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STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL SIMS
NO. COA11-187
(Filed  4 October  2011)
1.                                                                     Appeal  and  Error  —  argument  not  raised  at  trial  —  not  heard
on appeal
A constitutional argument not raised at trial was not
heard on appeal.
2.                                                                     Indecent Liberties  — purpose  — sufficiency of evidence
There  was  sufficient  evidence  from  which  the  jury
could  infer  that  the  conduct  of  a  defendant  charged  with
indecent  liberties  was  for  the  purpose  of  arousing  or
gratifying sexual desire.
3.                                                                     Sexual  Offenders                                                        —  satellite-based  monitoring   —  subject
matter jurisdiction
Although  defendant  contended  that  a  trial  court  did
not  have  subject  matter  jurisdiction  to  require  defendant
to  enroll  in  a  satellite-based  monitoring  system  because  no
complaint  was  issued  and  no  summons  was  issued  under  the
Rules  of  Civil  Procedure,  the  trial  court  exercised  the
jurisdiction  conferred  upon  it  by  N.C.G.S.  §  14-208.40A  and
followed the procedures therein.
4.                                                                     Sexual  Offenders                                                        —  satellite-based  monitoring   —  indecent
liberties  — sexually violent crime
The  trial  court  did  not  err  in  requiring  defendant  to
enroll  in  satellite-based  monitoring  where  defendant  was
convicted   of   indecent   liberties   and   the   trial   court
erroneously  found  that  this  was  an  offense  against  a  minor.
The  crime  of  indecent  liberties  is  a  sexually  violent
offense as defined by N.C.G.S.  §  14-208.6(5).




NO. COA11-187
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  4 October  2011
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.                                                                           Buncombe County
No.  09 CRS  60008
CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL SIMS
Appeal   by   defendant   from   judgment   and   order   requiring
defendant  to  enroll  in  satellite-based  monitoring  both  entered
11  August                                                                   2010  by  Judge  Jesse  B.  Caldwell,  III  in  Buncombe
County  Superior  Court.    Heard  in  the  Court  of  Appeals  31  August
2011.
Attorney  General  Roy  Cooper,  by  Assistant  Attorney  General
R. Kirk Randleman, for the State
Robert W. Ewing, for defendant-appellant.
STEELMAN, Judge.
Where  defendant  failed  to  raise  constitutional  arguments  at
trial,  we  will  not  review  them  on  appeal.     Where  evidence  was
presented   that   defendant   was   involved   in   three   separate
incidents  at  a   Target  store   with  the  victim,  that  another
individual   had   a   similar   experience   with   defendant,   and
defendant  admitted  to  having  an  obsession  with  women’s  legs,  the




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trial  court  did  not  err  in  holding  that  the  State  had  presented
sufficient  evidence  for  the  charge  of  indecent  liberties  with  a
child  to  be  submitted  to  the  jury.    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  14-208.40A
conferred  subject  matter  jurisdiction  upon  the  trial  court  to
consider  whether  defendant  should  be  enrolled  in  satellite-based
monitoring.     Defendant  qualified  for  lifetime  satellite-based
monitoring  because  he  committed  a  “sexually  violent  offense”  as
defined in N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  14-208.6(5), and was a recidivist.
I.    Factual and Procedural History
On                                                                             20  July      2009,  C.G.  and  her  mother  were  shopping  in  a
Target  store.     C.G.  was  looking  at  Band-Aids  on  the  clearance
aisle  when  she  noticed  Christopher  Michael  Sims                          (defendant)
crouched  down  a  couple  of  feet  away  looking  at  her  legs.    C.G.
began  to  feel  uneasy  and  left  and  went  to  another  aisle  with  her
mother.    Defendant  approached  her  again,  fell  into  her,  touched
her   belt   area,   and   wrapped   his   hands   around   her.               After
defendant  grabbed  C.G.  he  immediately  let  go  and  said                  “Sorry,
Sorry.”     As  defendant  walked  away,  C.G.  told  her  mother  that
defendant  had  been  following  her,  and  C.G.  and  her  mother  left
the  area  and  went  to  another  aisle.    Defendant  approached  C.G.  a
third  time  as  she  and  her  mother  looked  for  toothpaste,  and
kneeled  down  approximately  six  to  eight  inches  from  her  legs.




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At  this  point  C.G.’s  mother  placed  herself  between  C.G.  and
defendant.     Defendant  left  the  area.     As  C.G.  and  her  mother
sought   out   a   manager   to   report   these   incidents,   they   saw
defendant  leave  the  store.     After  speaking  with  the  manager,
C.G.  and  her  mother  left  the  store.     They  later  returned  to
Target,   called   the   police,   and   identified   defendant   from
Target’s  security  videotapes.    On  1  February  2010,  defendant  was
indicted  for  taking  indecent  liberties  with  a  child  relating  to
the  20 July  2009 incident.
At    trial,    Amy    McIllwain                                               (McIllwain)    testified    she
encountered  defendant  at  a  Target  store  in  the  summer  of              2009.
McIllwain  was  leaving  Target  walking  along  the  sidewalk  when
defendant  pulled  up  next  to  her  in  his  car,  and  asked  if  he
could  pay  her  a  compliment.     He  then  stated  that  she  had  the
best  looking  legs  he  had  seen  all  day.    McIllwain  was  concerned
that  if  she  went  to  her  car  defendant  might  follow  her,  so  she
went  into  another  store.    Defendant  followed  her  into  the  store
and  approached  McIllwain  several  times  inside  the  store,  finally
cornering  her  and  asking  her  if  he  could  hug  her  legs.    At  that
point  McIllwain  told  defendant  to  back  off,  and  he  left  the
store.     McIllwain  saw  defendant’s  car  the  next  day,  took  a
picture  of  his  license  plate,  and  reported  the  incidents  to




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police.                                                                        McIllwain   also   identified   defendant   from   a   photo
located on a government-regulated website.
Anne   Benjamin,   a   detective   with   the   Buncombe   County
Sheriff’s  Office,  testified  that  she  interviewed  defendant  as
part  of  her  investigation  of  the  incident  involving  C.G.    During
this  interview,  defendant  stated  that  he  had  admitted  to  his
mom,  his  dad,  and  his  wife  that  he  had  an  obsession  with  women’s
legs.
On  11  August  2010,  a  jury  found  defendant  guilty  of  taking
incident  liberties  with  a  child.    Defendant  was  sentenced  to  an
active  term  of  nineteen  to  twenty-three  months  imprisonment.
Based  upon  defendant  being  a  recidivist,  he  was  required  to
enroll  in  satellite-based  monitoring  (SBM)  for  the  remainder  of
his natural life, upon his release from prison.
Defendant appeals.
II.    Motions to Dismiss
In  his  first  argument,  defendant  contends  the  trial  court’s
denial   of   his   motions   to   dismiss   the   charge   of   indecent
liberties  with  a  child  at  the  close  of  the  State’s  evidence  and
at  the  close  of  all  the  evidence  violated  his  rights  pursuant  to
the   Fifth   Amendment   of   the   United   States   Constitution,   as
applied  to  the  States  through  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  thereto,




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and  also  pursuant  to  Article  I,  Section  19  of  the  North  Carolina
Constitution.    We disagree.
A.    Constitutional Argument
                                                                                                                                                    The   North   Carolina   Supreme   Court   has   held   that                                                                            “[a]
                                                                                                                                                    constitutional  issue  not  raised  at  trial  will  generally  not  be
                                                                                                                                                    considered  for  the  first  time  on  appeal.    Because  defendant  did
not  raise                                                                                                                                          [this]  constitutional  issue[]  below,  we  decline  to
address                                                                                                                                             [it]  now.”     State  v.  Maness,                                          363  N.C.                                     261,   279,   677
S.E.2d                                                                        796,                                                       808        (2009)                                                                      (quotation  and  citation  omitted),  cert.
denied,  ___ U.S.  ___,  176 L. Ed.  2d  568  (2010).
The constitutional portion of this argument is dismissed.
B. Non-Constitutional Argument
Defendant’s   non-constitutional   argument   focuses   entirely
upon  whether  the  State  produced  sufficient  evidence  that  the
conduct  was                                                                  “for  the  purpose  of  arousing  or  gratifying  sexual
desire,”  an  element  of  the  offense  of  taking  indecent  liberties
with  a  child  under  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                      §                                                          14-202.1   (2009).                                                                     “[T]hat
the  action  was  for  the  purpose  of  arousing  or  gratifying  sexual
desire,  may  be  inferred  from  the  evidence  of  the  defendant’s
actions.”    State  v.  Rhodes,                                               321  N.C.                                                  102,       105,                                                                        361  S.E.2d                                   578,
580  (1987).    In reviewing  the  denial  of  a  motion to  dismiss  in a
criminal  case,                                                               “we  must  view  the  evidence  in  the  light  most




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favorable  to  the  State,  giving  the  State  the  benefit  of  all
reasonable  inferences.”    State  v.  Benson,  331  N.C.  537,  544,  417
S.E.2d                                                                        756,                                                 761    (1992)        (citing  State  v.  Small,   328  N.C.                  175,
180,  400 S.E.2d  413,  415  (1991)).
Considering  the  evidence  in  the  light  most  favorable  to  the
State,  there  were  three  separate  incidents  at  the  Target  store:
(1)  defendant  was  crouched  down  looking  at  the  juvenile’s  legs;
(2)   defendant                                                               “fell  into”  the  juvenile,  wrapping  his  hands
around  her;  and  (3)  defendant  kneeled  down,  six  to  eight  inches
away  from  the  juvenile’s  legs.     The  State  also  presented  the
testimony  of  McIllwain,  pursuant  to  Rule  404(b)  of  the  Rules  of
Evidence which was relevant to defendant’s intent and purpose.
Finally,  the  testimony  of  Detective  Benjamin  disclosed  that
defendant  admitted  to  having  an  obsession  with  women’s  legs.    On
appeal,  defendant  does  not  attack  the  admissibility  of  the
testimony of either McIllwain or Detective Benjamin.
Defendant  relies  upon  this  Court’s  decision  in  State  v.
Brown,                                                                        162  N.C.  App.                                      333,   590  S.E.2d   433                          (2004)  to  support  his
argument  that  the  State  failed  to  produce  sufficient  evidence
that  the  conduct  in  question  was  “for  the  purpose  of  arousing  or
gratifying  sexual  desire.”    The  defendant  in  Brown  provided  the
victim  with  post-discharge  services  following  her  stay  at  a




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youth  shelter.     Defendant  contacted  the  victim  by  phone.     A
taped  conversation  revealed  inappropriate  comments  by  defendant,
including  how  she  looked,  that  he  would  like  to  see  her,  his
feelings  towards  her,  and  how  he  perceived  her  feelings  towards
him.    Id. at  335,  590 S.E.2d  435.
We   held   that                                                            “the   conversations   were   neither   sexually
graphic  and  explicit  nor  were  they  accompanied  by  other  actions
tending  to  show  defendant’s  purpose  was  sexually  motivated.
[N]othing  in  the  record  indicate[d]  defendant’s  actions  emanated
from  a  desire  or  purpose  to  arouse  or  gratify  sexual  desire.”
Id.   at                                                                    338,                                               590   S.E.2d   at   436-37.   The   instant   case   is
distinguishable  from  Brown.    As  discussed  above,  in  addition  to
defendant’s    three    interactions    with    C.G.    and    multiple
interactions  with  McIllwain,  defendant  admitted  to  having  an
obsession   with   women’s   legs.                                          This   leads   to   the   logical
conclusion  that  defendant  engaged  in  this  conduct                     “for  the
purpose  of  arousing  and  gratifying  sexual  desire.”     In  Brown
there  was  no  evidence  that  defendant  had  engaged  in  similar  bad
acts  in  the  past,  or  that  he  had  any  particular  obsession  with
young girls.
Based  upon  all  of  the  above-cited  testimony,  there  was
sufficient   evidence   presented   by   the   State   of   defendant’s




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conduct  from  which  the  jury  could  infer  that  this  conduct  was
for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire.
This argument is without merit.
III.    Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In  his  second  argument,  defendant  contends  the  trial  court
did  not  have  subject  matter  jurisdiction  to  enter  the  order
requiring  defendant  to  enroll  in  the  SBM  program  because  no
complaint was filed and no summons was issued.    We disagree.
The   North   Carolina   Supreme   Court   held   in,   State   v.
Bowditch,                                                                    364  N.C.                                                    335,                                                   352,                        700  S.E.2d   1,              13   (2010),  stay
denied,                                                                      ___  N.C.                                                    ___,                                                   703  S.E.2d                 151           (2010),  that        “[t]he  SBM
program                                                                      []  was  enacted  with  the  intent  to  create  a  civil,
regulatory  scheme  to  protect  citizens  of  our  state  from  the
threat  posed  by  the  recidivist  tendencies  of  convicted  sex
offenders.”    Defendant  argues  that  since  no  summons  was  issued
in  accordance  with  North  Carolina  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure  3  and
4,   the  trial  court  had  no  jurisdiction  to  enter  an  order
imposing SBM.
                                                                             Jurisdiction  is                                                                                                    “[t]he  legal  power  and
                                                                                                                                          authority  of  a  court  to  make  a  decision  that
                                                                                                                                          binds  the  parties  to  any  matter  properly
                                                                                                                                          brought  before  it.”    Black's  Law  Dictionary
869                                                                          (8th  ed.2004).                                                                                                     The  court  must  have
subject                                                                                                                                   matter                                                 jurisdiction,               or
“[j]urisdiction  over  the  nature  of  the  case
and  the  type  of  relief  sought,”  in  order  to




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decide  a  case.     Id.  at                                                  870.                           “A  universal
principle  as  old  as  the  law  is  that  the
proceedings  of  a  court  without  jurisdiction
of   the   subject   matter   are   a   nullity.”
                                                                              Burgess  v.  Gibbs,                                         262  N.C.                                          462,                                                     465,                                                137
                                                                                                             S.E.2d  806,  808  (1964).
                                                                              The                                                         General                                            Assembly                                                                                                     “within
                                                                                                                                          constitutional   limitations,   can   fix   and
                                                                                                                                          circumscribe  the  jurisdiction  of  the  courts
                                                                                                                                          of  this  State.”     Bullington  v.  Angel,                                                                                                                    220
N.C.                                                                          18,                            20,                          16  S.E.2d                                         411,                                                     412                                                 (1941).
“Where   jurisdiction   is   statutory   and   the
Legislature  requires  the  Court  to  exercise
its  jurisdiction  in  a  certain  manner,  to
follow   a   certain   procedure,   or   otherwise
subjects  the  Court  to  certain  limitations,
an  act  of  the  Court  beyond  these  limits  is
in  excess  of  its  jurisdiction.”     Eudy  v.
                                                                                                             Eudy,                        288  N.C.                                          71,                                                      75,                                                 215  S.E.2d    782,          785
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      (1975),  overruled  on  other  grounds  by  Quick
                                                                                                             v.   Quick,                                                                     305   N.C.                                               446,                                                290   S.E.2d                 653
                                                                                                             (1982).
State                                                                         v.                             Wooten,                                                                         194  N.C.  App.                                          524,                                                527,           669  S.E.2d   749,        750
                                                                                                                                                                                             (2008),  disc.  review  denied  and  cert.  dismissed,                                                                                    363  N.C.   138,
676 S.E.2d  308  (2009).
The  trial  court  exercised  its  jurisdiction  pursuant  to  and
in  accordance  with  the  procedures  set  forth  in  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §
14-208.40A                                                                    (2009).    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.   §                            14-208.40A  requires  that
when  an  offender  is  convicted  of  a  reportable  conviction  under
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  14-208.6(4)  “during  the  sentencing  phase,  the
district  attorney  shall  present  to  the  court”  evidence  relating
to  the  offender’s  qualification  for  SBM,  the  offender  shall  have




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an  opportunity  to  refute  this  evidence,  and  if  the  court  finds
the  defendant  meets  the  qualifications  for  SBM  the  court  shall
order  the  offender  to  enroll  in  SBM.    The  trial  court  exercised
the  jurisdiction  conferred  upon  it  by  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                 §                                                       14-
208.40A, and followed the procedures set forth therein.
This argument is without merit.
IV.    Satellite-Based Monitoring
In  his  third  and  fourth  arguments,  defendant  contends  that
the  trial  court’s  finding  of  fact  number                                1(a)  in  the                                           “Judicial
Findings   and   Order   for   Sex   Offenders;”   that   defendant   was
convicted   of   a   reportable   conviction   because   defendant   was
convicted  of  an                                                             “offense  against  a  minor”  was  not  supported  by
competent  evidence,  and  the  trial  court’s  order  and  conclusion
of  law  requiring  defendant  to  enroll  in  SBM  was  not  supported  by
the competent findings of fact.    We disagree.
A.    Standard of Review
This  Court  stated  the  standard  of  review  for
orders  as  to  SBM  in  State  v.  Kilby:                                    “[w]e
review  the  trial  court’s  findings  of  fact  to
determine   whether   they   are   supported   by
competent  record  evidence,  and  we  review  the
trial  court’s  conclusions  of  law  for  legal
accuracy    and    to    ensure    that    those
conclusions  reflect  a  correct  application  of
law to the facts found.”




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State  v.  Singleton,  201  N.C.  App.  620,  626,  689  S.E.2d  562,  566
(2010),                                                                                                                                   (quoting  State  v.  Kilby,                                                  198  N.C.  App.   363,   366,   679
                                                                                                                                          S.E.2d  430,  432  (2009)),  disc.  review  allowed,  364  N.C.  131,  696
S.E.2d                                                                          697                                                       (2010)  and  disc.  review  improvidently  allowed,                                                          364
                                                                                                                                          N.C.  418,  700 S.E.2d  226  (2010).
B.    Analysis
The  trial  court  made  the  following  oral  finding  during  the
SBM  hearing,                                                                   “the  court  having  entered  judgment  in  the  above-
captioned  action,  finds  that  the  defendant                                 --  in  addition,  the
court   finds   that   the   defendant   has   been   convicted   of   a
reportable  conviction  under  GS  14-208.6.    And,  Madam  Clerk,  this
will  be  an  offense  against  a  minor                                        .”    This  finding  was
incorporated  into  the  trial  court’s  order  requiring  defendant  to
be  enrolled  in  SBM  for  his  natural  life.    Box  1(a)  was  marked  on
the  order  finding  the  defendant  to  have  been  convicted  of  a
reportable   conviction   under   N.C.   Gen.   Stat.                           §                                                         14-208.6,
specifically  an  “offense  against  a  minor”  under  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.
§                                                                               14-208.6(1i).1                                            (Administrative  Office  of  the  Courts  Form  CR-
615.).
1  The statute number defining an offense against a minor has been
changed to N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  14-208.6(1m).
Further,  this  statute  was  amended  by                                       2011  North  Carolina
General  Assembly  Session  Law  145,  House  Bill  200.    However,  this
amendment  pertained  strictly  to  the  way  in  which  the  Department




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The  State  acknowledges  that  this  finding  is  not  supported
by  the  evidence,  and  argues  that  the  Assistant  District  Attorney
marked  the  wrong  box  on  the  form.    The  State  goes  on  to  argue
that  the  box  indicating  that  defendant  committed  a                     “sexually
violent  offense”  should  have  been  checked.     In  light  of  the
trial  court’s  explicit  instructions  to  the  clerk,  set  forth
above, we hold this argument to be disingenuous.
                                                                              N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                                  §                                                     14-208.6(1m)  defines                         “offense  against  a
minor” as:
                                                                                                                                                                                                 any  of  the  following  offenses  if  the  offense
                                                                                                                                                                                                 is  committed  against  a  minor,  and  the  person
                                                                                                                                                                                                 committing  the  offense  is  not  the  minor’s
                                                                                                  parent:  G.S.                                                                                                                                        14-39                   (kidnapping),  G.S.                                    14-41
                                                                                                                                                         (abduction  of  children),  and  G.S.                                                                                                                              14-43.3
(felonious    restraint).    The    term    also
includes    the    following    if    the    person
convicted   of   the   following   is   not   the
minor’s  parent:  a  solicitation  or  conspiracy
to  commit  any  of  these  offenses;  aiding  and
abetting any of these offenses.
Defendant’s  conduct  in  this  case  does  not  fall  within  the  above
definition of an  “offense against a minor.”
The  State  further  argues  that  this  case  is  controlled  by
our  decision  in  State  v.  Williams,  ___  N.C.  App.  ___,  700  S.E.2d
774                                                                           (2010).             In  that  case,  we  held  that  the  trial  court’s
finding  that  the  offense  was  an  “offense  against  a  minor”  was  in
of  Corrections  was  referred  to,  and  did  not  affect  the  substance
of the statute in any way.




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error,   and   that   the   defendant’s   conviction   for   indecent
liberties  was  instead  a                                                    “sexually  violent  offense”  under  N.C.
Gen.  Stat.                                                                   §                                                                           14-208.6(5).    Based  upon  this  holding,  this  Court
held                                                                                                                                                      “that   the   trial   court’s   order   enrolling   Defendant   in
lifetime  SBM  is  supported  by  necessary  findings  such  that  the
Order  itself  is  not  erroneous.”    Williams,  ___  N.C.  App.  at  ___,
700 S.E.2d at  776.
We  hold  that  the  instant  case  is  indistinguishable  from
Williams.    The  defendant  in  this  case  was  convicted  of  indecent
liberties.    The  trial  court  erroneously  found  that  this  was  an
“offense  against  a  minor.”                                                 As  in   Williams,  the  crime  of
indecent  liberties  explicitly  is  a  “sexually  violent  offense”  as
defined by N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  14-208.6(5).
                                                                              While  we  question  the  wisdom  of  appellate  courts  engaging
                                                                              in  fact-finding  we  are  bound  by  the  indistinguishable  holding  in
Williams.     In  re  Civil  Penalty,                                         324  N.C.                                                                   373,                                                                 384,   379  S.E.2d
30,  37  (1989)  (citations omitted).
This argument is without merit.
NO ERROR, in part, AFFIRMED, in part.
Judges HUNTER, Robert C., and McCULLOUGH concur.

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