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NO. COA10-1617
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  16 August  2011
POINT INTREPID, LLC and ADVANCED
INTERNET TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
v.                                                                     Cumberland County
                                                                       No.  09 CVS  3349
ROBYN FARLEY,
Defendant.
1.                                                                     Appeal  and  Error                                   —  preservation  of  issues   —  failure  to
object
Plaintiffs  did  not  preserve  for  appeal  an  argument
concerning  the  shifting  of  discovery  fees  where  they  did
not obtain a ruling from the trial court on the issue.
2.                                                                     Costs  — expert fees  — ex parte contact
The   trial   court   did   not   abuse   its   discretion   by
requiring  plaintiffs  to  pay  the  balance  of  an  independent
expert's  fees  despite  ex  parte  contact  between  the  expert
and  opposing  counsel  where  the  trial  court  decided  that  the
contact did not bias the witness.
3.                                                                     Costs  — independent expert fees  — reasonableness
The   trial   court   did   not   abuse   its   discretion   by
requiring  plaintiffs  to  pay  the  balance  of  the  fee  of  an
independent  expert  witness  where  plaintiffs  contended  that
the   fee   was   unreasonable.                                        Despite   evidence   to   the
contrary,  there  was  competent  evidence  that  the  invoice  was
reasonable.  The  rejection  of  plaintiffs'  expert  testimony
on  reasonableness  does  not  mean  that  the  testimony  was  not
considered  or  that  the  trial  court's  decision  was  not
supported by competent evidence.
4.                                                                     Costs  — expert  — expenses for recovering fee




An  award  for  attorney  fees  and  additional  expenses
expended  by  an  expert  witness  in  seeking  recovery  of  its
fees  was  reversed.    The  relevant  statutes  on  reimbursement
of  expert  witnesses  do  not  mention  attorney  fees,  the
witness  was  not  entitled  to  compensation  for  appearing  in
court  voluntarily,  and  compensation  does  not  extend  to
travel expenses.




NO. COA10-1617
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  16 August  2011
POINT INTREPID, LLC and ADVANCED
INTERNET TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
v.                                                                     Cumberland County
                                                                       No.  09 CVS  3349
ROBYN FARLEY,
Defendant.
                                                                                           Appeal  by  Plaintiffs  from  Orders  entered                     8  September    2010
and                                                                    22  September       2010  by  Judge  Gregory  A.  Weeks  in  Cumberland
                                                                                           County  Superior  Court.     Heard  in  the  Court  of  Appeals                   11  May
2011.
A. Bikash Roy for Plaintiffs-appellant.
Winslow  Wetsch,  PLLC,  by  Laura  J.  Wetsch,  for  Defendant-
appellee.
Hedrick,  Gardner,  Kincheloe  &  Garofalo,  L.L.P.,  by  Thomas
M. Buckley, for third-party appellee.
HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.
Point   Intrepid,   LLC                                                                    (“Point   Intrepid”)   and   Advanced
Internet  Technologies,  Inc.                                          (“AIT”)             (collectively                                                     “Plaintiffs”)
appeal  from  Orders  directing  AIT  to  pay  third-party  appellee
Forward  Discovery’s  invoice,  attorneys’  fees,  and  additional
expenses.    We affirm, in part, and reverse, in part.




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I. Facts and Procedural History
This   case   arises   from   an   employment   dispute   between
Plaintiffs  and  Robyn  Farley                                              (“Farley”),  a  former  employee  of
AIT.    While  the  parties  settled  the  litigation  relating  to  the
underlying  employment  dispute,  this  appeal  originates  from  a
disagreement  over  payment  of  third-party  expert  fees  incurred
during  the  parties’  litigation.    Plaintiffs  agreed  in  court  to
pay  the  entire  cost  of  the  third-party  expert,  but  subsequently
refused  full  payment.                                                     Plaintiffs  appeal  the  trial  court’s
Orders  mandating  their  payment  of  the  balance  of  the  expert’s
invoice, attorneys’ fees, and additional expenses.
AIT  is  a  North  Carolina  corporation  in  the  business  of
hosting   websites   and   providing   internet   technology-related
services.    Point  Intrepid  is  a  North  Carolina  company  that  acts
as   the   benefits   and   payroll   administrator   for   AIT,   its
subsidiaries, and affiliates.
On                                                                          6  June                                   2008,  Farley  was  hired  by  AIT  as  a  Database
Administrator/Engineer.                                                                                               Farley’s   employment   at   AIT   was
terminated  on                                                              26  February                              2009  following  allegations  of  her
unauthorized  access  of  her  supervisor’s  computer.     Plaintiffs
brought  suit  against  Farley  for,  inter  alia,  breach  of  contract
and  breach  of  fiduciary  duty.     Farley  made  numerous  counter-




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claims,  including  wrongful  discharge  and  defamation.     The  case
was  heard  at  the  19  November  2009  session  of  the  Superior  Court
of Cumberland County, Judge Gregory A. Weeks presiding.
During  a  motions  hearing,  Judge  Weeks  entered  a  discovery
order  on  3  December  2009  requiring  AIT  to  produce  “all  documents
supporting  and  negating  AIT’s  decision  to  determinate                  [sic]
Farley’s  employment.”     Because  AIT  wanted  to  use  an  expert  to
protect   its   proprietary   information   and   avoid   inadvertent
disclosure  of  customer  banking  information,  AIT  filed  a  motion
pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                              §             1A-1,  Rule                                          60(b).    Specifically,
AIT  requested  that  an  independent  third-party  expert,  either
designated  by  the  court  or  by  agreement  between  the  parties,
analyze  the  hard  drives  “with  the  costs  to  be  shared  equally  by
the  parties.”     At  a                                                     7  December   2009  hearing  for  this  Motion,
Farley  conceded  to  the  appointment  of  an  independent  third-party
expert,  but  proposed  that  AIT  pay  all  expenses  for  the  expert.
AIT  agreed  to  incur  the  costs  for  third-party  analysis  of  its
hard  drives,  and  explicitly  stated,  “[W]e  will  incur  [the  costs]
voluntarily and a hundred percent, we will incur it.”
On                                                                           4   January   2010,   the   trial   court   entered   an   Order
requiring  the  parties  to  agree  to  a  third-party  expert  within
five  business  days.     Pursuant  to  the  Order,  the  expert  would




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analyze    AIT’s    hard    drives    and    report    the    results.
Significantly,  the  Order  provided  that  “[t]he  third-party  expert
may  communicate  separately  with  each  party,  but  shall  maintain  a
complete  record  of  all  such  communications,  which  shall  be  made
available  to  the  court  or  either  party  upon  request.”    The  Order
also  stated,                                                                  “AIT  shall  promptly  pay  all  fees  and  expenses  of
the  third-party  expert  selected  to  perform  the  work  identified
in  this  Order,  consistent  with  the  third  party  expert’s  quote
which is incorporated in this Order by reference.”
On                                                                             11  January                                                2010,  the  parties  informed  the  trial  court
that  they  were  unable  to  agree  on  an  expert.    Farley  proposed  as
an  expert  Ryan  Johnson                                                      (“Johnson”)  of  Forward  Discovery,  Inc.
(“Forward  Discovery”).    Johnson  provided  an  estimate  of  $10,250
per  hard  drive                                                               ($20,500  total),  for  the  requested  work.     AIT
suggested  as  an  expert  Charles  Moreton,  of  Computer  Trauma
Center,  who  stated  the  cost  of  the  work  would  not  exceed  $2,200.
The  trial  court,  in  a  14  January  2010  Order,  selected  Johnson  of
Forward  Discovery,  the  expert  proposed  by  Farley.     The  trial
court  held  that  Johnson’s  estimate  of                                     $20,500  would  serve  as  a
cap on the work to be performed.
Pursuant  to  an  agreement  between  the  parties,  Johnson  did
not  begin  his  work  until  late  March                                      2010  to  allow  the  parties




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time  to  mediate  the  underlying  claims.     Farley’s  attorney  e-
mailed  Johnson  on  19  March  2010  to  inform  him  that  mediation  had
failed  and  that  he  could  begin  his  work.    AIT’s  attorneys  were
included   on   the   e-mail.                                                 This   prompted   an   exchange   of
contentious   e-mails   in   which   AIT’s   attorney   expressed   his
disapproval  of  this  unilateral  request  by  Farley’s  attorney  that
Johnson   begin   his   court-ordered   work.                                 On                                                  22   March   2010,
Farley’s  attorney  called  Forward  Discovery  about  these  e-mails,
on  which  Johnson  had  been  copied,  and  Johnson  advised  her  that
because  the  matter  seemed                                                  “contentious,”  it  might  be  best  to
arrange  a  conference  call  between  all  the  parties.     Forward
Discovery  logged  this  phone  call  with  Farley’s  attorney  pursuant
to  the  trial  court’s  Order,  but  admits  it  failed  to  log  two
instances  where  Farley’s  attorney  called  Forward  Discovery’s
office for driving directions.
In  early  May                                                                2010,  Forward  Discovery  completed  its  court-
ordered  work,  and  it  sent  an  invoice  to  AIT  in  early  June  2010.
The  invoice  listed  a  total  amount  of                                    $22,650.12  due  by                                 9  July
2010,  exceeding  the  court-ordered  limit  of  $20,500.    AIT  refused
to  pay  the  entire  amount,  and  requested  clarification  of  the
services  provided.    In  an  e-mail  exchange  with  AIT’s  attorney,




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Johnson  provided  the  requested  clarification.    On  30  July  2010,
AIT paid Johnson  $10,250, half of the court-ordered limit.
On  9  August  2010,  Plaintiffs  filed  a  Motion  to  Limit  Expert
Fees.    Plaintiffs  argued  that  Forward  Discovery’s  estimate  and
invoice   were   unreasonable,   that   AIT   had   already   paid   a
reasonable  fee  for  Forward  Discovery’s  work,  and  that  Johnson
should  show  cause  as  to  why  the  trial  court  should  not  consider
the  estimate  and  invoice  unreasonable.     The  next  day,  on           10
August  2010,  Forward  Discovery  filed  a  Motion  to  Show  Cause  why
AIT  should  not  be  held  in  contempt  of  court  for  failing  to  pay
the   balance   of   Forward   Discovery’s   invoice   and   requested
sanctions  against  AIT  for  failure  to  comply  with  the  trial
court’s  discovery  order.    Forward  Discovery’s  Motion  called  for
AIT  to  pay  the  fees  Forward  Discovery  incurred  for  its  court-
ordered  work,  as  well  as  attorneys’  fees,  interest,  and  monetary
sanctions  for  its  collection  efforts.    Both  parties  appeared  for
a  hearing  on  these  motions  on                                           30  August                                                                2010  before  Judge
Gregory  A.  Weeks  in  Cumberland  County  Superior  Court.    Johnson
voluntarily  attended  the                                                   30  August                                                                2010  hearing;  he  was  not
required to appear by subpoena.
On                                                                           8  September                                                              2010,  the  trial  court  entered  an  Order
                                                                             denying   Plaintiffs’   Motion   and   granting   Forward   Discovery’s




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Motion.     Specifically,  the  trial  court  found  the  invoice  for
Forward  Discovery’s  services  to  be  reasonable  under  N.C.  Gen.
Stat.                                                                      §                        8C-1,  Rule                                                                  706  and  required  AIT  to  pay  the  balance  of
                                                                                                    the  invoice  ($12,400.12).    On  13  September  2010,  the  trial  court
                                                                                                    held  an  additional  hearing  to  rule  on  Forward  Discovery’s  claim
                                                                                                    for  attorneys’  fees  and  additional  expenses.     The  trial  court
                                                                           entered  an  Order  on   22  September                                                                2010  requiring  AIT  to  pay
                                                                           Forward  Discovery       $3,762.50  for  attorneys’  fees  and                                                                                             $2,375.00
                                                                                                    for additional expenses  (a total of  $6,137.50).
                                                                                                    AIT  and  Farley  resolved  the  underlying  employment  dispute
on                                                                         4  October               2010,  manifested  in  a  Settlement  Agreement  and
Release                                                                                             (“Settlement  Agreement”).     Pursuant  to  the  Settlement
                                                                                                    Agreement,  AIT  filed  a  Notice  of  Voluntary  Dismissal  on                                                                   8
October                                                                    2010.                    This  voluntary  dismissal  was  with  prejudice  to
                                                                                                    all  claims,  except  with  regard  to                                       “the  Plaintiffs’  right  to
                                                                                                    appeal  the  Order  of  the  Court  entered  on  September                   8,                                                   2010  and
                                                                                                    the  Court’s  further  Order  entered  on  September  22,  2010,”  which
                                                                                                    were dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiffs  timely  entered  notice  of  appeal  from  the  trial
court’s  8  September  2010  Order  requiring  payment  of  the  balance
of  Forward  Discovery’s  invoice  and  the                                22  September            2010  Order




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                                                                                                                   requiring  payment  of  attorneys’  fees  and  expenses                                                                                                                                                         (collectively
                                                                               the  “September  2010 Orders”).
                                                                                                                   II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
                                                                                                                                                                             This  Court  has  jurisdiction  to  hear  the  instant  appeal
                                                                               pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.     §                                                         7A-27(b)                                                                                                                (2009).     We  review  the
                                                                               trial  court’s  Orders  under  an                                                                                                                                                “abuse  of  discretion”  standard.
                                                                               Smith  v.  Barbour,                 195  N.C.  App.                                           244,                                                             253,              671  S.E.2d                                                        578,             585
(2009)                                                                                                             (citing  Sharp  v.  Sharp,                                                                                                 116  N.C.  App.                                        513,                          533,             449
S.E.2d                                                                         39,                                 50,  disc.  rev.  denied,                                                                                                  338  N.C.         669,                                 453  S.E.2d                                    181
                                                                               (1994)).                                                                                      “Abuse  of  discretion  occurs  where  the  court’s  ruling
is  manifestly  unsupported  by  reason  or  is  so  arbitrary  it  could
not  have  been  the  result  of  a  reasoned  decision.”     State  v.
Syriani,  333  N.C.  350,  379,  428  S.E.2d  118,  133  (1993).    A  trial
court  does  not  reach  a  reasoned  decision,  and  thus  abuses  its
discretion,  when  its  findings  of  fact  are  not  supported  by
competent  evidence.     Leggett  v.  AAA  Cooper  Transp.,  Inc.,             198
N.C.  App.                                                                     96,                                 104,                                                      678  S.E.2d                                                      757,              763                                  (2009)                        (“[T]he  trial
court’s  finding  is  supported  by  competent  evidence,  and  does  not
constitute an abuse of discretion.”).
Findings  of  fact  are  conclusive  on  appeal  if  they  are
supported  by  competent  evidence.    Powers  v.  Tatum,  196  N.C.  App.
639,                                                                           648,                                676  S.E.2d                                               89,                                                              95                (citation  omitted),  disc.  rev.




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denied,                                                                     363  N.C.                              583,   681  S.E.2d   784    (2009).   Additionally,
“findings  of  fact  to  which                                              [the  appellant]  has  not  assigned
error  and  argued  in  his  brief  are  conclusively  established  on
appeal.”     Static  Control  Components,  Inc.  v.  Vogler,                152  N.C.
App.                                                                        599,                                   603,   568  S.E.2d   305,   308       (2002).     The  trial  court’s
legal  conclusions  receive  de  novo  review.    State  v.  Newman,  186
N.C. App.  382,  386,  651 S.E.2d  584,  587  (2007).




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III. Analysis
On   appeal,   Plaintiffs   argue   the   trial   court   erred   in
ordering  them  to  pay  the  balance  of  Forward  Discovery’s  invoice,
attorneys’   fees,   and   additional   expenses.                            Specifically,
Plaintiffs  contend  the  trial  court  should  not  have  allowed
recovery  of  the  balance  of  the  Forward  Discovery  invoice  for  its
hard   drive   analysis,   since   improper   communications   occurred
between   Johnson   and   Defendant’s   counsel   and   there   was   no
competent    evidence    that    Forward    Discovery’s    fees    were
reasonable.                                                                  Plaintiffs   further   argue   that   North   Carolina
statutes  and  case  law  do  not  permit  recovery  of  attorneys’  fees
and  additional  expenses  on  the  facts  of  this  case.    We  affirm,
in part, and reverse, in part.
A. Right to Appeal
Preliminarily,  we  address  Defendant’s  procedural  rebuttal
to  Plaintiffs’  claims.    Defendant  argues  that  AIT  lost  its  right
to  appeal  when  it  filed  a  voluntary  dismissal  with  prejudice
pursuant to the parties’ Settlement Agreement.    We disagree.
Generally,  a  voluntary  dismissal,  even  without  prejudice,
“terminates  a  case  and  precludes  the  possibility  of  an  appeal.”
Dodd  v.  Steele,                                                            114  N.C.  App.                                          632,   636,             442  S.E.2d   363,   366
(citing  Lloyd  v.  Carnation  Co.,                                                                                                          61  N.C.  App.   381,          384,   301




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S.E.2d                                                                       414,                  416       (1983)),  disc.  rev.  denied,                  337  N.C.         691,   448
S.E.2d                                                                       521                   (1994).   However,  a  voluntary  dismissal  of  claims
does  not  necessarily  act  as  a  bar  against  other  related  but
independent  claims;  as  our  state’s  Supreme  Court  has  stated,
“[d]ismissal  does  not  deprive  the  court  of   jurisdiction  to
consider   collateral   issues   such   as   sanctions   that   require
consideration  after  the  action  has  been  terminated.”    Bryson  v.
Sullivan,                                                                    330  N.C.             644,      653,                                            412  S.E.2d       327,   331   (1992);  see
Dodd,                                                                        114  N.C.  App.  at             634,                                            442  S.E.2d  at          365   (“Furthermore,
neither  the  dismissal  of  a  case  nor  the  filing  of  an  appeal
deprives   the   trial   court   of   jurisdiction   to   hear   Rule        11
motions.”);  VSD  Commc’ns,  Inc.  v.  Lone  Wolf  Publ’g  Group,  Inc.,
124  N.C.  App.  642,  644,  478  S.E.2d  214,  216  (1996)  (noting  that
after  a  voluntary  dismissal,  motions  for  attorneys’  fees  “have  a
life of their own”).
Still,  under  our  Rules  of  Appellate  Procedure,  for  a  party
to raise an issue on appeal, it
must  have  presented  to  the  trial  court  a
timely    request,    objection,    or    motion,
stating  the  specific  grounds  for  the  ruling
the  party  desired  the  court  to  make  if  the
specific  grounds  were  not  apparent  from  the
context.   It   is   also   necessary   for   the
complaining  party  to  obtain  a  ruling  upon
the party’s request, objection, or motion.




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N.C.R.  App.  P.  10(a)(1)  (2011);  see  Lake  Colony  Constr.,  Inc.  v.
Boyd,  __  N.C.  App.  __,  __,  __ S.E.2d  __,  __,  2011  WL  2200607,  at
*10                                                                            (No.                                                                  10-959)                                               (June                      7,          2011)   (explaining  that,  pursuant  to
N.C.R.  App.  P.                                                               10(a)(1),  appellant  failed  to  preserve  an  issue
for  appellate  review  where  the  appellant  did  not  raise  the  issue
in the trial court).
In  the  present  case,  the  voluntary  dismissal  of  claims
against  Farley  does  not  negate  Plaintiffs’  right  to  appeal  the
September  2010  Orders.    Although  the  overall  dismissal  was  with
prejudice,   the   Notice   of   Voluntary   Dismissal   provides   the
following exception:
This  dismissal  .  .  .  is  without  prejudice  to
the  Plaintiffs’  right  to  appeal  the  Order  of
                                                                                                                                                     the  Court  entered  on  September                    8,                         2010  and
                                                                                                                                                     the    Court’s    further    Order    entered    on
September                                                                      22,                                                                   2010.                                                 The  foregoing  is  with
                                                                                                                                                     Defendant   Robyn   Farley’s   consent,,                                         [sic]
pursuant   to   the   terms   of   the   mediated
settlement agreement between all parties.
Additionally,  the  Settlement  Agreement  specifically  stated  that
AIT  “preserv[ed]  its  right  to  appeal  from  the  Orders  entered  by
the  Honorable  Gregory  Weeks  on  September                                  8,                                                                    2010  and  September
22,                                                                            2010.”     Thus,  Plaintiffs  may  maintain  their  appeal  of  the
September  2010 Orders.
Nonetheless,  we  agree  with  Defendant  that  Plaintiffs  have
not  preserved  the  right  to  appellate  review  of  their  fee-




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shifting   argument,   whereby   Plaintiffs   contend   that   because
Defendant  engaged  in  improper  communications  with  Johnson,  the
burden  for  paying  Forward  Discovery’s  fees  should  be  shifted  to
Defendant.     In  its  carve-out  preserving  Plaintiffs’  right  to
appeal  the  September  2010  Orders,  the  Settlement  Agreement  does
not  address  the  fee-shifting  argument.     Additionally,  neither
AIT’s  Motion  nor  the  trial  court’s  Orders  make  any  mention  of  a
fee-shifting claim.
Thus,   pursuant   to   North   Carolina   Rule   of   Appellate
Procedure  10(a)(1),  we  conclude  that  Plaintiffs  did  not  preserve
the  fee-shifting  argument  because  they  did  not  obtain  a  ruling
from the trial court on the issue.
B. Allegations of Improper Ex Parte Communications
Plaintiffs  argue  the  trial  court  erred  and  abused  its
discretion  by  requiring  AIT  to   pay  the  balance  of  Forward
Discovery’s   invoice   because   improper   communications   occurred
between Johnson and Farley’s counsel.    We disagree.
Improper  ex  parte  communication  can  occur  when  contact
between  a  litigating  party  and  the  expert  inhibits  the  expert’s
ability  to  “provide  the  court  with  .  .  .  unbiased  information.”
Bd.  of  Managers  of  Bay  Club  Condominium  v.  Bay  Club  of  Long
Beach  Inc.,                                                                 15  Misc.   3d   282,   286,   827  N.Y.S.2d   855,   858   (N.Y.




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Sup.  Ct.                                                                    2007).                               Generally,                                                                                                                  “court-appointed  witnesses  should
                                                                                                                                                   remain  neutral  and  impartial  in  conducting  their  evaluations.”
In  re  David  W.,                                                                                                759  A.2d    89,                 95                                                                      (Conn.                                                   2000);  see  State  v.
Adams,                                                                       335  N.C.                            401,         408-10,                                                                                     439  S.E.2d        760,                                  763-64                   (1994)
(explaining  in  an  analogous  situation  of  ex  parte  communications
between  a  judge  and  potential  jurors  that  there  is  no  reversible
error  when  the  communication  is  harmless).    We  examine  the  facts
of  the  present  case  to  determine  whether  Johnson’s  neutrality
was   impacted   by   any   ex   parte   communications   with   Farley’s
counsel.
We  find  unpersuasive  Plaintiffs’  analogy  to  relevant  case
law  from  other  jurisdictions,  because  the  conduct  here  does  not
rise  to  the  level  of  impropriety  in  the  cases  referenced  by
Plaintiffs.    See,  e.g.,  Bd.  of  Managers  of  Bay  Club  Condominium,
15  Misc.                                                                    3d  at                               284-85,      827  N.Y.S.2d  at   857-58                                                                  (describing  how
the  plaintiff’s  attorneys  scheduled  a  meeting  with  the  third-
party  expert  without  the  defendant’s  knowledge  and  received
documents  from  the  expert  beyond  the  scope  of  the  expert’s
court-ordered  work);  G.K.  Las  Vegas  Ltd.  P’ship  v.  Simon  Prop.
Grp.,  671  F.  Supp.  2d  1203,  1227  (D.  Nev.  2009)  (explaining  how
the   defendants   invited   the   experts   to   their   office   and
interviewed  some  of  the  experts                                          “to  ensure  that  the  particular




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[experts]  who  were  expected  to  be  involved  would  be  sufficiently
knowledgeable  and  experienced”);  In  re  David  W.,  759  A.2d  at  92
(noting,  in  a  termination  of  parental  rights  case,  the  assistant
attorney  general’s  request  to  the  court-appointed  expert  for  an
independent  developmental  assessment  of  the  child  constituted
improper ex parte communication).
In   the   present   case,   the   facts   are   significantly
distinguishable  from  these  cases.    First,  in  the  case  at  hand,
the   trial   court’s   Order   expressly   permitted   communications
between  the  litigating  parties  and  the  court-appointed  expert,
and  required  Johnson  to  log  such  communications.     Furthermore,
we  are  not  persuaded  that  the  communications  between  Farley’s
counsel  and  Johnson  were  improper.     For  instance,  Plaintiffs
argue  that  a  22  March  2010  phone  call  between  Farley  and  Johnson
discussing  the                                                               “contentious”  nature  of  the  case  biased  Johnson
as a neutral third-party expert.    We disagree.
Per  the  trial  court’s  order,  Johnson  logged  this  phone  call
and described the call as follows:
[Defendant’s   counsel]   called                                                                                                      [Johnson]——
related   to   the   emails                                                   [sic]   between   the
parties.                                                                      [Johnson]   advised   that   current
matter  was  contentious  and  that  a  conference
call  with  counsel  would  be  beneficial  to  get
everyone on the same page.




-16-
Wetsch  advised  that  there  was  no  agreement
to further delay analysis.
[Johnson]  noted  that                                                       [Johnson]  had  received
an  e-mail  from  [Plaintiffs’  counsel]  at  9:46
but  that                                                                    [Johnson]  hadn’t  fully  read  it——
[Johnson]    would    read    and    respond    as
necessary.
[Johnson]   phoned   and   left   a   message   for
[AIT’s  outside  counsel].                                                   No  reply  phone
call.
We   cannot   reasonably   conclude   that   Farley’s   counsel   biased
Johnson  by  discussing  the  fact  that  the  case  was  contentious.
The  trial  court  itself  has  noted  the  contentiousness  of  this
case,1  and  Johnson  has  been  included  in  communications  between
the  litigating  parties  that  have  displayed  significant  tension.
We  do  not  believe  the  call  between  Farley’s  counsel  and  Johnson
was improper.
Plaintiffs   additionally   argue   that   an   e-mail   sent   by
Defendant’s  counsel  to  Johnson  directing  Forward  Discovery  to
begin  its  work                                                             “caused  great  anguish  within  AIT  because  what
1  For  instance,  during  the                                               7  December                                           2009  hearing,  the
trial  court  interrupted  proceedings  to  read  Rule  12  of  the  North
Carolina  General  Rules  of  Practice  for  the  Superior  and  District
Courts,  which  is  titled  Courtroom  Decorum.     The  trial  court
advised  counsel  for  both  parties  that                                   “‘[a]ll  personalities
between  counsel  should  be  avoided.     The  personal  history  or
peculiarities  of  counsel  on  the  opposing  side  should  not  be
alluded  to.    Colloquies  between  counsel  should  be  avoided.  .  .
Abusive    language    or    offensive    personal    references    are
prohibited.’”




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Farley  said  and  what  she  left  unsaid  conveyed  the  impression
that  Farley  somehow  spoke  for  the  court  to  the  exclusion  of
AIT.”     The  e-mail  to  Johnson  referenced  by  Plaintiffs,  in  its
entirety, reads:
Lee                                                                        [sic]                                    —  go  ahead  and  do  the  analysis
                                                                           required   by   the   Court’s   Order.   As   the
parties  did  not  resolve  this  matter  today,
this  work  needs  to  be  completed  as  soon  as
reasonably  possible.     Let  us  know  if  you
have   any   questions/concerns   regarding   the
foregoing.                                                                 FYI,   I   am   copying   Point
Intrepid/AIT’s   new   outside   counsel                                   (Lee
Boughman  and  Vicki  Burge)  on  this  e-mail,  as
well.
Thanks!                                                                    Hope   your   trip   overseas   was
uneventful and enjoyable!
We  find  Plaintiffs’  argument  unconvincing  and  believe  the  trial
court  did  not  abuse  its  discretion  in  deciding  this  e-mail  did
not bias Johnson as a neutral third-party expert.
In  summary,  we   find  no  evidence  of  improper   ex  parte
communications  between  Defendant’s  counsel  and  Johnson.     The
trial  court  thus  did  not  abuse  its  discretion  by  requiring
Plaintiffs to pay the balance of Forward Discovery’s invoice.
C. Reasonableness of Forward Discovery’s Fees
Plaintiffs  next  argue  the  trial  court  abused  its  discretion
by  requiring  them  to  pay  the  balance  of  the  Forward  Discovery




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invoice   because   competent   evidence   does   not   support   the
reasonableness of Johnson’s fee.    We cannot agree.
Rule                                                                         706  of  the  North  Carolina  Rules  of  Evidence  states,
“Expert   witnesses   so   appointed   are   entitled   to   reasonable
compensation  in  whatever  sum  the  court  may  allow.”     N.C.  Gen.
Stat.                                                                        §                                                             8C-1,  Rule   706(b)        (2009);  see  Sharp,   116  N.C.  App.  at
532-33,  449  S.E.2d  at  49-50  (concluding  trial  court  did  not  err
in  awarding  expert  witness  fees  in  excess  of  amount  agreed  upon
by  the  parties  in  a  consent  order).     In  deciding  whether  the
trial  court  abused  its  discretion  on  this  issue,  we  examine  only
whether   the   trial   court’s   findings   of   fact   as   to   the
reasonableness  of  Forward  Discovery’s  invoice  are  supported  by
competent  evidence.    Leggett,                                             198  N.C.  App.  at                                           104,          678  S.E.2d
at  763.
In  the  present  case,  Forward  Discovery  presented  to  the
trial  court  the  affidavits  of  four  experts  in  relevant  fields
supporting  the  reasonableness  of  its  invoice.    The  four  experts
were:  Christopher  H.  Chappell,  a  Task  Force  Agent  with  the  FBI’s
North  Carolina  Cyber  Crime  Task  Force;  Stephen  M.  Bunting,  a
retired  Captain  in  the  University  of  Delaware  Police  Department
who  performed  computer  forensics  investigations  and  has  authored
three  books  on  this  topic;  Michael  Weber,  Founder  and  CEO  of




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BitSec  Global  Forensics,  Inc.,  a  computer  forensics  company;  and
Susan  McMinn,  a  Principal  at  Dixon  Hughes,  LLC  with  over             200
hours  of  computer  forensics  training.     Each  of  these  experts
testified  in  their  affidavits  that  Johnson  took  a  reasonable
amount of time in completing his court-ordered work.
Plaintiffs,  in  support  of  their  argument  that  Johnson’s
fees  are  unreasonable,  offered  the  testimony  of  Lawrence  Daniel,
a  digital  forensic  examiner.    Daniel  had  been  certified  in  other
trials   as   an   expert   in   the   field   of   digital   forensic
examination,  and  was  accepted  by  the  trial  court  in  this  case  as
an   expert.                                                                  Daniel   testified   that   Johnson’s   quote   was
unreasonable,  citing  that  Daniel  had                                      “performed  hundreds  of
examinations,  many  much  more  complicated  than  this  and  never
came  close  to  that  number  of  hours  for  that  amount  of  data.”
Daniel  also  testified  the  entire  job  should  have  taken  Johnson
approximately                                                                 18  hours  and  Daniel  would  have  charged          $250  per
hour for similar services.
Plaintiffs’  offer  of  this  evidence  does  not  negate  the  fact
that  the  trial  court’s  conclusion  that  Johnson’s  fees  were
reasonable   was   based   upon   competent   evidence   and   therefore
                                                                                                                                    binding.     Barnhardt  v.  City  of  Kannapolis,         116  N.C.  App.                      215,
224-25,                                                                       447  S.E.2d                                           471,                                                477   (“[W]here  the  trial  court  sits




-20-
without  a  jury,  the  court’s  findings  of  fact  are  conclusive  if
supported  by  competent  evidence,  even  though  other  evidence
might  sustain  contrary  findings.”),  disc.  rev.  denied,  338  N.C.
514,  452 S.E.2d  807  (1994).
Plaintiffs  argue  that  because  the  trial  court  rejected
Daniel’s  testimony  without  explanation  in  its                             8  September                                                      2010
Order,  the  court  abused  its  discretion  by  not  considering  this
evidence.                                                                      In  its                                                           8  September   2010  Order,  the  trial  court
“reject[ed]  the  testimony  of  Plaintiffs’  expert,  Mr.  Lawrence
Daniels                                                                        [sic]  to  the  effect  that  Ryan  Johnson  spent  more  hours
than  were  reasonable  in  light  of  the  tasks  required  by  the
Court’s  orders.”     However,                                                 “[c]redibility,  contradictions,  and
discrepancies  in  the  evidence  are  matters  to  be  resolved  by  the
trier  of  fact,  here  the  trial  judge,  and  the  trier  of  fact  may
accept  or  reject  the  testimony  of  any  witness.”    Smith  v.  Smith,
89  N.C.  App.  232,  235,  365  S.E.2d  688,  691  (1988);  see  also  Fox
v.  Fox,  114  N.C.  App.  125,  134,  441  S.E.2d  613,  619  (1994)  (“The
trial  judge  is  the  sole  arbiter  of  credibility  and  may  reject
the testimony of any witness in whole or in part.”).
Moreover,  we  do  not  believe  the  trial  court’s                           8  September
2010  Order  ignores  the  evidence  presented  by  Plaintiffs.    In  its
deliberation   of   the   reasonableness   of   Forward   Discovery’s




-21-
invoice,  the  trial  court  was  presented  with  conflicting  evidence
                                                                            from  qualified  experts  from  both  parties.                                                                                  The  trial  court
                                                                            necessarily  had  to  select  one  expert,  and  the  rejection  of  the
                                                                            other   party’s   expert   does   not   indicate   the   trial   court’s
                                                                            decision   was   not   supported   by   competent   evidence.                                                                                       See
Barnhardt,                                                                  116  N.C.  App.  at                                                        224-25,        447  S.E.2d  at                       477.                The
trial  court’s  rejection  of  Daniel’s  testimony  does  not  imply
that his testimony was not considered.
Case   law   cited   by   Plaintiffs   does   not   support   the
proposition  that  the  trial  court  must  explicitly  address  all
relevant  evidence  in  its  Order.    For  instance,  Plaintiffs  cite
Langwell  v.  Albemarle  Family  Practice,  PLLC  where  we  found  the
trial  court  abused  its  discretion  when  it  entered  an  order
setting  aside  a  jury  verdict  and  granting  the  plaintiff’s  motion
for  a  new  trial,  because  it  did  not  address  evidence  presented
by  the  plaintiff’s  expert.                                               __  N.C.  App.  __,  __,  692  S.E.2d  476,
482                                                                         (2010).     Nonetheless,  Langwell  is  distinguishable  from  the
present  case  because  (1)  in  the  current  case,  the  trial  court’s
Order  refers  to  the  testimony  of  Plaintiffs’  expert,  see  id.  at
__,                                                                         692  S.E.2d  at                                                            481-82,  and   (2)  the  cases  possess  differing
evidentiary  standards.    Here,  the  trial  court’s  Order  must  only
be  supported  by  competent  evidence,  whereas  in  Langwell,  the




-22-
trial  court  had  to  determine   whether  the  jury  verdict  was
against  the  greater  weight  of  the  evidence.     Id.  at                __,                                                            692
S.E.2d  at                                                                   480-81.    Thus,  the  Langwell  trial  court  was  required
to  analyze  and  compare  all  available  evidence  to  determine  what
verdict  the  greater  weight  of  evidence  supported.     Conversely,
in  the  present  case  the  trial  court’s  decision  need  only  be
supported  by  competent  evidence,  so  it  need  not  exhaustively
address  all  available  evidence  in  its  Order.    See  Fortis  Corp.
v.  Ne.  Forest  Products,  Div.  of  Hardwood  Lumber  Mfg.  Co.,           68
N.C.  App.                                                                   752,                                                           753,   315  S.E.2d   537,   538   (1984)   (“The  general
rule  is  that  in  making  findings  of  fact,  the  trial  court  is
required  only  to  make  brief,  pertinent  and  definite  findings  and
conclusions  about  the  matters  in  issue,  but  need  not  make  a
finding on every issue requested.”  (citation omitted)).
We  conclude  the  affidavits  from  Forward  Discovery’s  four
experts  presented  competent  evidence  that  Johnson’s  invoice  was
reasonable.    Consequently,  we  find  the  trial  court  did  not  abuse
its discretion on this issue.
D. Attorneys’ Fees and Travel Costs
Plaintiffs  also  argue  the  trial  court  erred  and  abused  its
discretion  by  awarding  Johnson  attorneys’  fees  and  additional




-23-
expenses.     We  agree  and  reverse  the  trial  court’s  decision  on
this issue.
Forward  Discovery  seeks  to  recover  both  the  attorneys’  fees
and  additional  expenses  it  incurred  in  litigating  the  present
case.    By  affidavit,  Johnson  stated  that  he  spent  “at  least  2.5
hours  trying  to  resolve  the  concerns  AIT  expressed  with               [his]
invoice,”                                                                     “at  least                                 4  hours  providing  counsel  with  the  emails
[sic],  documents  and  other  materials  requested  for  review  and
Court  preparation,”  and                                                     “3  hours  traveling  to  and  from  the
Courthouse  for  the  Motion  to  Show  Cause  hearing  and  another  1.5
hours  in  attendance  at  said  hearing.”    Johnson  also  testified  by
affidavit  that  he  had  driven                                              174  miles  to  and  from  the  hearing
on  Forward  Discovery’s  Motion  to  Show  Cause,  and  charged              $0.50
per  mile  for  a  travel  cost  of  $87.00.    He  also  spent  $12.60  in
express  mail  fees  for  shipping  his  affidavit.    The  trial  court
included  all  of  these  expenses  in  its                                   22  September                              2010  Order
when it required Plaintiffs to pay Johnson  $2,375 for expenses.
As  discussed  supra,  expert  witnesses  appointed  by  the  Court
“are  entitled  to  reasonable  compensation  in  whatever  sum  the
court  may  allow.”    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                      §                                          8C-1,  Rule                                       706(b)   (2009);
see  also  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  7A-314(d)  (2009)  (“An  expert  witness,
other   than   a   salaried   State,   county,   or   municipal   law-




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enforcement   officer,   shall   receive   such   compensation   and
allowances  as  the  court,  or  the  Judicial  Standards  Commission,
in   its   discretion,   may   authorize.”).                                   This   reasonable
compensation, however, is not without limitations.
For  instance,  this  Court  has  previously  held                             “[i]t  is
settled  law  in  North  Carolina  that  ordinarily  attorneys                 [sic]
fees  are  not  recoverable  either  as  an  item  of  damages  or  of
costs,   absent   express   statutory   authority   for   fixing   and
awarding  them.”    Baxley  v.  Johnson,  179  N.C.  App.  635,  640,  634
S.E.2d  905,  908  (2006)  (quoting  Records  v.  Tape  Corp.  and  Broad.
System  v.  Tape  Corp.,  18  N.C.  App.  183,  187,  196  S.E.2d  598,  602
(1973))                                                                        (quotation  marks  omitted).     Additionally,  our  Supreme
Court  has  held                                                               “in  the  absence  of  express  statutory  authority,
attorneys’  fees  are  not  allowable  as  part  of  the  court  costs  in
                                                                                                                                                     civil  actions.”     City  of  Charlotte  v.  McNeely,   281  N.C.                                     684,
695,                                                                           190  S.E.2d                                                    179,   187                                                      (1972).     If  relevant  statutes  do  not
permit   reimbursement   of   attorneys’   fees,   we   may   not   award
attorneys’  fees  even  on  equitable  grounds.     Id.  at                    691,                                                           190
S.E.2d  at  185.    Significantly,  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  8C-1,  Rule  706,
the  relevant  statutory  authority  on  reimbursement  of  expert
witnesses, makes no mention of attorneys’ fees.




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When   an   expert   is   appointed   for   court-ordered   work,
reasonable   compensation   is   limited   to   reimbursement   for
performance  of  that  work  only.     See  Swilling  v.  Swilling,           329
N.C.  219,  226,  404  S.E.2d  837,  842  (1991)  (describing  that  while
an  expert  could  recover  his  court-ordered  appraisal  of  property
in   divorce   proceedings,   he   could   not   recover   a   fee   for
testifying   when   he   was   not   under   subpoena).                       Reasonable
compensation  thus  does  not  include  restitution  for  expenses
outside  the  court-ordered  services  provided  by  the  expert,  such
as  reimbursement  for  appearing  at  court  when  one  is  not  under
subpoena.    Peters  v.  Pennington,  __  N.C.  App.  __,  __,  707  S.E.2d
724,  741  (2011)  (“[A]  trial  court  may  tax  expert  witness  fees  as
costs  only  when  that  witness  is  under  subpoena.”);  Greene  v.
Hoekstra,                                                                     189  N.C.  App.                 179,   181,                                                                       657  S.E.2d   415,   417               (2008)
                                                                                                                     (“[T]he  cost  of  an  expert  witness  cannot  be  taxed  unless  the
                                                                                                                     witness  has  been  subpoenaed.”).    If  a  witness  appears  at  court
                                                                                                                     voluntarily,  that  witness  is  not  entitled  to  compensation  for
                                                                              the  appearance.    Hoekstra,          189  N.C.  App.  at                                                                      181,   657  S.E.2d  at
417.
Our  General  Statutes  also  clearly  state  expert  witnesses
are  only  compensated  for  time  spent  testifying  at  trial,  and
compensation does not extend to travel expenses:




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The  following  expenses,  when  incurred,  are
assessable  or  recoverable,  as  the  case  may
be.    The    expenses    set    forth    in    this
subsection  are  complete  and  exclusive  and
constitute   a   limit   on   the   trial   court’s
                                                                                                                  discretion                                                                                               (11)   Reasonable   and
                                                                                                                                                 necessary  fees  of  expert  witnesses  solely
                                                                                                                                                 for  actual  time  spent  providing  testimony  at
                                                                                                                                                 trial, deposition, or other proceedings.
                                                                            N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                     §            7A-305(d)         (2009)                                                                                                                          (emphasis  added).                 The
                                                                                                                                                 exhaustive  list  of  recoverable  expenses  in  section  7A-305  makes
                                                                                                                                                 no  mention  of  travel  costs.     Id.;  see  Jarrell  v.  Charlotte-
                                                                            Mecklenburg  Hosp.  Auth.,                                           __  N.C.  App.                                                            __,                                                   __,                  698  S.E.2d   190,
193   n.1                                                                   (2010)                                                                                                                                         (discussing   how   the   plaintiffs   could   have
                                                                                                                                                 contested  the  trial  court’s  award  of  the  experts’  travel  costs
                                                                            under  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                           §                                                                                           7A-305(d)(11),  but  failed  to  do  so  on
appeal).
In  the  present  case,  the  trial  court’s                                22  September                         2010
Order  expressly  requires  Plaintiffs  to  pay                             “attorneys’  fees
($3,762.50)   and   expert   fees                                           ($2,375.00)”   for   a   total   of
$6,137.50  in  addition  to  the  balance  of  the  Forward  Discovery
invoice.    We  believe  these  additional  fees  are  not                  “reasonable
compensation” under N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  8C-1, Rule  706.
First,  Johnson  cannot  recover  attorneys’  fees  because  Rule
706  does  not  explicitly  mention  attorneys’  fees  as  a  recoverable
expense.     See  McNeely,                                                  281  N.C.  at                         691,         190  S.E.2d  at   185.




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Unless  attorneys’  fees  are  explicitly  mentioned  by  statute,  they
are  not  recoverable  as  court  costs  in  civil  actions.                Id.
Consequently,  the  trial  court  erred  in  awarding  attorneys’  fees
to Forward Discovery in the present case.
Furthermore,  we  conclude  Johnson  cannot  recover  additional
expenses.                                                                                                                          These  expenses  were  incurred  independent  of  his
court-ordered  services                                                                                                            (the  review  of  AIT’s  hard  drives),  and
                                                                            thus  they  are  not  recoverable.    See  Swilling,   329  N.C.  at                                             226,
404  S.E.2d  at                                                             842                                                    (describing  how  an  expert  could  only  recover
for  expenses  from  court-ordered  services  he  performed).    Since
expert  witnesses  are  only  reimbursed  for  time  actually  spent  in
court  under  subpoena,  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                  §                                                      7A-305(d)(11)                                             (2009),
Johnson  cannot  recover  his  travel  expenses  and  costs  associated
with   his   efforts   to   recover   the   balance   of   the   invoice.
Additionally,  Johnson’s  appearance  at  the  30  August  2010  hearing
was  voluntary,  so  he  cannot  recover  for  expenses  associated  with
this  hearing.    Greene,                                                                                                          189  N.C.  App.  at  181,                                                         657  S.E.2d  at  417
(citing  State  v.  Johnson,                                                282  N.C.                                              1,                                                        27,       191  S.E.2d   641,                   659
(1972)).                                                                                                                           Consequently,  we  find  the  trial  court  abused  its
discretion   by   awarding   Johnson   an   additional                                                                                                                                                               $6,137.50   for
attorneys’ fees and additional expenses.
IV. Conclusion




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We  conclude  the  trial  court  did  not  abuse  its  discretion  by
requiring  Plaintiffs  to  pay  the  balance  of  Forward  Discovery’s
invoice   for   the   court-ordered   services.                          However,   we   find
Plaintiffs  cannot  be  required  to  pay  the  attorneys’  fees  and
additional  expenses  mentioned  in  the                                 22  September          2010  Order,
and we reverse the trial court’s Order regarding this issue.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
Judges STEELMAN and STEPHENS concur.

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