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NO. COA11-1025
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  6 March  2012
TEMPLETON PROPERTIES, L.P.,
Petitioner,
v.                                                                     Watauga County
                                                                       No.                                            10 CVS  000761
TOWN OF BOONE,
Respondent.
1.                                                                     Appeal and Error  — law of the case  — dicta
An  appeal  was  not  barred  by  the  law  of  the  case  where
respondent  argued  that  a  prior  appeal  had  decided  as  a
matter   of   law   that   the   record   contained   substantial
evidence  to  support  a  board  of  adjustment  zoning  decision.
The  statement  in  the  prior  decision  was,  in  context,  merely
dicta.
2.                                                                     Appeal  and  Error                             —  remand  for  reviewable  findings   —  new
hearing
The  trial  court  failed  in  its  de  novo  review  of  the
record  in  a  zoning  case  where  there  had  been  a  remand  for
reviewable  findings  of  fact  and  the  trial  court  conducted  a
new  hearing  and  gathered  more  evidence.     Moreover,  the
Board  did  not  conduct  a  full  hearing  as  only  opponents  of
the special use application were allowed to be heard.




NO. COA11-1025
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  6 March  2012
TEMPLETON PROPERTIES, L.P.,
Petitioner,
v.                                                                        Watauga County
                                                                          No.                                10 CVS  000761
TOWN OF BOONE,
Respondent.
Appeal  by  petitioner  from  order  entered  25  February  2011  by
Judge  Marvin  P.  Pope,  Jr.  in  Superior  Court,  Watauga  County.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  12 January  2012.
Brough  Law  Firm,  by  Michael  B.  Brough,  and  Di  Santi  Watson
Capua  &  Wilson,  by  Anthony  S.  di  Santi,  for  petitioner-
appellant.
Parker,   Poe,   Adams   &   Bernstein   L.L.P.,   by   Benjamin
Sullivan, for respondent-appellee.
STROUD, Judge.
Templeton  Properties,  L.P.                                              (“petitioner”)  appeals  from  a
trial  court’s  order  affirming  a  decision  of  the  Town  of  Boone
Board  of  Adjustment                                                     (referred  herein  as              “respondent”  or   “the
Board”)   denying   petitioner’s   application   for   a   special-use
permit.     For  the  following  reasons,  we  remand  for  reviewable
findings of fact.
I.    Background




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Petitioner  is  the  owner  of  a  2.9  acre  parcel  of  land  at  315
State  Farm  Road  in  the  Town  of  Boone,  North  Carolina  located  in
a                                                                             “R-1  Single  Family  Residential”  zoning  district.    On      2  March
2007,  petitioner  submitted  an  application  to  the  Town  for  a
special-use  permit  to  develop  on  this  property  a  medical  clinic
in   excess   of                                                              10,000   square   feet,1   which   was   listed   as   a
permissible  use  in  zone                                                    “R-1”   if  a  special-use  permit  was
obtained,  according  to  the  Town’s  Unified  Development  Ordinance
(“UDO”).2     The  Board  conducted  public  hearings  on  petitioner’s
application  on                                                               5  April  and                                                    1  May                                             2007  and  the  Board  heard
evidence  from  the  petitioner  regarding  the  proposed  medical
clinic,  and  from  nearby  residents,  who  spoke  in  opposition  to
granting  petitioner’s  permit.    At  the  conclusion  of  the  public
hearing   on                                                                  1   May                                                          2007,   the   Board   voted   unanimously   that
petitioner’s  application  was  complete  and  that  the  application
complied  with  all  applicable  requirements  of  the  UDO.    A  motion
was  made  and  seconded  to  grant  petitioner’s  special-use  permit
with   restrictions   including   reduced   parking,   restriction   of
hours  of  operation,  and  restrictions  as  to  what  types  of  medical
facilities  could  be  operated  at  that  location.     However,  the
1                                                                             The                                                              application                                        listed                         “James   West”   as   “the
applicant/contact[.]”
2                                                                             Subsequent  to  petitioner’s  application,  the  town  amended
the  UDO  to  remove  medical  clinics  in  excess  of                        10,000  square
feet   from   the   list   of   permissible   uses   in   an   R-1   zoning
district.




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motion  failed  by  a  vote  of                                               3  to                                                    5.    One  of  the  opposing  board
members  stated  that  the  proposed  development  was  not  in  harmony
with  the  neighborhood  and  was  incompatible  with  the  Town’s
Comprehensive  Plan;  a  second  opposing  board  member  stated  that
“the  congestion  would  be  a  serious  safety  concern  as  well  at
certain  times  of  the  day[;]”  and  a  third  opposing  board  member
agreed  that  after  listening  to  the  concerns  of  the  residents,  he
felt   there   was   an   issue   regarding   safety   due   to   traffic
congestion  and  also  felt  that  the  project  would  compromise  the
                                                                              quality   of   the   residential   neighborhood.                                                                                                                               On   4   May        2007,
                                                                                                                                       respondent  sent  petitioner  a  letter  informing  him  that  his
                                                                                                                                       application  for  the  special-use  permit  had  been  denied  and
                                                                                                                                       “Members  of  the  Board  stated  that  the  project  [(1)]  will  not  be
in   harmony   with   the   area,                                                                                                                                                                                   [(2)]   will   not   be   in   general
                                                                              conformity   with   the   comprehensive   plan,   and                                                                                                                               [(3)]   will
                                                                              materially  endanger  the  public  health  or  safety.                                                                                                                              The  last
concern  was  specifically  related  to  traffic  issues.”    On              8  May
2007,  petitioner,  through  counsel,  sent  a  letter  to  respondent
contending  that  the  result  of  the  Board’s                               1  May                                                   2007  vote  was
not  to  deny  his  special-use  permit,  and  because  they  never
adopted  or  voted  on  a  motion  to  deny  the  permit  pursuant  to  UDO
§§                                                                            74  and                                                  69,  their  actions  only  amounted  to  a  denial  of                       “the
conditions  that  the  applicant  proposed  were  not  imposed  by  the




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Board  of  Adjustment.”    On  14  May  2007,  respondent  sent  a  letter
to  petitioner  that  the  Board  had  scheduled  a                           “Continuation
Meeting”  on                                                                  21  May                                                              2007  to  address  petitioner’s  contention.
However,  on  18  May  2007,  petitioner  filed  a  petition  for  writ  of
certiorari  with  the  Superior  Court,  Watauga  County,  which  was
granted on  19 May  2007.3    On  21 May  2007, the Board conducted its
“Continuation    Meeting”    and    voted    to    deny    petitioner’s
application  for  a  special-use  permit.    In  subsequent  discussion,
two  Board  members  stated  that  the  motion  should  be  denied
because  the  proposed  development  would  not                               (1)  be  in  harmony
with the area in  which it is to  be located, and  (2) would  not be
in  general  conformity  with  the  Comprehensive  Plan.     On               7  July
2008,   the  superior  court  entered  an  order,  with  supporting
findings  of  fact  and  conclusions  of  law,  reversing  the  Board’s
denial  of  petitioner’s  application  for  a  special-use  permit  and
remanded  the  case  to  the  Board  for  issuance  of  petitioner’s
special-use permit.
Respondent  appealed  to  this  Court  from  the  superior  court’s
order.    This  Court  in  Templeton  Props.  LP  v.  Town  of  Boone,  ___
N.C.  App.                                                                    ___,                                                                 ___,                                           ___  S.E.2d   ___,   ___,   2009  N.C.  App.  LEXIS
3                                                                             Petitioner’s   petition   for   writ   of   certiorari   and   the
superior  court’s  order  granting  that  petition  are  not  in  the
record.




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1240  (N.C.  Ct.  App.  July  21,  2009)  (unpublished),  held  that  the
superior court erred by reviewing factual issues de novo as
[t]here  was  substantial  evidence  before  the
Board  of  Adjustment  supporting  and  opposing
the  special  use  permit  to  build  the  proposed
medical    clinic.    However,    neither    the
transcripts  of  proceedings  before  the  Board
of  Adjustment  nor  any  of  its  letters  to
Petitioner  indicate  the  facts  the  Board  of
Adjustment                                                                   ultimately                                                                      found.               Indeed,
                                                                             transcripts  from  the          1  May                                          2007  hearing  and
the                                                                          21  May                         2007  Continuation  Meeting  show
that  a  majority  of  the  Board  of  Adjustment
Members  intended  to  deny  the  special  use
permit,  but  the  facts  underlying  those  Board
members’ decisions are nowhere evident.
The  Superior  Court  was  not  free  to  find
facts  in  place  of  the  Board  of  Adjustment;
its  function  was  to  determine  whether  the
Board    of    Adjustment’s    findings    were
supported   by   competent   evidence   in   the
record   before   it.   Since   there   were   no
factual   findings   in   the   record   for   the
Superior  Court  to  review,  that  court  should
have  remanded  to  the  Board  of  Adjustment  for
reviewable findings of fact.
Id.  at                                                                      *12-13                          (citation  omitted).    This  Court  remanded   “to  the
Superior  Court  with  instructions  to  remand  to  the  Board  of
Adjustment  for  reviewable  findings  of  fact.”    Id.  at  *14.    This
Court  further  noted  that  it  was  not  addressing  the  parties’
remaining   arguments   on   appeal   and                                    “[i]f   there   are   further
proceedings   after   remand   to   the   Board   of   Adjustment,   the
Superior  Court  should  review  the  entire  record  of  proceedings




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before  the  Board  of  Adjustment,  including  its  actions  in  the
Continuation Meeting.”    Id.
On  remand,  the  Board  met  on                                               2  September                                                 2010  to  make
findings  of  fact,  as  directed  by  this  Court.    The  Board  agreed
to  permit  petitioner’s  counsel  to  present  arguments  and  to
permit  residents  to  voice  their  opinions  regarding  petitioner’s
application  for  a  special-use  permit.    Following  testimony  from
residents,  the  Board  made  findings  of  fact,  then  voted  (6-2)  to
adopt  those  findings  of  fact  in  support  of  the  denial  of  the
petitioner’s   application   for   a   special-use   permit.                   On                                                           29
September                                                                      2010,  the  Board  issued  a  written  decision  including
findings  of  fact  and  conclusions  of  law.     On                          27  October                                                  2010,
petitioner  appealed  to  the  superior  court  by  petition  for  writ
of  certiorari,  which  was  granted  on  the  same  day.    A  hearing  was
conducted  on                                                                  21  February                                                 20114  and  by  written  order,  the  trial
court  affirmed  the  Board’s  decision.    Petitioner  filed  notice  of
appeal to this Court on  25 March  2011.
II.   Standard of Review
We have stated that
[a]  particular  standard  of  review  applies  at
each  of  the  three  levels  of  this  proceeding
-  the  Board,  the  superior  court,  and  this
Court.  Mann  Media,  Inc.  v.  Randolph  Cty.
                                                                               Planning  Bd.,                                               356  N.C.                                     1,                                                               12-14,   565  S.E.2d
4                                                                                                                                                                                         A  transcript  of  this  hearing  is  not  in  the  record  on
appeal.




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9,                                                       16-18                                     (2002).  First,  the  Board  is  the
finder  of  fact  in  its  consideration  of  the
application  for  a  special  use  permit.  Id.,
356  N.C.  at  12,  565  S.E.2d  at  17.    The  Board
is required, as the finder of fact, to
follow  a  two-step  decision-making
process  in  granting  or  denying  an
application   for   a   special   use
permit.    If    an    applicant    has
produced  competent,  material,  and
substantial   evidence   tending   to
establish   the   existence   of   the
facts   and   conditions   which   the
ordinance                                                requires                                  for                                    the
issuance  of  a  special  use  permit,
prima  facie  he  is  entitled  to  it.
If    a    prima    facie    case    is
established,    a    denial    of    the
permit  then  should  be  based  upon
findings                                                 contra                                    which                                  are
supported  by  competent,  material,
and  substantial  evidence  appearing
in the record.
Any  decision  of  the  town  board  has
to    be    based    on    competent,
material,  and  substantial  evidence
that   is   introduced   at   a   public
hearing.
Id.,  356  N.C.  at  12,  565  S.E.2d  at  16-17.    A
Board’s                                                  “findings   of   fact   and   decisions
based   thereon   are   final,   subject   to   the
right  of  the  courts  to  review  the  record  for
errors  in  law  and  to  give  relief  against  its
orders  which  are  arbitrary,  oppressive  or
attended  with  manifest  abuse  of  authority.”
                                                         Id.,                                                                             356   N.C.   at                      12,                                                                          565   S.E.2d   at   17
                                                                                                                                          (citation and quotations omitted).
                                                                                                                                                                               Davidson  County  Broad.,  Inc.  v.  Rowan  County  Bd.  of  Comm'rs,  186
N.C.  App.                                               81,                                       86,                                    649  S.E.2d                          904,                                                                         909                 (2007),  disc.  review




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denied,  362  N.C.  470,  666  S.E.2d  119  (2008).    A  superior  court’s
review of a decision by the board of adjustment is limited to:
(1)  review  the  record  for  errors  of  law;  (2)
ensure  that  procedures  specified  by  law  in
both  statute  and  ordinance  are  followed;  (3)
ensure  that  appropriate  due  process  rights
of  the  petitioner  are  protected,  including
the  right  to  offer  evidence,  cross-examine
witnesses,  and  inspect  documents;  (4)  ensure
that  the  decision  is  supported  by  competent,
material,  and  substantial  evidence  in  the
whole   record;   and                                                         (5)   ensure   that   the
decision is not arbitrary and capricious.
Wright  v.  Town  of  Matthews,  177  N.C.  App.  1,  8,  627  S.E.2d  650,
656                                                                           (2006)                                                                                               (citation    and    quotation    marks    omitted).
                                                                              Additionally,
                                                                                                                                                                                   [t]he  standard  of  review  to  be  applied  by
                                                                                                                                                                                   the  superior  court  depends  upon  the  type  of
                                                                                                                               error  assigned.                                    [Mann  Media,  Inc.,                                  356  N.C.
                                                                              at                                               13,                               565  S.E.2d  at   17].                                                  “If  the  error
assigned  is  that  a  board’s  decision  is  not
supported  by  the  evidence  or  is  arbitrary  or
capricious,  the  superior  court  must  apply
the  whole  record  test.”    Id.    De  novo  review
is  appropriate  “if  a  petitioner  contends  the
board’s  decision  was  based  on  an  error  of
law,”                                                                         Id.                                              (citations    and    quotations
omitted).  .  .
When using de novo review,
the  superior  court  considers  the  matter  anew
and  freely  substitutes  its  own  judgment  for
the                                                                           [board’s]  judgment.  When  utilizing  the
                                                                              whole  record  test,  however,  the  reviewing
                                                                              court  must  examine  all  competent  evidence
(the                                                                          “whole  record”)  in  order  to  determine
whether  the                                                                  [board’s]  decision  is  supported
by                                                                            “substantial    evidence.”    The                “whole
record”  test  does  not  allow  the  reviewing




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court  to  replace  the  board’s  judgment  as
between   two   reasonably   conflicting   views,
even  though  the  court  could  justifiably  have
reached  a  different  result  had  the  matter
been before it de novo.
Mann  Media,  Inc.,                                                                                                                             356  N.C.  at                                 13-14,        565
S.E.2d   at                                                                   17-18                                                                             (internal   citations   and
quotations   omitted).   Also,   the   superior
court  “must  set  forth  sufficient  information
in  its  order  to  reveal  the  scope  of  review
utilized    and    the    application    of    that
review.”    Id.,  356  N.C.  at  13,  565  S.E.2d  at
17  (citations and quotations omitted).
Davidson  County  Broad.,  Inc.,  186  N.C.  App.  at  87,  649  S.E.2d  at
909-10.                                                                       “When  this  Court  reviews  a  superior  court’s  order  which
reviewed  a  zoning  board’s  decision,  we  examine  the  order  to:
(1)   determine   whether   the   superior   court   exercised   the
appropriate  scope  of  review  and,  if  appropriate,                        (2)  decide
whether  the  court  did  so  properly.”  Cook  v.  Union  County  Zoning
Bd.  of  Adjustment,                                                          185  N.C.  App.                                                   582,            587,                          649  S.E.2d   458,   464
(2007)                                                                        (citation,  brackets,  and  quotation  marks  omitted).     On
appeal   petitioner   argues   that   the   superior   court   erred   in
affirming  the  Board’s  decision  because                                    (1)  the  denial  of  the
application  cannot  be  supported  as  a  matter  of  law  “on  the  basis
that  the  proposed  medical  clinic  would  not  be  in  harmony  with
the  area  in  which  it  is  proposed  to  be  located[;]”                   (2)  the
denial  of  the  application  cannot  be  supported  as  a  matter  of  law
“on  the  basis  that  the  proposed  medical  clinic  would  not  be  in
general  conformity  with  the  town’s  comprehensive  plan[;]”  and




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(3)  the                                                                     “conclusion  that  the  clinic  would  materially  endanger
public   safety   is   not   supported   by   substantial   competent
evidence.”    Respondent  raises  two  arguments  pursuant  to  N.C.R.
App.  P.  28(c)5  arguing  that  (1)  petitioner’s  appeal  is  barred  by
the  law  of  the  case  and                                                 (2)  petitioner’s  argument  regarding
whether  his  proposed  development  would  have  been  in  conformity
with the Town’s Comprehensive Plan has been waived or abandoned.6
As  the  issue  regarding  the  law  of  the  case  is  dispositive,  we
address it first.
III.    Law of the case
Respondent  raises  one  concern,  as  noted  above,  regarding
the  law  of  the  case  and  the  record  before  us  presents  a  second
question regarding this same issue.
5                                                                            Even  though  respondent  did  not  appeal  this  issue,  N.C.R.
App.  P.                                                                     28(c)  permits  an  appellee                                       “[w]ithout  taking  an  appeal”
to  “present  issues  on  appeal  based  on  any  action  or  omission  of
the  trial  court  that  deprived  the  appellee  of  an  alternative
basis  in  law  for  supporting  the  judgment,  order,  or  other
determination  from  which  appeal  has  been  taken.”                       See  also
N.C.R. App. P.  10(c).
6                                                                            In  this  argument,  respondent  contends  that  petitioner’s
appeal  is                                                                   “moot”  because  he  failed  to  preserve  any  argument
regarding  the  proposed  medical  clinic’s  conformity  with  the
Comprehensive  Plan.                                                         “[A]  case  should  be  considered  moot  when  ‘a
determination  is  sought  on  a  matter  which,  when  rendered,  cannot
have   any   practical   effect   on   the   existing   controversy.’”
Hospice  &  Palliative  Care  Charlotte  Region  v.  N.C.  HHS,  185  N.C.
App.                                                                         109,                                                               111-12,                           648  S.E.2d   284,   286   (2007)   (citation  and
quotation  marks  omitted).     However,  as  a  determination  as  to
whether  this  issue  was  abandoned  or  waived  would  have  an  effect
on  the  case  before  us,  respondent’s  argument  is  not  about
“mootness” but rather an issue of abandonment or waiver.




-11-
A.    Substantial evidence
First  respondent  argues  that  petitioner’s  appeal  is  barred
by  the  “law  of  the  case”  because  this  Court  decided  as  a  matter
of  law  that  the  record  contained                                          “substantial  evidence”  to
support  the  Board’s  decision  to  deny  petitioner’s  application.
Respondent  argues  that  on  the  previous  appeal  this  Court  made
the following ruling:
There  was  substantial  evidence  before  the
Board  of  Adjustment  supporting  and  opposing
the  special  use  permit  to  build  the  proposed
medical clinic.
                                                                               Templeton  Props.  LP  v.  Town  of  Boone,                                                         ___  N.C.  App.   ___,      ___,
___  S.E.2d                                                                    ___,                                                        ___,          2009  N.C.  App.  LEXIS   1240,  at         *12-13.
Respondent  argues  that  since  this  was  the  law  of  the  case  and
petitioner                                                                     “did  not  seek  discretionary  review”  at  the  Supreme
Court,  it  is  established  as  a  matter  of  law  that  there  was
“substantial   evidence”   to   support   the   Board’s   decision.
Petitioner  responds  that  this  is  not  the  holding  of  the  case  and
the Court was merely making an observation.    We agree.
Our  Supreme  Court  has  stated  that                                         “[a]  decision  of  this
Court  on  a  prior  appeal  constitutes  the  law  of  the  case,  both  in
subsequent  proceedings  in  the  trial  court  and  on  a  subsequent
appeal.”     Lea  Co.  v.  North  Carolina  Bd.  of  Transp.,                  323  N.C.
697,                                                                           699,                                                        374  S.E.2d   866,                      868               (1989)           (quoting  Transportation,
                                                                               Inc.  v.  Strick  Corp.,                                                                            286  N.C.         235,      239,   210  S.E.2d                 181,   183




-12-
(1974));  see  Collins  v.  Simms,                                             257  N.C.                           1,                 3,     125  S.E.2d                  298,
300  (1962).    As  noted  above,  the  board  of  adjustment  is  the  sole
finder  of  fact  in  a  proceeding  concerning  an  application  for  a
special  use  permit.    See  Davidson  County  Broad.,  Inc.,  186  N.C.
App.  at                                                                       86,                                 649   S.E.2d  at   909.   Contrary  to  respondent’s
argument,  this  portion  of  the  opinion  was  not                           “the  law  of  the
case[.]”    See  Lea  Co.,  323  N.C.  at  699,  374  S.E.2d  at  868.    In
context,   it   is   merely   obiter   dicta   explaining   the   facts
surrounding  the  superior  court’s  error  as  it  notes  that  there
was  evidence  in  the  record  for  and  against  granting  the  permit
but  the  board  of  adjustment  failed  to  make  findings  of  fact
either  way.    See  Templeton  Props.  LP,  2009  N.C.  App.  LEXIS  1240,
at                                                                             *12-13;  Romulus  v.  Romulus,      ___  N.C.  App.    ___,   ___,                         715
S.E.2d  308,  321  (2011)  (explaining  that  “[i]n  every  case  what  is
actually  decided  is  the  law  applicable  to  the  particular  facts;
all  other  legal  conclusions  therein  are  but   obiter  dicta.”
(citation  omitted)).     In  fact,  this  Court’s  holding  was  that
“[t]he  Superior  Court  was  not  free  to  find  facts  in  place  of  the
Board  of  Adjustment;  its  function  was  to  determine  whether  the
Board   of   Adjustment’s   findings   were   supported   by   competent
evidence  in  the  record  before  it[,]”  and  the  matter  was  remanded
back  to  the  superior  court  with  instructions  to  remand  back  to
the  Board  of  Adjustment  to  make                                           “reviewable  findings  of  fact.”




-13-
Templeton  Props.  LP,  2009  N.C.  App.  LEXIS  1240,  at  *13-14.    This
Court  noted  that  there  was  substantial  evidence  both  supporting
and  opposing  issuance  of  the  special  use  permit;  the  role  of  the
Board  as  trier  of  fact  is  to  find  the  facts  from  that  evidence,
based  upon                                                                    “competent,  material,  and  substantial  evidence  that
is  introduced  at  a  public  hearing.”    See  Davidson  County  Broad.,
Inc.,  186  N.C.  App.  at  86,  649 S.E.2d  at  909.    The  prior  opinion
simply  notes  that  there  was  sufficient  evidence  in  the  record  to
support  a  decision  either  to  deny  or  allow  the  petition,  but  did
not  dictate  any  particular  findings,  as  it  is  the  role  of  the
Board   to   make   findings   of   fact.                                      Therefore,   respondent’s
argument is overruled.
We  further  note  that  the  superior  court  concluded  in  its  25
February  2011 order that
5.                                                                             The  Court  of  Appeals  has  already  held
that  there  was  substantial  evidence  in  the
Record   to   support   the   Board’s   decision.
That  holding  is  the  law  of  the  case  and
cannot be challenged by  [petitioner].
This  conclusion  amounted  to  an  error  of  law,  as  it  is  based  on
dicta  from  this  Court’s  previous  opinion.    See  Wright,  177  N.C.
App.  at                                                                       8,                                                         627  S.E.2d  at   656.    Accordingly,  this  conclusion  of
law in the superior court’s order is reversed.
B.    Reviewable findings of fact




-14-
The  record  before  us  raises  another  issue  regarding                    “the
law  of  the  case.”    It  appears  that  the  superior  court  failed  in
its  de  novo  review,  as  it  did  not  address  an  “error  of  law[,]”
“ensure  that  procedures  specified  by  law  in  both  statute  and
ordinance                                                                     [were]  followed[,]”  or   “ensure  that  appropriate  due
process  rights  of  the  petitioner  [were]  protected,  including  the
right  to  offer  evidence,  cross-examine  witnesses,  and  inspect
documents[,]”  see  id.,  as  the   record  shows  that  the  Board
conducted  a  new  hearing  and  gathered  additional  evidence  on           2
September  2010,  contrary  to  “the  law  of  the  case”  from  our  prior
opinion.
Our Supreme Court has stated that
[a]  county  may  create  a  planning  agency  to
perform  the  zoning  duties  of  a  board  of
                                                                              adjustment,  N.C.G.S.                                                             §         153A-344(a)                         (2001);
N.C.G.S.                                                                                                 §                                        153A-345(a)                           (2001),   including
                                                                                                         issuing   special   use   permits   to                                                               “permit
special  exceptions  to  the  zoning  regulations
in  classes  of  cases  or  situations  and  in
accordance  with  the  principles,  conditions,
safeguards,  and  procedures  specified  in  the
ordinance,” N.C.G.S.  §  153A-345(c).
A   special   use   permit   is                                               “one   which   is
expressly  permitted  in  a  given  zone  upon
proof   that   certain   facts   and   conditions
detailed                                                                      in                         the                                      ordinance     exist.”
Application  of  Ellis,  277  N.C.  419,  425,  178
S.E.2d  77,  80  (1970).                                                      “‘It  does  not  entail
making  an  exception  to  the  ordinance  but
rather   permitting   certain   uses   which   the
ordinance                                                                     authorizes                 under                                    stated
conditions.’”    Woodhouse  v.  Board  of  Comm'rs
of  Nags  Head,  299  N.C.  211,  218,  261  S.E.2d




-15-
882,                                                                          887                                           (1980)                                            (quoting   with   approval
                                                                                                                            Syosset  Holding  Corp.  v.  Schlimm,                                          15  Misc.
2d                                                                            10,                                    11,    159  N.Y.S.2d                               88,   89                           (N.Y.  Sup.
Ct.                                                                                                                         1956),   modified   on   other   grounds,                                      4
A.D.2d                                                                                                               766,   164  N.Y.S.2d                               890   (1957)).                     “It
is  granted  or  denied  after  compliance  with
the  procedures  prescribed  in  the  ordinance.”
Humble  Oil  &  Ref.  Co.  v.  Board  of  Aldermen
of   Chapel   Hill,                                                           284   N.C.                             458,   467,                                        202
S.E.2d  129,  135  (1974).
Mann  Media,  Inc.,  356  N.C.  at  10,  565  S.E.2d  at  15-16.    Several
sections  of  the  Town  of  Boone’s  UDO  were  relevant  to  the  Board
in  making  its  decision  regarding  petitioner’s  application  for  a
special-use  permit.     Section                                              69  of  the  UDO  governs  decisions
regarding  “Special Use Permits[:]”
[a]   An  application  for  a  special  use  permit
shall    be    submitted    to    the    Board    of
Adjustment    by    filing    a    copy    of    the
application    with    the    administrator    in
Development Services Department.
[b]   Subject  to  Subsection  [c],  the  Board  of
Adjustment,  shall  issue  the  requested  permit
unless    it    concludes,    based    upon    the
information submitted at the hearing, that:
[1]   The  requested  permit  is  not
within  this  jurisdiction  according
to  the  Table  of  Permissible  Uses,
or
[2]   The                                                                     application                            is
incomplete, or
[3]   If  completed  as  proposed  in
the   application,   the   development
will  not  comply  with  one  or  more
requirements   of   this   ordinance
(not  including  those  the  applicant
is   not   required   to   comply   with




-16-
under  the  circumstances  specified
in   Article   VIII,   Nonconforming
Situations), or
[c]   Even  if  the  permit  issuing  board  finds
that  the  application  complies  with  all  other
provisions  of  this  ordinance,  it  may  still
deny  the  permit  if  it  concludes,  based  upon
the  information  submitted  at  the  hearing,
that    if    completed    as    proposed,    the
development, more probably than not:
[1]   Will  materially  endanger  the
public health or safety, or
[2]   Will  substantially  injure  the
value   of   adjoining   or   abutting
property, or
[3]   Will  not  be  in  harmony  with
the  area  in  which  it  is  to  be
located, or
[4]   Will    not    be    in    general
conformity  with  the  comprehensive
plan,  thoroughfare  plan,  or  other
plan   officially   adopted   by   the
council.7
Section  118  of  the  UDO,  titled  “Hearing  Required  on  Appeals  and
Applications” states that
                                                                                                                                                              [a]   Before  making  a  decision  on                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      .  an
                                                                                  application  for  a                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 .  special-use  permit,
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          .  the  Board  of  Adjustment  shall  hold  a
                                                                                                                                                                                                      public hearing on the  .  .  . application.
                                                                                                        [b]   Subject  to  Subsection                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           [c],  the  hearing
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    shall  be  open  to  the  public  and  all  persons
7                                                                           UDO   §                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       74  states  the  procedures  for  voting  to  approve  or
                                                                                                        deny  a  special-use  permit  application  and  UDO                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          §   75  grants  the
Board   the   authority   to   include   additional   requirements   or
conditions    as    part    of    approving    a    special-use    permit
application.




-17-
interested  in  the  outcome  of  the  appeal  or
the    application    shall    be    given    an
opportunity    to    present    evidence    and
arguments  and  ask  questions  of  persons  who
testify.
Section  120(c) of the UDO states that
[c]   All  findings  and  conclusions  necessary
to  the  issuance  or  denial  of  the  requested
permit  or  appeal  (crucial  findings)  shall  be
based upon reliable evidence.  .  .
Section  123 of the UDO, in pertinent part, states that
[a]   Any   decision   made   by   the   Board   of
Adjustment  regarding  an  appeal  or  variance
or  issuance  or  revocation  of  a  special  use
permit   shall   be   reduced   to   writing   and
served  upon  the  applicant  or  appellant  and
all  other  persons  who  make  a  written  request
for a copy.
[c]   In   addition   to   a   statement   of   the
board’s  ultimate  disposition  of  the  case  and
any   other   information   deemed   appropriate,
the  written  decision  shall  state  the  board’s
findings    and    conclusions,    as    well    as
supporting  reasons  or  facts,  whenever  this
                                                                            ordinance                                    requires                                                                         the             same                                     as       a
                                                                                        prerequisite to taking action.
                                                                                                                         A   summary   of   the   progression   of   this   case   highlights                                                                                              the
superior  court’s  error.                                                                                                                                                                                                 First,  the  Board  conducted  a  full
hearing  pursuant  to  UDO                                                                                               §                                                                      118  on   5  April  and                                            1  May   2007.    The
Board  heard  evidence  from  petitioner,  including  testimony  from
the  applicant  James  West  regarding  the  proposed  medical  clinic’s
compliance   with   the   UDO;   diagrams   and   maps   describing   the




-18-
proposed   medical   clinic’s   light   fixtures,   dumpster   plan,
building  specifications,  parking  lot  specifications,  grading,
and   tree   removal;   diagrams   of   the   surrounding   neighboring
residential  properties;  pictures  showing  views  of  the  proposed
building  from  different  angles;  pictures  showing  views  of  the
proposed   medical   clinic   site   as   viewed   from   different
neighboring  residential  properties;  a  letter  from  an  appraiser
stating  that  the  proposed  medical  clinic  would  not  have  a
negative  impact  upon  residents’  surrounding  properties;  and  a
listing  of  properties  located  on  a  section  of  State  Farm  Road
near the proposed medical clinic showing several business uses.
Pursuant   to   UDO                                                            §   118(b),   the   Board   permitted   eight
residents  to  present  evidence  and  make  arguments.    Most  of  these
residents   voiced   opposition   or   concerns   regarding   granting
petitioner’s  application.    These  comments  included  the  following
specific  concerns:  the  proposed  medical  clinic  is  not  consistent
with  the  town’s  Comprehensive  Plan;  the  development  is  not  in
harmony  with  the  area  and  will  affect  the  character  of  the
neighborhood   because   the   surrounding   properties   are   all
residential  homes;  the  lighting  from  the  parking  lot  will  create
light  pollution  to  the  surrounding  residential  properties;  the
proposed  medical  facility  will  increase  traffic  volume;  there  is
a  blind  curve  on  State  Farm  Road  at  the  entrance  to  the  proposed




-19-
medical  clinic;  the  proposed  medical  clinic  will  lower  property
values;  the  type  of  medical  clinic  was  not  specified  and  could
include  anything  from  a  dentist  office  to  a  methadone  clinic;
and  the  medical  facility  could  produce  biomedical  waste.    Two  of
the  residents  presented  evidence  in  the  form  of  pictures  of  the
area  surrounding  the  proposed  medical  clinic  and  a  traffic-count
of  State  Farm  Road  on                                                     30  April                                                2007  conducted  by  residents
during three specific periods of time.
Petitioner   was   permitted   to   make   final   arguments   and
counsel  for  the  Board  made  clarifying  comments  regarding  the
evidence.                                                                     The  hearing  concluded  with  the  Board   voting  in
agreement   that   petitioner’s   application   was   complete   and
complied  with  the  UDO  pursuant  to  §  69(b)(2)  and  (3)  but  denied
petitioner’s  application  based  on  three  concerns  pursuant  to  UDO
§  69(c).    Pursuant  to  UDO  §  123(a),  the  Board  sent  petitioner  a
letter  on  4  May  2007,  informing  him  that  the  application  for  the
special-use   permit   had   been   denied   based   on   UDO                 §                                                        69(c).
However,  contrary  to  UDO  §§  120(c)  and  123(c),  the  Board  failed
to  make  findings  of  fact  to  support  its  decision.     Petitioner
subsequently  filed  for  and  was  granted  a  writ  of  certiorari  by
the  superior  court,  which  made  findings  of  fact  in  its  order  and
reversed  the  Board’s  decision.     Accordingly,  on  appeal,  this
Court  stated  that  it  was  error  for  the  trial  court  to  make




-20-
findings  and  remanded                                                      “to  the  Superior  Court  with  instructions
                                                                             to  remand  to  the  Board  of  Adjustment  for  reviewable  findings  of
fact.”    Templeton  Props.  LP,                                             2009  N.C.  App.  LEXIS                                                     1240  at                           *13-
14.
On  remand  from  this  Court  and  the  superior  court,  the  Board
held  a  hearing  on                                                         2  September                                                                2010  to  address  this  Court’s
ruling.    The  Board  permitted  petitioner  to  make  arguments  as  to
why  the  permit  should  be  granted.    Even  though  the  Chairman  of
the  Board  stated  that  it  was  not  his  intent  to  reopen  and  hear
the  case  “from  scratch[,]”  and  counsel  for  the  Board  advised  the
Board  several  times  that  they  were  not  to  consider  any  new
evidence  at  this  hearing,  counsel  for  the  Board  also  advised  the
Board  that  since  they  heard  arguments  from  petitioner,  they
could  hear  “arguments”  from  residents.    Consequently,  the  Board
permitted  seven  of  the  eight  residents  who  spoke  at  the  5  April
and  1  May  2007  hearings,  including  the  Mayor  of  Boone,  again  to
voice  opposition  and  present  evidence,  including  testimony  that
the  proposed  medical  clinic  would  not  be  in  harmony  with  the
neighborhood;  removal  of  the  trees  would  remove  a  wind  buffer;
construction  of  the  proposed  medical  clinic  could  cause  erosion
because   there   is   a                                                     “fault   line”   at   the   property;                                       the
neighborhood  is  one  of  the  few  in  Boone  that  does  not  have  any
commercial  or  business  uses;  and  the  proposed  medical  clinic




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would  cause  a  loss  of  property  values.     Additionally,  five  of
those   residents   emphasized   safety   concerns   regarding   the
proposed  medical  clinic,  stating  that  there  is  a  dangerous
intersection  at  the  proposed  medical  clinic  where  VFW  Drive
enters  State  Farm  Road;  there  are  “blind  curves”  at  the  entrance
to  the  proposed  medical  clinic;  State  Farm  Road  has  a  high
volume  of  traffic;  and  VFW  Drive  is  not  wide  enough  to  support
traffic  for  the  proposed  medical  clinic.    After  discussion,  the
Board   adopted   counsel’s   proposed   findings   of   fact,   with
“modifications”   to   include   the   following   specific   findings
regarding safety and traffic concerns:
34.   There  is  a  blind  curve  in  the  area  near
the proposed development.
35.   State  Farm  Road  is  narrow  in  the  area
and needs to be widened to  18 feet.
36.   The  curve  of  State  Farm  Road  and  the
volume  of  traffic  borne  by  State  Farm  Road
presents existing hazardous conditions.
37.   The  further  addition  of  traffic  to  that
particular  section  of  State  Farm  Road  would
be highly dangerous.
Counsel  for  petitioner  objected  at  the  hearing  to  the  Board’s
decision  to  hear  from  residents,  stating  that                           “what  you  are
limited  to  here,  it  seems  to  me,  are  legal  arguments  as  to  what
finding  you  can  or  can’t  make  or  what  findings  you  should  or
shouldn’t  make.”     Petitioner,  in  its                                    27  October       2010  petition




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for  writ  of  certiorari,  raised  an  issue  regarding  the  procedure
the Board implemented at the hearing on remand:
18.   At  the  September  2,  2010  meeting,  after
acknowledging  that  the  Board’s  actions  on
remand   had   to   be   based   solely   on   the
evidence  presented  at  the  April  5  and  May  1,
2007                                                                       hearings,    the    Board    nevertheless
proceeded  (over  the  Petitioner’s  objections)
to  listen  to  the  unsworn  testimony  of  seven
opponents  of  the  application,  including  the
mayor of the Town of Boone.
In  its  order,  the  superior  court  makes  no  mention  of  this
argument or the  2 September  2010 hearing but merely states that
[o]n  remand,  the  Board  in  due  time  adopted  a
                                                                           September                                   29,                                                                          2010   written   order   with
                                                                                                                       Findings  of  Fact  based  on  evidence  from  the
                                                                                                                       2007 quasi-judicial hearing.
                                                                                                                       As   noted   above,   this   Court’s   only   instruction   to   the
                                                                                                                       superior   court   was   for   it   to   remand   to   the   Board                                                    “with
                                                                                                                       instructions  to  remand  to  the  Board  of  Adjustment  for  reviewable
                                                                           findings  of  fact.”     Id.     at         *14                                                                                                                   (emphasis  added).     The  Board
                                                                                                                       stated   that   they   were   only   hearing                                                                          “arguments”   from   the
                                                                                                                       residents.     At  the  beginning  of  the                                   2  September                             2010  meeting,
                                                                                                                       the  chairman  of  the  Board  stated  that                                                                           “[a]ll  testimony  before
                                                                                                                       this  board  must  be  sworn  testimony.”    UDO                             §                                        120(b)  states  that
                                                                                                                       “[a]ll  persons  who  intend  to  present  evidence  to  the  permit-
                                                                                                                       issuance  board,  rather  than  arguments  only,  shall  be  sworn.”
                                                                                                                       See  Plummer  v.  Plummer,  198  N.C.  App.  538,  548,  680  S.E.2d  746,
753                                                                        (2009)                                      (noting  that                                                                “the  arguments  of  counsel  are  not




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evidence”  (citation  and  quotation  marks  omitted)).    We  note  that
none  of  these  residents  were  sworn  before  they  made  their
statements.     However,  not  swearing  the  residents  in  and  then
calling  their  testimony                                                      “argument”  did  not  make  their  comments
legal   argument.                                                              A   careful   examination   of   the   residents’
testimony  shows  that  their  statements  regarding  how  the  medical
clinic  would  devalue  their  property;  the  lack  of  businesses  in
the  neighborhood;  the  construction  would  cause  erosion;  and  the
traffic  issues  are  not  legal  arguments  but  a  presentation  of  the
same  type  of  factual  testimony  the  residents  were  allowed  to
present  at  the  original  5  April  and  1  May  2007  hearings.      This
Court  made  no  instruction  to  the  Board  to  gather  additional
evidence.    The  reviewable  findings  of  fact  were  to  be  based  on
the  evidence  presented  at  the                                              5  April  and                                       1  May                                                   2007  hearings
and   to   support   the   Board’s   decision   to   deny   petitioner’s
application.8    As  noted  above,  “[a]  decision  of  this  Court  on  a
8                                                                              At  the                                             2  September                                             2010  hearing,  there  was  some  confusion
as   to   whether   the   Board’s   decision   to   deny   petitioner’s
application  was  based  on  three  grounds  in  UDO  §  69(c)  mentioned
by  Board  members  at  the  conclusion  of  the  1  May  2007  meeting  or
on  the  two  UDO  §  69(c)  grounds  mentioned  by  Board  members  at  the
end   of   the                                                                                                                                                                              21   May                                                                                                                                    2010   “Continuation”   hearing.                                      Although
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          discussions   at   the   conclusion   of   these   meetings   about   why
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          individual    Board    members    decided    to    deny    petitioner’s
                                                                                                                                   application  were  based  on  reasons  listed  in  UDO                                                                                                                                                                                                 §   69(c),  these
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          conversations  did  not  amount  to  conclusions  of  law.     What  is
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          clear   from   the   record   is   that   the   Board   did   not   approve
                                                                                                                                                                                            petitioner’s  application  and  denial  was  based  on  UDO                                                                                                                                                       §          69(c).
                                                                               Therefore,  the  Board  was  free  on  remand  on                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           2  September                       2010  to




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prior  appeal  constitutes  the  law  of  the  case,  both  in  subsequent
proceedings  in  the  trial  court  and  on  a  subsequent  appeal.”    Lea
Co.,  323  N.C.  at  699,  374  S.E.2d  at  868.    But  contrary  to  “the
law  of  the  case[,]”  see  id,  the  Board  conducted  a  new  hearing
and  gathered  more  evidence  from  residents  on                             2  September                                      2010
before  making  its  findings  of  fact.     Therefore,  the  superior
court  failed  in  its  de  novo  review  of  the  record,  as  it  did  not
address  this  “error  of  law[.]”    See  Wright,  177  N.C.  App.  at  8,
627 S.E.2d at  656.
We  further  note  that  contrary  to  UDO                                     §                                                 118,  the  Board  did
not  conduct  a  full  hearing,  as  only  residents  in  opposition,
including   the   mayor,   were   allowed   to   present   evidence   in
opposition  to  petitioner’s  special-use  permit  application.     As
noted  above,  part  of  the  superior  court’s  review  is  to  ensure
“that  procedures  specified  by  law  in  both  statute  and  ordinance
[were]  followed[,]”  and                                                      “that  appropriate  due  process  rights  of
the  petitioner  are  protected,  including  the  right  to  offer
evidence,   cross-examine   witnesses,   and   inspect   documents[.]”
See  id.    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  153A-340(c1)  (2009)  states  that  when
a  board  of  adjustment  makes  decisions  regarding  special-use
permits   the   board                                                          “shall   follow   quasi-judicial   procedures.”
make  conclusions  based  on  any  of  the  grounds  listed  in  UDO           §
69(c),  as  long  as  they  are  supported  by  the  findings  of  fact  and
the law.




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Even  though  a  board  of  adjustment  is  not  bound  by  formal  rules
of  evidence  or  civil  procedure,  when  it                               “conducts  a  quasi-
judicial  hearing  to  determine  facts  prerequisite  to  issuance  of
a   permit,                                                                 [its   procedures]   can   dispense   with   no   essential
                                                                            element  of  a  fair  trial.”     Cook,                       185  N.C.  App.  at                                594,              649
S.E.2d   at                                                                 467-68                                                        (citations   and   quotation   marks   omitted).
Essential elements of a fair trial include:
(1)   The   party   whose   rights   are   being
determined  must  be  given  the  opportunity  to
offer                                                                       evidence,                                                     cross-examine                                      adverse
witnesses,   inspect   documents,   and   offer
evidence  in  explanation  and  rebuttal;                                   (2)
absent  stipulations  or  waiver  such  a  board
may  not  base  findings  as  to  the  existence  or
nonexistence  of  crucial  facts  upon  unsworn
statements;  and  (3)  crucial  findings  of  fact
which    are                                                                “unsupported    by    competent,
material  and  substantial  evidence  in  view  of
the   entire   record   as   submitted”   cannot
stand.
Humble  Oil  &  Refining  Co.,                                              284  N.C.  at                                                 470,                                               202  S.E.2d  at   137
(citation  omitted  and  emphasis  added).     Although  petitioner’s
counsel  was  permitted  to  make  arguments  at  the  2  September  2010
hearing  on  remand,  he  did  not  get  a  second  chance  to  present
evidence,   unlike   the   residents   who   testified   opposing   the
special-use   permit.                                                       Also   it   appears   that   the   residents’
testimon

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