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NO. COA11-209
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                 6 December  2011
JUMA MUSSA,
Plaintiff
v.                                                                     Wake County
                                                                       No.  09 CVD  24397
NIKKI PALMER-MUSSA,
Defendant
Annulment                                                              -  motion  to  dismiss  improperly  granted   -  bigamy     -
improper  solemnization                                                -  religious  dissolution                     -  voidable
marriage
The   trial   court   erred   by   dismissing   plaintiff’s
complaint  for  annulment.     Defendant’s  prior  marriage  to
another   man,   which   was   invalid   for   want   of   proper
solemnization,  was  merely  voidable  until  annulled  in  a
direct  action  by  a  proper  tribunal.    There  is  no  authority
supporting  the  dissolution  of  a  marriage  by  religious  means
that  can  be  deemed  to  be  the  equivalent  of  a  judicial
determination  regarding  the  validity  of  a  marriage.    Thus,
any marriage between plaintiff and defendant was bigamous.
Judge BRYANT dissenting.




NO. COA11-209
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                       6 December  2011
JUMA MUSSA,
Plaintiff
v.                                                                           Wake County
                                                                             No.  09 CVD  24397
NIKKI PALMER-MUSSA,
Defendant
Appeal  by  plaintiff  from  order  entered                                  27  July                                              2010  by
Judge  Christine  Walczyk  in  Wake  County  District  Court.    Heard  in
the Court of Appeals  29 August  2011.
Steven K. Griffith, for plaintiff-appellant.
Nikki Palmer-Mussa, pro se, for defendant-appellee.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Juma  Mussa                                                                  (“plaintiff”)  appeals  from  an  order  dismissing
plaintiff’s complaint for annulment.    We reverse and remand.
I.    Background
On                                                                           27   November                                                                                                                1997,   plaintiff   and   Nikki   Palmer-Mussa
                                                                                                                                   (“defendant”)  were  married  in  Raleigh,  North  Carolina.     The
parties  separated  on                                                                                                             3  February                                                            2009.                                            The  parties  had  three
children together.




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Earlier   in                                                                  1997,   defendant   participated   in   a   wedding
ceremony  with  Khalil  Braswell  (“Mr.  Braswell”).  At  the  ceremony,
defendant  and  Mr.  Braswell  consented  to  become  husband  and  wife.
Neither  defendant  nor  Mr.  Braswell  obtained  a  marriage  license,
as    they    only    sought    to    comply    with    Islamic    marriage
requirements.    After  the  ceremony,  the  couple  lived  together  in
Maryland, but the marriage was never consummated.
Defendant  divorced  Mr.  Braswell  in  the  manner  required  by
Islamic  law  by  returning  the  dowry  and  declaring  that  she  was
divorced  from  her  husband.                                                 At  the  time  this  took  place,
defendant  believed  she  was  divorced  since  the  marriage  was
entered  into  under  Islamic  law  and  ended  under  Islamic  law.
However,  defendant  never  sought  a  judicial  divorce  or  annulment
and Mr. Braswell was still alive.
After  returning  to  North  Carolina,  defendant  met  plaintiff.
Shortly  after  meeting,  the  parties  decided  to  marry  and  remained
married  for  twelve  years.     During  the  marriage,  the  parties
purchased  property  as  husband  and  wife,  filed  joint  tax  returns
and  defendant  was  listed  as  plaintiff’s  wife  on  his  insurance
policy.
On  4  December  2008,  defendant  filed  a  complaint  for  divorce
from  bed  and  board,  in  another  action.     As  a  result  of  those




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proceedings,  the  court  granted  defendant  child  support,  post-
separation  support  and  attorney’s  fees.     On                           3  December                                                          2009,
plaintiff  filed  a  complaint  for  annulment  based  on  bigamy.
Plaintiff  alleged  his  marriage  to  defendant  was  void  ab  initio,
pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                              §                                                                    51-3,  as  defendant  had  been
married  to  Mr.  Braswell  earlier  in                                      1997,  had  never  obtained  an
annulment  or  divorce  from  Mr.  Braswell  and  Mr.  Braswell  was
still  living.  On                                                           2  February                                                          2010,  defendant  filed  an  answer,
affirmative   defenses,   motions   to   dismiss   and   a   motion   for
attorney’s fees.
At  a  trial  on  the  matter,  there  was  a  dispute  regarding  the
timing   of   defendant’s   disclosure   regarding   her   previous
marriage.    Defendant  stated  she  disclosed  her  previous  marriage
prior  to  their  marriage,  but  plaintiff  claimed  he  learned  of  the
previous  marriage  after  he  and  defendant  married.     The  court
entered  an  order  on  27  July  2010  granting  defendant’s  motion  to
dismiss  plaintiff’s  claim  for  annulment.  Defendant’s  request  for
attorney’s fees was preserved for future determination.
II. Standard of Review
The  proper  standard  of  review  for  an  involuntary  dismissal
is                                                                           “(1)  whether  the  findings  of  fact  by  the  trial  court  are
supported  by  competent  evidence,  and  (2)  whether  the  findings  of




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fact  support  the  trial  court's  conclusions  of  law  and  its
judgment.”    Woodridge  Homes  Ltd.  Partnership  v.  Gregory,  __  N.C.
App.                                                                         __,                         697  S.E.2d   370,                                                 375                                                                          (2010)                                                        (citations  omitted).     The
                                                                             trial  judge’s                                                                                                                                                              “findings  of  fact  are  conclusive  on  appeal  if
                                                                                                                       supported   by   competent   evidence”   but   the                                                                                                                                              “trial   court’s
                                                                                                                                                                            conclusions  of  law  are  reviewable  de  novo  on  appeal.”    Riley  v.
                                                                             Ken  Wilson  Ford,  Inc.,                                                                      109  N.C.  App.                                                              163,                                                   168,   426  S.E.2d                     717,
                                                                             720  (1993).
                                                                                                                                                                            III. Bigamy
Plaintiff  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  by  granting
defendant’s motion to dismiss.    We agree.
Plaintiff   contends   that   the   first   marriage   was   merely
voidable,  and  since  the  previous  marriage  with  Mr.  Braswell  had
not  been  annulled  nor  was  there  a  divorce  judgment,  defendant
was  still  married  to  Mr.  Braswell  when  she  married  plaintiff,
therefore,  the  marriage  between  plaintiff  and  defendant  was
void.     The  dispositive  issue  is  whether  the  defendant’s  first
marriage  was  void  ab  initio  or  merely  voidable  because  of  the
status  of  the  person  who  performed  the  ceremony.    Mr.  Braswell’s
friend,  Kareem,  who  performed  the  ceremony,  was  not  an  imam,  an
Islamic    religious    leader.    His    primary    profession    was




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construction.    He  was  not  even  a  member  of  the  church  staff  or
employed by the church.
The  law  recognizes  a  distinction  between  void  and  voidable
marriages.    Pridgen  v.  Pridgen,  203  N.C.  533,  536,  166  S.E.  591,
593                                                                           (1932).                                                           “[A]   void   marriage   is   a   nullity   and   may   be
                                                                              impeached  at  any  time.”  Id.  at                               537,                                                         166  S.E.  at   593.  However,
“[a]  voidable  marriage  is  valid  for  all  civil  purposes  until
annulled  by  a  competent  tribunal  in  a  direct  proceeding.”  Id.
It  is  a  long-standing  rule  in  North  Carolina  that  the  only
marriage   that   is   absolutely   void   is   a   bigamous   marriage.
Watters  v.  Watters,  168  N.C.  411,  412,  84  S.E.  703,  704  (1915);
Fulton  v.  Vickery,                                                          73  N.C.  App.                                                    382,                                                         387,            326  S.E.2d      354,          358
(1985).
                                                                              When  defendant  married  Mr.  Braswell  in                                                                                                                     1997,   the   1977
                                                                              version of N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  51-1 was in effect which stated:
The  consent  of  a  male  and  female  person  who
may  lawfully  marry,  presently  to  take  each
other  as  husband  and  wife,  freely,  seriously
and   plainly   expressed   by   each   in   the
presence  of  the  other,  and  in  the  presence
of  an  ordained  minister  of  any  religious
denomination,   minister   authorized   by   his
church,   or   of   a   magistrate,   and   the
consequent  declaration  by  such  minister  or
officer  that  such  persons  are  husband  and
wife,   shall   be   a   valid   and   sufficient
marriage.




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State  v.  Lynch,                                                             301  N.C.                                                          479,   486-87,   272  S.E.2d   349,   353-54
(1980).    In  her  answer,  defendant  admitted  that  both  she  and  Mr.
Braswell  participated  in  a  ceremony,  consented  to  take  each
other  as  husband  and  wife,  and  that  each  had  “plainly  expressed
his  or  her  consent  freely  and  seriously  in  the  presence  of  the
other.”  “Upon  proof  that  a  marriage  ceremony  took  place,  it  will
be  presumed  that  it  was  legally  performed  and  resulted  in  a
valid  marriage.”     Kearney  v.  Thomas,                                    225  N.C.                                                          156,   163,      33
S.E.2d  871,  876  (1945).
The  trial  court  found  that  there  was  insufficient  evidence
to  find  Kareem  “had  the  status  of  either  ‘an  ordained  minister’
or  a  ‘minister  authorized  by  his  church’”...or  that  “Kareem  was
a  magistrate.”    Based  on  the  findings,  the  trial  court  concluded
as  a  matter  of  law  that  because  there  was  no  marriage  license
and                                                                           “insufficient  evidence  that  the  marriage  ceremony  met  the
requirements  for  a  valid  marriage,”  defendant  did  not  marry  Mr.
Braswell.                                                                     Since   there   was   no   marriage,   the   trial   court
reasoned,  there  was  no  need  for  an  annulment,  a  divorce  or  the
death of either party to terminate the marriage.
While  the  evidence  presented  at  trial  supported  the  trial
court’s  finding  that  Kareem  was  not  authorized  to  conduct  the
marriage  within  the  statutory  requirements,  the  court’s  finding




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does  not  support  its’  conclusion  of  law  that  defendant  and  Mr.
Braswell  were  not  married.     The  well-established  law  in  North
Carolina  confirms  that  only  bigamous  marriages  are  void  and  all
                                                                               other  marriages  are  voidable.  See  Fulton,   73  N.C.  App.  at                               387,
326  S.E.2d  at                                                                358.                                             Furthermore,  the  Court  has  uniformly  held
“that  a  marriage,  without  a  license  as  required  by  statute,  is
valid.”    Sawyer  v.  Slack,  196  N.C.  697,                                 700,  146  S.E.  864,  865
(1929).  Therefore,  even  though  defendant  and  Mr.  Braswell  did
not  have  a  marriage  license  and  the  ceremony  failed  to  meet
statutory requirements, the marriage is merely voidable.
As  stated  in  Pridgen,  a  voidable  marriage  is  valid  until  a
tribunal  annuls  the  marriage  in  a  direct  proceeding.  Pridgen,
203  N.C.  at  537,  166  S.E.  at  593.  In  the  instant  case,  defendant
admitted  that  neither  a  divorce  nor  an  annulment  was  granted  by
a  court  in  North  Carolina,  or  any  other  state,  and  that  Mr.
Braswell  was  still  living.      While  defendant  claimed  she  and  Mr.
Braswell  were  divorced  according  to  the  laws  of  Islam,  there  is
no   authority   supporting   the   dissolution   of   a   marriage   by
religious  means  that  can  be  deemed  to  be                                “the  equivalent  of  a
judicial  determination”  regarding  the  validity  of  a  marriage.
See  Fulton,                                                                                                                    73  N.C.  App.  at                               386-87,   326  S.E.2d  at                                       357   (divorce
                                                                               is   a   creature   of   statute).                                                                                            Therefore,   at   the   time   of




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defendant’s  marriage  to  plaintiff,  she  was  still  married  to  Mr.
Braswell  and  thus  any  marriage  between  plaintiff  and  defendant
was bigamous, and consequently void.
Defendant  cites  to  Lynch  to  support  her  argument  that  since
her  marriage  to  Mr.  Braswell  failed  to  meet  the  statutory
requirements,  that  the  marriage  is  invalid  and  her  marriage  to
plaintiff  is  not  bigamous.    In  Lynch,  the  defendant  was  charged
with  the  crime  of  bigamy.    Lynch,  301  N.C.  at  479,  272  S.E.2d  at
349.    The  prior  marriage  was  performed  by  the  bride’s  father  who
had  received  a  certificate  of  ordination  as  minister  in  the
Universal  Life  Church,  Inc.    Id.  at                                       480-81,                                                  272  S.E.2d  at   350.
The  Court  held  that  the  State  had  failed  to  prove  a  prior
marriage  because                                                               “[a]  ceremony  solemnized  by  a...layman...who
bought   for                                                                    $10.00   a   mail   order   certificate   giving   him
‘credentials  of  minister’...is  not  a  ceremony  of  marriage  to  be
recognized  for  purposes  of  a  bigamy  prosecution  in  the  State  of
North Carolina.”    Id. at  488,  272 S.E.2d at  354-55.
Despite  the  similarities  to  the  instant  case,  in  Lynch  the
State  had  the  burden  to  prove  the  person  performing  the  marriage
ceremony  had  statutory  authority  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.  See
Id.  at                                                                         486,                                                     272  S.E.2d  at   353;             1  Suzanne  Reynolds,  Lee's  North
                                                                                Carolina  Family  Law                                    §                 3.8,  at   146   (5th  ed.                             1993).    By  holding




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the  State  failed  to  meet  this  burden,  rather  than  annul  the
marriage,  the  Court  refused  to  allow  the  bigamy  conviction  to
stand.    Id.    Therefore,  the  holding  in  Lynch  does  not  conflict
with  the  general  rule  that  a  voidable  marriage  must  be  annulled
by  a  direct  action.    Id.    Furthermore,  no  civil  case  in  North
Carolina  dealing  with  the  issue  of  bigamy  has  chosen  to  follow
Lynch  since  it  was  decided  in                                          1980.                         Therefore,  we  hold  that
defendant’s  marriage  to  Mr.  Braswell,  which  is  invalid  for  want
of  proper  solemnization,  is  merely  voidable  until  annulled  in  a
direct action by a proper tribunal.
IV. Conclusion
Defendant's  marriage  to  Mr.  Braswell  was  voidable,  but
defendant  never  took  any  action  to  terminate  the  marriage.    As
such,   the   marriage   was   still   valid   when   defendant   married
plaintiff.                                                                                                                                  Therefore,   the   marriage   between   plaintiff   and
defendant is void.
                                                                            Reversed and Remanded.
                                                                            Chief Judge MARTIN concurs.
Judge                                                                       BRYANT                        dissents                     in   a                                                         separate   opinion.




NO. COA11-209
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                      6 December  2011
JUMA MUSSA,
Plaintiff
v.                                                                          Wake County
                                                                            No.  09 CVD  24397
NIKKI PALMER-MUSSA,
Defendant
BRYANT, Judge.
Because  I  do  not  believe  that  North  Carolina  law  allows  the
presumption   of   validity   conferred   upon   a   marriage   to   be
successfully  challenged  absent  direct  evidence,  I  respectfully
dissent.
I  agree  with  the  majority  that  the  plaintiff  presented
insufficient   evidence   to   support   the   conclusion   that   the
marriage  ceremony  participated  in  by  defendant  and  Braswell  in
early                                                                       1997  met  the  statutory  criteria  set  out  under  N.C.  Gen.
Stat.  '  51-1  (1997)  requiring  the  participation  of  “an  ordained
minister  of  any  religious  denomination,”  a                             “minister  authorized
by  his  church,”  or                                                       “a  magistrate.”     N.C.G.S.  '                                   51-1   (1997).
Therefore,  I  agree  with  the  trial  court’s  conclusion                 “there  is
insufficient   evidence   that   the   marriage   ceremony   met   the
requirements  for  a  valid  marriage,  [thus,]  the  Court  cannot  find




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that  Defendant  married  Mr.  Braswell  as  contemplated  by  the
statute.”                                                                     See  Lynch,                                                                 301  N.C.  at                                           488,      272  S.E.2d  at   354
(“Whether  defendant  is  married  in  the  eyes  of  God,  of  himself  or
of  any  ecclesiastical  body  is  not  our  concern.  Our  concern  is
whether  the  marriage  is  one  the  State  recognizes.”).    However,
the  dispositive  issue  is  not  whether  defendant’s  first  marriage
was  void  ab  initio  or  merely  voidable  but,  rather,  whether
plaintiff  met  his  burden  of  proof  establishing  that  defendant’s
first  marital  union  was  valid  and  remained  in  existence  at  the
time defendant married plaintiff.
“Upon  proof  that  a  marriage  ceremony  took  place,  it  will  be
presumed  that  it  was  legally  performed  and  resulted  in  a  valid
marriage.”    Kearney,  225  N.C.  at  163,  33  S.E.2d  at  876  (citation
omitted).                                                                                                                                                 “[P]roof  of  the  second  marriage  adduced  by  the
                                                                              defendant,  if  sufficient  to  establish  it  before  the  jury,  raises
                                                                              a   presumption   of   its   validity,   upon   which   property   rights
                                                                              growing  out  of  its  validity  may  be  based.”    Id.  at                                                                        163-64,   33
S.E.2d  at                                                                    876-77.                                                                     “[W]hen  the  plaintiff  attempts  to  assert  a
property  right  which  is  dependent  upon  the  invalidity  of  a
marriage,  he  must,  as  the  attacking  party,  make  good  his  cause
by  proof.”  Id.  at  163,  33  S.E.2d  at  876.                              “The  laws  of  evidence
do  not  recognize  a  presumption  on  a  presumption.    The  facts  upon




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which  a  presumption  is  based  must  be  proved  by  direct  evidence.”
Id.  (citation omitted).
Here,  the  record  establishes  that  plaintiff  and  defendant
were  married  on                                                            27  November   1997.           A  marriage  license  was
obtained,   and   the   validity   of   the   marriage   ceremony   is
uncontested.    Three children were produced from the union.
Because  the  validity  of  the  current  marriage  was  not  raised
as  an  issue  before  the  trial  court,  North  Carolina  law  confers
upon   it   a   presumption   of   validity.                                 See   id.      If   such   a
presumption  is  to  be  successfully  countered,  it  must  be  by
direct evidence, not a presumption.    See id.
Plaintiff’s   direct   evidence   failed   to   establish   the
existence  of  a  valid  prior  marriage  as  a  result  of  the  early
1997  ceremony.     Therefore,  plaintiff’s  claim  that  his  marriage
to  defendant  was  void  ab  initio  cannot  prevail.    Further,  though
perhaps  not  a  part  of  plaintiff’s  direct  evidence,  the  record
reflects  that  the  early  1997  Islamic  marriage  plaintiff  alleges
was  valid  ended  in  divorce  in  a  manner  recognized  under  Islamic
law.    Accordingly, I dissent.

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North Carolina Law