Preview:

Watson v. Price
NO. COA10-1112
(Filed  19 April  2011)
Medical  Malpractice                                                —  Rule                                     9(j)          —  order  extending  statute  of
                                                                    limitations  — not effective  — not filed
An  order  under  N.C.G.S.                                          §                                           1A-1,  Rule   9(j)  extending
the  statute  of  limitations  must  be  filed  to  be  effective
and  the  trial  court  in  this  case  correctly  dismissed  the
complaint  because  a  Rule                                         9(j)  order  that  was  signed  but
never filed did not extend the statute of limitations.
Judge HUNTER, Robert C., concurring.




NO. COA10-1112
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  19 April  2011
SANA KINDLEY WATSON,
Plaintiff,
v.                                                                          Durham County
No.  09 CVS  6637
KENNETH PRICE, M.D., and
REGIONAL NEUROSURGERY PLLC,
Defendants.
Appeal  by  Plaintiff  from  order  dated                                   9  June                                          2010  by  Judge
Orlando  F.  Hudson,  Jr.  in  Durham  County  Superior  Court.    Heard
in the Court of Appeals  22 February  2011.
Bryant,  Patterson,  Covington,  Lewis  &  Lindsley,  P.A.,  by
David O. Lewis, for Plaintiff.
Young  Moore  and  Henderson  P.A.,  by  William  P.  Daniell  and
Kelly E. Street, for Defendant.
STEPHENS, Judge.
On                                                                          29   September                                                                                                          2009,   Plaintiff   Sana   Kindley   Watson
                                                                                                                             (“Watson”)  filed  a  complaint  in  Durham  County  Superior  Court
                                                                            against   Defendants   Kenneth   Price,   M.D.                                                                                                                        (“Dr.   Price”)   and
Regional                                                                    Neurosurgery                                     PLLC                                                                   (“Regional”)                                  (collectively,
“Defendants”),  asserting  a  medical  malpractice  claim  against  Dr.
Price  and  seeking  to  hold  Regional  liable  for  Dr.  Price’s
alleged  malpractice  under  the  theory  of  respondeat  superior.    In




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her  complaint,  Watson  alleged  that  Dr.  Price  treated  Watson
between  9 June  2005 and  9 June  2006.
On                                                                           18  May                       2009,  prior  to  filing  her  complaint,  Watson
submitted  to  the  trial  court  a  motion  to  extend  the  statute  of
limitations  on  her  medical  malpractice  claim  pursuant  to  North
Carolina  Civil  Procedure  Rule  9(j).    On  that  same  date,  Resident
Superior  Court  Judge  Orlando  F.  Hudson,  Jr.  signed  an  order
granting   Watson’s   motion   and   extending   the   statute   of
limitations  to  2  October  2009;  from  the  record,  it  appears  that
Judge Hudson’s Rule  9(j) order was never filed.
In  December  2009,  Defendants  filed  their  answer,  which  was
later  amended  to  include                                                  (1)  a                        “Fourth  Defense”  pleading                                 “the
applicable  statutes  of  limitation”                                        “in  complete  bar  to  any
recovery  against  them  by  [Watson]”  and  (2)  a  “Fifth  Defense  and
Motion  to  Dismiss”  alleging  that  Watson  “fails  to  state  a  claim
upon  which  relief  can  be  granted”  and  seeking  dismissal  of
Watson’s  claim  pursuant  to  North  Carolina  Civil  Procedure  Rule
12(b)(6).
On                                                                           1   June                                                                                  2010,   Judge   Hudson   conducted   a   hearing   on
                                                                                                           Defendants’  motion  to  dismiss.    In  an  order  dated                                                           9  June      2010,
Judge  Hudson  found  that                                                                                                                                             “the  claims  set  forth  in                            [Watson’s]
action   are   time-barred”1   and   dismissed   Watson’s   action   with
1Although   generally   a   three-year   statute   of   limitations   is
applicable  to  medical  malpractice  actions  such  as  this  one,  Rule




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prejudice.                                                                     Watson   gave   notice   of   appeal   from   the   order
dismissing her claims on  30 June  2010.
On   appeal,   Watson   argues   that   Judge   Hudson   erred   by
dismissing  Watson’s  action  on  the  ground  that  the  claims  were
time-barred.     Watson  contends  that  Judge  Hudson’s  signature  on
the  Rule                                                                      9(j)  order  was  effective  to  extend  the  statute  of
limitations,  despite  the  fact  that  the  order  was  never  filed,
and,  therefore,  the  filing  of  the  complaint  on  29  September  2009
was  within  the  extended  statute  of  limitations,  which  expired  2
October                                                                        2009.     Defendants,  on  the  other  hand,  argue  that   “the
[Rule  9(j)  order]  was  not  filed,  and  therefore  it  did  not  serve
to  extend  the  statute  of  limitations.”    Accordingly,  Defendants
argue,  the  statute  of  limitations  expired  on  9  June  2009,  nearly
three months before Watson filed her complaint.
In  support  of  their  arguments,  the  parties  look  to  North
Carolina   Civil   Procedure   Rule                                            58,   which   governs                                       “Entry   of
judgment”  and  which  states  as  follows:  “[A]  judgment  is  entered
when  it  is  reduced  to  writing,  signed  by  the  judge,  and  filed
with  the  clerk  of  court.”  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  1A-1,  Rule  58  (2009)
(emphasis  added).    This  Court  has  previously  held  that  Rule           58
applies  to  orders,  as  well  as  judgments,  such  that  an  order  is
9(j)  allows  a  plaintiff  to  move  a  trial  court  for  a                  120-day
extension  of  the  statute  of  limitations  to  allow  the  plaintiff
additional    time    to    comply    with    the    enhanced    pleading
requirements  imposed  on  a  medical  malpractice  complainant  by
Rule  9(j). See N.C. Gen. Stat.  §§  1-52(5),  1A-1, Rule  9  (2009).




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likewise  entered  when  it  is  reduced  to  writing,  signed  by  the
judge,  and  filed  with  the  clerk  of  court.     Abels  v.  Renfro
Corp.,                                                                         126  N.C.  App.                                                    800,   803,          486  S.E.2d   735,                                   737-38   (holding
that  an  order  is  entered  when  it  is  reduced  to  writing,  signed
by  the  judge,  and  filed  with  the  clerk  of  court),  disc.  review
denied,                                                                        347  N.C.                                                          263,   493  S.E.2d   450           (1997).    However,  as  Rule
58  simply  sets  out  the  requirements  for  entry  of  an  order  and
contains  no  requirement  that  an  order  must  be  entered  to  be
effective,  the  rule  is  relevant  to  this  case  only  insofar  as  it
makes  clear  that  Judge  Hudson’s  Rule  9(j)  order  was  not  entered,
but  was  merely  rendered.  Searles  v.  Searles,  100  N.C.  App.  723,
726,                                                                           398  S.E.2d                                                        55,    56            (1990)        (“An  announcement  of  judgment  in
open   court   constitutes   the   rendition   of   judgment,   not   its
entry.”).2    As for the practical difference between rendering and
entering  in  the  context  of  judgments,  our  Supreme  Court  long  ago
stated that
[t]he   rendition   of   a   judgment   is   the
judicial  act  of  the  court  in  pronouncing  the
sentence   of   the   law   upon   the   facts   in
controversy  as  ascertained  by  the  pleadings
and   verdict,   the   entry   of   it   being   a
ministerial  act  which  consists  in  spreading
it upon the record.
2While                                                                         “rendering”  may  be  a  term  of  art  reserved  for  judgments
and  not  orders,  we  use  that  word  in  the  context  of  orders  as  it
is  the  recognized  counterpart  to                                           “entering”  and  appears  to  be
otherwise synonymous with  “issuing” or  “pronouncing.”




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Seip  v.  Wright,                                                             173  N.C.                                           14,               17,    91  S.E.        359,                 361   (1917)
(citation  omitted)                                                           (emphasis  added).     It  has  since  been  held
that  a  judgment  that  has  merely  been  rendered,  but  which  has  not
been  entered,  is  not  enforceable  until  entry.  Searles,  100  N.C.
App.  at                                                                      726-27,                                             398  S.E.2d  at   57     (noting  that   “the  judgment  is
not  enforceable  as  between  the  parties  to  this  action  as  it  has
not  been  entered”).     The  question  then  is  whether  that  rule
applicable  to  judgments  is  also  applicable  to  the  order  in  this
case,   i.e.,   whether   the   mere   judicial   act   of   issuance   or
rendition   of   the   Rule                                                   9(j)   order   effectively   extended   the
statute  of  limitations,  or  whether  the  ministerial  act  of  filing
or entry was necessary to give the order force.3
Addressing  this  question  by  turning  to  the  rule  granting
the  trial  court  the  power  to  extend  the  statute  of  limitations
in   medical   malpractice   cases,   it   appears   that   filing   is
unnecessary  and  that  mere  issuance  is  sufficient.    As  provided
by Rule  9(j),
[u]pon  motion  by  the  complainant  prior  to
the  expiration  of  the  applicable  statute  of
limitations,    a    resident    judge    of    the
superior  court                                                               .  may  allow  a  motion  to
extend   the   statute   of   limitations   for   a
3We   note   that   North   Carolina   Rule   of   Civil   Procedure          5(d)
provides  that  “[a]ll  orders  issued  by  the  court”  “shall  be  filed
with  the  court[.]”  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                       §                                                   1A-1,  Rule       5(d)   (2009).
However,  while  Rule  5(d)  requires  a  Rule  9(j)  order  to  be  filed
with  the  court,  that  rule  does  not  specify  a  time  in  which  the
order  must  be  filed,  nor  does  it  provide  a  sanction  for  any
party’s failure to file such an order.




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period  not  to  exceed                                                        120  days  to  file  a
complaint  in  a  medical  malpractice  action  in
order   to   comply   with   this   Rule,   upon   a
determination  that  good  cause  exists  for  the
granting  of  the  motion  and  that  the  ends  of
justice would be served by an extension.
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                              §                        1A-1,  Rule   9(j)                     (emphasis  added).     Per  the
clear  language  of  the  rule,  the  trial  court  need  only                 “allow  a
motion”  in  order  to  extend  the  statute  of  limitations.     This
wording  seems  to  indicate  that  it  is  the  judicial  act  of
“allowing”   the   motion,   rather   than   the   ministerial   act   of
“entering”  the  order,  that  extends  the  statute  of  limitations.
Compare  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                     §§                       1-75.12(a)    (“If,  in  any  action
pending  in  any  court  of  this  State,  the  judge  shall  find  that  it
would  work  substantial  injustice  for  the  action  to  be  tried  in  a
court  of  this  State,  the  judge  on  motion  of  any  party  may  enter
an  order  to  stay  further  proceedings  in  the  action  in  this
State.”                                                                        (emphasis  added)),      5A-23(e)      (2009)                   (“If  civil  contempt
is  found,  the  judicial  official  must  enter  an  order  finding  the
facts  constituting  contempt  and  specifying  the  action  which  the
contemnor   must   take   to   purge   himself   or   herself   of   the
contempt.”  (emphasis  added)).    Indeed,  it  is  an  oft-cited  maxim
of  statutory  construction  that  expressio  unius  est  exclusio
alterius:  the  expression  of  one  thing  is  the  exclusion  of
another.  See  Mangum  v.  Raleigh  Bd.  of  Adjust.,                          196  N.C.  App.
249,  255,  674  S.E.2d  742,  747  (2009).    Accordingly,  based  on  the




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clear  language  of  Rule                                                     9(j),  it  appears  that  a  Rule    9(j)  order
extending  the  statute  of  limitations  is  effective  as  soon  as  a
trial  judge  allows  a  motion  to  extend  and  regardless  of  whether
the order is filed.
However,  despite  the  language  used  in  Rule                              9(j),  there  is
some  authority  to  suggest  that  an  order  extending  the  statute  of
limitations  pursuant  to  Rule                                               9(j)  is  ineffective  until  that
order  is  filed.    In  Webb  v.  Nash  Hospitals,  Inc.,  133  N.C.  App.
636,                                                                          516  S.E.2d                                                                                191,  disc.  review  denied,                                                 351  N.C.                   122,                541
S.E.2d                                                                        471                                                                                        (1999),   the   plaintiff-appellants   filed   a   motion
                                                                              pursuant  to  Rule                   9(j)  on                                              19  September                                                                1997,  which  motion  was
                                                                                                                                                                         granted  in  an  order  dated  12  September  1997  -  seven  days  before
                                                                                                                   plaintiff-appellants’  motion  was  filed.  Id.  at                                                                                638,                        516  S.E.2d
at                                                                                                                 193.    The  order  was  then  filed  on              1  October                                                                                               1997.  Id.4    In
response  to  defendant-appellees’  argument  that  the  trial  court
lacked   jurisdiction   to   grant   plaintiff-appellants’   motion
“because  there  was  no  motion  pending  for  the  extension  of  time
when  the  order  was  signed[,]”  this  Court  held  that  because  the
order  was  not                                                               “filed  and                          ‘entered’”  until  after  the  motion  was
“filed  and  entered,”  the  court  had  jurisdiction  to  grant  the
motion.  Id.  at                                                              638-39,                              516  S.E.2d  at                                       193.    In  so  holding,  the
4The trial court subsequently granted defendant-appellees’ motion
to  dismiss  the  complaint  based  on  plaintiff-appellants’  failure
to  properly  serve  the  motion  on  defendant-appellees.  Webb,             133
N.C. App. at  638,  516 S.E.2d at  193.




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                                                                                                                                                            Court  cited  Worsham  v.  Richbourg’s  Sales  and  Rentals,                  124  N.C.
App.                                                                          782,                                                     784,   478  S.E.2d   649,                                                           650   (1996)   (which  itself  cites
Searles),  for  the  proposition  that                                        “the  mere  signature  on  a
judgment  that  has  not  been  entered  is  an  incomplete  judgment.”
Id.    The  obvious  implication  from  the  holding  in  Webb  is  that
the  trial  court’s  order  did  not  effectively  grant  the  Rule  9(j)
motion  until  the  order  was  filed.     Accordingly,  in  this  case,
pursuant  to  our  holding  in  Webb,  we  must  conclude  that  Judge
Hudson’s   Rule                                                               9(j)   order   did   not   extend   the   statute   of
limitations because the order was never filed.
As  further  authority  to  support  the  conclusion  that  a  Rule
9(j)  order  must  be  filed  to  be  effective,  we  note  the  following
discussion  of  Rule  58  and  its  application  to  orders  by  the  trial
court:
A  judgment  is  not  enforceable  between  the
parties  until  it  is  entered.    A  judgment  is
entered   when   it   is   reduced   to   writing,
signed  by  the  judge,  and  filed  with  the
clerk  of  court.    An  announcement  of  judgment
in  open  court  constitutes  the  rendition  of
judgment,  not  its  entry.     Although  Rule                                58
specifically  refers  only  to  judgments,  this
Court  has  held  that  it  applies  to  orders  as
well.    It  follows  that  an  order  rendered  in
open  court  is  not  enforceable  until  it  is
entered,   i.e.,   until   it   is   reduced   to
writing,  signed  by  the  judge,  and  filed  with
the clerk of court.
West  v.  Marko,  130  N.C.  App.  751,  755-56,  504  S.E.2d  571,  573-74
(1998)  (internal  citations  and  quotation  marks  omitted).    While




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the  conclusion  that  an  order  is  not  enforceable  until  entry  does
not  necessarily  follow  from  the  premise  that  the  Rule                 58  entry
requirements  apply  to  both  orders  and  judgments,  to  the  extent
this  Court  in  West  expressly  held  that  orders  of  the  trial  court
are  not  enforceable  until  entry,  we  find  ourselves  bound  by  the
conclusion                                                                    -  if  not  necessarily  the  logic                       -  of  this  Court’s
                                                                              prior  decision.  In  re  Appeal  from  Civil  Penalty,   324  N.C.              373,
384,  379 S.E.2d  30,  37  (1989).
Although    this    decision    leaves    unanswered    questions
regarding  the  effectiveness  of  a  Rule  9(j)  order  filed  after  the
complaint  is  filed,  whether  before  or  after  the  expiration  of
the  original  statute  of  limitations,  suffice  it  to  say  that,  in
this   case,   the   trial   court   correctly   dismissed   Watson’s
complaint  because  there  was  no  effective  Rule                           9(j)  extension
order filed in the case.    The ruling of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.
Judge ERVIN concurs.
Judge HUNTER, Robert C., concurs in a separate opinion.




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NO.  COA10-1112
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  19 April  2011
SANA KINDLEY WATSON,
Plaintiff,
v.                                                                          Durham County
No.  09 CVS  6637
KENNETH PRICE, M.D., and REGIONAL
NEUROSURGERY PLLC,
Defendants.
HUNTER, Robert C., Judge, concurring.
I  concur  with  the  majority  that  Webb  v.  Nash  Hosp.,  Inc.,
133  N.C.  App.                                                             636,                                                           639,                 516  S.E.2d   191,   193,  disc.  review
denied,                                                                     351  N.C.                                                      122,   541  S.E.2d   471                  (1999),  where  this  Court
held  that                                                                  “the  mere  signature  on  a  judgment  that  has  not  been
entered  is  an  incomplete  judgment[,]”  is  controlling  in  the
present   case.                                                             I   write   separately   to   point   out   that   the
legislature  never  intended  to  create  a  filing  requirement  for  an
order  granting  a  plaintiff’s  motion  to  extend  the  time  within
which  plaintiff  must  file  his  or  her  complaint  pursuant  to  Rule
9(j) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.
As  acknowledged  by  the  majority,  the  plain  language  of  Rule
9(j)  sets  forth  that  a  plaintiff  must  make  a  motion  to  extend
the  statute  of  limitations  prior  to  the  expiration  of  the




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applicable  statute  of  limitations  and  that  a  superior  court
judge  may  allow  the  motion  “for  a  period  not  to  exceed  120  days
.”    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  1A-1,  Rule  9(j)  (2009).    Therefore,
the  motion  is  effective  when  the  order  is  allowed.    Rule              9(j)
does  not  mandate  that  the  order  be  filed  with  the  clerk  of
court.                                                                          “When  the  language  of  a  statute  is  clear  and  without
ambiguity,  ‘there  is  no  room  for  judicial  construction,’  and  the
statute  must  be  given  effect  in  accordance  with  its  plain  and
definite  meaning.”    Avco  Financial  Services  v.  Isbell,                   67  N.C.
App.                                                                            341,                                                            343,   312  S.E.2d   707,   708   (1984)   (quoting  Williams  v.
Williams,  299 N.C.  174,  180,  261 S.E.2d  849,  854  (1980)).
Furthermore,  while  I  agree  with  the  ultimate  outcome  of  the
Webb  case,  I  disagree  with  the  Court’s  application  of  Rule  58  in
that  the  Court  broadened  the  scope  of  Rule  58  to  apply  to  an  ex
parte  order  entered  before  an  action  is  commenced.                       “[T]he
purposes  of  the  requirements  of  Rule  58  are  to  make  the  time  of
entry  of  judgment  easily  identifiable,  and  to  give  fair  notice
to  all  parties  that  judgment  has  been  entered.”     Durling  v.
King,  146  N.C.  App.  483,  494,  554  S.E.2d  1,  7  (2001).    It  is  my
interpretation  that  Rule  58  only  applies  to  judgments  and  orders
entered  subsequent  to  the  filing  of  a  complaint  where  the
defendant  is,  in  many  cases,  required  to  take  action  within  a
set  period  of  time.    Notice  is  not  an  issue  in  this  circumstance




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where  an  extension  of  time  is  granted  to  file  a  complaint,  but
an action has not been instituted.
When  a  plaintiff  requests  an  extension  of  the  statute  of
limitations,  the  relevant  dates  are:                                       (1)  the  date  when  the
motion  was  filed,  which  must  be  prior  to  the  expiration  of  the
applicable  statute  of  limitations,  and                                     (2)  the  date  set  by  the
trial  court  as  the  new  deadline  for  filing  the  complaint.    These
dates  are  set  out  in  the  trial  court’s  order  and  only  pertain  to
plaintiff’s  deadline  for  filing  a  complaint;  the  granting  of  the
order  has  no  effect  on  potential  defendants.     Moreover,  our
Court  has  clearly  held  that  the  order  granting  a  Rule                 9(j)
extension  of  time  to  file  the  complaint  does  not  have  to  be
served  on  the  potential  defendants  since  a  complaint  has  not
been  filed.     Timour  v.  Pitt  County  Memorial  Hosp.,  Inc.,             131
N.C.  App.                                                                     548,                           550,   508  S.E.2d   329,   330   (1998),  aff’d  per
curiam,  351  N.C.  47,  519  S.E.2d  316  (1999).    The  implication  is
that  potential  defendants  are  not  prejudiced  by  the  lack  of
notice  that  an  extension  has  been  granted.    In  fact,  all  medical
professionals  subject  to  a  medical  malpractice  lawsuit  are  on
notice  by  the  plain  language  of  Rule                                     9(j)  that  a  medical
malpractice  action  must  be  filed  within  three  years,  or  up  to
120  days  beyond  the  three-year  deadline  should  the  trial  court
grant   an   ex   parte   motion   for  an   extension.                        There   is  no




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practical  rationale  for  service  of  the  order  or  entry  of  the
order with the clerk of court.
The  Court  in  Webb  was  faced  with  resolving  a  narrow  issue
regarding  the  authority  of  the  trial  court  to  enter  the  order
for  an  extension  of  the  statute  of  limitations  when  it  held  that
Rule                                                                           58  applied  and  that  an  order  granting  an  extension  under
Rule  9(j)  must  be  “entered”  to  be  effective.    Clearly,  the  Court
did  not  contemplate  the  type  of  situation  currently  before  us
when  it  made  this  broad  declaration.    In  sum,  the  plain  language
of  Rule  9(j)  should  control  in  this  case,  not  Rule  58  as  applied
in  Webb.    In  other  words,  a  Rule  9(j)  order  should  be  considered
effective when allowed by the trial court.5
5 I recognize that the better practice would be to serve and file
the ex parte order; however, I do not believe that such actions
are required.

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