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NO. COA12-243
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  6 November  2012
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.                                                                      Wilkes County
                                                                        No.  11 CRS  708-717
JONATHAN RUSS MINTON,
Defendant.
1.                                                                      Conversion                                      -  by  bailee    -  motion  to  dismiss   -  intent  to
defraud
The  trial  court  did  not  err  by  failing  to  grant
defendant’s  motion  to  dismiss  the  conversion  of  property  by
bailee  charges.     The  State  presented  substantial  evidence
defendant  intended  to  defraud  Mr.  Center  by  failing  to
comply  with  the  terms  of  their  agreement  and  failing  to  use
the money for its intended purpose.
2.                                                                      Damages  and  Remedies                          -  restitution   -  amount                -  ability  to
pay
The   trial   court   did   not   err   in   a   conversion   of
property  by  bailee  case  by  ordering  defendant  pay  $5,000  in
restitution.                                                            The  evidence  at  trial  supported  the  ten
convictions  for  conversion,  and  thus,  it  supported  the
restitution  amount  of  ten                                            $500  payments.                                 Further,  the
trial  court  complied  with  N.C.G.S.  §  15A-1340.36(a)  because
evidence  of  defendant’s  financial  condition  and  ability  to
pay restitution was established at trial.




NO. COA12-243
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  6 November  2012
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.                                                                           Wilkes County
                                                                             No.  11 CRS  708-717
JONATHAN RUSS MINTON,
Defendant.
Appeal  by  defendant  from  order  entered  22  September  2011  by
Judge  Lindsay  R.  Davis,  Jr.  in  Wilkes  County  Superior  Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  29 August  2012.
Attorney  General  Roy  Cooper,  by  Special  Deputy  Attorney
General Gayl M. Manthei, for the State.
Charlotte Gail Blake for defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.
Defendant  Jonathan  Minton  appeals  from  judgment  entered
against  him  after  a  jury  found  him  guilty  of  ten  counts  of
conversion  of  property  by  bailee  in  violation  of  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.
§                                                                            14-168.1.     On  appeal,  defendant  argues  that  the  trial  court
erred  by:                                                                   (1)  denying  defendant’s  motion  to  dismiss;  and                    (2)
ordering  defendant  to  pay                                                 $5000  in  restitution.    After  careful
review, we find no error.
Background




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Defendant  was  indicted  for  ten  counts  of  obtaining  property
by  false  pretenses  and  ten  counts  of  conversion  of  property  by
bailee  (“conversion”).    The cases were joined for trial.
The  evidence  at  trial  tended  to  establish  the  following:
In                                                                             2005,  defendant  agreed  to  buy  real  property  from  Harold  and
Teresa  Cantrell                                                               (collectively                                                          “the  Cantrells”  or,  individually,
“Mr.  Cantrell”  or                                                            “Ms.  Cantrell”)  in  Wilkes  County.    Under  the
terms  of  their  agreement,  defendant  would  pay  the  Cantrells
$1000  per  month  for  a  total  of                                           80  months.    Once  defendant  paid
them  $75,000,  the  Cantrells  would  deed  the  property  to  him.    The
parties  all  signed  a  promissory  note  setting  forth  the  details
of  this  agreement.     The  property  was  a  tract  of  land  that
included  two  trailers,  a  barn,  and  two  chicken  houses.     Ms.
Cantrell,  who  keeps  the  books  on  the  property,  testified  that
defendant  paid  a  total  of  $35,000,  but  he  has  not  made  a  monthly
payment since July  2008.
In                                                                             2005,  defendant  approached  Ed  Center                               (“Mr.  Center”)  to
see  if  he  was  interested  in  paying  half  of  the  monthly  payment.
Mr.   Center   contended   that   he   had   a   verbal   agreement   with
defendant  to  pay  half  of  the  monthly  payment  in  order  to
eventually  share  ownership  of  the  land.     However,  defendant
alleged  that  they  only  had  a  rental  agreement  whereby  Mr.  Center




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would  rent  one  of  the  trailers  on  the  property,  and  they  never
had  an  agreement  to  share  ownership.    Mr.  Center  testified  that
he  began  making  monthly  payments  to  defendant  in  2005;  however,
he does not have any receipts for those payments.
Sometime  in  August  2009,  Mr.  Center  claimed  that  defendant
told  him  that  he  had  not  made  a  payment  to  Mr.  Cantrell  in  nine
months.    In  September  2009,  after  defendant  told  him  they  could
avoid  eviction  by  paying  Mr.  Cantrell                                     $5000,  Mr.  Center  gave
defendant  a  certified  check  in  the  amount  of                            $2500  to  give  Mr.
Cantrell.    The check was dated  29 September  2009.
At  the  end  of  the  State’s  evidence,  defendant  made  a  motion
to  dismiss  all  charges.     The  trial  court  dismissed  the  ten
counts  of  obtaining  property  by  false  pretenses  because  the
State  presented  no  evidence  other  than  defendant’s  failure  to
comply  with  his  contractual  obligation  to  establish  his  intent
to  defraud.    However,  the  trial  court  denied  defendant’s  motion
to dismiss the ten counts of conversion.
The  trial  court  instructed  the  jury  that  the  ten  counts  of
conversion  were  based  on  the  ten  alleged  acts  of  conversion
defendant  committed  each  month,  when  Mr.  Center  paid  him               $500,
from  August                                                                   2008  to  May               2009.    The  jury  found  defendant  guilty
of all ten counts.




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Defendant  was  sentenced  to  six  to  eight  months,  but  the
trial  court  suspended  his  sentence  and  placed  defendant  on         36
months   of   supervised   probation.                                      At   sentencing,   the   State
requested  the  trial  court  order  defendant  to  pay                    $5000   in
restitution  based  on  the  ten  payments  of                             $500  from  Mr.  Center,
which  defendant  was  convicted  of  converting.     The  trial  court
granted  the  State’s  request  and  ordered  defendant  to  pay  Mr.
Center  $5000 restitution.
Arguments
Defendant  first  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  by  not
granting  defendant’s  motion  to  dismiss  the  conversion  charges
because  the  State  failed  to  present  substantial  evidence  that
defendant    possessed    the    necessary    intent    to    defraud.
Specifically,  defendant  contends  that  the  only  evidence  the
State  offered  to  establish  intent  was  defendant’s  failure  to
comply  with  an  alleged  contractual  obligation.    Since  N.C.  Gen.
Stat.                                                                      §                                14-100(b)   specifically   states   that   evidence   of
nonfulfillment  of  a  contract  obligation,  standing  alone,  does
not  establish  the  requisite  intent  to  sustain  an  obtaining
property   by   false   pretenses   charge,   defendant   argues   that
nonfulfillment  of  a  contract  obligation  is  not,  or  should  not
be,  enough  to  establish  the  requisite  intent  for  a  conversion




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charge.    We do not agree.
“This  Court  reviews  the  trial  court’s  denial  of  a  motion  to
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          dismiss  de  novo.”     State  v.  Smith,   186  N.C.  App.                                  57,    62,           650
S.E.2d                                                                       29,                                                             33                                                                           (2007).                                     “Upon  defendant’s  motion  for  dismissal,
the  question  for  the  Court  is  whether  there  is  substantial
evidence                                                                     (1)  of  each  essential  element  of  the  offense  charged,
or  of  a  lesser  offense  included  therein,  and  (2)  of  defendant’s
being  the  perpetrator  of  such  offense.  If  so,  the  motion  is
                                                                                                                                             properly  denied.”     State  v.  Fritsch,                                                                               351  N.C.                                        373,   378,          526
                                                                                                                                             S.E.2d  451,  455,  cert.  denied,  531  U.S.  890,  148  L.  Ed.  2d  150
(2000)                                                                                                                                       (quoting  State  v.  Powell,                                                 299  N.C.                                   95,                                              98,    261  S.E.2d
114,                                                                         117                                                             (1980)).                                                                                                                 “Substantial   evidence   is   such   relevant
                                                                                                                                             evidence  as  a  reasonable  mind  might  accept  as  adequate  to
                                                                                                                                             support  a  conclusion.”     State  v.  Smith,                                                                           300  N.C.                                        71,    78,           265
                                                                                                                                             S.E.2d  164,  169  (1980).
                                                                                                                                             Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  14-168.1  (2011),
                                                                                                                                             [e]very  person  entrusted  with  any  property
                                                                                                                                             as  bailee                                                                   .  who  fraudulently  converts
                                                                                                                                             the  same                                                                    .  to  his  own  use,  or  secretes
it  with  a  fraudulent  intent  to  convert  it  to
his  own  use,  shall  be  guilty  of  a  Class                              1
misdemeanor.    If,  however,  the  value  of  the
property  converted                                                          .  is  in  excess  of
four  hundred  dollars  ($400.00),  every  person
so  converting  or  secreting  it  is  guilty  of  a
Class H felony.
Bailment  is  defined  as  the  “delivery  of  personal  property  by  one




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person                                                                        (the  bailor)  to  another                                      (the  bailee)  who  holds  the
property  for  a  certain  purpose,  usu.                                     [sic]  under  an  express  or
implied-in-fact  contract.”    Black’s  Law  Dictionary                       163  (9th  ed.
2009).    Intent  to  defraud,  as  in  cases  of  embezzlement,  may  be
established  by  direct  evidence  or  inferences  from  the  facts  and
circumstances.    See  generally  State  v.  McLean,  209  N.C.  38,  40,
182  S.E.  700,  701-02  (noting  that  for  purposes  of  embezzlement,
fraudulent  intent                                                            “may  be  shown  by  direct  evidence,  or  by
evidence  of  facts  and  circumstances  from  which  it  may  reasonably
be inferred”).
Here,  defendant’s  argument  is  based  on  his  contention  that
because                                                                       “[e]vidence  of  nonfulfillment  of  a  contract  obligation”
is  not  enough  to  establish  intent  for  an  obtaining  property  by
false  pretenses  charge,                                                     N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                               §                                14-100(b),  this
evidence  should  not  be  sufficient  to  establish  the  requisite
intent   to   defraud   for   a   conversion   charge.                        While   the
legislature  decided  to  specifically  include  that  limitation  in
the  obtaining  property  by  false  pretenses  statute,  it  chose  to
not  include  it  in  the  conversion  statute.    If  we  were  to  accept
defendant’s  argument,  we  would  have  to  rewrite  the  statute,  not
interpret  it,  to  include  that  limitation,  and  we  are  without
constitutional  authority  to  do  so.    See  N.C.  Const.  art.  I,  §  6




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(2011)                                                                        (noting  that  the  powers  of  the  legislative,  judiciary,
and   executive   branches   of   government   are                            “separate   and
distinct”);  News  and  Observer  Pub.  Co.  v.  Easley,  182  N.C.  App.
14,  19-20,  641  S.E.2d  698,  702  (2007)  (holding  that  “[art.  I,  §
6]  .  .  .  distributes  the  power  to  make  law  to  the  legislature,
the  power  to  execute  law  to  the  executive,  and  the  power  to
interpret   law   to   the   judiciary”).                                     Therefore,   defendant’s
argument is without merit.
Moreover,  a  review  of  the  record  shows  that  the  State
presented   substantial   evidence   that   defendant   intended   to
defraud  Mr.  Center.  Here,  taking  the  evidence  in  a  light  most
favorable   to   the   State,   defendant   and   Mr.   Center   had   an
agreement  where  Mr.  Center,  the  bailor,  would  give  defendant,
the  bailee,                                                                  $500  for  a  specific  purpose                                 —  to  use  the  money  to
pay  the  Cantrells  to  obtain  ownership  of  the  land.     Although
defendant  took  Mr.  Center’s  money,  he  did  not  use  it  for  its
intended  purpose  of  paying  the  Cantrells.    This  failure  to  do  so
is  established  by  Ms.  Cantrell’s  testimony  that  defendant  has
not  made  a  payment  since  July                                            2008  even  though  Mr.  Center
testified  he  had  been  giving  defendant  money   in  subsequent
months.     Therefore,  the  State  presented  substantial  evidence
defendant  intended  to  defraud  Mr.  Center  by  failing  to  comply




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with  the  terms  of  their  agreement  and  failing  to  use  the  money
for its intended purpose.
In  a  separate  but  related  argument,  defendant  also  claims
that  there  was  not  substantial  evidence  to  establish  intent  to
defraud  because  the  alleged  contract  between  himself  and  Mr.
Center  would  be  unenforceable  in  civil  court  due  to  the  statute
of  frauds.    See  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  22-2  (2011)  (stating  that  any
contracts  to  sell  or  convey  land  which  are  not                        “in  writing  and
signed  by  the  party  to  be  charged”  are  void).     Defendant  does
not  cite  any  authority  in  support  of  his  argument,  and  we  are
unable  to  find  any  caselaw  addressing  the  issue  of  whether
intent  to  defraud  for  a  criminal  charge  may  be  based  on  a
party’s  failure  to  comply  with  an  unenforceable  contract.    Thus,
since  there  is  no  prohibition  on  using  unenforceable  contracts
to   establish   substantial   evidence   to   support   a   conversion
charge, we find defendant’s argument unpersuasive.
Next,  defendant  argues  the  trial  court  erred  in  ordering
defendant  pay                                                                $5000  in  restitution.     Specifically,  defendant
contends  the  trial  court  erred  because  the  amount  was  not
supported  by  the  evidence,  as  required  by  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  15A-
1340.36(a),    and                                                            by                                                     failing    to    consider    defendant’s
                                                                              circumstances,  in  violation  of  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.   §                                          15A-1340.36.




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We disagree.
Pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  15A-1340.36(a)  (2011),  “[t]he
amount  of  restitution  must  be  limited  to  that  supported  by  the
record.”                                                                                                                                                       Our  Court  has  held  that                                                                               “the  restitution  amount
                                                                                                                                                                                             requested  by  the  State  must  be  supported  by  evidence  adduced  at
                                                                                                          trial  or  at  sentencing.”    State  v.  Calvino,                                                                                                             179  N.C.  App.                 219,
223,                                                                       632   S.E.2d                   839,                                                 843                           (2006)                                                                      (internal   quotation   marks
omitted).                                                                                                                                                                                    Here,   the   evidence   at   trial   supported   the   ten
convictions   for   conversion;   thus,   the   evidence   at   trial
supported the restitution amount of ten  $500 payments.
In  addition  to  ordering  restitution  that  is  supported  by
the evidence, N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  15A-1340.36(a) also states that:
[i]n  determining  the  amount  of  restitution
to   be   made,   the   court   shall   take   into
consideration  the  resources  of  the  defendant
including   all   real   and   personal   property
owned   by   the   defendant   and   the   income
derived  from  the  property,  the  defendant’s
ability  to  earn,  the  defendant’s  obligation
to  support  dependents,  and  any  other  matters
that  pertain  to  the  defendant’s  ability  to
make   restitution,   but   the   court   is   not
required   to   make   findings   of   fact   or
conclusions of law on these matters.
                                                                           In  State  v.  Smith,          90  N.C.  App.                                                                     161,                                                                        168,                            368  S.E.2d   33,                    38
                                                                           (1988),  aff’d  per  curiam,                                                        323  N.C.                     703,                                                                                                        374  S.E.2d   866,  cert.
denied,                                                                    490  U.S.                      1100,                                                104  L.  Ed.                  2d                                                                          1007                                          (1989),  this  Court
found  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  ordering  the  defendant  to




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pay  restitution  where  it                                                  “did  not  consider  any  evidence  of
defendant’s  financial  condition.”     Our  Supreme  Court  has  also
concluded  that  although  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                 §                                                  15A-1340.36(a)  does
not  require  the  trial  court  to  enter  written  findings  of  fact
regarding  its  award  of  restitution,                                      “it  requires  the  court  to
take  into  consideration  the  resources  of  the  defendant,               [his]
ability  to  earn,                                                           [his]  obligation  to  support  dependents,  and
such  other  matters  as  shall  pertain  to                                 [his]  ability  to  make
restitution  or  reparation.”    State  v.  Hunter,  315  N.C.  371,  376,
338 S.E.2d  99,  103  (1986).
Here,  during  sentencing,  defendant’s  counsel  requested  the
trial  court  suspend  defendant’s  sentence  because  he  was  married
with  two  young  children.    While  the  trial  court  never  inquired
as   to   defendant’s   employment   status   or   support   obligations
during  the  sentencing  hearing,  there  was  evidence  presented  at
trial  to  establish  defendant’s  ability  to  pay  the  restitution.
Specifically,  defendant  and  his  wife  testified  that  around  the
time  they  appeared  in  court  regarding  the  Cantrells’  attempt  to
evict  them,  sometime  in  May                                              2010,  they  offered  to  buy  the  land
from  the  Cantrells  for  $37,500.    Moreover,  even  though  defendant
is  not  currently  working,  he  did  testify  that  he  had  been
employed  in  the   past,   and   he  did  not  offer  any  testimony




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establishing  he  is  unable  to  work.    Accordingly,  the  trial  court
complied  with  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                            §   15A-1340.36(a)  and  did  not  err
in  ordering  defendant  to  pay  restitution  because  evidence  of
defendant’s  financial  condition  and  ability  to  pay  restitution
was established at trial.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing reasons, we find no error.
No error.
Judges BRYANT and STEELMAN concur.

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