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NO. COA11-1281
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                     Filed:             1 May  2012
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.                                                                                      Lenoir County
                                                                                        Nos.  09 CRS  2664,  53693
ROBIN LIVICE FOYE
1.                                                                   Motor  Vehicles    —  driving  while  impaired                                   —  driving  while
                                                                                        license revoked  — sufficient evidence  — driver of vehicle
The   trial   court   did   not   err   in   a   driving   while
impaired  and  driving  while  license  revoked  case  by  denying
defendant’s  motion  to  dismiss  for  insufficient  evidence.
The  State  presented  sufficient  evidence  of  all  elements  of
both  charges,  including  that  defendant  was  the  driver  of
the vehicle.
2.                                                                   Motor  Vehicles    -  driving  while  impaired                                   -  driving  while
                                                                     license  revoked   --  jury  instructions                                        —  reasonable  doubt     —
burden of proof not lowered  — no plain error
The  trial  court   did  not  commit  plain  error   in  a
driving  while  impaired  and  driving  while  license  revoked
case  by  giving  an  erroneous  instruction  to  the  jury  on
reasonable   doubt   which   improperly   lowered   the   State’s
burden  of  proof.    Additional  language  added  by  the  judge,
when   viewed   together   with   the   correct   pattern   jury
instruction,   did   not   lower   the   burden   to   less   than
reasonable    doubt    or    otherwise    prejudice    defendant.
Furthermore,  the  trial  court’s  additional  language  did  not
amount  to  a  structural  error  which  infected  defendant’s
entire trial process.
3.                                                                   Judges             —   duty   of   impartiality                                  —   jury   instruction   —
reasonable doubt  — not erroneous  — no violation
The   trial   court   did   not   violate   its   duty   of
impartiality  in  a  driving  while  impaired  and  driving  while
license   revoked   case   by   giving   an   erroneous   jury




instruction  which  lowered  the  State’s  burden  of  proof.    The
trial  court’s  additional  language  to  the  jury  instruction
on reasonable doubt was not erroneous.
4.                                                                     Motor  Vehicles    -  driving  while  impaired   -  driving  while
                                                                       license  revoked   --  jury  instructions        —  reasonable  doubt   —
no coercion
The  trial  court  did  not  coerce  the  jury  into  returning
guilty  verdicts  in  a  driving  while  impaired  and  driving
while  license  revoked  case  by  defining  reasonable  doubt  in
a  way  that  facilitated  findings  of  guilt  on  both  charges.
The   trial   court’s   additional   language   to   the   jury
instruction on reasonable doubt was not erroneous.




NO. COA11-1281
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                              Filed:                                       1 May  2012
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.                                                                                                                         Lenoir County
                                                                                                                           Nos.  09 CRS  2664,  53693
ROBIN LIVICE FOYE
Appeal  by  defendant  from  judgment  entered                                11  and                                      12  May
2011  by  Judge  Paul  L.  Jones  in  Lenoir  County  Superior  Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  6 March  2012.
Attorney  General  Roy  Cooper,  by  Assistant  Attorney  General
Tamara S. Zmuda, for the State.
Appellate  Defender  Staples  Hughes,  by  Assistant  Appellate
Defender David W. Andrews, for defendant appellant.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
Robin    Livice    Foye                                                       (“defendant”)    appeals    from    his
convictions  of  driving  while  intoxicated                                  (“DWI”)  and  driving
while  license  revoked                                                       (“DWLR”).  Defendant  contends  the  State
failed  to  prove  that  he  was  actually  driving  his  car,  an
essential  element  of  both  crimes.  Furthermore,  he  argues  the
trial  court  erred  in  its  instruction  to  the  jury  on  the  standard
of  reasonable  doubt.  For  the  following  reasons,  we  disagree  and
find no error on behalf of the trial court.




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I. Background
On                                                                               24  October                                                2009,  at  around   5:00  a.m.,  Officer  William
Grosclose,  who  at  the  time  had  been  a  traffic  officer  with  the
Kinston  Department  of  Public  Safety  for  almost  two  years,  was
parked   at   Grainger   Stadium   in   Kinston,   North   Carolina,
approaching  the  end  of  his  shift  when  he  heard  a  loud  boom.    He
was  unsure  of  the  cause  of  the  noise  and  could  not  locate  its
origin.    A  few  minutes  later  he  received  a  call  from  dispatch
alerting  him  to  a  wreck  on  Liberty  Hall  Road,  about  one  to  one-
and-one-half miles away.
Officer  Grosclose  arrived  at  the  scene  of  the  accident  to
find  a  damaged                                                                 1989  Buick  sedan  in  a  ditch  on  the  side  of  the
road.  Liberty  Hall  Road  is  a  two-lane  residential  road  and  the
vehicle  was  located  near  a  curve  and  an  intersection.    Officer
Grosclose  noticed  blood  between  the  driver’s  seat  and  passenger
seat,  on  the  steering  wheel,  and  on  the  back  of  the  passenger
seat.    No  one  was  in  the  car  and  there  were  not  any  keys  in  the
ignition.  The  driver’s  side  door  was  jammed  closed,  but  the
passenger  door  was  wide  open.    Officer  Grosclose  looked  up  the
registration  for  the  vehicle,  determined  that  it  belonged  to
defendant,  and  obtained  his  address.     He  requested  that  other
officers  check  defendant’s  residence,  but  they  reported  that  no




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one   was   home.   As   the   other   officers   tracked   back   from
defendant’s  home  to  the  scene  of  the  accident,  they  located
defendant on East Bright Street at approximately  5:30 a.m.
Officer  Grosclose  joined  the  other  officers  on  East  Bright
Street   and   found   defendant   leaning   against   a   patrol   car.
Defendant   had   an   injury   to   the   left   side   of   his   cheek,
consistent  with  the  impact  of  a  steering  wheel  or  seatbelt,  and
blood  on  his  hands.    Defendant’s  breath  emanated  a  strong  odor
of   alcohol.   Additionally,   according   to   Officer   Grosclose,
defendant  appeared  unsteady  on  his  feet,  slurred  his  speech,  and
refused  to  cooperate  with  the  officers’  investigation.  Officer
Grosclose  proceeded  to  question  defendant  about  the  accident,  to
which   he   responded   with   a   variety   of   stories.   Defendant
initially   told   Officer   Grosclose   that   he   had   been   at   the
Ponderosa  Club  when  a  fight  broke  out  and  his  car  had  been
stolen.  He  then  changed  his  story  to  his  friends  having  driven
the  car  while  he  was  a  passenger.  However,  officers  were  unable
to  obtain  any  evidence  that  other  people  had  been  at  the  scene
of  the  accident  and  the  nearby  hospitals  did  not  have  any
reports  of  patients  with  injuries  matching  those  possibly  caused
by  the  accident.  Defendant  finally  admitted  that  he  had  driven
the  car  because  he  had  been  jumped  at  the  Ponderosa  Club  and  he




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thought   his   life   had   been   threatened.   Officer   Grosclose
testified  at  trial  that  defendant’s  statements                         “didn’t  make
sense”  and                                                                 “wouldn’t  piece  together.”  Furthermore,  they  had
“[n]o logical order.”
Officer  Grosclose  attempted  to  have  defendant  perform  field
sobriety  tests,  but  he  refused.  Officer  Grosclose  testified  that
in  his  opinion  defendant  consumed  a  sufficient  amount  of  alcohol
such  that  his  mental  and  physical  faculties  were  impaired.  As  a
result,  he  arrested  defendant  for  DWI  and  DWLR.    Following  his
arrest,  defendant  also  refused  a  breathalyzer  test.  Officer
Grosclose  obtained  a  search  warrant  to  test  defendant’s  blood.
At  approximately                                                           7:20  a.m.,  a  paramedic  withdrew  defendant’s
blood.   Melanie   Thornton,   a   forensic   chemist   at   the   North
Carolina  State  Bureau  of  Investigation  Crime  Lab,  testified  that
she  analyzed  defendant’s  blood  and  determined  that  it  had  a
blood  alcohol  concentration  of                                           .18,  over  twice  the  legal  limit
in  North  Carolina.  Defendant  was  eventually  cited  for  DWI,  DWLR,
and misdemeanor hit and run.
On                                                                          4  October                                              2010,  in  Lenoir  County  District  Court  before
                                                                                                                                    Judge  Lonnie  Carraway,  defendant  was  found  guilty  of  DWI  and
                                                                                                                                    DWLR,  but  acquitted  of  misdemeanor  hit  and  run.  Judge  Carraway
                                                                            sentenced   defendant   as   a   Level                  1   offender   to   consecutive




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sentences  of  twelve  months  for  DWI  and  forty-five  days  for  DWLR.
Defendant  appealed  to  the  superior  court.  On                           7  February                                                    2011,
Judge  Paul  L.  Jones  conducted  a  trial  of  defendant’s  case  in
Lenoir  County  Superior  Court.  The  next  day  Judge  Jones  dismissed
defendant’s  hit-and-run  charge  and  ordered  a  mistrial  for  the
DWI and DWLR charges due to a hung jury.
On                                                                           9  May                                                         2011,  defendant  had  his  retrial  before  Judge
Jones.  At  the  end  of  all  evidence  defendant’s  counsel  made  a
motion  to  dismiss  asserting  that  there  was                             “nothing  to  link
defendant  to  driving  the  car”  and  that  there  was                     “no  evidence
that   anyone   observed   him   driving   the   car.”   Judge   Jones
responded,                                                                   “Well,   there   was   testimony   by   the   officer   that
defendant]  said  he  was  driving.”  Consequently,  the  trial  court
denied  defendant’s  motion  to  dismiss.  On                                12  May                                                        2011,  the  jury
returned  guilty  verdicts  against  defendant  on  the  charges  of  DWI
and  DWLR.  The  trial  court  entered  a  consolidated  sentence  of
twelve  months  for  both  charges.  Defendant  gave  oral  notice  of
appeal.
II. Analysis
A. Motion to Dismiss
Defendant’s  first  issue  on  appeal  is  that  the  trial  court
erred  in  denying  his  motion  to  dismiss  because  the  State  failed




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to  establish  the  corpus  delicti  of  his  DWI  and  DWLR  charges.  We
disagree.
Our  Court  reviews  the  denial  of  a  motion  to  dismiss  de
                                                                              novo.  State  v.  Adams,        ___  N.C.  App.                                                               ___,                                                                  ___,          721  S.E.2d   391,
                                                                                                              394  (2012).  Under  de  novo  review  we  consider  the  matter  anew  and
                                                                                                              freely  substitute  our  own  judgment  for  that  of  the  lower  court.
                                                                              Sutton  v.  Dep’t  of  Labor,   132  N.C.  App.                                                                                                                                     387,          389,          511  S.E.2d
340,                                                                          341                                                                                                           (1999).  To  survive  a  motion  to  dismiss  the  State  must
provide  substantial  evidence  of  each  essential  element  of  the
offense.  State  v.  Davis,                                                   74  N.C.  App.                  208,                                                                          212,                                                                  328  S.E.2d   11,
14  (1985).  Our  review  of  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  “is  the
same  whether  the  evidence  is  circumstantial  or  direct,  or  both.”
State  v.  Garcia,                                                            358  N.C.                       382,                                                                          413,                                                                  597  S.E.2d   724,          746                 (2004)
(internal  quotation  marks  and  citation  omitted).  The  evidence  is
to  be  viewed  in  the  light  most  favorable  to  the  State  with  the
State  receiving  any  reasonable  inferences  therefrom.  Id.  at  412-
13,                                                                           597  S.E.2d  at                 746.  Furthermore,  when  the  evidence  only
raises  a  suspicion  of  guilt,  a  motion  to  dismiss  must  be
                                                                              granted.  State  v.  Daniels,                                                                                 300  N.C.                                                             105,          114,          265  S.E.2d         217,
222                                                                                                                                                                                         (1980),  superseded  by  statute  on  other  grounds  in  State  v.
Wortham,                                                                      318  N.C.                       669,                                                                          351  S.E.2d                                                           294                         (1987).  However,   “[i]f
there  is  more  than  a  scintilla  of  competent  evidence  to  support




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allegations  in  the  warrant  or  indictment,  it  is  the  court’s  duty
to  submit  the  case  to  the  jury.”  State  v.  Everhardt,                96  N.C.
App.  1,  11,  384  S.E.2d  562,  568  (1989)  (internal  quotation  marks
and  citation  omitted),  aff’d,                                             326  N.C.                                                     777,           392  S.E.2d   391
(1990).
Defendant  argues  the  State  failed  to  present  substantial
independent  evidence  that  he  drove  his  car  on  the  morning  of  24
October                                                                      2009.  In  making  his  argument,  defendant  contends  the
State  may  not  solely  rely  on  a  naked,  extrajudicial  confession
to  support  a  criminal  conviction.  See  State  v.  Cope,                 240  N.C.
244,                                                                         247,                                                          81  S.E.2d     773,          776   (1954).  However,  defendant  argues
the  State  must  provide  other  corroborating  evidence  and  in  the
case  at  hand  the  other  evidence  offered  by  the  State  does  not
substantiate  defendant’s  single  comment  that  he  drove  his  car
after being jumped at the Ponderosa Club. Id.
Under  the  corpus  delicti  rule,  a  conviction  cannot  be  based
solely  on  a  defendant’s  confession.  State  v.  Smith,                   362  N.C.
583,                                                                         592,                                                          669   S.E.2d   299,          305   (2008).   Rather,                      “other
corroborating  evidence  is  needed  to  convict  for  a  criminal
offense.”   Id.   Moreover,   in   noncapital   cases,   a   defendant’s
conviction  will  be  upheld  by  the  defendant’s  confession  where
the  confession  is  supported  by  substantial  independent  evidence




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tending  to  establish  its  trustworthiness,  including  facts  that
the  defendant  had  the  opportunity  to  commit  the  crime.  See  State
v.  Trexler,                                                                 316  N.C.                                   528,   533,                                                                      342  S.E.2d                           878,   881   (1986)   (DWI
conviction  upheld  where  sufficient  independent  evidence  existed
to  show  that  defendant  appeared  impaired,  was  actually  impaired,
and otherwise the wreck was unexplained).
Defendant  argues  that  his  lone  confession  in  the  middle  of
his  sequence  of  rambling  excuses  was  not  sufficient  to  meet  the
State’s burden of proving that defendant actually drove his car.
A  person  commits  the  offense  of  impaired
driving  if  he  drives  any  vehicle  upon  any
highway,  any  street,  or  any  public  vehicular
area within this State:
(1)   While   under   the   influence   of   an
impairing substance; or
(2)                                                                          After    having    consumed    sufficient
alcohol  that  he  has,  at  any  relevant
time   after   the   driving,   an   alcohol
concentration   of                                                           0.08   or   more.   The
results  of  a  chemical  analysis  shall
be  deemed  sufficient  evidence  to  prove
a person's alcohol concentration; or
(3)   With   any   amount   of   a   Schedule   I
controlled   substance,   as   listed   in
G.S.                                                                         90‑89,  or  its  metabolites  in  his
blood or urine.
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                                        §      20-138.1(a)                                                               (2011).  Additionally,  any  person
                                                                             is  guilty  of  the  crime  of  DWLR                                                                                         “whose  drivers  license  has  been
                                                                                                                                revoked  who  drives  any  motor  vehicle  upon  the  highways  of  the




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State  while  the  license  is  revoked[.]”  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                §                                                              20-
28(a)                                                                         (2011).   Defendant  contends  the  State  did  not  present
sufficient  evidence  to  corroborate  his  alleged  confession  and
prove  that  it  was  trustworthy.  In  arguing  so,  defendant  notes
that  his  confession  contradicted  his  previous  statements;  there
were  no  eyewitnesses  to  him  having  driven  the  car  or  getting  out
of  the  driver’s  seat;  he  was  not  found  with  the  keys  to  the
vehicle  in  his  possession,  which  can  be  a  factor  in  determining
if  he  drove,  see  State  v.  Sawyer,  230  N.C.  713,  715,  55  S.E.2d
464,  466  (1949);  and  his  injuries  did  not  establish  that  he  was
driving  the  car  because  the  blood  on  the  back  of  the  passenger
seat  could  have  been  from  him  sitting  in  the  backseat.  Defendant
contends  these  discrepancies  are  merely  suspicion  and  are  not
sufficient  to  meet  the  level  of  substantial  evidence.  State  v.
Hamilton,  145 N.C. App.  152,  158,  549 S.E.2d  233,  237  (2001).
Alternatively,    the    State    argues    that    it    presented
sufficient  independent  evidence  tending  to  establish  the  corpus
delicti of the crime charged. The State notes that
“[i]ndependent    evidence    of    the    corpus
delicti                                                                       .   does   not   equate   with
independent  evidence  as  to  each  essential
element  of  the  offense  charged.  Applying  the
more    traditional    definition    of    corpus
delicti,   the   requirement   of   corroborative
evidence   would   be   met   if   that   evidence
tended  to  establish  the  essential  harm,  and




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it  would  not  be  fatal  to  the  State’s  case  if
some   elements   of   the   crime   were   proved
solely by defendant’s confession.”
State  v.  Highsmith,  173  N.C.  App.  600,  604,  619  S.E.2d  586,  590
(2005)                                                                        (quoting  State  v.  Parker,   315  N.C.                                                          222,   229  S.E.2d   487,
491                                                                                                          (1985)).   The   State   contends   it   presented   substantial
evidence  regarding  the  trustworthiness  of  defendant’s  statement
and  his  opportunity  to  commit  the  crime.  In  particular,  the
State   noted   that   the   vehicle   was   registered   to   defendant;
defendant  was  found  walking  on  a  road  near  the  scene;  defendant
had  injuries  consistent  with  someone  that  had  been  in  a  wreck;
and  defendant  concedes  he  was  impaired  based  on  the  blood  test.
In  regard  to  the  injuries,  defendant  had  a  cut  on  his  cheek
consistent  with  blood  on  the  steering  wheel;  there  was  blood
between  the  driver’s  and  passenger  seat,  as  well  as  on  the  back
of  the  passenger  seat,  consistent  with  defendant  having  to  crawl
out  the  passenger  door  due  to  the  driver’s  side  door  being  stuck
closed.   While   this   is   merely   a   scenario   that   could   have
happened,  it  is  sufficient,  in  consideration  with  the  other
evidence,
for   a   reasonable   jury   to   infer   that
defendant   was   under   the   influence   of   an
impairing   substance   when   he   drove   the
vehicle.
There    are    numerous    possible    other




-11-
scenarios,  .  .  .                                                            . But,
to  hold  that  the  trial  court  must
grant  a  motion  to  dismiss  unless,
in  the  opinion  of  the  court,  the
evidence  excludes  every  reasonable
hypothesis  of  innocence  would  in
effect   constitute   the   presiding
judge  the  trier  of  facts.
Proof  of  guilt  beyond  a  reasonable
doubt  is  required  before  the  jury
can   convict.                                                                 .   What   the
evidence  proves  or  fails  to  prove
is   a   question   of   fact   for   the
jury.
State  v.  Mack,  81  N.C.  App.  578,  583,  345  S.E.2d  223,  226  (1986)
(internal  quotation  marks  and  citations  omitted).  Consequently,
viewing  the  evidence  in  the  light  most  favorable  to  the  State,
the  State  presented  sufficient  evidence  to  survive  the  motion  to
dismiss;  and  as  a  result,  the  trial  court  did  not  err  in  denying
defendant’s motion to dismiss at the close of all evidence.
B. Jury Instruction on Reasonable Doubt
Defendant’s  next  argument  is  that  the  trial  court  committed
plain  error  by  giving  an  erroneous  instruction  to  the  jury  on
reasonable  doubt,  which  improperly  lowered  the  State’s  burden  of
proof. We disagree.
Our  Court  generally  reviews  jury  instructions  de  novo.
State  v.  Jenkins,                                                            202  N.C.  App.   291,   296,           688  S.E.2d   101,   105
disc.  review  denied,                                                         364   N.C.        245,   698   S.E.2d                 665    (2010).




-12-
However,   jury   instructions   which   are   not   objected   to   are
                                                                                                                                                                             reviewed  for  plain  error.  State  v.  Mohamud,   199  N.C.  App.                             610,
612,                                                                          681  S.E.2d                                                          541,                      543                                                 (2009).  Plain  error  exists  where  the
error  is  “‘so  basic,  so  prejudicial,  so  lacking  in  its  elements
that  justice  cannot  have  been  done[.]’”  State  v.  Odom,  307  N.C.
655,                                                                          660,                                                                 300  S.E.2d               375,                                                378                                         (1983)   (quoting  United  States  v.
McCaskill,  676  F.2d  995,  1002  (4th  Cir.  1982)).  “Under  the  plain
error  rule,  defendant  must  convince  this  Court  not  only  that
there  was  error,  but  that  absent  the  error,  the  jury  probably
would  have  reached  a  different  result.”  State  v.  Jordan,              333
N.C.  431,  440,  426 S.E.2d  692,  697  (1993).
In  the  case  at  bar,  the  trial  court  initially  gave  pattern
jury  instruction,  N.C.P.I.,  Crim.                                          101.10                                                               (2011),  regarding  the
State’s  burden  of  proof  and  reasonable  doubt.  Twenty-six  minutes
later  the  jury  indicated  that  it  was  deadlocked  and  was  set  to
reenter  the  courtroom  when  it  decided  to  rediscuss.  Nine  minutes
later  the  jury  returned  to  the  courtroom  and  the  foreperson
asked                                                                         “to  be  reminded  of  the  definition  of  the  burden  of  proof
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  and  we  wanted  to  also  look  at  some  of
the  photographic  evidence  that  was  submitted.”    The  trial  court
asked  if  either  side  had  an  objection  to  a  reinstruction,  which
they  did  not,  and  the  trial  court  proceeded  to  again  give  the




-13-
pattern  jury  instruction,  adding                                          “[r]emember,  nothing  can  be
proved  100  percent  basically,  but  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.  So
you  have  to  decide  for  yourself  what  is  reasonable,  what  makes
sense.”  The  jury  returned  to  deliberations  and  six  minutes  later
found defendant guilty on both charges.
In  adding  its  own  words  to  the  pattern  jury  instruction,
defendant  contends  the  trial  court  diluted  the  State’s  burden  of
proof.   Defendant   notes   that   the   right   to   proof   beyond   a
reasonable  doubt  is  a  well-established  principle  in  our  legal
system.  In  re  Winship,  397  U.S.  358,  363-64,  25  L.  Ed.  2d  368,
375                                                                          (1970).  The  additional  language  allegedly  undermined  the
principle  by  defining  doubt  in  a  way  that  allowed  the  jury  to
convict  defendant  without  being  fully  satisfied  or  entirely
convinced  of  his  guilt.  Furthermore,  defendant  argues  the  trial
court   failed   to   inform   defense   counsel   of   the   proposed
additional  language,  which  was  in  violation  of  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §
15A-1234(c)                                                                  (2011),   and   any                                              “failure   to   comply   with   the
statutory  mandate  is  reversible  error.”  In  re  Eades,                  143  N.C.
App.  712,  713,  547 S.E.2d  146,  147  (2001).
On  the  other  hand,  the  State  contends  the  instructions  to
the  jury,  as  a  whole,  were  conceptually  correct.  “‘[A]s  a  whole,
the   instructions                                                           [must]   correctly   conve[y]   the   concept   of




-14-
                                                                                                                                                                                  reasonable  doubt  to  the  jury.’”  State  v.  Hooks,                 353  N.C.                       629,
633,                                                                         548  S.E.2d                                                  501,                                    505                                                      (2001)        (quoting  Holland  v.  United
States,  348 U.S.  121,  140,  99 L. Ed.  150,  167  (1954)). Moreover,
“‘[t]he  charge  of  the  court  must  be  read  as
a  whole                                                                     ,  in  the  same  connected  way
that  the  judge  is  supposed  to  have  intended
it    and    the    jury    to    have    considered
it.  .  .                                                                    .’                                                           It                                      will                                                     be            construed
contextually,  and  isolated  portions  will  not
be  held  prejudicial  when  the  charge  as                                 [a]
whole  is  correct.  If  the  charge  presents  the
law  fairly  and  clearly  to  the  jury,  the  fact
that  some  expressions,  standing  alone,  might
be   considered   erroneous   will   afford   no
grounds for reversal.”
Id.  at                                                                      634,  548  S.E.2d  at  505                                   (quoting  State  v.  Rich,  351  N.C.
                                                                             386,  393-94,  527 S.E.2d  299,  303  (2000)).
If,  when  so  construed,  it  is  sufficiently
clear  that  no  reasonable  cause  exists  to
believe   that   the   jury   was   misled   or
misinformed,  any  exception  to  it  will  not  be
sustained  even  though  the  instruction  could
have been more aptly worded.
State  v.  Maniego,                                                          163  N.C.  App.                                              676,                                    685,                                                     594  S.E.2d   242,                            248
(2004)                                                                       (internal  quotation  marks  and  citation  omitted).  The
State  notes  the  first  two  paragraphs  of  the  instruction  given  to
the  jury  were  from  the  pattern  jury  instruction  on  reasonable
doubt  and  the  additional  statement  of                                   “nothing  can  be  proved
100  percent  basically,  but  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  so  you
have  to  decide  for  yourself  what  is  reasonable,  what  makes




-15-
sense[,]”  is  more  or  less  a  correct  statement  of  the  law.
Furthermore,   defendant   conveniently   neglects   to   discuss   the
trial  court’s  final  sentences  in  which  it  stated,  “Any  questions
about  the  definition  of  reasonable  doubt?  The  State  has  the
burden  and  the  defendant  has  no  burden.  That’s  why  he  doesn’t
have   to   testify.”   Evidently,   the   trial   court   attempted   to
rephrase  the  definition  of  reasonable  doubt  in  a  manner  in  which
the  jury  could  understand,  but  at  the  same  time  maintain  that
the entire burden was on the State and not defendant.
Our   Supreme   Court   has   addressed   this   issue   on   a   few
occasions  where  the  trial  court,  in  explaining  reasonable  doubt,
used  the  descriptions  “‘“not  satisfied  beyond  any  doubt,  or  all
doubt;  or  a  vain  or  fanciful  doubt,  but  rather  what  the  term
implies,  a  reasonable  doubt,  one  based  on  common  sense  and
reason,  generated  by  insufficiency  and  proof[,]”’”  State  v.
Flippin,  280  N.C.  682,  687,  186  S.E.2d  917,  921  (1972)  (quoting
State  v.  Brackett,                                                          218   N.C.                                                 369,   372,   11   S.E.2d   146,   148
(1940)),  and                                                                 “[t]his  does  not  mean  satisfied  beyond  all  doubt.
Neither  does  it  mean  satisfied  beyond  some  shadow  of  a  doubt  or
a  vain,  imaginary,  or  fanciful  doubt.”  State  v.  Miller,  344  N.C.
658,  671,  477  S.E.2d  915,  923  (1996).  Even  more,  one  trial  court
described  reasonable  doubt  as  meaning                                     “just  that,  a  reasonable




-16-
doubt.  It  is  not  a  mere  possible,  fanciful  or  academic  doubt,
nor  is  it  proof  beyond  a  shadow  of  a  doubt  nor  proof  beyond  all
doubts,  for  there  are  few  things  in  human  existence  that  are
                                                                                                                                               beyond  all  doubts.”  State  v.  Adams,     335  N.C.                                               401,     420,    439
S.E.2d                                                                         760,                                                            770                                          (1994).  To  be  upheld,  the  instruction  must  not
have  “indicate[d]  that  the  burden  of  proof  is  less  than  ‘beyond
a  reasonable  doubt.’”  Miller,  344  N.C.  at  671-72,  477  S.E.2d  at
923.                                                                           Based  on  the  cases  cited  and  the  trial  court’s  final
statements,  we  cannot  see  how  the  additional  language  that
“nothing  can  be  proved                                                      100   percent  basically,”  when  viewed
together  with  the  correct  pattern  jury  instruction,  lowered  the
burden  to  less  than  reasonable  doubt  or  otherwise  prejudiced
defendant.
Defendant  further  argues  the  trial  court’s  instruction  to
the jury amounted to structural error.
Structural   error   is   a   rare   form   of
constitutional                                                                                                                                 error                                        resulting                                                        from
                                                                               “structural  defects  in  the  constitution  of
                                                                               the  trial  mechanism”  which  are  so  serious
that                                                                                                                                           “‘a   criminal   trial   cannot   reliably
                                                                               serve   its   function   as   a   vehicle   for
                                                                               determination  of  guilt  or  innocence.’”  “Such
errors                                                                                                                                         ‘infect  the  entire  trial  process,’
and                                                                            ‘necessarily                                                                                                 render                                                  a        trial
fundamentally unfair[.]’”
.  .  . In    fact,    the    United    States
Supreme                                                                        Court                                                           emphasizes                                   a                                                       strong
presumption against structural error[.]




-17-
State  v.  Garcia,                                                          358  N.C.                                                        382,   409-10,                                                597  S.E.2d   724,   744
(2004)                                                                      (citations  omitted).  However,  as  discussed  above,  we  do
not  believe  the  trial  court’s  additional  language  amounted  to  a
structural   error   which   infected   defendant’s   entire   trial
process.  Consequently,  the  trial  court’s  jury  instruction,  when
viewed as a whole, does not amount to structural or plain error.
C. Duty of Impartiality Owed to the Jury
Defendant’s   third   argument   is   similar   to   his   second
argument  in  that  it  relates  to  the  trial  court’s  added  language
to  the  jury  instruction,  but  defendant  is  now  arguing  that  the
trial  court  violated  its  duty  of  impartiality  by  lowering  the
State’s  burden  of  proof  while  the  jury  was  deadlocked.  As  noted
above,  we  do  not  believe  the  trial  court’s  additional  language
was  a  violation,  and  consequently  we  disagree  with  defendant’s
current argument.
Defendant  failed  to  raise  its  issue  regarding  the  trial
court’s  impartiality  in  the  lower  court;  nonetheless,  a  question
of  whether  the  trial  court  violated  its  duty  of  impartiality  is
preserved  as  a  matter  of  law  notwithstanding  defendant’s  failure
                                                                                                                                                    to  raise  the  issue.  State  v.  Young,              324  N.C.     489,   494,                 380
S.E.2d                                                                      94,                                                              97     (1989).  In  determining  whether  the  trial  court
                                                                                                                                                    violated  its  duty  of  impartiality  we  apply  a                         “totality  of  the




-18-
                                                                                                                                                         circumstances”  test.  State  v.  Davis,  353  N.C.  1,  41,  539  S.E.2d
243,                                                                           269         (2000).                                                                                                                                   “Whether  the  judge's  language  amounts  to  an
                                                                                                                                                         expression  of  opinion  is  determined  by  its  probable  meaning  to
                                                                                                                                                         the  jury,  not  by  the  judge's  motive.”  State  v.  McEachern,                                                              283
N.C                                                                            57,         59-60,    194  S.E.2d                                         787,                                                                        789                                                 (1973).  Additionally,  the
timing  of  the  remarks  must  be  considered.  See  State  v.  Jenkins,
115 N.C. App.  520,  525,  445 S.E.2d  622,  625  (1994).
At   issue   is   whether   the   trial   court   abandoned   its
neutrality  in  regard  to  the  question  of  defendant’s  guilt.
Defendant   contends   the   trial   court   improperly   conveyed   its
opinion  of  the  case  to  the  jury  through  its  additional  language
in   the   instruction,   which   effectively   told   the   jury   that
convicting  defendant  would  be  proper  even  if  the  State  had  not
proven  guilt  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.  It  is  well  settled  that
“[j]urors   respect   the   judge   and   are   easily   influenced   by
suggestions,  whether  intentional  or  otherwise,  emanating  from
the  bench.”  State  v.  Holden,  280  N.C.  426,  429,  185  S.E.2d  889,
892  (1972).  “The  slightest  intimation  from  the  trial  judge  as  to
the  weight  or  credibility  to  be  given  evidentiary  matters  will
always  have  great  weight  with  the  jury,  .  .  .”  State  v.  Grogan,
40  N.C.  App.  371,  374,  253  S.E.2d  20,  22  (1979).  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.
§§                                                                             15A-1222,   -1232     (2011),  bar  the  trial  court  from  expressing




-19-
any  opinion  in  front  of  the  jury  regarding  a  question  of  fact.
Thus,  defendant  claims  the  trial  court’s  instruction  indicates
that  guilty  verdicts  would  be  proper,  in  the  case  at  hand,
because  the  State  could  not  be  expected  to  fully  establish  or
entirely convince the jury that defendant was guilty.
However,   the   State   argues   the   trial   court   properly
instructed  the  jury  on  the  standard  of  reasonable  doubt  and
therefore  did  not  violate  its  duty  to  remain  impartial.             “A
remark  by  the  court  is  not  grounds  for  a  new  trial  if,  when
considered  in  the  light  of  the  circumstances  under  which  it  was
made,  it  could  not  have  prejudiced  defendant’s  case.  The  burden
rests  on  the  defendant  to  show  that  the  trial  court’s  remarks
                                                                                         were  prejudicial.”  State  v.  Anderson,   350  N.C.                                     152,   179,   513
S.E.2d                                                                      296,   312   (1999)                                      (internal  quotation  marks  and  citations
omitted).   Sometime   prior   to   the   trial   court’s   questionable
instruction it had informed the jury that
[t]he  law  requires  the  presiding  judge
to  be  impartial  and  express  no  opinions  as
to   the   facts.   You   are   not   to   draw   any
inference  from  any  ruling  that  I  have  made.
You  must  not  let  any  inflection  in  my  voice
or  expression  on  my  face,  or  any  question
I’ve  asked  a  witness  or  anything  else  that  I
have  done  during  this  trial  influence  your
findings.  It  is  your  duty  to  find  the  facts
of the case from the evidence as presented.




-20-
Furthermore,  the  colloquy  between  the  trial  court  and  defense
counsel  indicates  that  the  jury  may  not  have  been  deadlocked  at
the time of the trial court’s additional language.
The   Court:   In   the   matter   of   State
versus  Robin  Foye,  there’s  some  indication
that the jury is deadlocked.
Mr.  Corrigan:  I  thought  the  issue  was
that they messed up the verdict sheet?
The   Court:   Well,   that’s   the   earlier
version.
Mr.  Corrigan:  We  didn’t  hear  the  second
version.
The Court: Bring them back in.
Bailiff:   Now   they’re   rediscussing   it
again.
Mr.   Corrigan:   I   guess   they   are   not
hopelessly deadlocked, huh, Judge?
The  Court:  Deadlocked,  but  maybe  not
hopeless.  What  did  they  do  with  the  verdict
sheet they messed up?
The                                                                         jury  then  discussed  the  case  for  nine  minutes   and
returned,  asking  for  the  reinstruction  on  reasonable  doubt           and
to  view  all  the  photographic  evidence.  Neither  defense  counsel,
nor  the  trial  court,  appears  to  have  known  what  the  jury  was
thinking  and  consequently  we  cannot  tell  either.  The  State
presented  substantial  evidence  of  the  crimes  and  the  trial  court
attempted  to  insulate  itself  from  any  views  of  impartiality  by




-21-
instructing   the   jury   to   not   draw   any   inferences   from   its
comments.  Thus,  the  trial  court  did  not  err  in  giving  its
additional  instruction  on  reasonable  doubt  because  it  did  not
violate its duty of impartiality.
D. Coercion of the Jury
Defendant’s  final  argument  again  revolves  around  the  trial
court’s   added   language   to   the   pattern   jury   instruction   on
reasonable  doubt.  This  time  defendant  contends  the  trial  court
coerced  the  jury  into  returning  guilty  verdicts  by  defining
reasonable  doubt  in  a  way  that  facilitated  findings  of  guilt  on
both charges. We again disagree.
As  stated  above,  defendant  failed  to  object  to  the  trial
court’s  instruction  to  the  jury;  and  as  a  result,  we  review
defendant’s  argument  for  plain  error.  State  v.  Hunt,                  192  N.C.
App.                                                                         268,          270,                                 664  S.E.2d                                        662,                                                                       663                                                  (2008).  In  reviewing  the
                                                                                                                                                                                   trial  court’s  instruction,  we  must  look  at  the  totality  of  the
                                                                                           circumstances.  State  v.  Dexter,                                                                                                                                 151  N.C.  App.                                      430,                          433,   566
S.E.2d                                                                       493,          496                                                                                                                                                                (2002).   Moreover,   we   must   look   for   any
                                                                                                                                indications  of  a  deadlock,  State  v.  Adams,                                                                                                                                   85  N.C.  App.                       200,
210,                                                                         354  S.E.2d                                        338,                                               344                                                                        (1987),  and  determine  whether  the
particular  instruction  altered  the  burden  of  proof.  State  v.
Dial,  38 N.C. App.  529,  533,  248 S.E.2d  366,  368  (1978).




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Defendant    argues    the    trial    court’s    instruction    on
reasonable  doubt  improperly  influenced  the  jury’s  deliberations
and  caused  the  jury  to  return  guilty  verdicts  where  it  is  likely
that  it  would  not  have.  It  is  well  established  that  a  trial
court  may  not  coerce  a  jury  into  returning  a  particular  verdict.
Jenkins  v.  United  States,  380  U.S.  445,  446,  13  L.  Ed.  2d  957,
958  (1965).  There  is  no  indication  that  the  jury  was  definitely
deadlocked  or  that  the  trial  court’s  instruction  improperly
coerced the jury into returning guilty verdicts.
At  the  same  time  the  jury  asked  for  a  reinstruction  on
reasonable  doubt,  it  asked  for  all  photographic  evidence,  which
included  photographs  of  the  bloodstains  within  the  vehicle,  as
well   as   pictures   of   defendant’s   various   injuries.   The
photographs  could  have  easily  influenced  the  jury  to  return
guilty  verdicts.  Furthermore,  as  previously  discussed,  the  trial
court’s  instruction  did  not  unduly  influence  the  jury  to  amount
to  plain  error.  The  trial  court  even  qualified  its  additional
comments  by  finishing  the  instruction  with  the  statements,  “Any
questions  about  the  definition  of  reasonable  doubt?  The  State
has  the  burden  and  the  defendant  has  no  burden.  That’s  why  he
doesn’t  have  to  testify.”  Clearly,  the  trial  court  left  for  the
jury  to  decide  what  was  reasonable  and  the  evidence  does  not




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prove  it  likely  that  the  jury  would  have  returned  any  other
verdicts  than  those  of  guilty.  Consequently,  the  trial  court  did
not  coerce  the  jury  into  returning  guilty  verdicts  and  its
additional  instruction  on  reasonable  doubt  did  not  amount  to
plain error.
III. Conclusion
Based  on  the  foregoing,  we  find  no  error  on  behalf  of  the
trial  court.  The  trial  court  did  not  err  in  denying  defendant’s
motion  to  dismiss  as  the  evidence  at  trial  was  sufficient  to
submit  the  issue  to  the  jury.  Furthermore,  the  trial  court’s
additional  instruction  regarding  reasonable  doubt  did  not  lower
the  State’s  burden  of  proof,  violate  the  trial  court’s  duty  of
impartiality,  or  unduly  coerce  the  jury  into  returning  verdicts
of guilty.
No error.
Judges McGEE and GEER concur.

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