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NO. COA12-703
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  20 November  2012
MNC HOLDINGS, LLC,
Petitioner,
v.                                                                       Mecklenburg County
                                                                         No.  11 CVS  19962
THE TOWN OF MATTHEWS,
Respondent.
1.                                                                       Appeal  and  Error                  -  service  of  notice  of  appeal                 -  non-
                                                                         jurisdictional                      -  not  a  substantial  or  gross  violation  of
                                                                         appellate rules
The    trial    court    had    jurisdiction    even    though
petitioner   MNC   Holdings   contended   it   was   not   properly
served  notice  of  appeal  in  this  matter.     Any  error  in
service  made  by  the  Town  was  non-jurisdictional  and  was  not
a substantial or gross violation of the appellate rules.
2.                                                                       Zoning                              -  variance  petition                              -  structural  alterations  when
                                                                         “required by law”
The  trial  court  did  not  err  by  reversing  the  Town
board’s   denial   of   a   variance   petition   based   on   its
erroneous  application  of  Section  153.224(D)  of  the  Town  of
Matthews’  Zoning  Ordinance.                                            The  plain  meaning  of  the
zoning   ordinance   suggested   that   it   allowed   structural
alterations  when                                                        “required  by  law”  in  general.   Because
MNC  was  compelled  by  law  to  make  the  alteration,  the
ordinance should be interpreted liberally.
3.                                                                       Judgments                           -   recitation   of   facts   in   record          -   not
freestanding findings of fact
Those  portions  of  the  judgment  contested  by  respondent
Town  in  a  zoning  case  were  merely  a  recitation  of  the  facts




contained  in  the  record  and  not  freestanding                     “findings  of
fact.”                                                                 Regardless,   even   if   these   portions   somehow
mischaracterized  the  evidence  in  the  record  before  the
trial  court,  there  was  no  indication  that  the  trial  court’s
ultimate  interpretation  of  the  zoning  ordinance  would  have
been different absent these portions of its judgment.




NO. COA12-703
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  20 November  2012
MNC HOLDINGS, LLC,
Petitioner,
v.                                                                            Mecklenburg County
                                                                              No.  11 CVS  19962
THE TOWN OF MATTHEWS,
Respondent.
Appeal  by  Respondent  from  judgment  entered  19  March  2012  by
Judge  Forrest  D.  Bridges  in  Mecklenburg  County  Superior  Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  24 October  2012.
Smith  Moore  Leatherwood  LLP,  by  Thomas  E.  Terrell,  Jr.  and
Elizabeth  Brooks  Scherer,  and  Bringewatt  &  Snover,  PLLC,  by
Kevin M. Bringewatt, for Petitioner-appellee.
Hamilton  Stephens  Steele  &  Martin,  PLLC,  by  Rebecca  K.
Cheney, for Respondent-appellant.
HUNTER JR., Robert N., Judge.
This  appeal  arises  from  the  denial  of  a  variance  petition
by  the  Town  of  Matthews  (“the  Town”).    Petitioner  MNC  Holdings,
LLC  (“MNC”)  sought  review  of  the  denial  by  writ  of  certiorari  in
superior  court,  which  was  granted.    The  court  then  reversed  the
denial  of  the  petition,  concluding  the  Town  erroneously  applied
Section                                                                       153.224(D)  of  the  Town  of  Matthews’  Zoning  Ordinance.




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For  the  following  reasons,  we   hold  that  the  trial  court’s
application of the Ordinance was correct and affirm.
I. Factual & Procedural History
Since  the                                                                    1980s,  MNC  and  its  predecessors  have  operated  a
medical  waste  incineration  facility  in  the  Town  of  Matthews.    In
1991,  the  Town  annexed  the  subject  property  and  rezoned  the  land
on  which  the  facility  is  located  from  Heavy  Industrial  use  to
Single-Family  Residential  use.    This  rezoning  made  the  existing
facility  a                                                                   “nonconforming  use.”1     This  status  requires  MNC  to
seek  permission  from  the  Town  by  variance  petition  before  making
physical alterations to the facility.
Since                                                                         1991,   changes   in   Environmental   Protection   Agency
regulations  governing  medical  waste  incinerators  required  MNC’s
air  pollution  equipment  to  be  upgraded.    On  at  least  one  prior
occasion,  the  Town  allowed  MNC  to  make  alterations  to  its
facility.    In  2009,  the  EPA  and  the  North  Carolina  Department  of
Environment   and   Natural   Resources                                       (“DENR”)   adopted   more
stringent   air   quality   regulations.                                      These   air   quality
regulations are enforced by DENR.
1  The  Town’s  zoning  code  defines  a  non-conforming  use  generally
as  one  which                                                                “may  not  meet  the  minimum  standards  contained  in
[the  zoning  code]  because  they  were  developed  under  no  specific
standards  or  under  standards  which  were  less  restrictive.”    Town
of Matthews Zoning Ordinance  §  153.220  (2012).




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While  the  regulations  at  issue  here  were  not  scheduled  to
take  effect  until                                                          2014,  the  Town  petitioned  DENR’s  Mecklenburg
County  Air  Quality  Division  to  shorten  the  time  frame  for  MNC’s
compliance.    At  the  Town’s  request,  the  date  for  MNC  to  comply
was  advanced  to                                                            6  October                                          2012.                       MNC  promptly  requested  a
variance  from  the  Town.                                                                                                                                   MNC  explained  that  extensive  and
accelerated  modifications  to  its  facility  would  be  necessary  in
order  to  comply  with  the  new  regulations  in  this  shortened
timeframe.    In  evaluating  MNC’s  request  for  a  variance,  the  Town
zoning  administrator  held  that  Section  153.224(D)  of  the  Town  of
Matthews’  Zoning  Ordinance                                                 (“the  Ordinance”)  would  not  permit
MNC  to  make  the  necessary  alterations.     His  interpretation  of
the  Ordinance  would  limit  modifications  to  MNC’s  plant  to  only
those  alterations  required  by  law  to  ensure  the  safety  of  the
structure.
Following   the   zoning   administrator’s   denial   of   MNC’s
request  to  make  the  necessary  changes,  MNC  appealed  to  the
Town’s  zoning  board.     On                                                3  November                                         2011,  the  zoning  board
unanimously  upheld  the  zoning  administrator’s  decision  denying
the  variance.     As  required  by  the  Ordinance,  MNC  then  filed  a
petition  for  writ  of  certiorari  for  judicial  review.                  The
petition  for  review  was  granted  and  a  hearing  was  held  on          26




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January                                                                        2012.                                           The  arguments  presented  at  that  hearing  are
discussed infra.
On                                                                             19  March                                       2012,  the  trial  court  reversed  the  Town’s
decision.    On                                                                              20  March                         2012,  the  Town  properly  filed  notice  of
appeal.    The  same  day,  the  Town  emailed  its  notice  of  appeal  to
MNC’s  counsel  of  record.    After  the  deadline  for  service  by  mail
of  the  notice  of  appeal  had  expired  on  18  April  2012,  MNC  moved
in  the  trial  court  to  dismiss  the  Town’s  appeal  for  failure  to
timely  serve  its  notice  of  appeal  as  provided  by  Rule  3  of  the
N.C.  Rules  of  Appellate  Procedure.    Judge  Hugh  B.  Lewis  of  the
Mecklenburg  County  Superior  Court  denied  the  motion  to  dismiss.
MNC has renewed its motion to dismiss in this Court.
II.   Jurisdiction
This  Court  has  jurisdiction  over  appeals  from  the  final
judgments  of  Superior  Courts  in  civil  cases.    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §
7A-27(b)  (2011).    This  includes  appeals  arising  from                    “any  final
judgment  entered  upon  review  of  a  decision  of  an  administrative
agency.”  Id.;  see  also  Premier  Plastic  Surgery  Center,  PLLC  v.
Bd.  of  Adjustment  for  Town  of  Matthews,  __  N.C.  App.  __,  __,  713
S.E.2d                                                                         511,          514                               (2011)                                                                                                          (“Jurisdiction  in  this  Court  is  proper
                                                                                             pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                       §   7A-27(b)                                                [as]                                          .  a  right  of
appeal  lies                                                                                                                                                                           .  from  the  final  judgment  of  a  superior  court




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entered  upon  review  of  a  decision  of  an  administrative  agency.”
(quotation marks and citation omitted)).
III. Analysis
A. MNC’s Motion to Dismiss
MNC  argues  this  Court  lacks  jurisdiction  because  MNC  was
not  properly  served  notice  of  appeal  in  this  matter.                  MNC
contends  the  Town’s  email  service  of  its  notice  of  appeal  did
not  comply  with  N.C.  R.  App.  P.                                         3(e),  which  specifies  that
“[s]ervice  of  copies  of  the  notice  of  appeal  may  be  made  as
provided  in                                                                  [N.C.  R.  App.  P.                                           26].”    MNC  argues  email  is  not  a
method  of  service  permitted  by  Rule  26,  and  therefore  the  Town’s
service  violates  the  appellate  rules,  thus  divesting  this  Court
of  jurisdiction  to  hear  the  Town’s  appeal.    While  MNC  is  correct
that  Rule                                                                    26  has  not  been  strictly  complied  with,  we  disagree
with  MNC’s  conclusion  that  this  Court  lacks  jurisdiction  to  hear
the Town’s appeal.
Prior  to  1993,  our  Supreme  Court  held  that  both  filing  and
proper  service  of  the  notice  of  appeal  were  jurisdictional
requirements  that  must  be  met  in  order  for  our  appellate  courts
to  have  jurisdiction.    See  Crowell  Constructors,  Inc.  v.  State
ex  rel.  Cobey,                                                              328  N.C.                                                     563,                                      563,   402  S.E.2d   407,   408   (1991)
(stating  that  “[u]nder  .  .  .  the  Rules  of  Appellate  Procedure,  a




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party  entitled  by  law  to  appeal  from  judgment  of  superior  court
rendered  in  a  civil  action  may  take  appeal  by  filing  notice  of
appeal  with  the  clerk  of  superior  court  and  serving  copies
thereof  upon  all  other  parties  in  a  timely  manner.    This  rule  is
jurisdictional.”).
In                                                                              1993,  the  Supreme  Court  held  that  proper  filing  of  a
notice  of  appeal  is  necessary  to  vest  appellate  courts  with
subject  matter  jurisdiction.                                                  However  the  manner  of  proper
service  of  that  notice   is  not  a  matter  of  subject  matter
jurisdiction,  but  rather  a  matter  of  personal  jurisdiction  which
may  be  waived  by  a  party.    See  Hale  v.  Afro-American  Arts  Int’l,
335 N.C.  231,  436 S.E.2d  588  (1993).
Following  Hale,  our  Supreme  Court  decided  Dogwood  Dev.  &
Mgmt.  Co.  v.  White  Oak  Transp.  Co.,  362  N.C.  191,  657  S.E.2d  361
(2008).    The  Court  in  Dogwood  noted  that                                 “a  party’s  failure  to
comply  with  nonjurisdictional  rule  requirements  normally  should
not  lead  to  dismissal  of  the  appeal.”    Id.  at  198,  657  S.E.2d  at
365.                                                                            However,   even   non-jurisdictional   errors   may   lead   to
dismissal  of  appeal  if  the  error  is  substantial  or  gross.    Id.
at  199,  657 S.E.2d at  366.
In                                                                              determining                                                       whether   a   party’s
noncompliance  with  the  appellate  rules  rises
to  the  level  of  a  substantial  failure  or
gross   violation,   the   court   may   consider,




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among  other  factors,  whether  and  to  what
extent  the  noncompliance  impairs  the  court’s
task   of   review   and   whether   and   to   what
extent  review  on  the  merits  would  frustrate
the adversarial process.
Id. at  200,  657 S.E.2d at  366-67.
In  Lee  v.  Winget  Rd.,  LLC,  this  Court  held  in  light  of  Hale
and  Dogwood  that  proper  service  of  a  notice  of  appeal  is  a  non-
                                                                                                                            jurisdictional  requirement.   204  N.C.  App.   96,                                 102,   693  S.E.2d
684,                                                                          689                                           (2010)                         (holding  that    “where  a  notice  of  appeal  is
properly  and  timely  filed,  but  not  served  upon  all  parties”  the
“violation   of   Rule                                                        3    is   a   nonjurisdictional   defect”).
Nevertheless,  the  Court  in  Lee  dismissed  the  appeal,  holding
that   the   failure   of   the   appellant   to   provide   any   notice
whatsoever  to  some  of  the  parties  was  a  substantial  violation  of
the  rules  necessitating  dismissal.     Id.  at                             103,                                          693  S.E.2d  at
690.    The Court explained that:
two  of  the  parties  to  this  case  were  never
informed   of   the   fact   that   there   was   an
appeal  which  affects  their  interests,                                     [and]
this   Court   has   no   way   of   knowing   the
positions  these  parties  would  have  taken  in
this  appeal.     The  fact  that  these  parties
have  not  objected  to  our  consideration  of
the  appeal  is  irrelevant,  because  as  far  as
we  can  tell  from  the  record,  these  parties
are  unaware  of  the  appeal.    Simply  put,  all
parties  to  a  case  are  entitled  to  notice
that a party has appealed.
Id.    The  Court  concluded  that  the  Lee  appellant’s  “noncompliance




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has  impaired  this  Court’s  task  of  review  and  that  review  on  the
merits  would  frustrate  the  adversarial  process.”     Id.  at            102,
693 S.E.2d at  690.
Here  we  hold  that  any  error  in  service  made  by  the  Town  is
non-jurisdictional  and  is  not  a  substantial  or  gross  violation
of  the  appellate  rules.     In  contrast  to  the  appellees  in  Lee,
MNC  has  been  given  actual  notice  of  the  Town’s  appeal,  allowing
them  to  fully  participate  in  the  proceedings.     Moreover,  both
parties  to  this  appeal  are  present  and  have  submitted  well
researched  briefs.  Any  technical  error  in  service  alleged  by  MNC
has  not  materially  impeded  the  adversarial  process  or  impaired
our  ability  to  examine  the  merits  of  this  appeal.     As  our
Supreme  Court  has  observed,                                               “it  is  the  task  of  an  appellate
court  to  resolve  appeals  on  the  merits  if  at  all  possible.”
Dogwood  Dev.  &  Mgmt.  Co.,                                                362  N.C.  at                                        199,   657  S.E.2d  at   366.
We  cannot  conclude  under  these  circumstances  that  the  Town’s
noncompliance  is                                                            “substantial  or  gross”  noncompliance  with  our
appellate  rules.     While  practitioners  need  be  cautioned  that
non-compliance  with  the  Rules  in  future  cases  may  result  in
dismissal  and  that  an  appellate  discussion  of  their  failure  to
follow  the  rules  should  be  unnecessary,  dismissal  of  the  Town’s
appeal is unwarranted under the facts of this case.




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B. Interpretation of the Ordinance
Our  review  of  a                                                                                                                                                                                                                      “trial  court’s  zoning  board  determination
is  limited  to  determining                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            [(1)]  whether  the  superior  court
                                                                                                                                                                applied  the  correct  standard  of  review,  and  to  determin[ing]
                                                                                                                                                                [(2)]   whether   the   superior   court   correctly   applied   that
standard.”                                                                                                                                                      Bailey   &   Assoc.,   Inc.   v.   Wilmington   Bd.   of
Adjustment,                                                                    202  N.C.  App.                                                        177,      190,                                                                    689  S.E.2d                                     576,                                   586   (2010)
(quotation  marks  and  citation  omitted)                                     (second  alteration  in
original).    The  superior  court  reviews  a  board  of  adjustment’s
interpretation  of  a  municipal  ordinance  de  novo.    Morris  Comm.
Corp.  v.  City  of  Bessemer,                                                 365  N.C.                                                              152,      155,                                                                    712  S.E.2d                                     868,
871                                                                            (2011).    From  the  record  it  is  clear  that  the  trial  court
employed  the  proper  standard  of  review.     The  issue  in  this
appeal  is  whether  the  trial  court’s  legal  interpretation  of  the
Ordinance  was  correct.    Because  interpretation  of  the  Ordinance
is  a  question  of  law,  we  also  employ  de  novo  review.    See  Lamar
Outdoor  Adv.,  Inc.  v.  Hendersonville  Zoning  Bd.,                         155  N.C.  App.
516,  518,                                                                     573  S.E.2d  637,  640                                                 (2002).   “Under  de  novo  review  a
reviewing   court   considers   the   case   anew   and   may   freely
substitute  its  own  interpretation  of  an  ordinance  for  a  board  of
adjustment’s  conclusions  of  law.”    Morris  Comm.  Corp.,  365  N.C.
at  156,  712 S.E.2d at  871.




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The                                                                          parties            present   two   fundamentally   different
interpretations of the Ordinance, which reads as follows:
No  structural  alterations  are  allowed  to  any
structure   containing   a   nonconforming   use
except  for  those  required  by  law  or  an  order
from  the  office  or  agent  authorized  by  the
Board   of   Commissioners   to   issue   building
permits   to   ensure   the   safety   of   the
structure.                                                                   (Doc. Ex.  470).
The  Town  argues  the  Ordinance  allows  only  alterations  to
nonconforming  uses  required  by  law  to  ensure  the  safety  of  the
structure;  thus,  because  the  EPA  regulations  are  not  aimed  at
ensuring  the  safety  of  the  structure,  MNC  is  not  permitted  to
make  the  alterations.    The  Town  asserts  that  the  plain  meaning
and  purpose  of  the  Ordinance  is  to  regulate  building  safety,  and
that  this  fact,  coupled  with  North  Carolina  law’s  disfavoring  of
nonconforming uses, warrants reversal of the trial court.
MNC   contends   that   the   Ordinance   allows   any   alteration
required  by  law;  thus,  the  alteration  should  be  allowed  because
the  EPA  regulation  is  a  law  requiring  alterations  to  MNC’s
structure.    The  trial  court  agreed,  explaining  that  “the  intent
of  [the  Ordinance]  is  to  allow  property  owners  of  buildings  that
house  a  nonconforming  use  to  make  structural  alterations  that
are   required   by   law,”   and   reversed   the   Town’s   narrow
construction  of  the  Ordinance.    We  agree  with  the  trial  court’s




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interpretation  that  the  plain  meaning  of  the  Ordinance  suggests
that  it  allows  structural  alterations  when  “required  by  law”  in
general.
Our Supreme Court has observed that:
[w]hen  construing  statutes,  this  Court  first
determines  whether  the  statutory  language  is
clear  and  unambiguous.     If  the  statute  is
clear  and  unambiguous,  we  will  apply  the
plain  meaning  of  the  words,  with  no  need  to
resort   to   judicial   construction.   However,
when  the  language  of  a  statute  is  ambiguous,
this  Court  will  determine  the  purpose  of  the
statute  and  the  intent  of  the  legislature  in
its enactment.
Wiggs  v.  Edgecombe  Cty.,  361  N.C.  318,  322,  643  S.E.2d  904,  907
(2007)  (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
A  plain  reading  of  the  Ordinance  would  apply  the  phrase  “to
ensure   the   safety   of   the   structure”   only   to   the   phrase
immediately  preceding  it,                                                  “an  order  from  the  office  or  agent
authorized  by  the  Board  of  Commissioners  to  issue  building
permits[,]”  and  not  to  the  prior  phrase                                “those  required  by
law[.]”     See  Doc.  Ex.                                                   470.                                                      However,  in  exercising  a  de  novo
construction   of   the   statute,   the   trial   court   additionally
examined  the                                                                “intent”  of  the  Ordinance.     Thus,  we  must  also
examine the intent.
The  intent  of  the  statute  is  to  allow  property  owners  to
make  alterations  when  such  alterations  are                              “required  by  law.”




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In  our  legal  system,  town  ordinances  must  defer  to  state  and
federal  laws.    See,  e.g.,  Craig  v.  Cty.  of  Chatham,  356  N.C.  40,
53,  565  S.E.2d  172,  180-81  (2002)  (finding  a  town’s  ordinance  to
be  preempted  by  state  law).2    The  fact  that  the  Town  enacted  the
Ordinance  recognizes  this  fact.     Further,                                “[z]oning  ordinances
are  in  derogation  of  the  right  of  private  property,  and,  where
exemptions  appear  in  favor  of  the  property  owner,  they  should  be
liberally  construed  in  favor  of  such  owner.”  In  re  W.P.  Rose
Builders’  Supply  Co.,                                                        202  N.C.                                                               496,                                 500,   163  S.E.     462,   464
(1932).    Our  Supreme  Court  has  observed  that  this  is  especially
true   when   property   owners   are   required   by   law   to   make
alterations  to  their  property.    See  Morris  Comm.  Corp.,  365  N.C.
at  159,  712  S.E.2d  at  873.  (finding  a  company  could  reinstall  a
nonconforming  sign  after  being  required  to  remove  it  because  of
a   state   highway   project   because                                        “[o]ne   of   the   fundamental
purposes   of   zoning   boards   of   adjustment   is   to   provide
flexibility   and                                                              ‘prevent                                                                .   practical   difficulties   and
                                                                               unnecessary  hardships’  resulting  from  strict  interpretations  of
zoning  ordinances”)                                                           (citation  omitted)                                                     (second  alteration  in
2  Federal  regulations  are  generally  given  the  same  deference  as
federal  statutes  under  a  preemption  analysis.     See  Hopkins  v.
Ciba-Geigy  Corp.,                                                             111  N.C.  App.                                                         179,                                 185,   432  S.E.2d   142,   145
(1993)                                                                         (“Preemption  is  not  limited  to  conflicts  between  state
and  federal  statutes;  federal  regulatory  schemes  may  preempt
state common-law  .  .  . as well.”).




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original);  In  re  O’Neal,                                                   243  N.C.                    714,                                           719,              92  S.E.2d   189,                       192
(1956)  (finding  a  nursing  home  had  the  right  to  construct  a  new
fireproof  building  required  by  law  despite  the  Zoning  Board  of
Adjustment’s refusal).
Accordingly,  because  MNC  is  compelled  by  law  to  make  the
alteration,  the  Ordinance  should  be  interpreted  liberally.    The
provision  of  the  Ordinance  allowing  for  alterations  “required  by
law”  was  placed  there  by  the  legislators  specifically  for  the
purpose  of                                                                                                “provid[ing]  flexibility  and                                                ‘prevent[ing]  practical
                                                                                                           difficulties  and  unnecessary  hardships.’”                                  See  Morris  Comm.
Corp.,                                                                        365  N.C.  at                159,                                           712  S.E.2d  at   873.         (citation  omitted)
Accordingly,  we  affirm  the  trial  court’s  reversal  of  the  zoning
board.
C. Erroneous  “Findings of Fact”
The   Town   additionally   contends   that   the   trial   court
erroneously  made                                                             “findings  of  fact”  that   “there  is  substantial
evidence  in  the  Record  that  the  required  alterations  can  be
accomplished  within  the  footprint  where  the  existing  equipment
and   structures   are   located”   and   that                                “a   previous   zoning
administrator  had  allowed  structural  alterations  to  Petitioner’s
property[.]”    However,  these  portions  of  the  judgment  appear  to
be  merely  a  recitation  of  the  facts  contained  in  the  record,  not




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freestanding                                                               “findings  of  fact.”     Regardless,  even  if  these
portions  of  the  judgment  somehow  mischaracterize  the  evidence  in
the  record  before  the  trial  court,  there  is  no  indication  that
the  trial  court’s  ultimate  interpretation  of  the  Ordinance  would
have been different absent these portions of its judgment.
IV.   Conclusion
For  the  foregoing  reasons,  the  judgment  of  the  trial  court
is
AFFIRMED.
Judges HUNTER, Robert C., and CALABRIA concur.

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