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NO. COA10-1143
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  16 August  2011
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.                                                                    Moore County
                                                                      No.  08 CRS  53833
MAURICE DONNELL WHITE
Constitutional   Law                                                  —   search   and   seizure                                             —   no   reasonable
                                                                      suspicion  for  stop  —  no  probable  cause  for  arrest  —  motion
to suppress improperly denied
The  trial  court  erred  in  a  possession  with  intent  to
sell  and  deliver  cocaine  and  possession  of  cocaine  case  by
concluding  the  police  had  reasonable  suspicion  to  conduct
an  investigatory  stop  and  in  denying  defendant’s  motion  to
suppress  the  State’s  evidence  obtained  pursuant  to  his
unlawful  seizure.     The  circumstances  did  not  provide  the
officers  with  reasonable  suspicion  necessary  to  justify  an
investigatory   stop   of   defendant   or   probable   cause   for
defendant’s arrest.




NO. COA10-1143
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  16 August  2011
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.                                                                            Moore County
                                                                              No.  08 CRS  53833
MAURICE DONNELL WHITE
Appeal  by  Defendant  from  denial  of  motions  to  suppress
entered                                                                       17  April                                 2009  by  Judge  Shannon  R.  Joseph  and   1  October
2009  by  Judge  R.  Stuart  Albright  and  judgment  entered                 12  May
2010  by  Judge  John  O.  Craig,  III  in  Moore  County  Superior  Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  24 March  2011.
Attorney  General  Roy  Cooper,  by  Assistant  Attorney  General
Jay L. Osborne, for the State.
Appellate  Defender  Staples  Hughes,  by  Assistant  Appellate
Defender Kathleen M. Joyce, for Defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.
Maurice  Donnell  White                                                       (“Defendant”)  appeals  the  denial  of
his   motions   to   suppress   evidence   in   connection   with   his
warrantless   arrest   for   possession   with   intent   to   sell   and
deliver  cocaine,  and  possession  of  cocaine.     Defendant  asserts
(1)  the  trial  court  erred  in  finding  the  police  conducted  a
lawful   investigatory   stop   based   on   reasonable   suspicion   of




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criminal  activity,  and  (2)  the  trial  court  erred  in  denying  his
motions   to   suppress   evidence   obtained   from   an   unlawful
investigatory  stop  in  violation  of  the  Fourth  Amendment  of  the
United  States  Constitution  and  analogous  provisions  of  the  North
Carolina Constitution.    We reverse.
I. Facts & Procedural History
The  State’s  evidence  tended  to  show  the  following.    On  the
2:00  p.m.  to  midnight  shift  of                                           15  August                             2008,  Detective  Brian
Edwards  and  Sergeant  Jack  Austin  of  the  Southern  Pines  Police
Department  were  on  patrol  in  an  unmarked  white  Dodge  Durango.
Sometime   after   dark,   the   officers   received   a   report   from
dispatch  complaining  of  loud  music  near  the  corner  of  Coates
Street  and  Shaw  Avenue.    Although  this  location  is  at  the  center
of  Brookside  Park  Apartments,  the  report  did  not  identify  the
apartment  complex  or  a  specific  apartment  within  it  as  the
source  of  the  music  complaint,  nor  did  it  identify  the  person
who  made  the  complaint.    Additionally,  Coates  Street  intersects
Shaw  Avenue  at  two  locations,  but  the  report  did  not  specify
either intersection as the subject of the loud music complaint.
Detective   Edwards   testified   that   he   had   been   to   the
Brookside  Park  Apartments  on                                               “several  occasions  throughout  the
evening”  and  had  made  between  fifty  and  one  hundred  drug  arrests
there  in  the  past.    He  also stated  he  was  aware of  other  arrests




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made  at  that  location  by  other  officers  of  his  department,  and
thus he believed it to be a high-crime area.
Responding  to  the  loud  music  complaint,  Detective  Edwards
saw  three  or  four  men,  including  Defendant,  standing  near  a
dumpster  near  the  intersection  of  Coates  and  Shaw  Streets.    The
officer  did  not  recognize  any  of  these  men,  but  decided  to
question  them  about  the  loud  music.    As  Detective  Edwards  turned
from  Shaw  Avenue  on  to  Coates  Street,  he  stopped  his  vehicle
about  thirty-five  feet  from  the  men  and  on  the  opposite  side  of
the dumpster.
The  officers  were  dressed  in  cargo  pants  and  blue  polo
shirts  with  “Police”  written  in  black  letters  on  the  back  and  an
embroidered  badge  on  the  front  left  chest.     The  officers’  car
was   unmarked   with   no   labels,   decals,   or   exterior   lights.
Detective  Edwards  testified  that  as  he  was  exiting  the  vehicle
and  turning  to  close  the  door,  he  heard  Sergeant  Austin  yell,
“Stop!  Police[,]”  and  he  “took  off  running  around  the  back  side
of  the  vehicle.”     Detective  Edwards  then                               “ran  to  the  opposite
side  of  the  Dumpster  so  [he]  could  see[,]”  and  observed  Sergeant
Austin  chasing  a  black  male  up  Shaw  Avenue.    Detective  Edwards
gave pursuit behind Sergeant Austin.
As  he  pursued  Defendant,  Detective  Edwards  shouted  for
Defendant  to  stop.    After  running  approximately  one  hundred  and
fifty   yards,   Defendant   tripped   and   fell   to   the   ground.




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Detective  Edwards  then  “jumped  on  top  of  him,”  rolled  Defendant
on  his  side  and  handcuffed  him.     Sergeant  Austin  then  arrived
and  helped  Defendant  to  his  feet.                                        After  Defendant  stood,
Sergeant  Austin  noticed  a  small  bag  on  the  ground  and  told
Detective  Edwards,                                                           “There’s  a  bag  of  crack  there  next  to  you.”
Detective  Edwards  visually  identified  the  bag’s  contents  as
crack cocaine.
Defendant  was  charged  with                                                 (1)  possession  with  intent  to
sell  and  deliver  cocaine,                                                  (2)  possession  of  cocaine,  and                    (3)
resisting,  delaying,  and  obstructing  a  public  officer  pursuant
to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  14-223.    On  8  December  2008,  a  grand  jury
issued  indictments  on  the  first  two  charges,  but  did  not  return
an   indictment   for   the   charge   of   resisting,   delaying,   and
obstructing a public officer.
On                                                                            15  January                                           2009,  Defendant  filed  a  Motion  to  Suppress
the  State’s  evidence  arguing  that  on  the  night  in  question
Defendant  was  not  engaging  in  any  activity  that  would  provide
reasonable  suspicion  necessary  to  justify  his  seizure.    He  also
argued  the  police  officers’  recovery  of  the  substance  the  State
contended  to  be  cocaine  was  the  result  of  an  unlawful  seizure.
The  Motion  came  on  for  a  hearing  on                                    18  February                                          2009  in  Moore
County Superior Court, Judge Shannon R. Joseph presiding.
At  the  suppression  hearing,  Detective  Edwards  testified
that  before  he  stopped  his  car  and  exited  the  vehicle,  he  did




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not  hear  any  music,  and  did  not  see  any  noise-producing  device
near  the  men.     When  asked  by  the  trial  court  why  he  stopped
where  the  men  were  gathered,  he  replied,                                “[w]e  were  given  the
call  that  there  was  loud  music  at  the  corner  of  Coates  and  Shaw
Avenue.”    When  asked  by  the  trial  court  whether  there  was  loud
music  at  this  location,  he  reiterated  that  he  heard  no  loud
noises.     After  cross-examination,  the  trial  court  asked  what
Detective   Edwards   saw   the   men   doing   as   he   approached;   he
replied,                                                                      “They  were  congregating  in  between  the  apartment  and
the  trash  can  area.”    He  did  not  see  any  weapons,  there  was  no
exchange   of   hands   that   would   indicate   a   possible   drug
transaction,  and  he  was  unable  to  identify  any  of  the  men  prior
to  arresting  Defendant.    Sergeant  Austin  did  not  testify  at  the
hearing.
The   trial   court   denied   Defendant’s   Motion   to   Suppress
during  the                                                                   18  February                                                  2009  hearing   (and  by  Order  entered   21
April  2009)  and  found,  inter  alia:    Defendant’s  flight  from  the
scene  was  unprovoked;  after  Defendant  fell  and  before  standing
again,   Detective   Edwards   arrested   Defendant   for   resisting,
delaying,   and   obstructing   an   officer;   after   Defendant   was
returned   to   standing,   Detective   Edwards   and   Officer   Austin
observed  a  plastic  bag  of  rock  cocaine  where  Defendant  had  been
lying   on   the   ground;   and   Detective   Edwards   had   personal
knowledge  that  the  area  at  issue  is  a  high-crime  area.     The




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trial  court  concluded  that  considering  the  totality  of  the
circumstances  the  police  had  reasonable  suspicion  to  believe
criminal  activity  was  afoot,  and  that  none  of  Defendant’s  state
or federal constitutional rights had been violated.
Defendant   filed   a   Supplemental   Motion   to   Suppress   the
State’s  evidence  on                                                         16  April                                          2009.     In  this  motion,  Defendant
                                                                              argued  that  the  trial  court,  following  the   18  February                             2009
suppression  hearing,  did  not  rule  on  whether  probable  cause
existed  for  Defendant’s  arrest.     Defendant  further  argued  that
on  the  night  of  his  arrest,  he  was  not  engaged  in  any  activity
that   would   provide   Detective   Edwards   with   probable   cause
necessary  to  justify  his  seizure.    Accordingly,  Defendant  sought
to  have  the  trial  court  suppress  the  State’s  evidence  derived
from Defendant’s seizure.
Relying  on  the  transcript  from  the  hearing  on  Defendant’s
first  motion  to  suppress,  Judge  R.  Stuart  Albright  denied  the
Supplemental  Motion  in  an  Order  entered  1  October  2009.    In  this
Order,  the  trial  court  incorporated  the  findings  of  fact  from
the  previous  hearing  and  concluded  that  Detective  Edwards  had
“reasonable  suspicion  to  justify  his  stop  and  detention  of  the
Defendant,”  and  had                                                         “probable  cause  to  charge  Defendant  with
resisting,    delaying,    or    obstructing    a    public    officer.”
Defendant  filed  a  notice  of  intent  to  appeal  the  denial  of  the
suppression  motions  prior  to  the  entry  of  an  Alford  guilty  plea,




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on  30  March  2010,  to  one  count  of  possession  with  intent  to  sell
and distribute cocaine.
II. Jurisdiction & Standard of Review
Defendant  has  an  appeal  of  right  to  this  Court  pursuant  to
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                                                              §              7A-27(b)                                                            (2009)  and  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.   §                     15A-
979(b)                                                                         (2009)                                                                                    (“An  order  finally  denying  a  motion  to  suppress
evidence  may  be  reviewed  upon  an  appeal  from  a  judgment  of
conviction,   including   a   judgment   entered   upon   a   plea   of
guilty.”).    We  review  the  trial  court’s  order  regarding  a  motion
to  suppress  to  determine  if  competent  evidence  supports  the
trial  court’s  findings  of  fact  and  whether  the  findings  of  fact
support  its  conclusion  of  law.    State  v.  Edwards,  185  N.C.  App.
701,                                                                           702,                                                            649   S.E.2d   646,       648                                                      (2007).                          The  trial  court’s
conclusions of law are subject to de novo review.    Id.
III. Analysis
Defendant  argues  the  trial  court  erred  in  concluding  the
police  had  reasonable  suspicion  to  conduct  an  investigatory  stop
and  in  denying  his  Motion  to  Suppress  the  State’s  evidence
obtained  pursuant  to  his  unlawful  seizure.    We  agree  and  reverse
the trial court’s Orders.
As  an  initial  matter,  we  note  Defendant  incorrectly  asserts
he  was  seized  at  the  moment  Sergeant  Austin  exited  his  car  and
yelled,                                                                        “Stop!   Police[,]”   and   thereby   violated   his   Fourth
Amendment  right  to  be  free  from  unreasonable  seizures.    While  a




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show  of  authority  is  required  for  a  Fourth  Amendment  seizure  to
occur,  that  alone  is  not  sufficient.    See  California  v.  Hodari
D,  499  U.S.  621,  629,  113  L.  Ed.  2d  690,  699  (1991)  (explaining
that  even  though  an  officer’s  pursuit  constituted  a  show  of
authority  enjoining  the  defendant  to  halt,  because  the  defendant
did not comply, he was not seized until he was tackled).
“An  individual  is  seized  by  a  police  officer  and  is  thus
within  the  protection  of  the  Fourth  Amendment  when  the  officer’s
conduct  would  have  communicated  to  a  reasonable  person  that  he
was  not  at  liberty  to  ignore  the  police  presence  and  go  about
                                                                                             his  business.”     State  v.  Icard,                                        363  N.C.      303,   308,                          677  S.E.2d
822,                                                                             826         (2009)                                         (quotation  marks  omitted)                                (citing  Florida  v.
Bostick,                                                                                     501  U.S.                               429,   437,                          115  L.  Ed.   2d     389,   400                    (1991)).
Police  conduct  necessary  for  a  seizure  may  include  a                     “show  of
authority”  that  restrains  an  individual’s  freedom  of  movement.
State  v.  Farmer,  333  N.C.  172,  187,  424  S.E.2d  120,  129  (1993).
Such  a  show  of  authority  includes,  among  other  things,                   “the
officer’s  words  and  tone  of  voice.”    Icard,  363  N.C.  at  309,  677
S.E.2d at  827.
However,  when  a  suspect  does  not  yield  after  the  police
engage   in   a   verbal   show   of   authority,   a   seizure   has   not
occurred.    Hodari  D,  499  U.S.  at  621,  113  L.  Ed.  2d  at  694.    In
Hodari D, the United States Supreme Court stated:




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The  word  ‘seizure’  .  .  .                                                                                                         .  does  not  remotely
apply                                                                     .  to  the  prospect  of  a  policeman
                                                                          yelling  ‘Stop,  in  the  name  of  the  law!’  at  a
                                                                          fleeing  form  that  continues  to  flee.     That
is  no  seizure                                                           .  An  arrest  requires
either  physical  force                                                                                                               .  or,  where  that
is  absent,  submission  to  the  assertion  of
authority.
Id. at  626,  113 L. Ed.  2d at  697.
In   the   present   case,   Defendant   was   not   seized   until
Detective  Edwards  utilized  physical  force  and                        “fell  on  top  of
him.”                                                                     Once  seized,  Defendant  was  immediately  arrested  for
resisting, delaying, and obstructing a public officer.
Both   parties   characterize   the   facts   of   this   case   as
involving  an  investigatory  stop  of  Defendant,  requiring  only
reasonable  suspicion  that  criminal  activity  may  be  afoot.    See
Terry  v.  Ohio,                                                          392  U.S.                                                   1,                                                       30,                                                                       20  L.  Ed.   2d   889,   911                  (1968)
                                                                                                                                                                                               (holding  that  where  police  observe  conduct  which  leads  them  to
                                                                                                                                                                                               reasonably  conclude  criminal  activity  may  be  afoot,  they  may
                                                                          conduct   a   brief   investigatory   stop).                                                                                                                                                                             We   conclude   no
                                                                                                                                      investigatory  stop  occurred  in  the  present  case.                                                                                                       Instead,
Detective  Edwards  arrested  Defendant  when  he                         “fell  on  top  of
him,”  and  placed  him  in  handcuffs  for  resisting,  delaying,  and
obstructing a public officer.
An  investigatory  stop  is  a                                            “brief  stop  of  a  suspicious
individual[]  in  order  to  determine  his  identity  or  to  maintain
the  status  quo  momentarily  while  obtaining  more  information.”




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                                                                               Adams  v.  Williams,                                                          407  U.S.   143,                                                                         146,                                                            32  L.  Ed.                        2d     612,             617
(1972).                                                                                                                                                                  Such  a  stop  may  only  be  justified  by                                                                                                                                            “a  reasonable
                                                                                                                                                                         suspicion,  based  on  objective  facts,  that  the  individual  is
                                                                                                                                                                         involved  in  criminal  activity.”    State  v.  Watkins,  337  N.C.  437,
441,                                                                           446  S.E.2d                                                     67,           70          (1994)                                                                                                                                       (citation  and  quotation  marks
omitted).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             “Thus,  a  police  officer  must  have  developed  more  than
                                                                                                                                                                         an  ‘unparticularized  suspicion  or  hunch’  before  an  investigatory
                                                                                                      stop  may  occur.”  State  v.  Willis,                                                                                                          125  N.C.  App.                                                                                    537,   541,             481
S.E.2d                                                                         407,                   410                                      (1997)                    (quoting  Watkins,                                                                                                                           337  N.C.  at                             442,             446
S.E.2d  at                                                                     70)                                                                                                                                                                    (citation  and  quotation  marks  omitted)                                                                (emphasis
added).
At  the  suppression  hearing,  Detective  Edwards  was  asked,
“What  was  the  purpose  of  you  jumping  on  top  of  [Defendant]?”    He
replied,  to  “[a]pprehend  him  for  resist,  delay,  obstruct.”    When
again  asked  by  Defense  counsel,                                            “Okay.                 And  you  told                           [the
prosecutor]  that  you  jumped  on  [Defendant]  to  apprehend  him  for
resisting a public officer?”    He answered,  “Yes.”
We   recognize   that   to   effectuate   an   investigatory   stop
police  officers  may  use  means  of  restraint  often  associated  with
an  arrest  when  such  means  are  necessary  to  “maintain  the  status
quo”  or  to  ensure  officer  safety.    State  v.  Campbell,                 188  N.C.
App.                                                                           701,                   710,                                     656  S.E.2d   721,        728                                                                          (2008)                                                          (affirming  the  trial
court’s  order  finding  the  police  were  justified  in  handcuffing
defendant  during  an  investigatory  stop).     However,  Detective




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Edwards’  testimony  at  the  suppression  hearing  confirms  that  he
did  not  handcuff  Defendant  in  order  to  conduct  an  investigatory
stop,  that  is  to                                                           “diligently  pursue[]  a  means  of  investigation
that  was  likely  to  confirm  or  dispel                                    [his]  suspicions  quickly,
during  which  time  it  was  necessary  to  detain  the  defendant.”
United  States  v.  Sharpe,                                                   470  U.S.                                            675,     686,     84  L.  Ed.                           2d   605,
616  (1985).    Rather  the  officer  testified  he  fell  upon  Defendant
and  handcuffed  him  with  the  intent  to  arrest  Defendant  for
resisting,  delaying,  or  obstructing,  a  public  officer.    See  N.C.
Gen.   Stat.                                                                  §                                                    14-223   (2009)   (making   it   a   misdemeanor   to
“willfully  and  unlawfully  resist,  delay  or  obstruct  a  public
officer  in  discharging  or  attempting  to  discharge  a  duty  of  his
office”).
Thus,   Detective   Edwards   needed   probable   cause,   not
reasonable   suspicion,   in   order   to   effectuate   Defendant’s
warrantless  arrest.    See  State  v.  Mello,  200  N.C.  App.  561,  568,
684  S.E.2d  477,  482  (2009)  (explaining  that  probable  cause,  not
reasonable  suspicion,  is  required  before  making  an  arrest),
aff’d,  364 N.C.  421,  700 S.E.2d  224  (2010).
We  find  this  case  analogous  to  State  v.  Sinclair,  191  N.C.
App.  485,  663  S.E.2d  866  (2008),  and  State  v.  Joe,  No.  10-1037,
__  N.C.  App.  __,  __  S.E.2d  __,                                          2011  WL  2732222  (July  5,                         2011).
In   both   cases,   we   concluded   the   defendants’   flight   from
consensual  encounters  with  the  police,  in  high-crime  areas,  did




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not   justify   their   arrest   for   resisting   a   public   officer.
Sinclair,  191  N.C.  App.  at  491,  663  S.E.2d  at  871;  Joe,  __  N.C.
App. at  __,  __ S.E.2d at  __,  2011 WL  2732222, at  *6.
In  Sinclair,  a  police  officer  received  a  report  of                    “drug
activity”  at  a  bowling  alley,  which  was                                 “a  known  drug  activity
area.”                                                                        191  N.C.  App.  at                                                            486-87,                663  S.E.2d  at   869   (quotation
marks  omitted).    The  officer  responded  to  the  bowling  alley  in
an  unmarked  car——with  at  least  two  marked  vehicles  present  as
well——and  parked  approximately  sixteen  to  twenty  feet  from  the
defendant,  who  was  sitting  among  a  group  of  other  men.    Id.  at
487,  663  S.E.2d  at  869.    The  officer  and  another  law  enforcement
agent  exited  the  patrol  car  and  walked  toward  Defendant.     Id.
The  officer  was  wearing  khaki  pants  and  a  polo  shirt  with  an
embroidered  police  badge  on  the  front.     Id.     As  the  officer
approached  the  defendant  and  said  “‘[L]et  me  talk  to  you,’”  the
defendant  stood  up  took  a  couple  of  steps  toward  the  officer  and
said,  “‘Oh,  you  want  to  search  me  again,  huh?’”;  the  officer  had
searched  the  defendant  on  at  least  one  previous  occasion.    Id.
The  officer  replied,                                                        “‘Yes,  sir[,]”  as  he  continued  to  walk
toward  the  defendant.     The  Defendant                                    “‘quickly  shoved  both  of
his  hands  in  his  front  pockets  and  then  removed  them,’”  balled
his  fists,  and                                                              “took  a  defensive  stance.”     Sinclair,                                    191  N.C.
                                                                              App.  at  487,  663  S.E.2d  at  869.    As  the  officer  got  closer,  the
defendant  said,                                                              “‘Nope.     Got  to  go,’  and                                                 ‘took  off  running’




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across  an  adjacent  vacant  lot.”     Id.     The  police  gave  chase,
quickly   apprehended   the   defendant,   and   charged   him   with
resisting  a  public  officer,  pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  14-223
(2007).    Sinclair,  191 N.C. App. at  487,  663 S.E.2d at  869.
On  appeal  to  this  Court,  we   concluded  the  defendant’s
flight,  viewed  in  the  light  most  favorable  to  the  State,  did  not
give   rise   to   reasonable   suspicion   that   the   defendant   was
involved  in  criminal  activity,  and  was  not  sufficient  to  justify
an  investigatory  stop.    Id.  at  491,  663  S.E.2d  at  871.    Rather,
we  concluded  the  encounter  between  the  officer  and  the  defendant
was   consensual   and   the   defendant   was   free   to   ignore   the
officer’s  request.    Id.  at  490-91,  663  S.E.2d  at  871  (“Although
Defendant’s   subsequent   flight   may   have   contributed   to   a
reasonable  suspicion  that  criminal  activity  was  afoot  thereby
justifying  an  investigatory  stop,  Defendant’s  flight  from  a
consensual  encounter  cannot  be  used  as  evidence  that  Defendant
was  resisting,  delaying,  or  obstructing                                   [the  officer]  in  the
performance of his duties.”).
Additionally,  we  concluded  that  had  the  officer  in  Sinclair
been  attempting  to  effectuate  an  investigatory  stop  of  the
defendant,  the  facts  were  not  sufficient  to  give  the  officer  “a
reasonable,  articulable  suspicion”  the  defendant  was  involved  in
criminal  activity.     Id.  at                                               491,                      663  S.E.2d  at   871   (noting  the
only  articulated  facts  to  support  the  investigatory  stop  were




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the  report  of  drug  activity,  that  the  scene  was  a                     “known  drug
activity  area,”  and  that  the  officer  made  previous  drug  arrests
in the area).
In   Joe,   the   arresting   officer   testified   that   he   was
patrolling  an  area  in  which  he  had  made                                 “no  less  than                                               10  drug
arrests”  and  had  assisted  with  many  more.                                __  N.C.  App.  at  __,
__  S.E.2d  at  __,  2011  WL  2732222,  at  *1.    The  officer  described
that  upon  seeing  the  police  van  the  defendant’s  eyes                   “got  big”
and   he   immediately   turned   and   walked   behind   an   apartment
building.    Id.  at  __,  __  S.E.2d  at  __,  2011  WL  2732222,  at  *2.
The  officer  pursued  the  defendant  yelling,  “Police,  stop[,]”  but
the  defendant  kept  running.     Id.     After  running  for  several
blocks,  the  officer  found  defendant  sitting  beside  an  air-
conditioning  unit,  as  if  he  were  trying  to  hide,  manipulating
something  in  one  hand.     Id.  at                                          __,                                                           __  S.E.2d  at   __,   2011  WL
2732222,  at                                                                   *2.     The  officer  ordered  the  defendant  to  put  his
hands  up;  he  refused,  and  the  officer  arrested  the  defendant  for
resisting  a  public  officer.    Id.  at  __,  __ S.E.2d  at  __,  2011 WL
2732222, at  *2.
On  appeal,  we  cited  Sinclair  and  concluded  that  prior  to
the   defendant’s   flight   the   encounter   was   consensual   and   a
“reasonable  person  would  have  felt  at  liberty  to  ignore                [the
officer’s]  presence  and  go  about  his  business.”    Joe,  __  N.C.  at
__,  __  S.E.2d  at  __,  2011  WL  2732222,  at  *6  (affirming  the  trial




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court’s  dismissal  of  the  charge  for  resisting,  delaying,  or
obstructing   the   officer   as   the   defendant’s   flight   from   a
consensual   encounter   cannot   be   used   as   evidence   for   that
offense).
Similarly,  in  the  present  case  the  only  articulable  facts
to  support  an  investigatory  stop  were  that  the  police  officers
were  responding  to  a  complaint  of  loud  music  and  Detective
Edwards  regarded  the  area  as  a  high-crime  area  in  which  he  had
made  previous  drug  arrests.    Detective  Edwards  testified  that  he
did  not  see  Defendant  engaged  in  any  suspicious  activity  and  did
not  see  any  device  capable  of  producing  loud  music.    Defendant
was  merely  standing  outside  at  night,  with  two  or  three  other
men.    In  fact,  Detective  Edwards  testified  that  he  stopped  his
car  because  “that  was  the  only  intersection  near  Coates  and  Shaw
that  had  people  standing  at  it[,]  which  is  why  [he  and  Sergeant
Austin]  were  going  to  get  out  and  find  out  about  the  loud
music.”                                                                      These   facts   do   not   provide   reasonable   suspicion
necessary  to  justify  an  investigatory  stop  of  Defendant.     As
such,  the  encounter  that  Detective  Edwards  was  attempting  to
make  with  Defendant  would  have  been  a  consensual  encounter,  an
encounter  that  Defendant  would  have  been  free  to  ignore.     See
Sinclair,                                                                    191  N.C.  App.  at  490-91,  663  S.E.2d  at  871.    Had  the
officers  attempted  an  investigatory  stop  on  these  facts,  the
stop  would  be  unlawful.     Id.     As  such,  the  officer  would  not




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have  been                                                                    “attempting  to  discharge  a  duty  of  his  office,”  an
essential   element   of   the   statutory   offense   of   resisting,
delaying,   or   obstructing   a   public   officer,   and   Defendant’s
                                                                              subsequent  arrest  was  unlawful.                                          N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                         §         14-223;
Sinclair,                                                                     191  N.C.  App.  at                                          489-90,        663  S.E.2d  at     870                   (“If                            [the
attempted    investigatory    stop]    was    unlawful,    there    was
insufficient  evidence  that                                                  [the  police  officer]  was  discharging
or    attempting    to    discharge    a    duty    of    his    office.”).
Furthermore,  Defendant’s  subsequent  flight  from  a  consensual
encounter  or  from  an  unlawful  investigatory  stop  cannot  be  used
to  justify  his  arrest  for  resisting,  delaying,  or  obstructing  a
                                                                              public  officer.     See  Sinclair,                                                             191  N.C.  App.  at   489-90,                         663
S.E.2d  at                                                                    870;  Joe,                                                   __  N.C.  at   __,                 __  S.E.2d  at        __,       2011  WL
2732222, at  *6.
As  the  State  acknowledges,  mere  presence  in  a  high-crime
area  is  not  sufficient  to  create  reasonable  suspicion  that  the
person  is  involved  in  criminal  activity.    Illinois  v.  Wardlow,
                                                                              528  U.S.  119,  119,  145  L.  Ed.  2d  570,                                                                         573-74    (2000);  see  State
v.  Butler,                                                                   331  N.C.                                                    227,           234,                415  S.E.2d           719,      722-23                (1992)
(stating  the  fact  that  the  defendant  was  congregating  with
others  on  a  corner  known  for  drug-related  activity  did  not
justify  an  investigatory  stop).    The  State  also  correctly  notes
that  presence  in  a  suspected  drug  area,  coupled  with  evasive
action,  may  provide  the  reasonable  suspicion  necessary  for  an




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investigatory  stop.    Butler,  331  N.C.  at  234,  415  S.E.2d  at  722-
23  (noting  the  “additional  circumstance——defendant’s  immediately
leaving  the  corner  and  walking  away  from  the  officers  after
making  eye  contact  with  them”  justified  the  investigatory  stop);
State  v.  Willis,                                                             125  N.C.  App.                                                537,              542,               481  S.E.2d                         407,                              411
(1997)                                                                         (noting  that  because  the  defendant  exited  a  suspected
drug  house,  exhibited                                                        “nervous  behavior,”  and                                      “took  evasive
action  when  he  knew  he  was  being  followed”  an  investigatory  stop
was  justified).     The  State  therefore  argues  Defendant’s  flight
from the scene justified an investigatory stop.
However,  the  State  has  failed  to  establish  a  nexus  between
Defendant’s  flight  and  the  police  officers’  presence.    The  State
has  provided  no  evidence  that  Defendant’s  flight  was  in  response
to  the  officer’s  presence.    Cf.  Wardlow,  528  U.S.  at  124,  145  L.
Ed.                                                                            2d  at                                                         576               (defendant  fled                                       “upon  noticing  the  police”);
Butler,                                                                                                                                       331  N.C.  at     234,               415  S.E.2d  at                     722-23                            (defendant  fled
“after  making  eye  contact”  with  the  police);  Willis,                    125  N.C.
App.  at                                                                       542,                                                           481  S.E.2d  at   411                (defendant  took  evasive  action
after  discovering  he  was  being  followed).     Here,  the  officers
arrived  in  an  unmarked  car,  after  dark,  and  parked  thirty-five
feet  away  from  Defendant  on  the  opposite  side  of  a  dumpster.
There  was  no  testimony  to  indicate  whether  Defendant  knew  the
police  were  present  before  he  began  running.     There  was  no
testimony  that  Defendant  made  eye  contact  with  the  officers,  or




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even  looked  in  the  direction  of  the  officers.    And  there  was  no
testimony  as  to  whether  other  cars  were  passing  by.     That  the
officers  were  responding  to  a  complaint  of  loud  music  and  did
not  see  any  evidence  of  a  radio  near  Defendant  indicates  that
some  other  activity  was  occurring  in  the  area  to  which  Defendant
could   have   been   reacting.                                               To   conclude   the   officers   were
justified  in  effectuating  an  investigatory  stop,  on  these  facts,
would  render  any  person  who  is  unfortunate  enough  to  live  in  a
high-crime  area  subject  to  an  investigatory  stop  merely  for  the
act of running.
IV. Conclusion
We  conclude  the  circumstances  did  not  provide  the  officers
with  reasonable  suspicion  necessary  to  justify  an  investigatory
stop  of  Defendant  or  probable  cause  for  Defendant’s  arrest.
Consequently,   the   trial   court   erred   in   denying   Defendant’s
Motions to Suppress and the trial court’s Orders are
Reversed.
Judges STROUD and THIGPEN concur.

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