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NO. COA11-1488
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  5 June  2012
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.                                                                     Rowan County
                                                                       No.                                                07CRS006708;  07CRS050172
MONTARIO ANTWOND GLENN,
Defendant.
1.                                                                     Drugs                                              —  possession  of  cocaine                                                                                      —  variance  in  indictment          —
                                                                       argument waived  — no merit
                                                                                                                                                                      The  trial  court  did  not  err  in  a  felony  possession  of
                                                                                                                                                                      cocaine  case  by  denying  defendant’s  motion  to  dismiss  for
                                                                       insufficient  evidence.                                                                                                                                            Although  the  indictment  alleged
                                                                       that  defendant  possessed                                                                                                                                         .1  grams  of  cocaine  while  the
State’s  evidence  showed  that  defendant  possessed  only            .03
grams  of  cocaine,  defendant  failed  to  raise  a  specific
argument  at  trial  regarding  dismissal  based  on  a  fatal
variance  and  the  argument  was  waived  on  appeal.    Further,
in   its   discretion,   the   Court   of   Appeals   reviewed   the
argument and found it had no merit.
2.                                                                     Attorneys                                                                                      —  request  to  remove  court-appointed  attorney                                                        —
                                                                                                                          complaints  not  sufficient  for  removal                                                                       —  sufficient  inquiry
                                                                       — no ineffective assistance
The  trial  court  did  not  abuse  its  discretion  in  a
possession   of   cocaine   case   by   failing   to   conduct   a
meaningful  inquiry  into  defendant’s  complaints  regarding
his   court-appointed   attorney   and   denying   defendant’s
requests  to  remove  his  attorney.     Defendant’s  complaints
regarding  his  dissatisfaction  with  his  attorney’s  work  and
trial   strategy   were   not   a   sufficient   basis   for   the
appointment  of  substitute  counsel.                                  Further,  the  trial
court  made  sufficient  inquiry  to  determine  that  the  nature
of  the  conflicts  were  defendant’s  general  dissatisfaction
with  defense  counsel,  communication  problems,  and  trial
strategy.                                                              None  of  the  circumstances  surrounding  these
complaints   were   such   as   to   render   defense   counsel’s




assistance ineffective.
3.                                                                     Jury  —  contact  with  police  officer  witnesses  —  inadvertent,
brief, and harmless  — motion for mistrial properly denied
The  trial  court  did  not  err  by  denying  defendant’s
motion  for  a  mistrial  in  a  felony  possession  of  cocaine
case   where   three   law   enforcement   officers   who   were
witnesses  in  the  case  walked  through  the  jury  assembly  room
in   the   presence   of   some   jurors.                              The   contact   was
inadvertent, brief, and ultimately harmless.




NO. COA11-1488
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  5 June  2012
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.                                                                       Rowan County
                                                                         No.                                       07CRS006708;  07CRS050172
MONTARIO ANTWOND GLENN,
Defendant.
                                                                                                                                                                                   Appeal  by  defendant  from  amended  judgment  entered  on  or
about                                                                    9  June                                                                                                   2011  by  Judge  Joseph  N.  Crosswhite  in  Superior
                                                                                                                   Court,  Rowan  County.     Heard  in  the  Court  of  Appeals                                                                     4  April
2012.
Attorney  General  Roy  A.  Cooper,  III,  by  Special  Deputy
Attorney General E. Burke Haywood, for the State.
Michael E. Casterline, for defendant-appellant.
STROUD, Judge.
Montario    Antwond    Glenn                                             (“defendant”)    appeals    from
convictions  for  felony  possession  of  cocaine  and  attaining  the
status  of  habitual  felon.                                             For  the  following  reasons,  we  find
no error in defendant’s trial.
I.    Background
On  27  August  2007,  defendant  was  indicted  for  one  count  of
felony  possession  with  intent  to  sell  and/or  deliver  cocaine,




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committing  an  offense  while  on  pretrial  release,  and  attaining
the  status  of  habitual  felon.     Defendant  was  tried  on  these
charges  at  the                                                              6  June                                                           2011  Session  of  Criminal  Court,  Rowan
County.    The  State’s  evidence  tended  to  show  that  on                 9  January
2007  Detective  C.M.  Walker  with  the  Kannapolis  Police  Department
went  to  defendant’s  residence  to  serve  a  warrant  for  defendant’s
arrest.                                                                       Detective   Walker   knocked   on   the   door,   identified
himself  to  defendant,  and  defendant  opened  the  front  door  and
“then                                                                         [defendant]  just  kind  of  nonchalantly  turned  and  walked
away  from                                                                    [Detective  Walker]                                               ——  walked  into  the  apartment  away
from                                                                          [him].”     While  talking  with  defendant,  Detective  Walker
followed  defendant  into  the  apartment.     While  Detective  Walker
explained  to  defendant  that  he  had  a  warrant  for  his  arrest,  he
noticed  that  defendant  was  moving  something  around  in  his  hand,
which  led  Detective  Walker  to  believe  defendant  was  trying  to
conceal  something.    As  he  approached  defendant,  Detective  Walker
told  defendant  to  put  his  hands  behind  his  back,  but  defendant
began                                                                         “flail[ing]  his  arms,  not  as  if  he  was  trying  to  hurt
[Detective  Walker]  but  as  if  he  were  trying  to  prevent               [him]
from  placing                                                                 [defendant]  under  arrest.”     Detective  Walker  got
defendant  to  the  ground  and  radioed  for  assistance.    He  was  then
able  to  put  handcuffs  on  defendant  and  place  him  under  arrest.




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Before   the   struggle,   Detective   Walker   thought   he   heard         “a
rustling  noise[,]”  like  a  plastic  baggie  in  defendant’s  hand
but,  once  defendant  was  in  custody,  he  could  not  locate  anything
on  the  floor  around  defendant.     Detective  Roth  arrived  at  the
scene  about  five  minutes  after  Detective  Walker’s  call  for
assistance.    Detective  Walker  explained  the  situation  to  him  and
they   both   could   not   locate   anything   on   the   floor   around
defendant  in  the  apartment.    Detective  Walker  then  sat  defendant
in  a  chair,  asked  him  to  open  his  mouth,  and  noticed  something
in  defendant’s  mouth.    Detective  Roth  then  told  defendant  that
if  he  did  not  open  his  mouth  he  would  spray  him  with  pepper
spray.     Defendant  then  spit  two  plastic  baggies  out  of  his
mouth,  containing  what  appeared  to  be  cocaine.    It  was  Detective
Walker’s  concern  that  if  defendant  ingested  drugs  he  would
become  sick  or  die.     Detective  Roth  then  collected  the  two
baggies,  put  them  in  a  sealed  plastic  bag,  and  Detective  Walker
turned  the  plastic  bag  over  to  the  police  station’s  evidence
property  storage  area.                                                     The  plastic  baggies  were  sent  for
analysis.     Jennifer  Lindley,  a  forensic  drug  chemist  with  the
North  Carolina  State  Bureau  of  Investigation,  testified  that  the
packages  taken  from  defendant  contained                                  0.03  grams  of  cocaine
hydrochloride.




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Defendant  did  not  present  any  evidence  at  trial.    On  8  June
2011,  a  jury  found  defendant  guilty  of  felony  possession  of
cocaine.     On                                                              9  June                                                      2011,  a  jury  found  that  defendant  had
attained  the  status  of  habitual  felon.     On  the  same  day,  the
trial  court  sentenced  defendant  to  a  term  of                          80  to                                                       105  months
imprisonment.     Defendant  gave  notice  of  appeal  in  open  court.
On  appeal,  defendant  contends  that  (1)  the  trial  court  erred  in
denying   his   motions   to   dismiss   for   insufficiency   of   the
evidence;                                                                    (2)  the  trial  court  failed  to  conduct  a  meaningful
inquiry  into  his  complaints  regarding  his  trial  counsel  and
erroneously  denied  his  requests  to  remove  his  court-appointed
attorney;  (3)  the  trial  court  erred  in  not  declaring  a  mistrial;
and  (4)  his  habitual  felon  status  should  be  declared  void  since
the  underlying  conviction  for  felony  possession  of  cocaine  was
in error.
II.   Motion to dismiss
Defendant  contends  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  denying
his  motions  to  dismiss,  as  there  was  insufficient  evidence  to
support   his   conviction   for   felony   possession   of   cocaine.
Defendant  argues  that  there  was  a                                       “fatal  variance”  in  the
indictment,  as  it  alleged  that  he                                       “did  possess                                                .1  grams  of
Cocaine”  and  the  State’s  evidence  which  showed  that  he  was  in




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possession  of  only                                                          0.03  grams  of  cocaine.     Defendant  contends
that  even  though  this  fact  was  not  necessary  for  a  conviction
for  possession  of  cocaine,  the  State  chose  to  allege  it  in  their
indictment,  the  State  was  required  to  and  failed  to  prove  this
fact,  and  therefore,  the  trial  court  erred  in  denying  his  motion
to dismiss.
We  note  that  defense  counsel  raised  a  motion  to  dismiss  at
the  close  of  the  State’s  evidence  but  when  asked  whether  he
wanted  to  be  heard  on  that  motion,  defense  counsel  stated,  “I’ll
rest  my  argument  on  the  evidence  heard  by  the  Court,  Your
Honor.”     The  trial  court  denied  defendant’s  motion.     Defense
counsel   stated   that   defendant   would   not   be   presenting   any
evidence.    Out  of  the  presence  of  the  jury,  the  State  made  the
following statement regarding the indictment:
[The STATE]:    Yes.  Your  Honor,  there’s                                   ——
in   the   court   file   I   see   there’s   an
indictment   in   this   case.                                                The   body                                          ——
language  of  the  indictment  is  possession  of
cocaine,  which  is  what  he  is  charged  with.
But  there’s  surplusage  in  the  title.  It  is
not   possession   with   intent.                                             It’s   just
possession  of  cocaine.  I  want  to  make  sure
that  everybody  is  aware  of  that  and  that’s
just  a  mistake.     But  the  actual  body  and
language  of  the  indictment  is  correct.     It
is just possession of cocaine.
THE COURT:                                                                    Okay.  Which  would  be  a  Class
I felony?




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[THE STATE]:    Yes.                                                          And                 the   calendar
reflects   incorrectly,   also,   because   it’s
reflecting  that  title.  So  it’s  really  just
possession of cocaine.
THE COURT:                                                                    Yes, sir.
In response, defense counsel made the following statement:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:   Judge,    I    think    the
substantive    language    of    the    indictment
indicates    the    underlying                                                ——    just    the
possession  of  cocaine.  I  don’t  believe  there
has  been  any  evidence  of  possession  with
intent.   If   the   State   were   to   elect   to
proceed  with  ——  on  a  possession  with  intent,
we’d  have  a  motion  regarding  the  language  of
the   indictment.   But   I   think   they   can
overcharge  in  an  indictment.  I  just  don't
think  they  can  undercharge  and  try  to  charge
——[.]
The  trial  court  informed  the  parties  that  he  was  allowing            the
indictment  to  be  amended  “to  reflect  the  Class  I  possession  of  a
controlled  substance.”    Defendant  did  not  raise  any  objection  to
this  amendment.     Defense  counsel  then  renewed  his  motion  to
dismiss  at  the  close  of  all  evidence,  stating  that  he  was
“rely[ing]  on  the  same  facts  of  the  case,  Your  Honor.”     The
trial  court  again  denied  his  motion  and  moved  to  the  jury  charge
conference.
“[A]  fatal  variance  between  the  indictment  and  proof  is
properly  raised  by  a  motion  for  judgment  as  of  nonsuit  or  a
motion  to  dismiss,  since  there  is  not  sufficient  evidence  to




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support  the  charge  laid  in  the  indictment.”    State  v.  Faircloth,
297  N.C.                                                                    100,                                                    107,                                         253  S.E.2d                                                    890,                                                                     894                                                         (citations  omitted),
                                                                                                                                                                                  cert.  denied,  444  U.S.  874,  62  L.Ed.  2d  102  (1979).                                                                                                                                                                “A  motion
to  dismiss                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               [for  a  variance]  is  in  order  when  the  prosecution
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 fails  to  offer  sufficient  evidence  the  defendant  committed  the
                                                                                                                                     offense  charged.”     State  v.  Waddell,                                                                                                                                           279  N.C.                                                   442,                    445,         183
S.E.2d                                                                       644,                                                    646                                          (1971).                                                                                                                                 “A  variance  between  the  criminal
offense  charged  and  the  offense  established  by  the  evidence  is
in  essence  a  failure  of  the  State  to  establish  the  offense
charged.”  Id.                                                               Here,  the  record  does  not  contain  any  argument
at  trial  by  defense  counsel  that  the  charges  should  be  dismissed
because  there  was  a  fatal  variance  between  the  indictment  and
evidence presented.    We have recently stated that
[g]enerally,  “error  may  not  be  asserted  upon
appellate  review  unless  the  error  has  been
brought  to  the  attention  of  the  trial  court
by   appropriate   and   timely   objection   or
                                                                             motion.”   N.C.   Gen.   Stat.                                                                       §                                                              15A-1446(a)
(2009);                                                                      N.C.R.                                                  App.                                         P.                                                             (10)(a)(1).
                                                                             Objections    must                                                                                   “stat[e]    the    specific
grounds  for  the  ruling  the  party  desired  the
court  to  make  if  the  specific  grounds  were
not  apparent  from  the  context.”    N.C.R.  App.
P.                                                                           (10)(a)(1).                                             “Failure    to    make    an
appropriate  and  timely  motion  or  objection
constitutes  a  waiver  of  the  right  to  assert
the  alleged  error  on  appeal                                              .”    N.C.
Gen. Stat.  §  15A-1446(b).




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State  v.  Edmonds,                                                            ___  N.C.  App.      ___,    ___,        713  S.E.2d             111,   114
(2011).    As  the  above  portions  of  the  transcript  show,  defense
counsel’s  only  objection  regarding  the  indictment  was  whether
the  State  was  going  to  pursue  the  charge  of  possession  with
intent,  which  the  State  ultimately  did  not  pursue.                      Since
defendant   failed   to   raise   a   specific   argument   regarding
dismissal  based  on  a  fatal  variance  at  trial,  those  arguments
have  been  waived  on  appeal.    See  id.    However  in  our  discretion,
we have reviewed this issue and find it has no merit.
III. Substitute counsel
Defendant  next  contends  that  “the  trial  court  erred  when  it
failed  to  conduct  a  meaningful  inquiry  and  denied  [his]  repeated
requests to remove his court-appointed attorney.”
In State v. Covington, our Supreme Court stated that
[t]he  right  to  the  assistance  of  counsel  and
the   right   to   face   one’s   accusers   and
witnesses                                                                      with                 other   testimony   are
guaranteed  by  the  Sixth  Amendment  to  the
Federal                                                                        Constitution         which   is          made
applicable  to  the  States  by  the  Fourteenth
Amendment,  and  by  Article  I,  Sections  19  and
23  of  the  Constitution  of  North  Carolina.
The   right   to   the   assistance   of   counsel
includes  the  right  of  counsel  to  confer  with
witnesses,  to  consult  with  the  accused  and
to prepare his defense.
                                                                               State  v.  Cradle,           281  N.C.   198,                    207,   188
S.E.2d                                                                         296,                 302     (1972)      (citations  omitted).
Errors  arising  pursuant  to  the  United  States




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Constitution  are  presumed  prejudicial  unless
the  appellate  court  finds  that  the  error  was
harmless   beyond   a   reasonable   doubt.   N.C.
Gen.   Stat.                                           §        15A-1443(b)                                           (2007).                                                                     “The
burden  is  upon  the  State  to  demonstrate,
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  that  the  error
was  harmless.”  Id.  Our  Supreme  Court  applies
this  principle  to  errors  arising  pursuant  to
the  North  Carolina  Constitution.     State  v.
Bunch,                                                          363  N.C.                                             841,                                                                        844,   689  S.E.2d                                 866,
868                                                    (2010)                                                         (quoting  State  v.  Huff,                                                         325  N.C.
1,                                                     33,      381  S.E.2d                                           635,                                                                        654    (1989),  sentence
                                                                                                                      vacated  on  other  grounds,  497  U.S.  1021,  111
                                                                L. Ed.  2d  777  (1990)).
                                                                205  N.C.  App.  254,  256,  696  S.E.2d  183,  185                                                                                                                                  (2010).   “Absent  a
showing  of  a                                                  [S]ixth                                                                                                                                  [A]mendment  violation”,  we  review  the
                                                                                                                      denial  of  a  motion  to  appoint  substitute  counsel  under  an  abuse
                                                                of  discretion  standard.    State  v.  Hutchins,                                                                                        303  N.C.                                             321,         336,
                                                                279 S.E.2d  788,  798  (1981)  (citation omitted).
While  it  is  a  fundamental  principle  that  an
indigent   defendant   in   a   serious   criminal
prosecution  must  have  counsel  appointed  to
represent   him,   Gideon   v.   Wainwright,           372
U.S.  335,  9  L.Ed.  2d  799  (1963),  an  indigent
defendant  does  not  have  the  right  to  have
counsel  of  his  choice  appointed  to  represent
him.  This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  a
defendant  is  never  entitled  to  have  new  or
substitute  counsel  appointed.    A  trial  court
is   constitutionally   required   to   appoint
substitute   counsel   whenever   representation
by  counsel  originally  appointed  would  amount
to  denial  of  defendant’s  right  to  effective
assistance  of  counsel,  that  is,  when  the
initial    appointment    has    not    afforded
defendant    his    constitutional    right    to
counsel.




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State  v.  Thacker,                                                           301  N.C.                             348,                                    351-52,         271  S.E.2d   252,                                  255
(1980)                                                                        (citations  and  footnote  omitted)                                                                         (emphasis  in  original).
“Substitute  counsel  is  required  and  must  be  appointed  when
defendant  shows  good  cause,  such  as  a  conflict  of  interest  or  a
complete  breakdown  in  communications.”    State  v.  Nelson,  76  N.C.
App.                                                                          371,                                  373,                                    333  S.E.2d     499,          501                                   (1985)   (citations  omitted),
aff'd  as  modified  on  other  grounds,  316  N.C.  350,  341  S.E.2d  561
(1986).    On the other hand,
when  it  appears  to  the  trial  court  that  the
original  counsel  is  reasonably  competent  to
present  defendant’s  case  and  the  nature  of
the  conflict  between  defendant  and  counsel
is   not   such   as   would   render   counsel
incompetent  or  ineffective  to  represent  that
defendant,  denial  of  defendant’s  request  to
appoint    substitute    counsel    is    entirely
proper.
Thacker,  301  N.C.  at  352,  271  S.E.2d  at  255  (citations  omitted)
(emphasis  in  original).    General  dissatisfaction  or  disagreement
over  trial  tactics  is  not  a  sufficient  basis  to  appoint  new
                                                                                                                    counsel.    See  State  v.  Prevatte,                   356  N.C.     178,                                  216,     570  S.E.2d
440,                                                                          461                                   (2002)                                  (noting  that                 “[a]n  indigent  defendant  has  no
right  to  replace  appointed  counsel  merely  because  the  defendant
is  dissatisfied  with  the  present  attorney’s  work  or  because  of  a
disagreement  over  trial  tactics.”),  cert.  denied,  538  U.S.  986,
155 L.Ed.  2d  681  (2003).




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Specifically,    defendant    contends    that    he    repeatedly
informed  the  judge  that  his  defense  counsel  was  not                  “doing  a
good  job  representing  his  interests,  and  that  he  had  had  very
little  contact  with                                                        [defense  counsel]  before  trial”  and                     “he
wasn’t  sure                                                                 [defense  counsel]  had  his  best  interest  at  heart.”
Defendant  contends  that                                                    “[t]he  trial  court  did  not  conduct  a
serious  and  focused  inquiry  into  the  nature  of  the  conflict
between”   defendant   and   defense   counsel   and                         “was   unable   to
ascertain  whether  the  conflict  was  so  severe  that  it  would
render  counsel  incompetent  or  ineffective  to  represent  that
defendant.”                                                                  (emphasis  omitted).  Defendant  concludes  that  this
failure  to  investigate  amounted  to  an  abuse  of  discretion,  this
violation  of  his  constitutional  rights  was  presumed  prejudicial,
and  his  conviction  should  be  reversed  as  the  State  cannot  show
that this error was  “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Here,  defendant  makes  no  argument  regarding  any  conflict  of
interest.  See  Nelson,                                                      76  N.C.  App.  at                                          373,   333  S.E.2d  at   501.
The  trial  transcript  shows  that  at  two  separate  times  during  his
trial  defendant  voiced  his  desire  to  hire  new  counsel  and  have
his  appointed  counsel  dismissed.    However,  a  thorough  review  of
the  transcript  shows  that  a  majority  of  defendant’s  complaints
were  directed  towards  defense  counsel’s  choice  of  trial  strategy




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or  defendant’s  general  dissatisfaction  with  defense  counsel.    As
to  trial  strategy,  defendant  complained  that  defense  counsel  was
trying  to  coerce  him  into  taking  a  plea  bargain,  had  only  spent
50  hours  working  on  his  case,  and,  on  the  second  day,  it  appears
that  he  was  unhappy  with  defense  counsel’s  cross-examination  of
Detective   Walker.                                                            In   voicing   his   general   dissatisfaction,
defendant  stated  that  he  felt  defense  counsel                            “hasn’t  really
been  representing  me  the  best  way  that  his—that  I  feel  like  he
can[;]”     defense  counsel  did  not  have                                   “his  best  interest  at
heart[;]”     and  defendant  felt  the                                        “he                                               [had  not]  really  done
nothing  [sic]  for  [him].”    As  noted  above,  complaints  regarding
defendant’s  dissatisfaction  with  a  defendant’s  trial  counsel’s
work  or  trial  strategy  are  not  a  sufficient  basis  for  the
appointment  of  substitute  counsel.     See  Prevatte,                       356  N.C.  at
216,  570 S.E.2d at  461.
As   to   defendant’s   complaints   regarding   a   lack   of
communication  with  his  trial  counsel,  we  note  that  defendant  on
the  first  day  of  trial  complained  that  he  had  not  seen  his
counsel  prior  to  trial                                                      “like  once  every  eight  months.”    On  the
second  day  of  trial,  there  was  an  outburst  by  defendant  in  open
court  while  he  was  conferring  with  defense  counsel  during  the
cross-examination  of  Detective  Walker,  indicating  that  there




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were  some  communication  difficulties  between  defendant  and  his
trial  counsel.    Even  so,  we  find  nothing  in  the  record  to  show
that                                                                          “the  nature  of  the  conflict  between  defendant  and  counsel
[was]                                                                                                                                                                                                      .   such   as   would   render   counsel   incompetent   or
                                                                                                                                                  ineffective  to  represent”  defendant.  See  Thacker,   301  N.C.  at
352,                                                                          271   S.E.2d  at                                                    255.                                                     The  transcript  shows   that   after
defendant  voiced  his  complaints  there  were  several  instances
where  the  trial  court  stopped  the  trial  or  recessed  the  trial
early  so  that  defendant  could  confer  with  defense  counsel.    Even
after  defendant  complained  during  cross  examination  of  Detective
Walker  that  he  was  not  receiving  “a  fair  trial,”  the  trial  court
stopped  the  trial  and  gave  defendant  time  to  talk  with  defense
counsel  before  bringing  in  the  jury;  when  cross-examination
resumed,  defense  counsel  indicated  that  after  conferring  with
defendant  he  had  specific  questions  from  defendant  to  ask  the
witness.     Therefore,  we  cannot  say  that  there  was  a                 “complete
breakdown  in  communications”[,]  see  Nelson,  76  N.C.  App.  at  373,
333   S.E.2d  at                                                              501,   which  would  justify  the  appointment  of
substitute counsel.
As  to  defendant’s  arguments  regarding  the  trial  court’s
inquiry  into  defendant’s  request  for  substitute  counsel,  we  note
that   the   Thacker   Court   expressly   rejected   the   defendant’s




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argument                                                                      “that  failure  to  make  a  detailed  inquiry   [into  an
alleged  conflict  with  appointed  counsel]  amounts  to  a  per  se
violation  of  defendant’s  right  to  counsel.”  301  N.C.  at  353,  271
S.E.2d  at                                                                    255                                              (emphasis  added).     Our  Supreme  Court  held  that
“when   faced   with   a   claim   of   conflict   and   a   request   for
appointment  of  substitute  counsel,  the  trial  court  must  satisfy
itself  only  that  present  counsel  is  able  to  render  competent
assistance  and  that  the  nature  or  degree  of  the  conflict  is  not
such  as  to  render  that  assistance  ineffective.”    Id.  at  353,  271
S.E.2d  at  256.    Here,  as  noted  above,  defendant  twice  requested
substitute  counsel.    In  the  first  instance,  defendant’s  concerns
were  based  on  a  disagreement  as  to  defense  counsel’s  trial
strategy,  a  lack  of  communication  between  defendant  and  defense
counsel,  and  defendant’s  general  dissatisfaction  with  defense
counsel.     After  hearing  defendant’s  concerns,  the  State  argued
that  appointment  of  substitute  counsel  would  not  be  appropriate
as   defense   counsel   had   been                                           “work[ing]   diligently”   on
defendant’s  case,  including  filing  motions  on  his  behalf,  and
another  attorney  would  just  delay  the  case.                             We  note  that
defense  counsel  had  filed  two  pre-trial  motions  on  behalf  of
defendant.     The  trial  court  agreed  with  the  comments  from  the
State,  and  further  noted  that  the  case  was  five  years  old,  that




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he  had  handled  many  cases  with  defense  counsel,  and  that  defense
counsel  was                                                                   “very  experienced”  and   “very  competent.”  The  trial
court  denied  defendant’s  motion  and  gave  them  an  opportunity  to
“talk among yourselves.”
On  the  second  day  of  trial,  defendant  again  voiced  his
dissatisfaction  with  defense  counsel’s  representation,  stated
that  he  wanted  to  hire  his  own  lawyer,  claimed  that  he  was  not
getting  a  fair  trial,  and  disagreed  with  defense  counsel’s  trial
strategy  regarding  the  questions  defense  counsel  was  asking
Detective  Walker  on  cross-examination.    The  trial  court,  after
listening  to  defendant’s  concerns,  told  defendant  that  defense
counsel  had  “tried  a  lot  of  cases,  and  he’s  practiced  law  a  long
time.     So  I  do  want  to  encourage  you  to  listen  to  his  advice
about  what  can  be  asked  and  what  can’t  be  asked.”     The  trial
court  then  stopped  the  trial  and  gave  defendant  time  to  talk
with  defense  counsel  before  bringing  in  the  jury.     In  both
instances,  the  trial  court  made  sufficient  inquiry  to  determine
that   the   nature   of   the   conflicts   were   defendant’s   general
dissatisfaction  with  defense  counsel,  communication  problems,
and  trial  strategy.    None  of  the  circumstances  surrounding  these
complaints,  as  determined  above,  were  such  as  to  render  defense
counsel’s  assistance  ineffective.     The  trial  court  also  voiced




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his  confidence  in  defense  counsel,  noting  his  competence,  trial
experience,  and  diligent  work  on  defendant’s  case.    Therefore,
having   learned                                                              “that   present   counsel                                   [was]   able   to   render
competent  assistance  and  that  the  nature  or  degree  of  the
conflict                                                                      [was]   not   such   as   to   render   that   assistance
ineffective[,]”  see  Thacker,  301  N.C.  at  353,  271  S.E.2d  at  256,
the   trial   court   did   not   abuse   its   discretion   in   denying
defendant’s motions for substitute counsel.
IV.   Mistrial
Defendant  next  contends  that  “the  trial  court  erred  in  not
declaring  a  mistrial  when  three  law  enforcement  officers  walked
through  the  jury  assembly  room  in  the  presence  of  some  jurors.”
Defendant  argues  that  the  trial  court  should  have  conducted  an
inquiry  with  jurors  pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  15A-1211(b)  to
determine  if  the  contact  by  the  officers  had  been  prejudicial  to
defendant,   as   these   were   three   witnesses   for   the   State.
Defendant  concludes  that  it  was  error  for  the  trial  court  not  to
grant  his  motion  for  a  mistrial                                          “because  the  integrity  of  this
verdict  is  in  doubt”  due  to  these  officers                             “marching  through
[the]  jury  room”  and  there  “was  no  way  to  know  what  the  impact
of this event might be on the objectivity of the jurors.”




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Generally,                                                                     “the  trial  court  possesses  broad  discretionary
powers  to  conduct  a  fair  and  just  trial.”    State  v.  Garcell,  363
N.C.                                                                           10,                                                   44,                         678  S.E.2d                                                                618,                                                             639                                                             (citation  and  quotation  marks
                                                                                                                                     omitted),  cert.  denied,                                                                              ___  U.S.                                                        ___,                                               175  L.Ed.   2d                                 362      (2009).
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  15A-1061 states, in pertinent part, that
[u]pon  motion  of  a  defendant  or  with  his
concurrence  the  judge  may  declare  a  mistrial
at  any  time  during  the  trial.     The  judge
must  declare  a  mistrial  upon  the  defendant’s
motion  if  there  occurs  during  the  trial  an
error  or  legal  defect  in  the  proceedings,  or
conduct   inside   or   outside   the   courtroom,
resulting   in   substantial   and   irreparable
prejudice to the defendant’s case.
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  15A-1061  (2007).    But  “[n]ot  every  disruptive
event  which  occurs  during  trial  automatically  requires  the  court
to  declare  a  mistrial.”    State  v.  Allen,  141  N.C.  App.  610,  617,
541  S.E.2d                                                                    490,                                                  496                         (2000)                                                                                                                                      (citation  omitted),  disc.  review
                                                                               denied  and  appeal  dismissed,                                                                                                                              353   N.C.                                                       382,                                                            547   S.E.2d                       816
(2001).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     “Our  standard  of  review  when  examining  a  trial  court’s
                                                                                                                                                                 denial  of  a  motion  for  mistrial  is  abuse  of  discretion.”  State
v.  Simmons,                                                                                                                         191  N.C.  App.             224,                                                                       227,                                                             662  S.E.2d                                        559,         561                                (2008)
(citation   omitted).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        We   find   that   the   case   before   us   is
analogous  to  State  v.  Washington,  141  N.C.  App.  354,  540  S.E.2d
388                                                                            (2000),  disc.  review  denied,                       353  N.C.                   396,                                                                       547  S.E.2d                                                      427
(2001).




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In  Washington,  the  defendant  argued  that                            “the  trial  court
erred  by  not  declaring  a  mistrial  sua  sponte  after  a  bailiff
entered  the  jury  room  during  deliberations.”     Id.  at            375,                           540
S.E.2d at  402  (footnote omitted).    This Court stated that
[a]ppellate  courts  are  deferential  to  the
trial  court’s  exercise  of  discretion  in  this
area  because  a  “‘trial  judge  is  in  a  better
position  to  investigate  any  allegations  of
misconduct,  question  witnesses  and  observe
their    demeanor    and    make    appropriate
                                                                                                        findings.’”     State  v.  Rutherford,                                                                  70  N.C.
App.                                                                     674,                           677,                                       320  S.E.2d                             916,   919           (1984)
(citation omitted).
“Misconduct  must  be  determined  by  the  facts
and  circumstances  of  each  case  .  .  .                              .”  Id.
“‘The   circumstances   must   be   such   as   not
merely   to   put   suspicion   on   the   verdict,
because  there  was  opportunity  and  a  chance
for  misconduct,  but  that  there  was  in  fact
misconduct.  When  there  is  merely  matter  of
suspicion,  it  is  purely  a  matter  in  the
                                                                                                        discretion  of  the  presiding  judge.’”                                                  [State
                                                                         v.  Sneeden,                   274  N.C.                                  498,                                    504,   164  S.E.2d
190,                                                                     195                                                                       (1968)](quoting  Lewis  v.  Fountain,
168 N.C.  277,  279,  84 S.E.  278,  279  (1915)).
The  great  weight  of  authority  sustains  the
rule  that                                                               .  a  verdict  will  not  be
disturbed  because  of  a  conversation  between
a  juror  and  a  stranger  when  it  does  not
appear  that  such  conversation  was  prompted
by  a  party,  or  that  any  injustice  was  done
to  the  person  complaining,  and  he  is  not
shown  to  have  been  prejudiced  thereby,  and
this  is  true  of  applications  for  new  trial
by  the  accused  in  a  criminal  case  as  well  as
of  applications  made  in  civil  actions.  .  .
[A]nd  if  a  trial  is  really  fair  and  proper,
it  should  not  be  set  aside  because  of  mere




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suspicion   or   appearance   of   irregularity
which   is   shown   to   have   done   no   actual
injury.   Generally   speaking,   neither   the
common   law   nor   statutes   contemplate   as
ground   for   a   new   trial   a   conversation
between  a  juror  and  a  third  person  unless  it
is  of  such  a  character  as  is  calculated  to
impress  the  case  upon  the  mind  of  the  juror
in  a  different  aspect  than  was  presented  by
the  evidence  in  the  courtroom,  or  is  of  such
a  nature  as  is  calculated  to  result  in  harm
to  a  party  on  trial.  The  matter  is  one
resting  largely  within  the  discretion  of  the
trial judge.
Id.                                                                           (alteration   in   original)   (citation
omitted).
Id.  at  376-77,  540  S.E.2d  at  403.    In  concluding  that  there  was
no  abuse  of  discretion  as  “there  was  no  misconduct  affecting  the
jury”  and  overruling  the  defendant’s  argument,  this  Court  stated
that
the  evidence  showed  that  when  the  intrusion
by  the  bailiff  became  known  to  the  court,
the  trial  judge  put  the  bailiff  under  oath,
determined   that   the   bailiff   had,   without
authorization  of  the  court,  knocked  on  the
door   of   the   jury   room,   that   he   did   so
because  another  bailiff  had  asked  him  to
retrieve  some  magazines  for  defendant,  that
the  bailiff  said  nothing  to  the  jurors  and
the  jurors  said  nothing  to  him,  and  that  he
heard   no   deliberations   and   had   no   other
contact  with  the  jurors.  Neither  the  State
nor                                                                           defendant                      accepted    the   court’s
invitation  to  make  further  inquiry  of  the
bailiff,  and  defendant  did  not  then  seek  a
mistrial.
Id. at  377,  540 S.E.2d at  403.




-20-
Likewise  here,  the  record  shows  no  misconduct  affecting  the
jury.     Defense  counsel  raised  a  motion  for  mistrial  on  the
second  day  of  trial  stating  that  three  police  officers  and
witnesses  in  the  trial,  Detective  Walker,  Detective  Roth  and
Officer  Ruth  Steward,  had  walked  through  the  jury  assembly  room
on  their  way  to  court  that  morning  and  two  members  of  the  jury
were  in  that  room.    After  hearing  arguments  from  both  sides,  the
trial    court    stated    that    the    contact    with    jurors    was
“inadvertent”  as  there  was  no  conversation  between  the  officers
and    the    jurors    and    denied    the    motion    for    mistrial.
Subsequently,  defense  counsel  requested  that  the  officers  tell
what  happened  under  oath.     The  officers  stated  that  they  were
told  to  be  in  the  courtroom  by                                          9:15  a.m.  to  talk  with  the
prosecutor   but   because   the   courtroom   door   was   locked,   the
officers   sought   access   to   the   courtroom   through   what   they
thought  was  the  grand  jury  room.    However,  this  room,  which  had
previously  been  used  as  the  grand  jury  room,  was  now  being  used
as   the   jury   assembly   room;   they   did   not   notice   the   sign
indicating  that  it  was  the  jury  assembly  room.     There  was  no
conversation  with  jurors  and,  even  though  they  noticed  a  woman
coming  out  of  the  bathroom  and  another  man  standing  in  the  room,
they  did  not  make  eye  contact  with  them  and  quickly  exited  the




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room.     Like  the  baliff  in  Washington,  the  officers  here  said
nothing  to  the  jurors,  the  jurors  made  no  comments  to  the
officers,  and  the  officers  did  not  even  make  eye  contact  with
the  jurors.    The  contact  was  inadvertent,  brief,  and  ultimately
harmless.     Also,  we  note  that  unlike  Washington,  in  which  the
contact  was  made  during  jury  deliberations,  here  the  contact  was
in  the  jury  assembly  room  before  trial  on  the  second  day.
Because  defendant’s  arguments  point  to  a                                 “mere  suspicion  or
appearance  of  irregularity”  but  the  record  shows                        “no  actual
injury”   by   the   officers’   contact   with   the   jurors,   see
Washington,  141  N.C.  App.  at  376-77,  540  S.E.2d  at  403,  we  will
not  set  aside  the  verdict  and  hold  that  the  trial  court  did  not
abuse   its   discretion   in   denying   defendant’s   motion   for   a
mistrial.                                                                     We  need  not  address  defendant’s  argument  regarding
his  habitual  felon  status  as  that  argument  is  based  on  errors  in
his  conviction  for  possession  of  cocaine.    However,  we  find  no
error in defendant’s trial for possession of cocaine.
For  the  foregoing  reasons,  we  find  no  error  in  defendant’s
trial.1
1                                                                             On                                                         26  April                                                         2012,  defendant  filed  a  pro  se  motion                  “for
                                                                                                                                                     appropriate  relief  from  his  current  sentence.”                                                 However,  as
noted  above,  defendant  is  represented  by  appellate  counsel  in
this  appeal.                                                                 Our  Supreme  Court  has  stated  that                     “[h]aving
elected   for   representation   by   appointed   defense   counsel,




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NO ERROR.
Judges HUNTER, Robert C. and ERVIN concur.
defendant  cannot  also  file  motions  on  his  own  behalf  or  attempt
to  represent  himself.  Defendant  has  no  right  to  appear  both  by
himself  and  by  counsel.”    State  v.  Grooms,  353  N.C.  50,  61,  540
S.E.2d                                                                         713,                                                     721           (2000)   (citations  omitted),  cert.  denied,   534
U.S.  838,  151  L.Ed.  2d  54  (2001);  see  State  v.  Parton,  303  N.C.
55,                                                                            61,                                                      277  S.E.2d   410,     415                                     (1981)   (stating  that   “a  party  has
the  right  to  appear  in  propria  persona  or,  in  the  alternative,
by  counsel”  but                                                              “[t]here  is  no  right  to  appear  both  in  propria
persona  and  by  counsel.”),  overruled  on  other  grounds  by  State
v.  Freeman,  314  N.C.  432,  437-38,  333  S.E.2d  743,  746-47  (1985);
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  1-11  (2007).    As  there  is  no indication  in  the
record  that  defendant’s  appellate  counsel  has  withdrawn  from  his
representation   of   defendant,   we   dismiss   defendant’s   pro   se
motion.

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