Preview:

State v. Blount
NO. COA10-352
(Filed  18 January  2011)
1.                                                                      Indictment and Information  - felony obstruction of justice  -
                                                                        elevation  of  charge  from  misdemeanor  to  felony             -  subject
matter jurisdiction
The  superior  court  had  subject  matter  jurisdiction  to
accept  defendant’s  guilty  plea  to  felony  obstruction  of
justice.   The indictment on its face was sufficient to elevate
the charge from a misdemeanor to a felony under N.C.G.S. § 14-
3.
2.                                                                      Sentencing  - mitigating range  - plea arrangement
The  Court  of  Appeals  granted  defendant’s  petition  for
writ of certiorari and concluded that the trial court did not
fail to comply with the sentencing procedures under N.C.G.S.
§                                                                       15A-1024.                                                        Although  defendant  characterized  the  plea
arrangement as requiring the trial court to sentence defendant
within  the  mitigated  range,  this  interpretation  was  not
supported by the plain language of the plea arrangement.
3.                                                                      Sentencing                                                       -  prior  record  level                         -  miscalculation  harmless
                                                                        error
The   trial   court   committed   harmless   error   by   its
calculation  of  defendant’s  prior  record  level.  The  correct
calculation of defendant’s prior record points did not affect
the determination of his prior record level.
4.                                                                      Sentencing - restitution - sufficiency of findings - clerical
error
The trial court erred by ordering defendant to pay $6,225
in  restitution,  and  the  order  was  vacated  and  remanded.    No
evidence   was   presented   in   support   of   the   restitution
worksheet,  and  defendant  did  not  stipulate  to  the  specified
amount.                                                                 Further,  on  remand  the  clerical  error  on  the
restitution worksheet listing Williams as an “aggrieved party”
should be changed to list him as the  “victim.”




NO. COA10-352
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  18 January  2011
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
                                                                              Lenoir County
v.                                                                            Nos.  09 CRS  50158
09 CRS  50159
QUINTEN LAVAUGHN BLOUNT,
Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered  2 November  2009 by
Judge  Kenneth  F.  Crow  in  Lenoir  County  Superior  Court.    Heard  in
the Court of Appeals  27 October  2010.
Attorney  General  Roy  Cooper,  by  Assistant  Attorney  General
Jennifer M. Jones, for the State.
John T. Hall for defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.
Defendant  Quinten  Lavaughn  Blount  appeals  from  the  judgment
entered on his guilty plea to felony possession of stolen goods and
felony obstruction of justice.    Defendant's principal argument on
appeal is that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction
to  accept  his  plea  to  felony  obstruction  of  justice  as  the
indictment is insufficient to elevate the misdemeanor charge to a
felony.    We conclude that the indictment is sufficient to elevate
the  charge  and  thus  the  trial  court  had  jurisdiction  to  enter
judgment  on  defendant's  guilty  plea.    With  respect  to  the  trial
court's  restitution  order,  however,  we  conclude  that  it  is  not
supported  by  sufficient  evidence  in  the  record.    Accordingly,  we
vacate and remand the court's restitution order.




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Facts
The State's summary of the factual basis for defendant's pleas
tended  to  establish  that  on  7  July  2008,  Detective  R.A.  Pearson,
Jr.,   with   the   Lenoir   County   Sheriff's   Department,   began
investigating a break in at Williams' Auto Sale, in Grifton, North
Carolina.   Detective Pearson spoke with Garland Williams, the owner
of  the  business,  who  stated  that  several  items  were  missing  from
his  shop,  including  a  tow  dolly,  an  impact  wrench,  an  air
compressor, a sawzall, a mower, a weed-eater, two electric drills,
and three car CD players.    About a month later, on  8 August  2008,
Mr. Williams spotted a red Ford Explorer parked on the side of the
road,  with  the  missing  tow  dolly  hitched  behind  the  vehicle  and
towing a brown Plymouth Acclaim.    Although the tow dolly had been
re-painted, Mr. Williams recognized it as being the one taken from
his shop by the wench he had installed on it.   Mr. Williams called
the  Lenoir  County  Sheriff's  Department  and  Detective  Tim  Murray,
along  with  Detective  Pearson,  came  out  to  the  scene.                 The
detectives were able to see an air compressor inside the Explorer,
but  were  unable  to  confirm  that  it  was  the  one  taken  from  Mr.
Williams's shop because the vehicle was locked.   Using the license
plate  number,  the  detectives  determined  that  the  Explorer  was
registered  to  Lindsey  Rouse.    The  detectives  were  also  able  to
trace the Acclaim to Willie Sutton, who had previously reported the
vehicle stolen in Craven County.
Detective Pearson returned the tow dolly to Mr. Williams, had
Webb's Wrecker Service impound the Explorer and Acclaim, and asked




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to  be  notified  if  anyone  contacted  Webb's  to  claim  the  Explorer.
On  11  August  2008,  Webb's  called  Detective  Pearson  and  told  him
that Ms. Rouse wanted to retrieve her vehicle.   A detective went to
Webb's and interviewed Ms. Rouse, who explained that the Explorer
belonged to defendant, but instead of using his real name (Quinten
Lavaughn  Blount),  she  identified  him  as  "Quinten  Corbett."    She
also told the detective that defendant had a bill of sale for the
tow  dolly.    When  Ms.  Rouse  and  defendant  went  to  Webb's  the  next
day  to  get  the  Explorer  from  the  impound  yard,  they  produced  a
hand-written  bill  of  sale  for  the  tow  dolly.     Detective  Chris
Cahoon, who was at Webb's to assist in the investigation, asked Ms.
Rouse for permission to search the Explorer.    Ms. Rouse consented
and  Detective  Cahoon  found  several  power  tools  that  matched  the
description of the items taken from Mr. Williams' shop.   Detective
Cahoon also found inside the Explorer a note stating that Ms. Rouse
should  tell  investigators  that  the  tow  dolly  belonged  to  her
"boyfriend, Quinten Corbett" and that she let her boyfriend's uncle
use the Explorer and tow dolly to pick up the Acclaim, which he had
just purchased.   The note also indicated that Ms. Rouse should tell
investigators  that  "Mr.  Corbett"  was  living  in  Florida,  but  that
she would call his mother to see if she could find the bill of sale
for the tow dolly.
When  Detective  Pearson  interviewed  defendant,  he  initially
said  that  he  had  purchased  the  tow  dolly  in  Ahoskie  in  2007  and
that his uncle  — not he  — was using the Explorer and tow dolly to
pick  up  the  Acclaim  when  the  vehicles  were  impounded.    Detective




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Pearson  told  defendant  that  the  tow  dolly  had  been  positively
identified  by  its  owner  and  that  several  items  found  in  the
Explorer  matched  the  description  of  items  taken  from  the  same
location  from  which  the  tow  dolly  was  taken.    Defendant  denied
taking the tow dolly or any of the other items.    Later during the
conversation,   defendant   told   Detective   Pearson   that   he   had
purchased all the items in the Explorer, but was unable to provide
any  receipts.    Defendant  also  told  Detective  Pearson  that  he  and
another man, Malcolm Smith, had taken the Acclaim from a residence
on  Highway  55  East.    Mr.  Smith,  who  was  interviewed  separately,
admitted to being with defendant when the Acclaim was taken.    All
the  items  in  the  Explorer  were  seized  and  taken  to  the  sheriff's
office,  where  Mr.  Williams  identified  the  items  as  the  property
taken from his shop.
Defendant,   during   the   entire   investigation,   told   the
investigating officers that his name was Quinten Bernard Corbett,
and  was  initially  indicted  for  possession  of  stolen  goods  under
that name until it was discovered that his legal name was Quinten
Lavaughn Blount.   Defendant was subsequently charged with one count
of possession of stolen goods, one count of possession of a stolen
motor vehicle, and two counts of common law obstruction of justice.
A hearing was held on 2 November 2009, where defendant pled guilty
to  felony  possession  of  stolen  goods  and  felony  obstruction  of
justice.    The  trial  court  sentenced  defendant  to  a  presumptive-
range term of eight to 10 months imprisonment and ordered defendant




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to pay $6,225.00 in restitution to Mr. Williams.   Defendant timely
appealed to this Court.
I
Defendant first argues that the superior court lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea to felony obstruction
of  justice  as  the  indictment  was  insufficient,  on  its  face,  to
elevate the charge from a misdemeanor to a felony under N.C. Gen.
Stat.  §  14-3  (2009).    Although  the  State  contends  that  defendant
waived  appellate  review  of  this  issue  by  pleading  guilty,  it  is
well established that a defendant may challenge the sufficiency of
the indictment despite having knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty
to  the  charge.    See  State  v.  McGee,  175  N.C.  App.  586,  587,  623
S.E.2d                                                                         782,      784                                                       (2006)   ("By  knowingly  and  voluntarily  pleading
guilty, an accused waives all defenses other than the sufficiency
of the indictment."), disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 489, 632 S.E.2d
768                                                                            (2006).   Where,  as  here,  "an  indictment  is  alleged  to  be
invalid  on  its  face,  thereby  depriving  the  trial  court  of  its
jurisdiction,  a  challenge  to  that  indictment  may  be  made  at  any
time, even if it was not contested in the trial court."    State v.
Wallace, 351 N.C.  481,  503,  528 S.E.2d  326,  341, cert. denied, 531
U.S.  1018,  148 L. Ed.  2d  498  (2000).
"[A]n  indictment  is  fatally  defective  when  the  indictment
fails on the face of the record to charge an essential element of
the offense."   State v. Bartley, 156 N.C. App. 490, 499, 577 S.E.2d
319, 324-25 (2003).   Common law obstruction of justice, the offense
with  which  defendant  was  charged,  is  ordinarily  a  misdemeanor.




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State  v.  Preston,                                                           73  N.C.  App.                                   174,             175,     325  S.E.2d   686,   688
(1985).   N.C. Gen. Stat.  § 14-3(b) provides that a misdemeanor may
be elevated to a felony if the indictment alleges that the offense
is "infamous, done in secrecy and malice, or [done] with deceit and
intent to defraud  .  .  .                                                    ."   This Court has held that "[t]o elevate
the misdemeanor offense to a felony pursuant to G.S.  14-3(b), the
indictment must specifically state that the offense was 'infamous'
or 'done in secrecy and malice' or done 'with deceit and intent to
defraud.'"   State v. Bell, 121 N.C. App. 700, 702,  468 S.E.2d  484,
486  (1996)  (quoting  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  14-3(b));  accord  State  v.
Rambert,                                                                      116  N.C.  App.                                  89,              93-94,   446  S.E.2d   599,   602   (1994)
("[F]or  a  conviction  to  be  elevated  under  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.            §
14-3(b),  the  indictment  must  warn  the  defendant  of  a  possible
elevation to felony status with a specific reference to 'infamy,'
'secrecy and malice,' or 'deceit and intent to defraud.'" (quoting
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  14-3(b))),  rev'd  in  part  on  other  grounds,  341
N.C.  173,  459  S.E.2d  510  (1995).    Where  "[t]he  indictment  .  .  .
fail[s]  to  notify                                                           [the]  defendant  that  the  State  s[eeks]  a
conviction  for  a  felony"  under  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                         §                                                14-3(b),  "the
superior court d[oes] not have subject matter jurisdiction over the
case."   Bell,  121 N.C. App. at  702, 468 S.E.2d at 486; Preston,  73
N.C. App. at  176-77,  325 S.E.2d at  688-89.
The  indictment  in  this  case  alleges  in  pertinent  part  that
defendant  "unlawfully,  willfully  and  feloniously  did  obstruct
justice  by  providing  the  false  name  of  Quinton  Bernard  Corbett
during  a  felony  investigation,  when  in  fact  his  real  name  is




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Quinten Lavaughn Blount.   This act was done with deceit and intent
to interfere with justice."                                                   (Emphasis added.)   Defendant contends
that  the  discrepancy  between  §  14-3(b)'s  language  —  "deceit  and
intent to defraud"  — and the indictment's  — "deceit and intent to
interfere   with   justice"                                                   —   is   fatal   to   the   trial   court's
jurisdiction.   While defendant is correct that the indictment does
not use the precise language supplied in § 14-3(b), we believe that
the  phrase  used  in  the  indictment  is  sufficiently  similar  to  the
statute's  to  provide  adequate  notice  to  defendant  that  the  State
intended  to  seek  elevation  of  the  offense  to  felony  status.    The
indictment,  moreover,  alleges  that  defendant  committed  the  act
constituting the offense "unlawfully, willfully and feloniously."
See State v. Haskins,  160 N.C. App.  349,  355,  585 S.E.2d  766,  770
(explaining that "these words are used to characterize the offense
as a felony offense and to put the defendant on notice that he must
defend against a felony charge"), appeal dismissed and disc. review
denied,  357 N.C.  580,  589 S.E.2d  356  (2003).
In State v. Clemmons,  100 N.C. App. 286, 292, 396 S.E.2d  616,
619  (1990), this Court held that the indictments in that case were
sufficient  under                                                             §                                             14-3(b)  to  elevate  charges  of  soliciting
obstruction  of  justice  and  attempted  obstruction  of  justice  to
felonies because, in addition to "charg[ing] that the offenses were
infamous,"  the  "indictments  detailed                                       [the]  defendant's  actions
involving  elements  of  deceit  and  intent  to  defraud."                   The
indictment in this case similarly "detail[s]" conduct by defendant
involving deceit and intent to defraud: "obstruct[ing] justice by




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providing [a] false name . . . during a felony investigation."   We,
therefore, conclude that the indictment in this case is sufficient
under § 14-3(b) to allege felony obstruction of justice.   The trial
court had jurisdiction to accept defendant's plea to that charge.
II
Defendant  next  argues  that  the  trial  court  failed  to  comply
with  the  sentencing  procedures  set  out  in  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  15A-
1024 (2009).   As an initial matter, we note that a challenge to the
procedures followed in accepting a guilty plea does not come within
the scope of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444 (2009), which specifies the
grounds for appeals as of right.   State v. Carriker, 180 N.C. App.
470,  471,  637  S.E.2d  557,  558  (2006);  State  v.  Rhodes,  163  N.C.
App.                                                                           191,   193,   592  S.E.2d   731,   732   (2004).   Consequently,  a
defendant seeking review of the trial court's compliance with N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-1024 "must obtain grant of a writ of certiorari."
Carriker,  180  N.C.  App.  at  471,  637  S.E.2d  at  558.    As  defendant
has  requested  this  Court  to  "review  .  .  .  this  issue  by  writ  of
certiorari[,]" and the State does not oppose the petition, we grant
defendant's petition and review his contention.
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  15A-1024 provides:
If  at  the  time  of  sentencing,  the  judge  for
any  reason  determines  to  impose  a  sentence
other than provided for in a plea arrangement
between the parties, the judge must inform the
defendant   of   that   fact   and   inform   the
defendant that he may withdraw his plea.   Upon
withdrawal,  the  defendant  is  entitled  to  a
continuance until the next session of court.
The  Supreme  Court  has  explained  that  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  15A-1024
applies when




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the   trial   judge   does   not   reject   a   plea
arrangement  when  it  is  presented  to  him  but
hears   the   evidence   and   at   the   time   for
sentencing    determines    that    a    sentence
different  from  that  provided  for  in  the  plea
arrangement   must   be   imposed.                                            Under   the
express provisions of this statute a defendant
is  entitled  to  withdraw  his  plea  and  as  a
matter of right have his case continued until
the next term.
State  v.  Williams,  291  N.C.  442,  446-47,  230  S.E.2d  515,  517-18
(1976)  (emphasis omitted).    Thus, once the trial court decides to
impose  a  sentence  different  from  the  one  provided  in  the  plea
agreement, the court must (1) inform the defendant of its decision;
(2)  inform  the  defendant  that  he  or  she  may  withdraw  his  or  her
plea; and (3) if the defendant chooses to withdraw his or her plea,
grant  a  continuance  until  the  next  session  of  court.    State  v.
Wall,  167 N.C. App.  312,  314,  605 S.E.2d  205,  207  (2004); Rhodes,
163 N.C. App. at  195,  592 S.E.2d at  733.
Defendant  argues  that  the  trial  court,  by  sentencing  him  in
the  presumptive  range  rather  than  the  mitigated  range,  "did  not
honor                                                                         [his]  plea  bargain"  with  the  State.     Although  defendant
characterizes the plea arrangement as requiring the trial court to
sentence defendant within the mitigated range, this interpretation
is not supported by the plain language of the plea arrangement as
written in the transcript of plea:
Defendant  shall  plead  guilty  to  one  count  of
Possession  of  Stolen  Goods  and  one  count  of
Common Law Obstruction of Justice.    The State
shall  dismiss  all  remaining  charges  and  the
defendant shall not be further prosecuted for
any  conduct  arising  out  of  this  matter.    The
State  shall  not  object  to  punishment  in  the
mitigated range of punishment.




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(Emphasis added.)   The terms of the plea arrangement do not provide
for  a  mitigated-range  sentence  —  only  that  the  State  would  "not
object" to such a sentence.   There was thus no agreed-upon sentence
for the trial court to reject.   Defendant's argument is overruled.
III
Defendant   also   argues   that   the   trial   court   erred   in
calculating  his  prior  record  level.     The  prior  record  level
worksheet submitted in this case indicates that defendant has one
prior  Class  I  felony  conviction  and  four  prior  Class  A1  or
misdemeanor convictions.   Defendant does not challenge the validity
of any of these convictions on appeal.   Rather, defendant contends
that because Class I convictions are assigned two points each under
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                            §                                                               15A-1340.14(b)(4)                                                              (2009)  and  Class  A1  and
misdemeanor convictions are assigned one point each under N.C. Gen.
Stat.  §  15A-1340.14(b)(5), the trial court incorrectly determined
that defendant had a total of eight points rather than six.
The State acknowledges the error but points out that defendant
was assigned a prior record level of III, which required five but
not  more  than  eight  points.    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  15A-1340.14(c)(3)
1
(2007).                                                                      As  the  correct  calculation  of  defendant's  prior  record
points does not affect the determination of his prior record level,
the error is harmless.   See State v. Smith, 139 N.C. App. 209, 220,
1
                                                                             N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                                                              §                             15A-1340.14(c)  was  amended  in                                                     2009  to
                                                                                                                                             require at least six but not more than nine points.   See  2009 N.C.
                                                                                                                                             Sess.  Law  555,  §  1.    As  the  amended  statute  "applies  to  offenses
                                                                                                                                             committed on or after"  1 December  2009, and the offenses for which
                                                                             defendant  was  convicted  occurred  prior  to                                                                                                                                                                                                      1  December   2009,  the
prior  version  of  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        §   15A-1340.14(c)  governs  this
case.




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533 S.E.2d 518, 524 (holding that error in calculating defendant's
prior  record  points  is  harmless  if  the  error  does  not  affect  the
determination of defendant's prior record level), appeal dismissed,
353 N.C.  277,  546 S.E.2d  391  (2000).
IV
Defendant   also   argues   that   the   trial   court   erred   by
"order[ing]  payment  of  an  amount  of  restitution  that  was  not
supported by competent evidence."   As a threshold issue, the State
contends that defendant failed to preserve this issue for appellate
review by not "timely object[ing] when the trial court entered the
$6,225.00  restitution  judgment  against  him  .  .  .                       ."    While  it  is
undisputed  that  defendant  failed  to  object  to  the  trial  court's
entry  of  an  award  of  restitution,  this  Court  has  repeatedly  held
that  the  issue  of  restitution  is  preserved  for  appellate  review
under  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  15A-1446(d)(18)  (2009),  which  allows  for
review of sentencing errors where there was no objection at trial.
See State v. Davis, __ N.C. App. __, __, 696 S.E.2d 917, 921 (2010)
("[I]t is well established that a restitution order may be reviewed
on appeal despite no objection to its entry."); State v. Mauer, __
N.C. App. __, __,  688 S.E.2d 774,  777-78 (2010) ("[T]his Court has
consistently   held   that   pursuant   to   N.C.   Gen.   Stat.              §
15A-1446(d)(18) (2007) a defendant's failure to specifically object
to  the  trial  court's  entry  of  an  award  of  restitution  does  not
preclude appellate review."); State v. Shelton, 167 N.C. App. 225,
233,                                                                          605   S.E.2d          228,   233   (2004)   ("While  defendant  did   not
specifically  object  to  the  trial  court's  entry  of  an  award  of




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restitution,  this  issue  is  deemed  preserved  for  appellate  review
under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1446(d)(18)."); State v. Reynolds, 161
N.C. App. 144, 148-149, 587 S.E.2d 456, 459-60 (2003) (holding that
notwithstanding defendant's failure to object to the trial court's
"requiring him to pay  .  .  . restitution," issue was preserved for
appellate review pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  15A-1446(d)(18)).
The amount of restitution ordered by the trial court must be
supported by competent evidence presented at trial or sentencing.
State  v.  Wilson,  340  N.C.  720,  726,  459  S.E.2d  192,  196  (1995).
Here,  during  sentencing,  the  prosecutor  presented  a  restitution
worksheet  specifying  that  the  State  was  requesting                     $6,225.00  in
restitution for Mr. Williams, the owner of the tow dolly and tools
taken  from  his  shop.     Mr.  Williams  did  not  testify  and  no
additional documentation was submitted in support of the worksheet.
Neither   defendant   nor   his   trial   counsel   stipulated   to   the
worksheet.     A  restitution  worksheet,  unsupported  by  testimony,
documentation, or stipulation, "is insufficient to support an order
of restitution."   Mauer, __ N.C. App. at __, 688 S.E.2d at 778; see
also State v. Swann, 197 N.C. App. 221, 225, 676 S.E.2d 654, 657-58
(2009)                                                                       (vacating  restitution  award  where  "[t]he  victim  did  not
testify[,]                                                                   .   the   worksheet   was   not   supported   by   any
documentation[,   and]                                                       [d]efendant   did   not   stipulate   to   the
worksheet"); State v. Calvino,  179 N.C. App.  219,  223,  632 S.E.2d
839,  843  (2006)  ("Here, at the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor
noted   that   the   State   had   a   'restitution   sheet'   requesting
reimbursement from defendant of  $600 for SBI 'lab work,' and  $100




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to  the  'Dare  County  Sheriff's  Office  Special  Funds.'    However,
defendant  did  not  stipulate  to  these  amounts  and  no  evidence  was
introduced at trial or at sentencing in support of the calculation
of these amounts.    We vacate the restitution order and remand for
a  hearing  on  the  matter  at  resentencing.").    As  no  evidence  was
presented  in  support  of  the  restitution  worksheet,  and  defendant
did not stipulate to the amount specified, the trial court erred in
ordering defendant to pay $6,225.00 in restitution.   We, therefore,
vacate the trial court's restitution order and remand for rehearing
on the issue.
For purposes of remanding this case, we note a clerical error
on  the  restitution  worksheet.     Mr.  Williams  is  listed  on  the
worksheet as an "aggrieved party," rather than as a "victim."   N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.34(a) (2009) defines a "victim" as "a person
directly  and  proximately  harmed  as  a  result  of  the  defendant's
commission of the criminal offense."   Mr. Williams, whose property
was taken and found in the possession of defendant, meets N.C. Gen.
Stat.                                                                         §   15A-1340.34(a)'s  definition  of  a  victim  and  should  be
listed as such on the restitution worksheet.    See State v. Davis,
123 N.C. App.  240,  242-43,  472 S.E.2d  392,  393  (1996)  ("[A] court
of  record  has  the  inherent  power  to  make  its  records  speak  the
truth  and,  to  that  end,  to  amend  its  records  to  correct  clerical
mistakes or supply defects or omissions therein.").
Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part.
Judges CALABRIA and GEER concur.

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