behavior  throughout  YFS’s
interaction  with  respondent.    Ms.  Peperak  reported  respondent’s
inappropriate  comments  that  Jennifer  “should  just  get  over           [her
sexual                                                                      abuse]”                                                     and        that   “every                                                     child   is   touched
inappropriately.”                                                                                                                                                  Ms.   Peperak   also   described   respondent’s
participation  in  therapy,  the  many  accommodations  provided  to
respondent  to  encourage  her  to  attend  Jennifer’s  therapy,  and
respondent’s  apathetic  attitude  towards  the  lessons  offered  in
domestic  violence  counseling,  parenting  classes,  and  therapy
generally.
Finally,  psychologist  Dr.  Terri  Watters                                 (“Dr.  Watters”)
testified  regarding  her  psychological  evaluations  of  respondent.
The  evaluations  revealed  respondent’s  narcissistic  traits.  The
court   accepted   into   evidence   and   considered   the   Parenting
Capacity  Evaluation                                                        (“PCE”)  which  Dr.  Watters  wrote.     In  her
PCE,  Dr.  Watters  expressed  concern  that  respondent  would  seek
out  another  violent  relationship  if  she  failed  to  address  her
own  mental  health  needs.  Thus,  findings  of  fact                      11  and                                                     12  were
supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.
As  to  finding  of  fact                                                   14,  respondent  takes  issue  with  the
portion  of  the  finding  which  states  that  she                         “complied  with




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elements  of  her  domestic  violence  service  agreement  obligation.”
Respondent  contends  that  this  finding  implies  that  she  did  not
comply  with  the  totality  of  the  agreement.     Respondent  argues
that,   under   the   agreement,   she   was   required   to   obtain   an
assessment  and  follow  through  on  all  recommendations  and  that
she did what she was told.
Respondent  is  correct  that  her  agreement  required  her  to
complete  a  domestic  violence  assessment  and  follow  all  treatment
recommendations.  Specifically,  the  agreement  required  her               “to
participate  in  Domestic  Violence  treatment  to  learn  about  and
engage  in  healthy  relationships.”                                         (Emphasis  added).     However,
Ms.  Peperak  testified  that  even  though  respondent  had  completed
a  twelve-week  program  at  the  Women’s  Commission,  she  had  not
implemented  the  skills  she  had  learned  there.    For  example,  Ms.
Peperak  testified  that  respondent  failed  to  walk  away  or  contact
law  enforcement  when  respondent                                           “ran  into”  Jennifer’s  father.
Based  upon  Ms.  Peperak’s  testimony,  we  conclude  finding  of  fact
14 is supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence.
The   trial   court’s   findings   demonstrate   that,   although
respondent  had  participated  in  some  services,  her  failure  to
participate   with   her   own   mental   health   treatment   and   her
inconsistency  in  participating  in  Jennifer’s  therapy  was  not




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reasonable  progress  under  the  circumstances.     Therefore,  the
trial   court’s   findings,   which   were   supported   by   competent
evidence,  supported  its  conclusion  that  a  ground  existed  to
terminate   respondent’s   parental   rights   because   respondent
willfully  left  Jennifer  in  foster  care  for  more  than  twelve
months  and  failed  to  make  reasonable  progress  to  correct  the
conditions which led to Jennifer’s removal.
Since   we   have   found   that   the   trial   court   properly
terminated  respondent’s  parental  rights  on  the  basis  of  her
willfully  leaving  Jennifer  in  foster  care  for  more  than  twelve
months  without  showing  reasonable  progress,  it  is  unnecessary  to
address  her  arguments  on  the  remaining  grounds  found  by  the
trial  court.    See  In  re  Humphrey,                                    156  N.C.  App.   533,   540,   577
S.E.2d  421,  426-27  (2003).
III.    Best Interests
Respondent  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  concluding
it  was  in  Jennifer’s  best  interests  to  terminate  her  parental
rights.    Specifically,  respondent  contends  that  the  trial  court
failed  to  make  the  necessary  findings  of  fact  required  by  N.C.
Gen. Stat.  §  7B-1110.    We agree.




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The  determination  of  whether  termination  is  in  the  best
interests  of  the  minor  child  is  governed  by  N.C.  Gen.             Stat.         §
7B-1110.
In  each  case,  the  court  shall  consider  the
following  criteria  and  make  written  findings
regarding the following that are relevant:
(1)   The age of the juvenile.
(2)   The   likelihood   of   adoption   of   the
juvenile.
(3)   Whether   the   termination   of   parental
rights  will  aid  in  the  accomplishment  of  the
permanent plan for the juvenile.
(4)   The  bond  between  the  juvenile  and  the
parent.
(5)   The  quality  of  the  relationship  between
the   juvenile   and   the   proposed   adoptive
parent,    guardian,    custodian,    or    other
permanent placement.
(6)   Any relevant consideration.
N.C.                                                                       Gen.  Stat.   §                                   7B-1110(a)                                                            (2011).                 “We  review  the              trial
                                                                                                                             court’s  decision  to  terminate  parental  rights   for  abuse  of
                                                                                         discretion.”    In  re  Anderson,                                                                         151  N.C.  App.   94,   98,                           564  S.E.2d
599,                                                                       602                                               (2002).     The  trial  court  is                                                             “subject  to  reversal  for
                                                                                                                             abuse   of   discretion   only   upon   a   showing                                                                         .   that   the
challenged  actions  are  manifestly  unsupported  by  reason.”    Clark
v. Clark,  301 N.C.  123,  129,  271 S.E.2d  58,  63  (1980).




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In  the  instant  case,  the  trial  court  made  the  following
findings regarding the best interests of Jennifer:
The  best  interests  of                                                    [Jennifer]  would  be
served  by  the  termination  of  parental  rights
of  both  respondent  parents  with  respect  to
this juvenile.
[Jennifer]  is  in  a  placement  and  is  being
cared for appropriately.
[Jennifer]  is  only  seven-years-old  [sic]  and
is  capable  of  being  adopted.                                            [Jennifer’s]
therapeutic  needs  are  being  met  and  she  is
progressing  well  and  thriving  in  her  current
placement.
[Jennifer]    is    not    in    a    foster/adopt
placement,  but  the  Court  has  no  doubt  she
will be adopted.
However,  the  trial  court  made  no  findings  which  reflected
consideration  of  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                        §                                                        7B-1110(a)(3),   “whether  the
termination  of  parental  rights  will  aid  in  the  accomplishment  of
the  permanent  plan  for  the  juvenile,”  or  of  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.       §
7B-1110(a)(4),                                                              “the  bond  between  the  juvenile  and  the  parent.”
Although  the  trial  court  concludes  that  Jennifer  likely  will  be
adopted,  it  fails  to  specifically  state  that  termination  of
respondent’s   parental   rights   is   necessary   to   achieve   that
permanent  plan.    Furthermore,  there  was  testimony  at  the  hearing
and   evidence   in   the   record   relevant   to   the   bond   between
respondent  and  Jennifer.    Dr.  Watters  testified  that  there  was




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“no  doubt  in                                                                [her]  mind  that  there’s  a  bond  between”  Jennifer
and  respondent.                                                              She  also  testified  that  Jennifer  respects
respondent,  and  that  Jennifer  and  respondent  seem  to  enjoy  their
time  together.     Ms.  Simmons  also  testified  that  she  believed
there was a bond between Jennifer and respondent.
However,  in  therapy,  Jennifer  stated  that  she  misbehaved  at
school  and  in  foster  care,  because  she  was  afraid  that  she  would
be  sent  back  to  her  mother  if  she  was  good.     In  addition,
Jennifer’s  incidents  of  poor  behaviors  increased  after  visits
with  respondent.    Finally,  Jennifer  also  stated  that  she  did  not
trust  her  mother  to  keep  her  safe  from  further  sexual  abuse.
Thus,  the  bond  between  Jennifer  and  respondent  was  relevant  to
the  trial  court’s  best  interests  determination.     Nevertheless,
while  the  trial  court  was  required  to  consider  the  statutory
factors  in  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                §                                                         7B-1110(a)     and   “make  written
findings  regarding                                                           [those]  that  are  relevant,”  it  failed  to  do
so.
Although  petitioner  acknowledges  that  the  trial  court  did
not  make  explicit  findings  on  all  of  the  relevant  statutory
factors,  it  still  contends  that  the  trial  court’s  order  is
sufficient  under  this  Court’s  decision  in                                In  re  S.C.H.,  199  N.C.
App.                                                                          658,                                                      682  S.E.2d          469              (2009).   In  S.C.H.,  the  Court  held




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that,                                                                         “[a]lthough  the  trial  court  may  have  not  made  a  specific
finding  addressing  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                        §                                                                   7B-1110(a)(4),”  there  was
no  abuse  of  discretion  so  long  as                                       “it                                                                 [wa]s  apparent  that  the
trial  court  did  consider”  that  factor.  Id.  at  668,  682  S.E.2d  at
475.                                                                          Respondent  argues  that  there  is  also  evidence  in  the
instant   case   that   the   trial   court   considered   all   relevant
factors in N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  7B-1110.
However,   at   the   time   S.C.H.   was   decided,   a   different
version  of  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                §                                                                   7B-1110  was  in  effect.     This
previous version of the statute stated, in relevant part:
After   an   adjudication   that   one   or   more
grounds  for  terminating  a  parent's  rights
exist,   the   court   shall   determine   whether
terminating  the  parent's  rights  is  in  the
juvenile's   best   interest.   In   making   this
determination,  the  court  shall  consider  the
following:
                                                                                                                                                  N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  7B-1110(a)  (2009)(emphasis added).
In                                                                            2011,  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                            §                                                                           7B-1110(a)  was  amended  for     all
                                                                                                                                                  juvenile  actions  “filed  or  pending  on  or  after”  1  October  2011.
See                                                                           2011  N.C.  Sess.  Laws                                             295.                                                                        As  noted  above,  the  current
version  of  the  statute  directs  the  trial  court  to  “consider  the
following   criteria   and   make   written   findings   regarding   the
following  that  are  relevant.”  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  7B-1110(a)(2011)
(emphasis  added).     Therefore,  due  to  this  change  in  statutory
language,  S.C.H.  and  other  cases  similar  to  it  are  no  longer




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applicable  to  this  Court’s  evaluation  of  a  trial  court’s  best
interests  determination  under  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                          §                                            7B-1110.   The
amended  statute  now  explicitly  requires  the  trial  court  to  make
written  findings  of  fact  on  all  relevant  factors  from  N.C.  Gen.
Stat.  §  7B-1110(a)  when  it  determines  whether  termination  is  in
the juvenile’s best interests.
In  the  instant  case,  the  issues  of  whether  termination  will
aid  in  the  accomplishment  of  the  permanent  plan  and  the  quality
of  the  bond  between  Jennifer  and  respondent  were  raised  during
the  termination  hearing,  but  the  trial  court  did  not  make  any
written  findings  regarding  these  factors.     As  a  result,  the
trial  court’s  order  does  not  comply  with  the  requirements  of
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                                        §          7B-1110                                                                    (2011).   Since  the  record  contains
                                                                                                                                    evidence  from  which  the  court  could  make  findings  as  to  this
                                                                                                                                    factor,  we  remand  for  entry  of  appropriate  findings  pursuant  to
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                                        §          7B-1110(a).     See  In  re  E.M.,                                                                                  202  N.C.  App.
                                                                            761,  765,  692 S.E.2d  629,  631  (2010).
IV.    Conclusion
The  trial  court  correctly  concluded  that  grounds  existed  to
terminate  respondent’s  parental  rights  on  the  ground  of  her
willfully  leaving  Jennifer  in  foster  care  for  more  than  twelve
months  without  showing  reasonable  progress.     Consequently,  we




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affirm  the  adjudication  portion  of  the  trial  court’s  order.
However,  the  trial  court  failed  to  make  findings  on  relevant
factors   included   in   N.C.   Gen.   Stat.                             §   7B-1110(a)   when
determining  whether  termination  of  respondent’s  parental  rights
was  in  Jennifer’s  best  interests.     Accordingly,  we  remand  the
disposition  portion  of  the  trial  court’s  order  for  further
findings as required by N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  7B-1110(a).
Affirmed in part and remanded in part.
Judges BEASLEY and THIGPEN concur.

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