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NO. COA10-1517
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  16 August  2011
MELVA BANKS WILSON,
Plaintiff,
v.                                                                    Pitt County
                                                                      No.  88 CVD  842
DANNY JAMES WILSON,
Defendant.
1.                                                                    Child  Custody  and  Support                                          —  support  order        —  impermissibly
                                                                      modified defendant’s support obligation
The  trial  court  erred  in  a  child  support  case  by
entering  an  order  which  impermissibly  modified  defendant’s
support  obligation.     The  trial  court  erroneously  computed
increases  in  defendant’s  salary  and  applied  those  increases
to  payments  over  an  eighteen-year  period  without  a  finding
of a substantial change of circumstances.
2.                                                                    Child  Custody  and  Support                                          —  support  obligation   —  language
                                                                      of agreement unambiguous
Defendant’s  argument  in  a  child  support  case  was  that
he  was  not  required  to  pay  child  support  beyond  October
2004  because  the  younger  son  was  not  in  good  academic
standing  was  overruled.    Because  the  younger  son  was  still
enrolled  in  school  and  did  finish  his  degree  requirements
in  May                                                               2005,  the  unambiguous  language  of  the  incorporated
agreement  required  that  defendant  continue  to  pay  child
support from November  2004 through May  2005.
3.                                                                    Appeal  and  Error  —  issues  not  alternative  basis  to  support
order  — failure to cross-appeal  — arguments dismissed
Neither   of   the   issues   plaintiff   presented   in   her
appellee  brief  in  a  child  support  case,  if  meritorious,
would  have  provided  an  alternative  basis  for  upholding  the
trial   court’s   judgment   ordering   defendant’s   payment   of
child  support  arrearages.    To  properly  present  these  issues




for  appellate  review,  plaintiff  should  have  cross-appealed
from  the  trial  court’s  order.     Plaintiff’s  arguments  were
dismissed.




NO. COA10-1517
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  16 August  2011
MELVA BANKS WILSON,
Plaintiff,
v.                                                                             Pitt County
                                                                               No.  88 CVD  842
DANNY JAMES WILSON,
Defendant.
Appeal  by  defendant  from  order  entered                                    21  June                                                            2010  by
Judge  David  A.  Leech  in  Pitt  County  District  Court.    Heard  in
the Court of Appeals  23 May  2011.
Mills  &  Bryant,  LLP,  by  Cynthia  A.  Mills,  for  plaintiff-
appellee.
Sutton   Law   Offices,   P.A.,   by   David   C.   Sutton,   for
defendant-appellant.
MARTIN, Chief Judge.
Plaintiff  and  defendant  married  on                                         2  June                                                             1972.    Two  sons
were  born  during  the  marriage,  one  on  22  October  1979  and  one  on
27  October  1981.    The  parties  later  separated  and  entered  into  a
separation  agreement,  drafted  by  plaintiff’s  attorney,  dated             25
June  1987.    Defendant  was  not  represented  by  an  attorney.    On  13
June                                                                           1988,  a  judgment  of  absolute  divorce  was  entered  and  the
separation  agreement  was  incorporated  into  the  judgment.     The




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incorporated    agreement    provides,    in    relevant    part,   the
following:
III.    Child Support
It   is   further   agreed   and   understood
that  the  non  custodial  parent  shall  pay  to
the  custodial  parent  for  the  support  and
maintenance  of  the  said  minor  children  of
the  marriage,  the  sum  of  Five  Hundred  and
no/100   Dollars                                                    ($500.00)   per   month,   said
payments  beginning  on  the                                        5th  day  of  July,
1987,  and  a  like  sum  being  due  and  payable
on  the  same  day  of  each  successive  calendar
month thereafter.
IV.    Termination of Support
C.     If  any  child  of  the  parties  shall
be  enrolled  in  college,  technical  school  or
trade  school,  the  summer  after  graduation
from  high  school,  in  good  academic  standing,
and  desires  to  continue  his  education  past
high  school,  then  the  payments  specified  in
this   agreement   for   the   maintenance   and
support  and  education  of  the  child  shall  be
continued  beyond  his  high  school  graducation
[sic]   or   until   he   sooner   completes   his
undergraduate  education  or  course  of  study
and  earns  an  appropriate  academic  degree  or
withdraws from school.
V.    Additional Child Support
It  is  understood  and  agreed  between  the
parties  that  the  non  custodial  parent  may
receive  bonuses  and/or  salary  increases  from
that  party’s  employment  from  time  to  time.
The  non  custodial  parent  does  agree  to  pay
to  the  custodial  parent  for  the  support  and
maintenance  of  the  minor  children  born  of




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the  marriage  twenty-five  percent                                          (25%)  of
all   such   bonuses   and/or   salary   increases
each  years  beginning  on  December  5th  of  each
year   in   which   he   has   an   increase   and
continue  each  month  thereafter  in  addition
to the child support in Paragraph III.
In  April  2005,  plaintiff  filed  a  verified  Motion  for  Order
to  Show  Cause  and  Order  Holding  Defendant  in  Contempt  in  Pitt
County  District  Court.    She  contended  defendant  had  violated  the
child   support   provisions   of   the   incorporated   agreement   by
failing  to  pay  the  full  amount  of  child  support  owed  based  on
his  bonuses  and/or  salary  increases,  by  reducing  the  amount  of
the   support   payments   after   November                                  2002   and   terminating
payments  after  October  2004,  and  by  failing  to  pay  his  share  of
the medical expenses of the parties’ children.
At  the  hearing,  plaintiff  testified  that,  in  July                     1987,
defendant  began  paying  her  $500  per  month  in  child  support.    In
December                                                                     1987,  defendant  increased  the  monthly  amount  to   $525,
and  each  December  thereafter,  defendant  increased  the  monthly
amount  by  $25.    By  November  2002,  defendant  was  paying  plaintiff
$850  per  month.                                                            In  December                                            2002,  defendant  decreased  his
monthly  payment  to                                                         $425,  which,  according  to  a  finding  in  the
trial  court’s  order,  occurred  upon  the  older  son’s  graduation
from  college.     Defendant  paid  plaintiff                                $425  per  month  until
October  2004, when he made his last payment.




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Following  the  hearing,  the  trial  court  computed                       25%  of
defendant’s  yearly  gross  salary  increases,  beginning  in  1987  and
continuing  until  May  2005,  to  determine  the  increased  amount  of
child   support   defendant   owed   each   year,   and   ordered   that
defendant  pay  plaintiff  a  total  of                                     $23,921  for  past  due  child
support;  that  defendant  pay  plaintiff                                   $3700  for  her  attorney’s
fees;  and  that  defendant  pay  interest  on  those  amounts  from  the
date  of  the  docketing  of  the  judgment  until  the  judgment  is
paid.    Defendant appeals from the trial court’s order.
Defendant   initially   contends   the   trial   court   erred   by
entering  an  order  which  impermissibly  modified  his  child  support
obligation.                                                                 Under  the  circumstances  of  this  case,  we   are
constrained to agree.
N.C.G.S.  §  50-13.4(c) provides that
[p]ayments   ordered   for   the   support   of   a
minor  child  shall  be  in  such  amount  as  to
meet  the  reasonable  needs  of  the  child  for
health,  education,  and  maintenance,  having
due    regard    to    the    estates,    earnings,
conditions,  accustomed  standard  of  living  of
the  child  and  the  parties,  the  child  care
and  homemaker  contributions  of  each  party,
and other facts of the particular case.
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  50-13.4(c)  (2009).                                   “[A]n  order  of  a  court  of
this  State  for  support  of  a  minor  child  may  be  modified  or




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vacated  at  any  time,  upon  motion  in  the  cause  and  a  showing  of
changed  circumstances  by  either  party  .  .  .                           .”    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.
§                                                                            50-13.7(a)                                           (2009).                                                                                                                                                                                                               “These  principles  apply  equally  to  child
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            support   agreements   between   the   parties   that   have   been
                                                                                                                                                                                            incorporated  into  a  court  order.”     Beamer  v.  Beamer,                                                                                                                                                                             169  N.C.
App.                                                                         594,                                                 596,                                        610  S.E.2d                                                                   220,                                                                         222            (2005)                                                                        (citing  Walters  v.
Walters,                                                                                                                          307   N.C.                                  381,          386,                                                                                                                                         298   S.E.2d                                                   338,                          342                    (1983)).
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            “[M]odification  of  a  child  support  order  involves  a  two-step
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            process.    The  court  must  first  determine  a  substantial  change  of
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            circumstances  has  taken  place;  only  then  does  it  proceed  to  .  .
                                                                                                                                                                                            .  calculate  the  applicable  amount  of  support.”                                                                                                                                                                                      Meehan  v.
Lawrance,                                                                                                                         166  N.C.  App.                                           369,                                                            380,                                                                                        602  S.E.2d                                     21,                           28                     (2004)
                                                                                                                                  (alteration  and  omission  in  original)                                                                                                                                                                                                                             (internal  quotation  marks
omitted).
This  Court  has  held  a  clause  in  an  order  providing  for  an
automatic  annual  increase  in  monthly  child  support  payments
based  on  the  percentage  increase  of  the  consumer  price  index
unenforceable,  recognizing  such  a  clause  “is  at  odds  with  North
Carolina  statutory  and  case  law.”    Falls  v.  Falls,  52  N.C.  App.
203,                                                                         219,                                                 278  S.E.2d                                 546,          557,  disc.  review  denied,                                    304  N.C.
390,  285  S.E.2d  831                                                       (1981).    In  Falls,  we  noted  that  the  order
“allows  future  changes  in  support  payments  without  any  showing




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of  changed  circumstances  of  the  parents.”     Id.     It  was             “not
sufficient  that  there  is  a  proviso  that  conditions  the  increase
on  the  children’s  need  at  the  time  the  increase  goes  into  effect
since  the  income  of  the  parents  is  also  a  relevant  factor  under
G.S.  50-13.4(c).”    Id.;  see  also  Snipes  v.  Snipes,  118  N.C.  App.
189,                                                                           199-200,          454  S.E.2d                                                864,                                                         870           (1995)        (applying  Falls  and
holding   that   an   incorporated   separation   agreement   ordering
automatic  child  support  increases  based  on  the  consumer  price
index was void).
The  incorporated  agreement  in  this  case  provides  automatic
annual  increases  in  child  support  based  on  defendant’s  salary
and  fails  to  consider  the  needs  of  the  children  or  other  factors
contained  in  N.C.G.S.  §  50-13.4(c).    To  determine  the  amount  of
the  increases  in  child  support,  the  trial  court  computed  annual
percentage  increases  in  defendant’s  salary  for  eighteen  years,
beginning  in  1987.    We  note  that  “an  increase  in  income  alone  is
not   enough   to   prove   a   change   of   circumstances   to   support
                                                                                                 [modification   of]   a   child   support   obligation.”                                                                                            Thomas   v.
Thomas,                                                                        134  N.C.  App.   591,                                                       595-96,                                                      518  S.E.2d   513,          516                     (1999);
Greer  v.  Greer,                                                                                101  N.C.  App.                                            351,                                                         355,          399  S.E.2d   399,                    402
(1991).                                                                                                                                                     Defendant  contends,  and  we  agree,  that  by  computing
increases  in  defendant’s  salary  and  applying  those  increases  to




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payments  over  an  eighteen-year  period  without  a  finding  of  a
substantial    change    of    circumstances,    the    trial    court
impermissibly  modified  the  child  support  order  in  this  case.    We
therefore   reverse   the   trial   court’s   judgment   ordering   that
defendant  pay  child  support  arrearages  in  the  amount  of  $23,921.
Having   done   so,   we   need   not   address   defendant’s   remaining
arguments related to this issue.
Defendant  also  contends  he  was  not  required  to  pay  child
support  beyond  October                                                      2004  because  the  younger  son  was  not  in
“good  academic  standing.”    Defendant  testified  that  he  believes
“good  academic  standing”  means  enrolled  as  a  full-time  student
and  earning  at  least  a                                                    “C”  average  each  semester.    However,  we
note  that                                                                    “[t]he  effect  of  the  agreement  is  not  controlled  by
what  one  of  the  parties  intended  or  understood.”     Grady  v.
Grady,  29  N.C.  App.  402,  403-04,  224  S.E.2d  282,  283  (1976);  see
Fucito  v.  Francis,                                                          175  N.C.  App.                                               144,   150,           622  S.E.2d   660,                664
(2005)                                                                        (The  trial  court  has  the  authority                                                           “to  construe  or
interpret  an  ambiguous  consent  judgment”  and  should                     “consider
normal  rules  of  interpreting  or  construing  contracts.”),  appeal
after   remand,                                                               184   N.C.   App.                                             377,   646   S.E.2d   441           (2007)
(unpublished),  disc.  review  denied,  362  N.C.  234,  659  S.E.2d  440
(2008).    Furthermore,  “[i]f  the  plain  language  of  a  contract  is




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clear,  the  intention  of  the  parties  is  inferred  from  the  words
                                                                                                                                               of  the  contract.”     Helms  v.  Schultze,   161  N.C.  App.                                    404,   409,
588  S.E.2d                                                                    524,                                                            527                                            (2003).     Here,  the  trial  court  determined
that,  because  the  younger  son  “was  still  enrolled  in  school  and
did  finish  his  degree  requirements  in  May  2005,”  the  unambiguous
language  of  the  incorporated  agreement  required  that  defendant
continue  to  pay  child  support  from  November                              2004  through  May
2005.                                                                          Defendant’s  argument  is  therefore  overruled.     However,
because   the   trial   court’s   calculation   of   arrearages   from
November  2004  through  May  2005  was  based  on  annual  increases  in
defendant’s  salary,  we  must  remand  this  case  for  recalculation
of any arrearages during that period.
In  plaintiff’s  appellee  brief,  she  attempts  to  argue  that
the  trial  court  erred                                                       “in  determining  the  ten  year  statute  of
limitations   barred   collection   of   a   child   support   arrearage
existing  on  a  date  within  ten  years  of  the  filing  of  the  Motion”
and  “in  determining  the  child  support  obligation  was  cut  in  half
when  the  oldest  child  was  no  longer  entitled  to  child  support.”
N.C.R. App. P.  10(c) provides, in relevant part,
Without  taking  an  appeal,  an  appellee  may
list  proposed  issues  on  appeal  in  the  record
on  appeal  based  on  any  action  or  omission  of
the  trial  court  that  was  properly  preserved
for  appellate  review  and  that  deprived  the
appellee  of  an  alternative  basis  in  law  for




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supporting   the   judgment,   order,   or   other
determination   from   which   appeal   has   been
taken.
Neither  of  the  issues  plaintiff  presents  in  her  appellee  brief,
if  meritorious,  would  provide  an  alternative  basis  for  upholding
the  trial  court’s  judgment  ordering  defendant’s  payment  of  child
support  arrearages  in  the  amount  of                                      $23,921.          To  properly
present  these  issues  for  appellate  review,  plaintiff  should  have
cross-appealed  from  the  trial  court’s  order.    See  Bd.  of  Dirs.
v.  Rosenstadt,  ___  N.C.  App.  ___,  ___,  ___  S.E.2d  ___,  ___  (Aug.
2,  2011)  (No.  COA10-1190)  (noting  that  “[t]he  new  Rule  10(c)  is
similar  to  the  old  Rule                                                                     10(d)”  and  that                                                                                      “[r]evised  Rule                      28(c),
like  former  Rule                                                                              28(c),  permits  an  appellee  to                                                                                         ‘present  issues
                                                                                                on  appeal  based  on  any  action  or  omission  by  the  trial  court
                                                                                                that  deprived  the  appellee  of  an  alternative  basis  in  law  for
                                                                                                supporting  the  judgment,  order,  or  other  determination  from
which  appeal  has  been  taken.’”                                                                                                                                        (quoting  N.C.R.  App.  P.                      28(c));
Harllee  v.  Harllee,                                                         151  N.C.  App.   40,                                                                       51,                          565  S.E.2d        678,               684
(2002)  (“Whereas  cross-assignments  of  error  under  Rule  10(d)  are
the  proper  procedure  for  presenting  for  review  any  action  or
omission  of  the  trial  court  which  deprives  the  appellee  of  an
alternative  basis  in  law  for  supporting  the  judgment,  order,  or
other  determination  from  which  appeal  has  been  taken;  the  proper




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procedure  for  presenting  alleged  errors  that  purport  to  show
that  the  judgment  was  erroneously  entered  and  that  an  altogether
different  kind  of  judgment  should  have  been  entered  is  a  cross-
appeal.”);   Mann   Contr’rs,   Inc.   v.   Flair   with   Goldsmith
                                                                            Consultants-II,  Inc.,                135  N.C.  App.            772,   776,   522  S.E.2d                   118,
121                                                                         (1999)                                (holding  that,  because                 “[n]either  of  the  cross-
assignments  of  error  brought  forward  in  plaintiff-appellee’s
brief,  if  sustained,  would  provide  an  alternative  basis  for
upholding  the                                                              $36,000  judgment  in  this  case,”   “[i]n  order  to
properly   present   the   alleged   errors   for   appellate   review,
plaintiff  should  have  cross-appealed  from  the  trial  court’s
judgment”).    Accordingly,  we  do  not  address  plaintiff’s  issues
on appeal.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Judges STEPHENS and THIGPEN concur.

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