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NO. COA10-1412
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  5 July  2011
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.                                                                     Hoke County
Nos.  08 CRS  51487
08 CRS  51492
RASHAMELL Q. BILLINGER,
Defendant
1.                                                                     Firearms  and  Other  Weapons                                                                                                  -  possession  of  weapon  of  mass
                                                                                                                                death  and  destruction  -  motion  to  dismiss  -  sufficiency  of
                                                                       evidence  - possession
The  trial  court  did  not  err  by  denying  defendant’s
motion  to  dismiss  the  charge  of  possession  of  a  weapon  of
mass  death  and  destruction  based  on  alleged  insufficient
evidence  of  possession.     The  evidence  was  sufficient  to
support  a  reasonable  inference  that  defendant  owned  and
constructively possessed a blue sawed-off shotgun.
2.                                                                     Conspiracy                                               -   failure   to   allege   essential   element                       -
agreement to commit unlawful act
The  trial  court  erred  by  convicting  defendant  on  the
charge  of  conspiracy  to  commit  robbery  with  a  dangerous
weapon.    The  State’s  failure  to  allege  an  essential  element
of  the  crime  of  conspiracy,  the  agreement  to  commit  an
unlawful  act,  rendered  the  indictment  facially  defective
and  deprived  the  trial  court  of  jurisdiction  to  adjudicate
the charge.
3.                                                                     Damages and Remedies  - restitution  - no jurisdiction
The   trial   court’s   restitution   award   was   vacated
because  there  was  no  conspiracy  conviction  attached  to  it
due to the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction.




NO. COA10-1412
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  5 July  2011
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.                                                                         Hoke County
Nos.  08 CRS  51487
08 CRS  51492
RASHAMELL Q. BILLINGER,
Defendant
Appeal  by  defendant  from  judgments  entered  21  April  2010  by
Judge  William  R.  Pittman  in  Hoke  County  Superior  Court.    Heard
in the Court of Appeals  13 April  2011.
Attorney  General  Roy  Cooper,  by  Assistant  Attorney  General
John A. Payne, for the State.
Thomas R. Sallenger for defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.
Defendant  Rashamell  Q.  Billinger  appeals  his  convictions
for  possession  of  a  weapon  of  mass  death  and  destruction  and
conspiracy  to  commit  robbery  with  a  dangerous  weapon.     After
careful  review,  we  find  no  error  with  respect  to  defendant's
possession   conviction,   but   conclude   that   the   conspiracy
indictment   is   facially   defective,   requiring   vacating   that
conviction  as  well  as  the  restitution  award  based  on  that
conviction.




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Facts
At  trial,  the  State  presented  evidence  tending  to  establish
the  following  facts:  Late  in  the  afternoon  on                         26  June                       2008,
defendant,   Kerry   Braithwaite,   Jonathan   Jackson,   and   Jevaris
McArn,  along  with  others,  met  at  Mr.  Braithwaite's  mother's
house  in  Raeford,  North  Carolina.    The  men  played  basketball  in
the  cul-de-sac  and  later  played  cards  in  the  Braithwaites'
garage.     During  the  card  game,  Mr.  Jackson  complained  about
needing  money  to  make  his  car  payment.    Defendant  also  indicated
that he needed money.
When  the  card  game  ended  around                                         10:00  p.m.,  the  four  men
got  into  Mr.  Jackson's  blue  Dodge  Charger,  with  Mr.  Jackson
driving,  Mr.  Braithwaite  in  the  front  passenger  seat,  Mr.  McArn
in  the  backseat  behind  Mr.  Braithwaite,  and  defendant  in  the
back  behind  Mr.  Jackson.    On  the  way  to  get  something  to  eat,
Mr.  Jackson  suggested  robbing  a  nearby  Hardees  restaurant  and
defendant  agreed.    As  they  drove  by  the  Hardees,  however,  they
realized  that  the  restaurant  was  closed  and  decided  to  go  back
to  the  Braithwaite  residence.    On  the  way  back,  defendant  told
Mr.  Jackson  to  "drop  him  off"  at  the  Food  Lion  grocery  store
near  the  Braithwaites'  house,  saying  that  "[h]e  needed  to  find
some money" and  that  he was going to try to rob  the Food Lion or
"something  like  that."     When  Mr.  Jackson  pulled  into  an  alley




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between  the  grocery  store  and  Mi  Casita's,  a  Mexican  restaurant,
defendant  got  out  of  the  car  carrying  a  black  pump  action
shotgun,  owned  by  Mr.  McArn.    Defendant,  who  was  wearing  a  black
shirt,  "baggy"  blue  pants,  black  Timberland  boots,  and  a  black
bandana,  "tucked"  the  shotgun  into  his  pants  so  that  it  could
not be seen and went behind the buildings.
Luis  Alberto  Reyes-Perez,  a  waiter  at  Mi  Casita's,  was
leaving  the  restaurant  through  the  alley  behind  the  building,
when  he  encountered  an  African-American  male                             -  later  identified
as  defendant                                                                 -  wearing  "Timber  boots,"  baggy  jeans,  a  black
handkerchief  over  his  face,  and  a  black  jacket  with  a  hood  over
his  head.                                                                    Defendant  "pulled  out"  a  "dark"-looking  weapon,
roughly                                                                       24  inches  long,  that  appeared  to  be  a  shotgun,  pointed
it  at  Mr.  Reyes-Perez,  and  demanded  his  money.    As  Mr.  Reyes-
Perez  was  trying  to  take  his  money  out  of  his  apron,  the  gun
discharged,  hitting  Mr.  Reyes-Perez  in  his  right  arm.    At  that
point,  defendant  "took  off  running"  and  Mr.  Reyes-Perez  climbed
into   his   co-worker's   van   and   was   eventually   taken   to   the
hospital.
As  the  men  in  the  Charger  were  driving  by  the  front  of  the
Food  Lion,  they  thought  they  heard  a  gunshot  and  saw  defendant
running  across  a  field  behind  Mi  Casita's.    Although  Mr.  Jackson
did  not  want  to  pick  up  defendant,  Mr.  McArn  told  the  other  men




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that  defendant  had  his  shotgun  and  that  they  needed  to  "go  pick
him  up."    As  they  approached,  defendant  jumped  into  the  backseat
of  the  Charger  with  Mr.  McArn's  shotgun  and  they  men  drove  back
to  Mr.  Braithwaite's  mother's  house.     Shortly  after  returning,
defendant  left  the  Braithwaite  residence  with  several  other
people.
Captain   John   Kivett,   with   the   Hoke   County   Sheriff's
Department,  responded  to  the  reported  shooting  at  Mi  Casita's,
and,  while  waiting  for  the  K9  unit  to  arrive,  he  received
another  dispatch  about  shots  being  fired  about  two  blocks  away.
Captain  Kivett  and  two  sheriff's  deputies  responded  to  the
second   dispatch,   which   resulted   in   their   going   to   the
Braithwaite  residence,  where  they  saw  several  people  standing
outside  in  the  yard.                                                      While  investigating  the  "shots-fired"
call,  Captain  Kivett  noticed  an  "unfired"  shotgun  shell  laying
in  the  yard.    The  deputies  then  searched  the  perimeter  of  the
yard  and  found  a  black,  pump  action  shotgun  covered  in  a  red
"hoodie."     Captain  Kivett  also  searched  Mr.  Braithwaite's  car,
finding  in  plain  view  a  blue-in-color  single-shot  shotgun  in  the
rear floorboard.
                                                                             Defendant  was  charged  with  attempted  first-degree  murder
(08  CRS                                                                     51486),  attempted  robbery  of  Mr.  Reyes-Perez  with  a
dangerous  weapon                                                            (08  CRS                                                         51487);  conspiracy  to  rob  Mr.  Reyes-




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Perez  with  a  dangerous  weapon                                             (08  CRS                                                      51487);    possession  of  a
weapon  of  mass  death  and  destruction                                     (08  CRS                                                      51492);  assault
with  a  deadly  weapon  with  intent  to  kill  inflicting  serious
injury  ("AWDWIKISI")  (08  CRS  51488);  three  counts  of  discharging
a   firearm   into   occupied   property                                      (08   CRS                                                     51489-91);   and,
conspiracy  to  rob  the  Hardees  with  a  dangerous  weapon                 (09  CRS
945).                                                                         Defendant  pled  not  guilty  and  the  case  proceeded  to
trial,  where,  at  the  conclusion  of  all  the  evidence,  defendant
moved  to  dismiss  all  the  charges  against  him.                          The  State
voluntarily  dismissed  two  counts  of  discharging  a  weapon  into
occupied  property  and  the  trial  court,  after  hearing  arguments,
dismissed   the   third   count.                                              The   court,   however,   denied
defendant's  motion  to  dismiss  the  charges  of  attempted  murder,
AWDWIKISI,  attempted  armed  robbery,  possession  of  a  weapon  of
mass  death  and  destruction,  conspiracy  rob  Mr.  Reyes-Perez,  and
conspiracy  to  rob  the  Hardees.    The  jury  acquitted  defendant  of
attempted   murder,   attempted   armed   robbery,   AWDWIKISI,   and
conspiracy  to  rob  the  Hardees,  but  found  defendant  guilty  of
conspiracy  to  rob  Mr.  Reyes-Perez  with  a  dangerous  weapon  and
possession  of  a  weapon  of  mass  death  and  destruction.    The  trial
court  sentenced  defendant  to  consecutive  presumptive-range  terms
of  25  to  39  months  imprisonment  on  the  conspiracy  charge  and  16
to  20  months  on  the  possession  charge,  suspended  the  sentence  on




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the  possession  conviction,  and  imposed                                   36  months  of  supervised
probation.                                                                   The   trial   court   also   awarded                  $46,059.00   in
restitution  in  connection  with  the  possession  charge.    Defendant
timely appealed to this Court.
I
Defendant  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  denying  his
motion  to  dismiss  the  charge  of  possession  of  a  weapon  of  mass
death  and  destruction.     In  ruling  on  a  defendant's  motion  to
dismiss,  the  trial  court  must  determine  whether  the  State  has
presented  substantial  evidence  (1)  of  each  essential  element  of
the  offense  and                                                            (2)  of  the  defendant's  being  the  perpetrator.
State  v.  Crawford,  344  N.C.  65,  73,  472  S.E.2d  920,  925  (1996).
"Substantial  evidence"  is  that  amount  of  relevant  evidence  that
a   "reasonable   mind   might   accept   as   adequate   to   support   a
                                                                                                                                   conclusion."     State  v.  Smith,   300  N.C.   71,                                              78-79,                       265  S.E.2d
164,                                                                         169                                                   (1980).                                          When  considering  the  issue  of  substantial
evidence,   the   trial   court   must   view   all   of   the   evidence
presented  "in  the  light  most  favorable  to  the  State,  giving  the
State  the  benefit  of  every  reasonable  inference  and  resolving
any  contradictions  in  its  favor."    State  v.  Rose,  339  N.C.  172,
192,                                                                         451  S.E.2d                                           211,                                 223         (1994),  cert.  denied,                          515  U.S.                    1135,
132  L.  Ed.                                                                 2d                                                    818                                  (1995).     "Whether                                         [the]  evidence  presented
constitutes  substantial  evidence  is  a  question  of  law  for  the




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court[,]"  State  v.  Vause,                                                 328  N.C.                                         231,                                236,                                   400  S.E.2d       57,                                    61
(1991),  "which  this  Court  reviews  de  novo,"  State  v.  Bagley,  183
N.C. App.  514,  523,  644 S.E.2d  615,  621  (2007).
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                            §                                                 14-288.8                            (2009)  makes  it  "unlawful  for
any  person  to  manufacture,  assemble,  possess,  store,  transport,
sell,  offer  to  sell,  purchase,  offer  to  purchase,  deliver  or
give  to  another,  or  acquire  any  weapon  of  mass  death  and
destruction[,]"  which,  pertinent  to  this  case,  includes  "any
shotgun  with  a  barrel  or  barrels  of  less  than                        18  inches  in
                                                                             length  or  an  overall  length  of  less  than                                       26  inches                             ."
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                            §                                                 14-288.8(a),                        (c)(3).     In  order  to  obtain  a
conviction   for   possession   of   a   weapon   of   mass   death   and
destruction,   the   State   must   prove   two   elements   beyond   a
reasonable  doubt:  (1)  that  the  weapon  is  a  weapon  of  mass  death
and  destruction  and                                                        (2)  that  defendant  knowingly  possessed  the
                                                                                                                               weapon.     State  v.  Watterson,                                          198  N.C.  App.   500,                                   504-05,   679
S.E.2d                                                                       897,                                              900                                 (2009).                                                  Defendant  does  not  challenge  the
sufficiency  of  the  evidence  with  respect  to  whether  the  blue
sawed-off   shotgun   constitutes   a   weapon   of   mass   death   and
destruction,1  but,  rather,  contends  that  the  State  failed  to
present sufficient evidence of possession.
1  This  firearm,  marked  as  State's  Exhibit                              13,  was  identified  at
trial  as  a  "blue-in-color"  Iver  Johnson                                 12  gauge  single-shot
shotgun,  with  a  barrel  length  of                                        18.25  inches  and  an  overall




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Possession  of  a  firearm  may  be  actual  or  constructive.
State  v.  Alston,                                                             131  N.C.  App.   514,                                                    519,        508  S.E.2d   315,                            318
(1998).    A  person  has  actual  possession  of  a  firearm  if  it  is on
his  person,  he  is  aware  of  its  presence,  and  either  by  himself
or  together  with  others  he  has  the  power  and  intent  to  control
its  disposition  or  use.    State  v.  Reid,  151  N.C.  App.  420,  428-
29,                                                                            566  S.E.2d       186,                                                    192         (2002).       In  contrast,  a  person  has
constructive  possession  of  a  firearm  when,  although  not  having
actual  possession,  the  person  has  the  intent  and  capability  to
maintain  control  and  dominion  over  the   firearm.                         State  v.
Taylor,  __ N.C. App.  __,  __,  691 S.E.2d  755,  764  (2010).
The  State,  in  its  brief,  argues  that  the  evidence  that
defendant  owned  the  blue  sawed-off  shotgun  is  sufficient  to
establish  constructive  possession.     Although  neither  defendant
nor   the   State   cite   any   North   Carolina   appellate   decision
directly  on  point,  and  we  have  found  none,  it  is  a  well-
established   principle   of   the   law   of   possession   in   other
jurisdictions  that  constructive  possession  may  be  established  by
evidence  showing  the  defendant's  ownership  of  the  contraband.
                                                                                                 See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  Armstrong,             187  F.3d   392,          396                             (4th
Cir.                                                                           1999)             ("A   person   has   constructive   possession   over
contraband  when  he  has  ownership,  dominion,  or  control  over  the
length of  25.5 inches.




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contraband  itself  or  over  the  premises  or  vehicle  in  which  it
was  concealed.");  United  States  v.  Hiebert,                              30  F.3d                            1005,   1008
(8th  Cir.)  ("An  individual  constructively  possesses  a  firearm  if
he  owns  it  or  has  control  or  dominion  over  it."),  cert.  denied,
513  U.S.  1029,  130  L.  Ed.  2d  516                                       (1994);  State  v.  Parfait,  693
So.2d  1232,  1243  (La.  Ct.  App.  1997)  ("In  order  for  a  person  to
constructively  possess  a  drug,  he  must  either  own  it  or  have
dominion or control over it.").
At  trial,  defendant's  cousin  Rickey  Hailey  testified  that
defendant  owned  a  "blue  shotgun"  and  that  he  was  with  defendant
when  he  purchased  it  from  an   "Indian  guy"  nicknamed  "R2."
Defendant's  other  cousin  Maurice  Jones  similarly  testified  that
defendant  owned  a  "blue"  shotgun  that  was  "[m]aybe  a  foot  long."
Defendant's  friend  Kerry  Braithwaite,  when  asked  at  trial  to
identify  the  "blue-in-color"  shotgun  found  in  the  backseat  of
his   car,   responded:   "That's   Rashamell's   sawed-off   shotgun."
This  evidence  is  sufficient  to  support  a  reasonable  inference
that    defendant    owned,    and,    accordingly,    constructively
possessed,   the   blue   sawed-off   shotgun.                                The   trial   court,
therefore,  properly  denied  defendant's  motion  to  dismiss  the
charge of possession of a weapon of mass death and destruction.
II




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In  his  second  argument,  defendant  challenges  the  trial
court's   jurisdiction   to   enter   judgment   on   the   conspiracy
conviction,  arguing  that  the  indictment  was  facially  invalid.
"North  Carolina  law  has  long  provided  that  '[t]here  can  be  no
trial,  conviction,  or  punishment  for  a  crime  without  a  formal
and  sufficient  accusation.    In  the  absence  of  an  accusation  the
court  acquires  no  jurisdiction  whatever,  and  if  it  assumes
jurisdiction  a  trial  and  conviction  are  a  nullity.'"    State  v.
Neville,                                                                      108  N.C.  App.                                               330,           332,   423  S.E.2d                           496,     497                       (1992)
(quoting  McClure  v.  State,  267  N.C.  212,  215,  148  S.E.2d  15,  17-
18  (1966)).    As  a  "[p]rerequisite  to  its  validity,  an  indictment
must  allege  every  essential  element  of  the  criminal  offense  it
purports  to  charge."    State  v.  Courtney,  248  N.C.  447,  451,  103
S.E.2d                                                                        861,                                                          864                   (1958);  accord  State  v.  Wilson,            128  N.C.  App.
688,                                                                          691,                                                          497   S.E.2d   416,   419                                   (1998)   (explaining   that   an
indictment  is  fatally  defective  "if  it  wholly  fails  to  charge
some   offense                                                                .   or  fails  to   state   some  essential   and
necessary  element  of  the  offense  of  which  the  defendant  is  found
guilty"                                                                       (citation   and   internal   quotation   marks   omitted)).
Because  a  challenge  to  the  facial  validity  of  an  indictment
implicates   the   trial   court's   subject-matter   jurisdiction   to
adjudicate   the   charge,   an   appellate   court   "review[s]   the




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sufficiency  of  an  indictment  de  novo."    State  v.  McKoy,  196  N.C.
App.  650,  652,  675 S.E.2d  406,  409  (2009).
The  State's  indictment  attempts  to  charge  defendant  with
conspiracy  to  commit  robbery  with  a  dangerous  weapon.                   "A
criminal  conspiracy  is  an  agreement  between  two  or  more  persons
to  do  an  unlawful  act  or  to  do  a  lawful  act  in  an  unlawful  way
or  by  unlawful  means."    State  v.  Bindyke,  288  N.C.  608,  615,  220
S.E.2d  521,  526  (1975).    The  "essence,"  State  v.  Medlin,  86  N.C.
App.  114,  121,  357  S.E.2d  174,  178  (1987),  or  "gist  of  the  crime
of  conspiracy  is  the  agreement  itself[,]"  State  v.  Rozier,             69
N.C. App.  38,  52,  316 S.E.2d  893,  902  (1984).
Here,  the  indictment  charging  defendant  with  conspiracy  to
commit robbery with a dangerous weapon reads in pertinent part:
AND  THE  JURORS  FOR  THE  STATE  UPON  THEIR  OATH
PRESENT  that  on  or  about  the                                              26th  day  of
June,                                                                          2008,  in  the  county  named  above  the
defendant  named  above  unlawfully,  willfully
and   feloniously   did   with   Jevaris   Charan
McArn,    Kerry    Kurtis    Braithwaite,    and
Jonathan  Wilson  Jackson  to  commit  the  felony
of   Robbery   With   a   Dangerous   Weapon,   in
violation  of  North  Carolina  General  Statutes
Section                                                                        14-87,  against  Luis  Alberto  Reyes-
Perez.    This  act  was  in  violation  of  North
Carolina   Common   Law   and   North   Carolina
General Statutes  14-2.4.
As   defendant   points   out,   the   State   failed   to   include   any
"operative  language"  between  the  words  "did"  and  "with"  denoting
a  conspiracy  or  agreement.     Thus,  defendant  maintains,  because




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the  indictment  does  not  allege  that  he  "agreed  with  or  conspired
with  any  other  person"  to  commit  the  underlying  offense,  the
indictment  is  "fatally  defective"  and  the  trial  court  lacked
jurisdiction to enter judgment on the charge.
With    respect    to    the    sufficiency    of    a    conspiracy
indictment's  allegation  of  the  requisite  agreement  between  the
defendant   and   another   person,   a   leading   national   treatise
explains:
The  agreement  to  accomplish  an  unlawful
purpose  or  to  accomplish  a  lawful  purpose  by
unlawful   means   must   be   alleged   in   a
conspiracy indictment.
The  agreement,  combination,  or  common
purpose   must   be   charged   in   appropriate
language.    A  distinct  and  direct  averment  of
this  fact  is  necessary.    An  indictment  which
charges   an   agreement   or   combination   by
inference or implication only is defective.
15A  C.J.S.  Conspiracy                                                      §        147   (2011);  see  also   16  Am.  Jur.   2d
Conspiracy  §  33  (2011)  ("An  indictment  charging  that  a  defendant
conspired  to  commit  an  offense  must  allege  that  the  defendant
agreed  with  one  or  more  persons  to  commit  the  offense.     The
conspiratorial   agreement   must   be   distinctly   and   directly
alleged,  inference  and  implication  not  being  sufficient  against
a demurrer.").
It  is  undisputed  that  the  indictment  in  this  case  fails  to
allege  an  essential  element  of  the  crime  of  conspiracy               -  the




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                                                                                                                                                                      agreement  to  commit  an  unlawful  act.    See  State  v.  Looney,            294
N.C.                                                                          1,                    11,    240  S.E.2d   612,                                         618                                                                    (1978)   ("[T]he  reaching  of  an
agreement    is    an    essential    element    of    the    offense    of
conspiracy.");  accord  State  v.  Aleem,  49  N.C.  App.  359,  362,  271
S.E.2d                                                                        575,                  578    (1980)        ("An   agreement   between   the   parties
charged  is  an  essential  element  of  conspiracy.").     Without  a
"distinct  and  direct"  allegation  that  defendant  and  at  least  one
other  person  "agreed"  to  commit  the  underlying  armed  robbery,
the  indictment  in  this  case  fails  to  allege  an  essential  element
of  the  crime  of  conspiracy.     See  Hamner  v.  United  States,          134
F.2d                                                                          592,                  595    (5th   Cir.   1943)                                        (explaining   that   since
conspiracy's  "essence  lies  in  the  agreement[,]                           [t]hat  agreement
must  be  distinctly  and  directly  alleged"  and  "[i]nference  and
implication  will  not,  on  demurrer,  suffice");  United  States  v.
Wupperman,  215  F.  135,  136  (D.C.N.Y.  1914)  (holding  that  "[t]he
crime  of  'conspiracy'  is  sufficiently  charged  if  it  be  stated
that  two  or  more  persons,  naming  them,  conspired                       (that  is,
agreed  together)  to  commit  some  offense"                                 (emphasis  added)).
While  "the  verb  'conspire'  is  certainly  the  most  appropriate  to
charge   a   conspiracy[,]"   the   use   of   other   verbs,   such   as
"combine,"  "confederate,"  or  "agree,"  are  sufficient  to  denote
the  requisite  meeting  of  the  minds  between  the  defendant  and
another  person.    Wright  v.  United  States,                               108  F.               805,   810           (5th




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Cir.                                                                          1901).     Nonetheless,  "the  charge  must  be  so  stated  as  to
show  that  a  crime  has  been  committed  .  .  .                           ."    State  v.  Green,
151 N.C.  729,  729,  66 S.E.  564,  565  (1909).
The   State   nevertheless   argues   that   the   indictment's
caption,  which  identifies  the  charge  as  "Conspiracy  to  Commit
Robbery  with  a  Dangerous  Weapon,"  and  the  indictment's  reference
to  the  offense  being  committed  in  violation  of  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §
14-2.4                                                                        (2009),  which  governs  "[p]unishment  for  conspiracy  to
commit  a  felony,"  are  sufficient  to  provide  adequate  notice  to
defendant   and   the   trial   court   of   the   offense   with   which
defendant  was  being  charged.    With  respect  to  the  caption,  our
Supreme  Court  has  held  that  "[t]he  caption  of  an  indictment  .  .
.  is  not  a part of  it  and  the designation  therein  of  the  offense
sought  to  be  charged  can  neither  enlarge  nor  diminish  the
                                                                                                                                                           offense  charged  in  the  body  of  the  instrument."                                                                 State  v.
Bennett,                                                                      271  N.C.                                                             423,   425,                                                     156  S.E.2d                       725,   726         (1967)   (per
curiam).     And  as  for  the  indictment's  reference  to  N.C.  Gen.
Stat.  §  14-2.4,  it  is  well  established  that  "'[m]erely  charging
in  general  terms  a  breach  of  [a]  statute  and  referring  to  it  in
the  indictment  is  not  sufficient'"  to  cure  the  failure  to  charge
"the  essentials  of  the  offense"  in  a  plain,  intelligible,  and
                                                                                                                                                           explicit  manner.     State  v.  Sossamon,               259  N.C.                         374,   376,        130
S.E.2d                                                                        638,                                                                  639    (1963)                                                   (quoting  State  v.  Ballangee,          191  N.C.




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700,                                                                         702,                                                                          132  S.E.   795,                                      795    (1926)).    Accordingly,  the  State's
failure   to   allege   an   essential   element   of   the   crime   of
conspiracy   renders   the   indictment   in   this   case   facially
defective   and   deprived   the   trial   court   of   jurisdiction   to
adjudicate  the  charge.    Defendant's  conviction  on  this  charge  -
08 CRS  51487  - is vacated.2
III
Defendant's  final  argument  on  appeal  is  that  the  trial
court  erred  in  ordering  him  to  pay  restitution  in  connection
with  his  conviction  for  possessing  a  weapon  of  mass  death  and
destruction.     It  is  well  established  that  "'for  an  order  of
restitution  to  be  valid,  it  must  be  related  to  the  criminal  act
for  which  defendant  was  convicted,  else  the  provision  may  run
afoul  of  the  constitutional  provision  prohibiting  imprisonment
                                                                                                                                                                       for  debt.'"     State  v.  Valladares,          182  N.C.  App.                          525,                          526,   642
S.E.2d                                                                       489,                                                                          491         (2007)                                           (quoting  State  v.  Froneberger,                                             81  N.C.
App.                                                                         398,                                                                          404,        344  S.E.2d                               344,   348                                      (1986));  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.          §
15A-1343(d)  (2009).    In  its  brief,  the  State  concedes  that  "the
restitution  ordered  by  the  trial  court  had  no  factual  connection
with  [defendant's]  conviction  for  possession  of  a  weapon  of  mass
destruction,"  but  argues  that  "the  transcript  indicates  that  the
                                                                             2  We  note  that  our  holding  does  not  preclude  the  State  from  re-
                                                                             indicting  defendant  for  conspiracy  to  commit  robbery  with  a
dangerous  weapon.    State  v.  Ingram,                                     20  N.C.  App.                                                                464,        466,                                      201
S.E.2d  532,  534  (1974).




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restitution  charge  was  meant  to  be  associated  with  the  criminal
conspiracy  charge."     Due  to  this  "clerical  error,"  the  State
urges  this  Court  to  remand  the  case  for  resentencing  so  that  the
trial   court   may   award   the   restitution   in   connection   with
defendant's   conspiracy   conviction.                                        As   we   have   vacated
defendant's  conspiracy  conviction  due  to  the  trial  court's  lack
of  jurisdiction,  there  is  no  conspiracy  conviction  to  which  the
restitution  order  may  be  attached.    Consequently,  we  must  also
vacate the restitution award in this case:  08 CRS  51492.
No error in part; vacated in part.
Judges BRYANT and McCULLOUGH concur.

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