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NO. COA12-421
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                19 March  2013
DAVID B. WIND,
Plaintiff,
v.                                                                    Gaston County
No.  10 CVS  805
THE CITY OF GASTONIA, NORTH
CAROLINA, A Municipal
Corporation,
Defendant.
1.                                                                    Appeal   and   Error                                  -   interlocutory   orders   and   appeal             -
substantial right  - privileged information
Because    the    trial    court’s    interlocutory    order
compelled   production   of   files   which   may   be   privileged
pursuant  to  N.C.G.S.                                                §  160A-168,  the  trial  court’s  order
affected    a    substantial    right    and    was    immediately
appealable.
2.                                                                    Public  Officers  and  Employees                      -  police  officer                                    -  right  to
                                                                      inspection   of   documents                           -   employee   personnel   file                       -
official personnel decisions
The   trial   court   did   not   err   by   concluding   that
defendant   City   violated   N.C.G.S.                                §  160A-168   by   denying
plaintiff  police  officer’s  request  to  inspect  the  pertinent
documents   in   his   employee   personnel   file.                   Assuming
arguendo  that  Internal  Affairs  Investigative  Case  Files
2008-265   and                                                        2008-307   were   materials   to   which   the
disclosure  exemptions  of  subsection  (c1)(4)  applied,  such
materials   were   used   by   Chief   Adams   to   make   official
personnel  decisions  with  respect  to  plaintiff,  and  thus,
plaintiff  had  a  statutory  right  to  inspect  the  requested
files under subsection  (c1)(4).
3.                                                                    Discovery                                             -  statutory  obligation  to  allow  inspection  of
                                                                      confidential information  - employee personnel file




Separately  maintaining  Internal  Affairs  investigative
files,   which   defendant   City   conceded   were   a   part   of
plaintiff’s   employee   personnel   file,   did   not   exempt
defendant   from   its   statutory   obligation   under   N.C.G.S.
§  160A-168(c)(1)   to   allow   plaintiff   to   inspect   this
“confidential” information.
4.                                                                    Appeal  and  Error   -  preservation  of  issues   -  failure  to
argue
Since  defendant  City  did  not  argue  that  it  could
satisfy  the  mandatory  disclosure  requirement  of  N.C.G.S.
§  160A-168(c)(1)    by    allowing    plaintiff    to    inspect
“confidential”  information  from  his  own  employee  personnel
file  that  had  been  subjectively  redacted  by  defendant,  and
since  questions  as  to  public  policy  are  for  legislative
determination,  such  a  discussion  was  inapposite  to  the
issues.
Judge  DILLON  concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in
part.




NO. COA12-421
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                   19 March  2013
DAVID B. WIND,
Plaintiff,
v.                                                                       Gaston County
No.  10 CVS  805
THE CITY OF GASTONIA, NORTH
CAROLINA, A Municipal
Corporation,
Defendant.
Appeal  by  defendant  from  order  entered                              1 November       2011  by
Judge  Forrest  Donald  Bridges  in  Gaston  County  Superior  Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  7 January  2013.
The  McGuinness  Law  Firm,  by  J.  Michael  McGuinness,  for
plaintiff-appellee.
Cranfill  Sumner  &  Hartzog  LLP,  by  Jaye  E.  Bingham-Hinch,
Patrick  H.  Flanagan,  and  Bradley  P.  Kline,  for  defendant-
appellant.
North   Carolina   State   Lodge   of   the   Fraternal   Order   of
Police, by Richard L. Hattendorf, amicus curiae.
MARTIN, Chief Judge.
Defendant  City  of  Gastonia  appeals  from  the  trial  court‖s
order  granting  plaintiff  David  B.  Wind‖s  motion  for  summary
judgment,  denying  defendant‖s  cross-motion  for  summary  judgment,
and  ordering  that  defendant  disclose  to  plaintiff  unredacted




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copies  of  all  documents  contained  in  the  City  of  Gastonia  Police
Department‖s  Internal  Affairs  Investigative  Case  Files                  2008-265
and  2008-307.    We affirm and remand for further proceedings.
According  to  the  record  before  us,  plaintiff  joined  the
Gastonia  Police  Department  in  March                                      2008  as  a  patrolman,  after
serving  as  a  detention  enforcement  officer  for  the  United  States
Immigration  and  Naturalization  Service,  and  as  an  officer  and
detective  with  the  Coral  Springs  Police  Department  in  Florida.
In  the  Fall  of  2008,  two  complaints  were  made  against  plaintiff
and   reported   to   the   Gastonia   Police   Department;   one   by   a
citizen,  and  one  by  a  police  officer.    The  citizen‖s  complaint,
which  was  designated  as  Internal  Affairs                                (“IA”)  Investigative
Case                                                                         File  2008-307,                                                                                            alleged                                             that   plaintiff                    exhibited
                                                                                                              “Rudeness/Force  by  Firearm”  after  plaintiff  disarmed  the  citizen
                                                                                                              and  secured  the  citizen‖s  firearm  while  plaintiff  conducted  an
investigation.                                                                                                                                                                          The   officer‖s   complaint,   which   had   been
                                                                                                              designated  as  IA  Investigative  Case  File  2008-265,  alleged  that
plaintiff   exhibited                                                                                                                                                                   “Conduct   Unbecoming   of   an   Officer”   and
challenged  plaintiff‖s                                                                                       “Integrity”  and                                                                                                                     “Truthfulness”  after  the
complainant   charged   that   plaintiff   falsified   grounds   for
probable  cause  in  order  to  make  an  arrest  at  a  traffic  stop.
The   citizen‖s   complaint   was   investigated   by   plaintiff‖s
supervisor,  while  the  officer‖s  complaint  was  investigated  by




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Gastonia  Police  Department‖s  Office  of  Professional  Standards
Unit, formerly its IA Unit.
Gastonia  Police  Department‖s  Chief  of  Police  Timothy  Lee
Adams  was  provided  with  all  of  the  information  collected  upon
the  conclusion  of  both  investigations  in  order  to  “adjudicate[]
the  case[s]”  and  make  his  final  decisions  with  respect  to  each
complaint.                                                                  With   respect   to   the   citizen‖s   complaint,   the
allegations                                                                 “were  determined  to  be  NOT  SUSTAINED”  and  the  case
was                                                                         “closed.”     With  respect  to  the  officer‖s  complaint,  the
allegations  were  determined  to  be                                       “unfounded  by  the  Chief                                         [of
Police]”  and  the  case  was  designated  as                               “closed,  no  further
action required.”
In   February  2009,   after   the   cases   were   deemed   closed,
plaintiff  sent  a  written  memorandum  to  Chief  Adams  requesting  an
opportunity  to  view  the  complete  investigative  files  associated
with  the  complaints,  and  met  with  Chief  Adams  in  person  shortly
thereafter  to  request  the  same.     Plaintiff  asserts  that  Chief
Adams  refused  his  request  to  inspect  the  complete  contents  of
the  files.     While  the  record  indicates  that  Chief  Adams  did
provide  documents  from  these  files  to  plaintiff——albeit  two
years  after  plaintiff‖s  initial  request——the  documents  provided
to   plaintiff   were   significantly   redacted.                           Defense   counsel
represented  to  the  trial  court  that  the  redactions  concealed




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only  the  identity  of  the  complainants  and  such  information  as
would enable someone to identify them.
Plaintiff  filed  his  Complaint  and  First  Amended  Complaint
against    defendant    City    of    Gastonia                              (“Gastonia”)                                                  in
February  2010,    alleging    that    Gastonia    violated    N.C.G.S.
§  160A-168,  the  North  Carolina  Constitution,  and  Gastonia‖s  own
“rules,  regulations,  policies  and  procedures”  by                       “refusing  to
disclose                                                                    [to  plaintiff]  the  requested  documents”  comprising  IA
Investigative  Case  Files  2008-307  and  2008-265.     Plaintiff  and
Gastonia  filed  cross-motions  for  summary  judgment,  which  were
heard  on                                                                   24 October                                                    2011.    On                              1 November   2011,  the  trial  court
entered   an   order   granting   plaintiff‖s   motion   for   summary
judgment,  denying  Gastonia‖s  motion  for  summary  judgment,  and
retaining  for  trial  “[t]he  issue  of  any  damages  from  the  denial
of   the   records                                                          .”                                                            The   court   further   ordered   that
plaintiff                                                                   “is  entitled  to  complete  copies  of  the  documents
contained   in                                                              [IA]   Files  2008-265   and                                  2008-307   without   any
redacted  information,”  and  ordered  that  Gastonia  “disclose  these
documents  to  [plaintiff].”    Gastonia  appealed  to  this  Court,  and
the  trial  court  entered  a  consent  order  staying                      “all  further
trial   court   level   proceedings   in   this   matter”   until   the
conclusion of this appeal.




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“Generally,  there  is  no  right  of  immediate  appeal  from
                                                                                                                              interlocutory   orders   and   judgments.”                                                                                                                           Sharpe   v.   Worland,
351 N.C.                                                                      159,                                            161,                                         522 S.E.2d                                                                577,                         578              (1999),   on   remand,
                                                                              137 N.C.   App.                                 82,                                          527 S.E.2d                                                                75                                            (2000);   see   also   id.
(“Interlocutory  orders  and  judgments  are  those  made  during  the
pendency  of  an  action  which  do  not  dispose  of  the  case,  but
instead  leave  it  for  further  action  by  the  trial  court  to  settle
and  determine  the  entire  controversy.”  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted)).     However,                                                       “[n]otwithstanding  this  cardinal  tenet  of
appellate  practice,  immediate  appeal                                       .  .  .  is  available  from  an
interlocutory  order  or  judgment  which  affects  a  substantial
right.”                                                                       Sharpe,                                         351 N.C.   at                                161-62,                                                                   522 S.E.2d   at              579
                                                                                                                                                                           (citations  and  internal  quotation  marks  omitted);  see  also  N.C.
Gen.  Stat.                                                                                                                   §  1-277(a)                                  (2011);  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                             §  7A-27(d)(1)
(2011).                                                                                                                                                                    “It  is  well  settled  that  an  interlocutory  order  affects
a  substantial  right  if  the  order  deprive[s]  the  appealing  party
of  a  substantial  right  which  will  be  lost  if  the  order  is  not
reviewed  before  a  final  judgment  is  entered.”    Sharpe,  351 N.C.
at                                                                            162,                                            522 S.E.2d  at                               579                                                                       (alteration  in  original)   (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Here,   Gastonia   concedes   that   the   present   appeal   is
interlocutory.     However,  Gastonia  argues  that  such  appeal  is
properly  before  this  Court  for  immediate  review  because  the




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trial  court‖s  order  affects  a  substantial  right                       “that  would  be
forever  lost  by                                                           [Gastonia]  if  the  matter  proceeded[]  by  having
to  turn  over  documents  which                                            [Gastonia]  claims  are  statutorily
privileged.”     We  recognize  that                                        “if                                                            [Gastonia]  is  required  to
disclose  the  very  documents  that  it  alleges  are  protected  from
disclosure  by  the  statutory  privilege,  then  a  right  materially
affecting  those  interests  which  a                                       [person]  is  entitled  to  have
preserved   and   protected   by   law——a   substantial   right——is
affected,”  and                                                             “the  substantial  right  asserted  by                         [Gastonia]
will  be  lost  if  the  trial  court‖s  order  is  not  reviewed  before
entry  of  a  final  judgment.”     See  id.  at                            164-65,                                                        522 S.E.2d  at
580-81  (second  alteration  in  original)  (internal  quotation  marks
omitted).    Thus,  because  the  trial  court‖s  interlocutory  order
compels  production  of  files  which  may  be  privileged  pursuant  to
N.C.G.S.                                                                    §  160A-168,  we  conclude  that  the  trial  court‖s  order
affects  a  substantial  right  and  is  immediately  appealable  to
this  Court.     See  Hayes  v.  Premier  Living,  Inc.,                    181 N.C.  App.
747,                                                                        751,                                                           641 S.E.2d                     316,   318   (2007).   We  further  conclude,
since  the  sole  argument  advanced  by  the  parties  regarding  the
grounds  for  immediate  appellate  review  is  Gastonia‖s  argument
that  protecting  the  requested  files  from  disclosure  affects  a
substantial  right  pursuant  to  a  statutory  privilege  arising
under  N.C.G.S.                                                             §  160A-168,  only  the  issues  of  whether  N.C.G.S.




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§  160A-168  requires  Gastonia  to  disclose  the  requested  files  to
plaintiff,  and  whether  Gastonia  is  statutorily  exempt  from  the
requirement,  if  any,  to  disclose  the  same,  are  properly  before
us.
Gastonia  first  argues  that  it  did  not  violate  N.C.G.S.
§  160A-168   by   denying   plaintiff‖s   request   to   inspect   the
documents  at  issue,  because  the  documents  requested  fall  within
a  subsection  of  the  statute,  N.C.G.S.                                   §  160A-168(c1)(4),  which,
according  to  Gastonia‖s  argument,  exempts  it  from  any  disclosure
obligations  arising  under  the  other  subsections  of  the  statute.
“Where  the  language  of  a  statute  is  clear  and  unambiguous,  there
is   no   room   for   judicial   construction   and   the   courts   must
construe  the  statute  using  its  plain  meaning.”    Burgess  v.  Your
                                                                             House  of  Raleigh,  Inc.,                                                                                                326 N.C.                                                                     205,     209,   388 S.E.2d                           134,        136
                                                                                                                                                                                                       (1990);  see  also  Perkins  v.  Ark.  Trucking  Servs.,  Inc.,  351 N.C.
634,                                                                         638,                          528 S.E.2d                     902,                                                         904                                                                          (2000)          (“Nothing  else  appearing,
                                                                                                                                                                                                       the  Legislature  is  presumed  to  have  used  the  words  of  a  statute
                                                                                                                                          to   convey   their   natural   and   ordinary   meaning.”                                                                                                                                     (internal
                                                                                                           quotation  marks  omitted)).                                                                                                                                                             “[H]owever,  where  a  statute  is
ambiguous  or  unclear  as  to  its  meaning,  we  must  interpret  the
statute  to  give  effect  to  the  legislative  intent.”    N.C.  Dep’t
of  Revenue  v.  Hudson,                                                     196 N.C.  App.                765,                           767,                                                         675 S.E.2d                                                                   709,
711  (2009).    Additionally,  “[w]ords  and  phrases  of  a  statute  may




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not  be  interpreted  out  of  context,  but  individual  expressions
must  be  construed  as  a  part  of  the  composite  whole  and  must  be
accorded  only  that  meaning  which  other  modifying  provisions  and
the  clear  intent  and  purpose  of  the  act  will  permit.”  In  re
Hardy,                                                                         294 N.C.                                 90,       95-96,                                240 S.E.2d   367,   371-72   (1978)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
According   to   N.C.G.S.                                                      §  160A-168(a),   employee   personnel
files  “maintained  by  a  city  are  subject  to  inspection  and  may  be
disclosed  only  as  provided  by  [N.C.G.S.  §  160A-168].”    N.C.  Gen.
Stat.                                                                          §  160A-168(a)                           (2011).   “[A]n  employee‖s  personnel  file”
“consists  of  any  information  in  any  form  gathered  by  the  city
with  respect  to  that  employee  and,  by  way  of  illustration  but
not   limitation,   relating   to   his   application,   selection   or
nonselection,   performance,   promotions,   demotions,   transfers,
suspension  and  other  disciplinary  actions,  evaluation  forms,
leave,  salary,  and  termination  of  employment.”     Id.     In  the
present  case,  Gastonia  conceded  during  oral  arguments  to  this
Court  that  the  documents  at  issue  are  a  part  of  plaintiff‖s
employee    personnel    file    in    accordance    with    N.C.G.S.
§  160A-168(a).
All  information  contained  in  a  city  employee‖s  personnel
file  that  is  not  deemed  to  be  “a  matter  of  public  record,”  which
includes  information  such  as  name,  age,  current  position  and




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salary,  and  date  of  original  employment,  see  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.
§  160A-168(b),                                                               “is  confidential  and  shall  be  open  to  inspection
only”  in  certain  instances.    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                           §  160A-168(c)(1).
One  instance  in  which                                                      “confidential”  information  from  a  city
employee‖s  personnel  file                                                   “shall  be  open  to  inspection”  allows
“[t]he  employee  or  his  duly  authorized  agent”  to                       “examine  all
portions  of  his  personnel  file,”  id.,  with  limited  exceptions,1
which  gives  the  employee  an  opportunity  to  determine  whether
material  in  his  file  “is  inaccurate  or  misleading.”    See,  e.g.,
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                             §  160A-168(d)                                                      (providing  that  the  city  council
of  a  city  that  maintains  personnel  files  “containing  information
other  than”  that  which  is  a  matter  of  public  record                  “shall
establish  procedures  whereby  an  employee  who  objects  to  material
in  his  file  on  grounds  that  it  is  inaccurate  or  misleading  may
seek  to  have  the  material  removed  from  the  file  or  may  place  in
the  file  a  statement  relating  to  the  material”).    In  the  present
case,  Gastonia  does  not  dispute  that,  with  limited  exceptions,  a
1  Subsection  (c)(1)  provides  that  all  information  contained  in  a
city  employee‖s  personnel  file  other  than  that  which  is  deemed  a
matter  of  public  record  under  subsection  (b)                            “shall  be  open  to
inspection”  to  an                                                           “employee  or  his  duly  authorized  agent
except                                                                        (i) letters  of  reference  solicited  prior  to  employment,
and                                                                           (ii) information  concerning  a  medical  disability,  mental  or
physical,  that  a  prudent  physician  would  not  divulge  to  his
patient.”     N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                               §  160A-168(c)(1).     Because  neither
plaintiff   nor   Gastonia   assert   that   these   exceptions   are
applicable  to  the  files  requested  in  the  present  case,  we  do  not
address these exceptions further.




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city  employee  has  a  statutory  right  to  inspect                        “confidential”
information  in  his  own  personnel  file  pursuant  to  N.C.G.S.
§  160A-168(c)(1).
However,  the  statute  further  provides  that,                                                                               “[e]ven  if
considered  part  of  an  employee‖s  personnel  file,  the  following
information  need  not  be  disclosed  to  an  employee  nor  to  any
other   person”:                                                             “Notes,   preliminary   drafts   and   internal
communications   concerning   an   employee.                                 In   the   event   such
materials  are  used  for  any  official  personnel  decision,  then  the
employee  or  his  duly  authorized  agent  shall  have  a  right  to
inspect  such  materials.”    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  160A-168(c1)(4).    It
is  under  this  exception  enumerated  in  subsection  (c1)(4)2  that
Gastonia  asserts  its  authority  to  deny  plaintiff‖s  request  to
inspect  the  documents  at  issue.    Thus,  we  now  consider  whether
Gastonia   was   permitted   by   the   exemption   under   N.C.G.S.
§  160A-168(c1)(4)  to  deny  plaintiff  the  opportunity  to  inspect
the   IA   investigative   files   at   issue——files   which   Gastonia
concedes  are  a  part  of  plaintiff‖s  employee  personnel  file  in
2                                                                            Subsections  (c)(1)   and  (c1)   of   N.C.G.S.                                                                                     §  160A-168   are
similarly-enumerated                                                         provisions                                        of                                                                          the   same                            statute;
subsection  (c1)  was  added  to  N.C.G.S.                                                                                                                                                                       §  160A-168  by  the  General
                                                                                                                               Assembly  in  1981,  after  subsections  (a)  through  (f)  were  already
codified.     See                                                            1981 N.C.  Sess.  Laws                            1424,                                                                             1425,  ch.  926,                §  3;
1975 N.C.  Sess.  Laws                                                       929,                                              930-32,  ch.  701,                                                                §  2.     Because  this
opinion   makes   repeated   references   to   both   subsections,   we
caution  the  reader  to  be  mindful  of  the  potential  confusion
these similar designations may cause.




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accordance   with   N.C.G.S.                                                                                                                                                                        §  160A-168(a)——despite   plaintiff‖s
statutory  right  under  N.C.G.S.                                                                                                                                                                   §  160A-168(c)(1)  to  otherwise
inspect this  “confidential” information.
                                                                                                                                We   note   as   a   preliminary   matter   that,   because   the
disclosure                                                                  exemption                                           arising                                                             under                                   subsection  (c1)(4)
                                                                            particularly  applies  only  to  those  materials                                                                                                               “concerning  an
employee”  that  are  described  as  “[n]otes,  preliminary  drafts  and
internal  communications,”  see  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  160A-168(c1)(4),
Gastonia   can   only   invoke   the   disclosure   exemption   of   this
subsection  if  the  IA  investigative  files  at  issue  are  materials
that  qualify  for  this  exemption.                                        In  other  words,  because
Gastonia  asks  this  Court  to  conclude  that  it  was  statutorily
authorized  to  exempt  the  complete  IA  investigative  files  at
issue  under  subsection  (c1)(4),  each  file  would  have  to  be
deemed  a  note,  a  preliminary  draft,  or  an  internal  communication
concerning                                                                  plaintiff,                                          as                                                                  such                                    terms                 are   used   in
subsection  (c1)(4),   in   order   for   Gastonia‖s   claim   of   an
exemption  from  the  disclosure  requirements  of  subsection  (c)(1)
to succeed.
We  look  for  guidance  about  what  materials  the  General
Assembly  intended  to  include  within  the  ambit  of                     “[n]otes,
preliminary  drafts  and  internal  communications”  by  examining  the
plain  meaning  of  these  terms.    Based  on  the  common  definitions




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of  these  terms  at  the  time  this  statute  was  promulgated,  it
appears  the  General  Assembly  intended  to  allow  a  disclosure
exemption  under  subsection  (c1)(4)  for  written  materials  that
are  informal  or  provisional  in  character.     See  Webster’s  New
World  Dictionary  423  (2d  ed.  1974)  (defining  “draft”  as  “a  rough
                                                                              or  preliminary  sketch  of  a  piece  of  writing”);  id.  at                                                     973
(defining                                                                     “note”  as                                                       “a  brief  statement  of  a  fact,  experience,
etc.  written  down  for  review,  as  an  aid  to  memory,  or  to  inform
someone  else”).    In  the  present  case,  the  documents  comprising
the  IA  investigative  files  at  issue  are  not  in  the  record  before
this  Court,  nor  would  we  expect  them  to  be  in  light  of  the
substantial   right   asserted   as   the   grounds   for   Gastonia‖s
interlocutory  appeal.     Nonetheless,  the  materials  sought  for
inspection   by   plaintiff   in   this   case   are   the   complete
investigative    files    concerning    complaints    made    against
plaintiff,  which  investigations  have  been  finally  adjudicated
and  determined  to  be  closed.    Since  it  is  Gastonia‖s  burden  as
the  appellant  to  provide  argument  supporting  its  assertion  that
the  materials  it  seeks  to  exempt  from  the  disclosure  requirement
of  subsection  (c)(1)  fall  within  the  ambit  of  material  that  may
be  exempt  from  disclosure  under  subsection  (c1)(4),  see  N.C.R.
App.   P.  28(b)(6),   in   the   absence   of   contrary   argument   or
evidence   in   the   record,   we   cannot   conclude   that   the   IA




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investigative  files  that  plaintiff  seeks  to  inspect  are  each  a
note,   a   preliminary   draft,   or   an   internal   communication
concerning   plaintiff.                                                     Nevertheless,   even   assuming   without
deciding  that  the  IA  investigative  files  that  plaintiff  seeks  to
inspect  are  materials  that  may  be  exempted  from  disclosure  to
plaintiff  under  subsection  (c1)(4),  we  are  not  persuaded  by
Gastonia‖s  argument  that  it  had  a  statutory  right  to  refuse
plaintiff‖s  request  to  inspect  these  materials  because  such
materials were not  “used for any official personnel decision.”
While   the   General   Assembly   uses   the   phrase                      “official
personnel  decision”  in  four  other  provisions  of  the  General
Statutes,  see  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  122C-158(d)(4)  (2011)  (regarding
privacy   of   personnel   records   for   employees   of   facilities
delivering                                                                  services                                      for                                                                       mental   health,                                       developmental
                                                                                                                          disabilities,    and    substance    abuse);    N.C.    Gen.    Stat.
§  131E-257.2(d)(4)                                                         (2011)                                                                                                                           (regarding   privacy   of   personnel
                                                                                                                          records   for   public   hospital   employees);   N.C.   Gen.   Stat.
§  153A-98(c1)(4)                                                           (2011)                                                                                                                           (regarding  privacy  of  personnel  records
                                                                            for  county  employees);  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                      §  162A-6.1(d)(4)                             (2011)
                                                                                                                          (regarding  privacy  of  personnel  records  for  water  and  sewer
                                                                                                                          authorities‖  employees),  the  General  Assembly  has  not  explicitly
defined this phrase.
                                                                            As    we    recognized    above,                                                                                                 “[s]tatutory    interpretation




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properly  begins  with  an  examination  of  the  plain  words  of  the
statute,”  because                                                            “[t]he  legislative  purpose  of  a  statute  is
first  ascertained  by  examining  the  statute‖s  plain  language.”
                                                                                                                                          Correll  v.  Div.  of  Soc.  Servs.,                                                                332 N.C.                                                                  141,                                               144,                               418 S.E.2d
232,                                                                          235                                                                                                      (1992);  see  also  Perkins,                                                                                                     351 N.C.  at                                       638,                               528 S.E.2d
at                                                                            904                                                                                                                                                             (“[C]ourts  may  look  to  dictionaries  to  determine  the
                                                                                                                                                                                       ordinary  meaning  of  words  within  a  statute.”).                                                                                                                                                                   “If  a  statute
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              ―contains  a  definition  of  a  word  used  therein,  that  definition
                                                                                                                                          controls,‖  but  nothing  else  appearing,                                                                                                                                                                                       ―words  must  be  given
                                                                                                                                          their  common  and  ordinary  meaning.‖”                                                                                                                                                                                         Knight  Publ’g  Co.  v.
                                                                                                                                          Charlotte-Mecklenburg   Hosp.   Auth.,                                                                                                                                        172 N.C.   App.                                                                       486,              492,
                                                                              616 S.E.2d  602,  607                                                                                                                                                                                                                     (quoting  In  re  Clayton-Marcus  Co.,  286 N.C.
215,                                                                          219,                                                        210 S.E.2d                                   199,                                                   202-03                                                                                                                       (1974)),  disc.  review  denied,
360 N.C.  176,  626 S.E.2d  299  (2005).
Generally,  “official”  is  defined  as  “by,  from,  or  with  the
proper  authority;  authorized  or  authoritative”;                           “personnel”  is
defined  as                                                                   “persons  employed  in  any  work,  enterprise,  service,
establishment,  etc.”;  and                                                   “decision”  is  defined  as                                 “a  judgment
or   conclusion   reached   or   given.”                                      Webster’s   New   World
Dictionary  366,  988,  1062  (2d  ed.  1974).    Thus,  according  to  the
plain  meaning  of  the  terms  comprising  this  phrase,  an  “official
personnel  decision”  is  an  authorized  or  authoritative  judgment
or  conclusion  of  or  pertaining  to  employed  persons.                                                                                Since




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“personnel”  is  a  collective  noun,  the  plain  meaning  of  this
phrase——as  it  is  used  in  this  statute——more  specifically  refers
to  authorized  or  authoritative  judgments  or  conclusions  of  or
pertaining  to  the  employed  person  about  whom  the  judgment  or
conclusion  is  rendered.    Gastonia  urges  this  Court  to  narrowly
construe  this  phrase  to  apply  only  to  those                           “decisions”  that
result   in                                                                  “some   type   of   change   or   alternation                 [sic]   in
employment.”                                                                 (Emphasis  added.)     However,  Gastonia  provides  no
meaningful   support   for   its   narrowly-drawn   interpretation.
Instead,   we   think   the   General   Assembly‖s   use   of   the   term
“personnel”  in  subsection  (a)  of  this  statute  is  consistent  with
a  less-constrained  reading  of  the  phrase                                “official  personnel
decision,”  as  the  phrase  is  used  in  subsection  (c1)(4),  and  is
also  instructive  in  construing  the  meaning  of  the  challenged
phrase within the context of this statute.
The  General  Assembly  broadly  defines  the  phrase  “employee‖s
personnel  file”  as  “consist[ing]  of  any  information  in  any  form
gathered  by  the  city  with  respect  to  that  employee.”    N.C.  Gen.
Stat.  §  160A-168(a)  (emphasis  added).    In  other  words,  according
to  the  General  Assembly,  the  information  included  in  a  city
employee‖s  personnel  file  is  not  limited  to  information  that,  as
Gastonia  might  suggest  based  on  its  asserted  plain  meaning  of
the  term                                                                    “personnel,”  concerns  only  changes  in  employment  like




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promotions,  demotions,  or  transfers.    Rather,  according  to  the
express  language  of  the  statute,  the  information  in  a  city
employee‖s    personnel    file    also    concerns                          “nonselection,”
“performance,”                                                               “evaluation  forms,”  as  well  as  other  information
“in   any   form   gathered   by   the   city   with   respect   to   that
employee.”     See  id.     In  fact,  the  General  Assembly  expressly
declines  to  limit  what  form  the  information  included  in  an
employee‖s  personnel  file  may  take,  by  providing  a  list  of
examples  of  information  that  it  specifies  is  offered  “by  way  of
illustration  but  not  limitation.”     See  id.                            (emphasis  added).
Thus,  with  respect  to  the  phrase  “official  personnel  decision,”
as   it   is   used   in   the   context   of   the   subsection  (c1)(4)
exemption,  we  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  General  Assembly
similarly  intended  that  an                                                “official  personnel  decision”  need
not  be  limited  only  to  those  determinations  that  result  in  a
change  to  an  employee‖s  position  of  employment,  as  Gastonia
suggests.                                                                    Therefore,   we   conclude   that   when   an   informal,
provisional,    or    otherwise                                              “preliminary”    or                                         “internal”
communication,  note,  or  draft  concerning  an  employee  is  included
in  his  or  her  personnel  file,  that  communication,  note,  or  draft
is  subject  to  the  disclosure  requirement  of  subsections  (c)(1)
and  (c1)(4)  when  such  materials  are  used  to  make  an  authorized
or  authoritative  judgment  or  conclusion  with  respect  to  that




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employee.
According   to   the   depositions   of   both   Chief   Adams   and
Sergeant  Reid  E.  Brafford,  who  is  the  supervisor  of  the  Office
of  Professional  Standards  and  reports  directly  to  Chief  Adams,
once    the    investigations    were    concluded,    the    complete
investigative  files  for  each  complaint,  which  included  all  of
the  documents  necessary  to  develop  a  thorough  investigative  file
into  both  complaints,  were  provided  to  Chief  Adams,  the  senior-
most   official   of   the   department.                                     In   accordance   with
departmental  policy,  Chief  Adams  is  the  person  authorized  to
serve  as  the  final  decision-maker  with  respect  to  complaints  of
misconduct  against  employees  and  to  adjudicate  such  matters  on
behalf  of  the  department.     Chief  Adams  analyzed  the  facts  and
issues   arising   out   of   the   complaints   as   detailed   in   each
document  comprising  the  investigative  files  and  weighed  all  of
the  evidence  based  on  the  information  included  in  the  respective
investigative  files  in  order  to  finally  determine  each  matter.
After   considering   all   of   the   information   included   in   each
document  in  the  investigative  files,  Chief  Adams  finally  decided
to  dismiss  or  terminate  the  complaints  made  against  plaintiff
and  determined,  as  a  result  of  the  respective  investigations,
that  no  disciplinary  action  need  be  taken  against  plaintiff  in
either  matter.    In  other  words,  Chief  Adams  was  authorized  to,




-18-
and  did,  use  IA  Investigative  Case  Files                               2008-265  and                                            2008-307
to finally adjudicate matters pertaining to plaintiff.
Gastonia    insists,    however,    that    because    plaintiff
“experienced  no  change”  in  his  employment  as  a  result  of  Chief
Adams‖s  final  adjudications  regarding  the  complaints  against
plaintiff,  Chief  Adams                                                     “made  no                                                ―official  personnel  decision‖
with  regards  to  the  two  disputed  IA  investigative  files,”  and,
thus,  plaintiff  failed  to  establish  that  he  is  entitled  to
inspect   the   investigative   files   under   subsection  (c1)(4).
Nonetheless,   as   we   recognized   above,   the   General   Assembly
provided  in  subsection  (a)  that  an  employee‖s                          “personnel”  file
may  include  information  regarding                                         “selection  or  nonselection,”
“performance,”                                                               “evaluation  forms,”  as  well  as  other  information
“in  any  form”  “with  respect  to  that  employee.”    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.
§  160A-168(a)                                                               (emphasis  added).     Similarly,  even  though  Chief
Adams‖s  decisions  did  not  result  in  a  change  in  plaintiff‖s
employment,  we  are  persuaded  that  Chief  Adams  made  official
personnel   decisions,   as   we   have   construed   this   phrase,   to
finally  dismiss  or  terminate  the  complaints  against  plaintiff
and   to   take   no   disciplinary   action   against   him   using   the
information  included  in  the  IA  investigative  files.    Therefore,
assuming  arguendo  that  IA  Investigative  Case  Files  2008-265  and
2008-307  were  materials  to  which  the  disclosure  exemptions  of




-19-
subsection  (c1)(4)  applied,  because  we  are  persuaded  that  such
materials  were  used  by  Chief  Adams  to  make  official  personnel
decisions  with  respect  to  plaintiff,  we  conclude  that  plaintiff
has  a  statutory  right  to  inspect  the  requested  files  under
subsection  (c1)(4).
Gastonia  next  argues  that  it  did  not  violate   N.C.G.S.
§  160A-168   by   denying   plaintiff‖s   request   to   inspect   the
documents   at   issue,   because   the   requested   documents            “are
separate  files  employed  for  the  maintenance  of  confidentially
[sic]  and  protection  of                                                 [Gastonia‖s]  IA  investigation  program.”
Gastonia  appears  to  suggest  that  physically  separating  the  IA
investigative  files  at  issue  from  other  materials  in  plaintiff‖s
employee  personnel  file  renders  the  disclosure  requirements  of
this  statute  inapplicable  to  the  requested  files.    Nevertheless,
perhaps   because   Gastonia   realized   the   untenability   of   its
argument,  seeking  an  exemption  from  a  statutory  requirement  to
disclose  certain  documents  while  simultaneously  arguing  that  the
statute   under   which   the   disclosure   requirement   arises   is
inapplicable  to  the  type  of  documents  for  which  it  seeks  the
statutory  exemption,  Gastonia  conceded  during  oral  arguments
that  the  requested  files  are  a  part  of  plaintiff‖s  employee
personnel   file   under   N.C.G.S.                                        §  160A-168(a).                              Additionally,
Gastonia  does  not  direct  this  Court  to  any  relevant  authority




-20-
which  exempts  the  requested  files  from  the  disclosure  mandate  of
N.C.G.S.                                                                     §  160A-168(c)(1),    requiring    that,    with    limited
exception,  all                                                              “confidential”  information  in  a  city  employee‖s
personnel  file                                                              “shall  be  open  to  inspection”  by  that  employee.
Thus,   we   find   no   support   for   Gastonia‖s   assertion   that
“separately”  “maintain[ing]”  these  IA  investigative  files,  which
it  concedes  are  a  part  of  plaintiff‖s  employee  personnel  file,
exempts  Gastonia  from  its  statutory  obligation  under  N.C.G.S.
§  160A-168(c)(1)    to    allow    plaintiff    to    inspect    this
“confidential” information.
Finally,  we  note  that  the  dissent  raises  a  public  policy
argument   that   advocates   for   Gastonia‖s   right   to   provide
plaintiff   with   redacted   information   from   plaintiff‖s   own
employee   personnel   file.                                                 Since   Gastonia   does   not   present
argument  to  this  Court  that  it  could  satisfy  the  mandatory
disclosure  requirement  of  N.C.G.S.                                        §  160A-168(c)(1)  by  allowing
plaintiff  to  inspect                                                       “confidential”  information  from  his  own
employee  personnel  file  that  had  been  subjectively  redacted  by
Gastonia,  and  since                                                        “questions  as  to  public  policy  are  for
legislative  determination,”  see  Home  Sec.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.
McDonald,  277 N.C.  275,  285,  177 S.E.2d  291,  298  (1970),  we  find
such  a  discussion  to  be  inapposite  to  the  issues  properly  before
us.




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Accordingly,  we  conclude  the  trial  court  did  not  err  when
it   granted   summary   judgment   in   favor   of   plaintiff,   denied
Gastonia‖s   cross-motion   for   summary   judgment,   and   ordered
Gastonia  to  disclose  to  plaintiff  unredacted  copies  of  all
documents    contained    in    Gastonia    Police    Department‖s    IA
Investigative Case Files  2008-265 and  2008-307.
Affirmed; Remanded for further proceedings.
Judge HUNTER concurs.
Judge   DILLON   concurs   in   part   and   dissents   in   part.




NO. COA12-421
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  19 March  2013
DAVID B. WIND,
Plaintiff,
v.                                                                           Gaston County
No.  10 CVS  805
THE CITY OF GASTONIA, NORTH
CAROLINA, A Municipal Corporation,
Defendant.
DILLON, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I   concur   with   the   majority‖s   holding   that,   although
interlocutory,   the   trial   court‖s   summary   judgment   order   is
immediately  appealable  as  the  order  affects  a  substantial  right.
I  also  concur  with  the  majority‖s  holding  that  the  information
sought  by  Plaintiff  falls  within  the  scope  of  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §
160A-168(a)                                                                  (2011),  as  part  of  Plaintiff‖s  employee  personnel
file.  However,  I  respectfully  dissent  from  the  portion  of  the
majority   opinion   defining                                                “official   personnel   decision”   and
affirming  the  trial  court‖s  order,  because  I  believe,  based  on
the  facts  of  this  case  and  the  issues  properly  before  us,  that
the  information  sought  by  Plaintiff  falls  under  the  exemption
contained in N.C. Gen. Stat.  160A-168(c1)(4)  (2011).
In   the   case   sub   judice,   Plaintiff,   a   police   officer
employed  by  Defendant,  was  the  subject  of  two  separate  internal




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affairs   investigations   which   arose   out   of   complaints   filed
against  him,  one  by  a  citizen  and  one  by  a  fellow  police
officer.     After  investigations  were  conducted,  both  complaints
were  dismissed  by  Plaintiff‖s  superior,  Chief  of  Police  Tim
Adams                                                                        (Chief  Adams),  with  no  action  taken  against  Plaintiff.
Plaintiff,  however,  sought  from  Defendant  access  to  the  contents
of  the  internal  investigation  files.     Based  on  the  record,  it
appears   that   Defendant   has   provided   all   of   the   requested
information  to  Plaintiff,  but  with  the  identities  of  the  people
who  lodged  the  initial  complaints  redacted.     Plaintiff  filed
this  appeal  to  compel  Defendant  to  disclose  the  identity  of  the
citizen and the police officer who filed the complaints.3
I:    Exemption, N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  160A-168(c1)(4)
Defendant  argues  that  even  if  the  information  is  part  of
Plaintiff‖s                                                                  “employee  personnel  file”  pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.
Stat.                                                                        §                                                               160A-168(a),  Defendant  may,  nonetheless,  withhold  the
information  from  Plaintiff  pursuant  to  the  exemption  in  N.C.
Gen. Stat.  §  160A-168(c1)(4), which provides the following:
3  At  the  hearing  on  the  motions  for  summary  judgment,  the  trial
court   asked   whether                                                      “the   city‖s   position   is   the   plaintiff
doesn‖t  get  anything  from  the  IA  file[,]”  to  which  Defendant‖s
attorney  stated,                                                            “[j]ust  the  identity  of  the  individuals  who
made  the                                                                    [complaints].”     When  the  court  further  inquired,         “so
everything   else   has   been   disclosed,”   Defendant‖s   attorney
responded,                                                                   “Yes[.]”     This  is  a  fact  that  Plaintiff  does  not
dispute.




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(c1)                                                                        Even   if   considered   part   of   an
employee‖s   personnel   file,   the   following
information   need   not   be   disclosed   to   an
employee nor to any other person:
(4)   Notes,    preliminary    drafts    and
internal   communications   concerning   an
employee.    In  the  event  such  materials
are   used   for   any   official   personnel
decision,  then  the  employee  or  his  duly
authorized  agent  shall  have  a  right  to
inspect such materials.
Id.     Therefore,  to  qualify  for  the  exemption  from  disclosure
under                                                                       (c1)(4),  the  information  sought                             (1)  must  be  comprised  of
“[n]otes,  preliminary  drafts                                              [or]  internal  communications[,]”
and                                                                         (2)  must  not  have  been                                     “used  for  any  official  personnel
decision[.]”    Id.    The  majority  ultimately  bases  its  holding  on
the    second    requirement,    concluding    that    the    requested
information  was  used  for                                                 “official  personnel  decision[s]”  as
follows:                                                                    “Nevertheless,  even  assuming  without  deciding  that  the
IA  investigative  files  that  plaintiff  seeks  to  inspect  are
[notes,  preliminary  drafts  and  internal  communications],  we  are
not  persuaded  by  Gastonia‖s  argument  that  it  had  a  statutory
right  to  refuse  plaintiff‖s  request  to  inspect  these  materials
because  such  materials  were  not  ―used  for  any  official  personnel
decision.‖”    I  disagree  with  the  majority  and  believe  that  the
decisions  by  Chief  Adams  not  to  sustain  the  complaints  did  not




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rise  to  the  level  of                                                       “official  personnel  decision[s]”  under
(c1)(4).     I  believe  the  proper  holding  in  this  case  is  to
reverse  the  trial  court‖s  entry  of  summary  judgment  in  favor  of
Plaintiff  and  to  remand  the  case  to  the  trial  court  for  entry  of
an order granting Defendant‖s motion for summary judgment.
Based  on  the  record  and  the  arguments  of  the  parties,  the
only  issue  regarding  the  application  of                                   (c1)(4)  concerns  the
question  of  whether  an                                                      “official  personnel  decision”  was  made,
and  not  whether  the  materials  were  “[n]otes,  preliminary  drafts
and   internal   communications[.]”                                            N.C.   Gen.   Stat.                                 §                       160A-
168(c1)(4).     At  the  summary  judgment  hearing  below,  Plaintiff
conceded   that   the   only   issue   in   this   case   regarding   the
applicability  of                                                              (c1)(4)  concerns  whether  the  materials  were
“used for  [an] official personnel decision”:
THE COURT:                                                                     But  it  sounds  like  what  my
                                                                               decision  really  boils  down  to  in  this  case
                                                                               is  a  matter  of  statutory  interpretation  of
[N.C.   Gen.   Stat.                                                           §]                                                  160A-168   subsection
(c1)(4).                                                                       “In  the  event  such  materials  are
used  for  any  official  personnel  decision,
then  the  employer‖s  duly  authorized  agent
shall   have   the   right   to   inspect   such
material  [sic].”    So  what  I  am  being  called
on  to  decide  is,  does  that  mean  what  it
says,    any    official    personnel    decision
including  the  determination  of  what  if  any
consequences  are  suffered  as  a  result  of
                                                                               that   internal   affairs   investigation.                                          Or
                                                                               does  that  really  mean  any  other  official
personnel                                                                      decision,                                           other                   than    [a]




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determination  of  the  subject  of  the  internal
affairs  inquiry.     Is  that  really  what  it
boils down to?
[PLAINTIFF‖S COUNSEL]:    Your  Honor,  I  think
.  the  foremost  determination  that  you
have  to  make                                                              [is  whether  Defendant
has]  to  comply  with  that  statute  because
their  chief  of  police,  and  I  give  him  credit
for  this,  their  chief  of  police  testified
under   oath   that   he   made   a   personnel
decision.
Likewise,  Plaintiff  does  not  make  an  argument  in  his  brief  with
this  Court  that  the  information  requested  is   not                    “[n]otes,
preliminary  drafts                                                         [or]  internal  communications[.]”     N.C.  Gen.
Stat.                                                                       §                                                             160A-168(c1)(4).   Rather,   Plaintiff   argues   that
subsection  “(c1)(4)  essentially  presents  one  question:    were  the
documents                                                                   [at]  issue  used  for  any  official  personnel  decision?
Chief  Adams  used  the  information  from  the  documents  in  making
his final official personnel decision.”
The  majority  states  that                                                 “we  cannot  conclude  that  the  IA
investigative  files  that  plaintiff  seeks  to  inspect  are  each  a
note,   a   preliminary   draft,   or   an   internal   communication,”
recognizing  that  not  all  of  the  materials  sought  by  Plaintiff
are  even  part  of  the  record.                                           However,  though  not  part  of  its
holding,  the  majority  does  state  that  it  appears  the  General
Assembly  intended  the  phrase                                             “notes,  preliminary  drafts  and
internal   communications”   as   used   in                                 (c1)(4)   to   apply   to




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“materials  that  are  informal  or  provisional  in  character[,]”
relying  on  WEBSTER‖S  DICTIONARY  definitions  for                          “note”  and  “draft.”
Specifically,   the   majority   refers   to   WEBSTER‖S   definition   of
“note”  as  being                                                             “a  brief  statement  of  a  fact,  experience,  etc.
written  down  for  review,  as  an  aid  to  memory,  or  to  inform
someone  else[.]”    Based  on  evidence  of  record,  I  believe  that  at
least  some  portions  of  the  IA  investigative  file                       -  collections
of  statements  of  facts  or  experiences,  “written  down  for  review”
by  Chief  Adams  or                                                          “to  inform”  Chief  Adams                                                   -  falls  within  the
majority‖s  stated  definition  of                                            “notes.”                                                                     Additionally,  the
record  does  contain  a  redacted  memorandum  to  Chief  Adams  drafted
by  the  officer  who  investigated  one  of  the  complaints  against
Plaintiff,  which  I  believe  clearly  constitutes  an                       “internal
communication  concerning  an  employee”  within  the  plain  meaning
of  (c1)(4).
                                                                              I  also  find  the  Supreme  Court‖s  decision  in   News  and
Observer  Publishing  Co.  v.  Poole,                                                                                                                      330  N.C.               465,   412  S.E.2d             7
(1992),  informative  as  to  the  meaning  of                                                                                                                                            “preliminary  draft.”
                                                                              In  that  case,  the  UNC  system  president  appointed  a  commission  to
                                                                              investigate  alleged  improprieties  relating  to  a  university‖s
men‖s  basketball  team.    Id.  at                                           470,                                                                         412  S.E.2d  at                10.    At  the
                                

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