Jones v. N&S Auto Sales, Inc.

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State: Ohio

Court: Ohio Southern District Court

Docket No: 2013-Ohio-2468

Case Date: 06/13/2013

Plaintiff: Jones

Defendant: N&S Auto Sales, Inc.

Preview:[Cite as Jones v. N&S Auto Sales, Inc., 2013-Ohio-2468.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No.                                                        99172
RONALD L. JONES
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
vs.
N&S AUTO SALES, INC., ET AL.
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-764381
BEFORE:   Boyle, P.J., Rocco, J., and Kilbane, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:     June 13, 2013

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Michael L. Berler
Ronald I. Frederick
Ronald Frederick & Associates
1370 Ontario Street
Suite 1240
Cleveland, Ohio                 44113
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES
Vincent G. Farris
1330 Rockside Road
Suite 222
Parma, Ohio                     44134

MARY J. BOYLE, P.J.:
{¶1}    Plaintiff-appellant, Ronald L. Jones, appeals the judgment of the trial court
granting summary judgment to defendants-appellees, N&S Auto Sales, Inc., and Simon
Peters.    Jones raises the following three assignments of error for our review:
1. The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff waived his right to demand
rescission pursuant to R.C. 4505.181(B)(1), as in effect at the time of the
filing of his complaint.
2. The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff failed to assert his right to a
rescission and refund within a reasonable amount of time.
3. The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff was not entitled to a refund
of the full purchase price of the vehicle pursuant to R.C. 4505.181(B)(1), as
in effect at the time of his filing of his complaint.
{¶2} Finding no merit to his appeal, we affirm.
Procedural History and Factual Background
{¶3}    Jones filed a complaint against defendants in September 2011, alleging that
defendants  violated  numerous  statutory  provisions  when  they  sold  him  a  used  car,
including  the  Consumer  Sales  Practices  Act,  the  Retail  Installment  Sales  Act,  the
Odometer Rollback and Disclosure Act, and the Uniform Commercial Code.    Jones
sought  to  recover  actual,  statutory,  noneconomic,  treble,  and  punitive  damages,
reasonable attorney fees, declaratory and injunctive relief, and costs.
{¶4}    Defendants answered the complaint, denying the allegations and asserting
several affirmative defenses.

{¶5}    In March  2012, Jones moved for summary judgment as to liability only.
Jones asserted in his affidavit attached to his summary judgment motion that he purchased
a 2002 Pontiac Grand Am from defendants on November 24, 2010, for $6,995 plus tax
and license.    Jones’s salesperson, Mike, represented to Jones that the car was in good
working  condition  and  had  never  been  in  an  accident.    Jones  later  learned  that  the
Pontiac Grand Am had been in an accident in 2008.
{¶6}    Jones averred that the Grand Am began having mechanical problems soon
after he purchased it.    In his motion, Jones stated that between December 2010 and July
2011, the vehicle broke down at least five times and had to be towed for repair.    In his
affidavit, he explained in detail what happened each time the car broke down.    On July
1, 2011, he sent a letter to defendants demanding his money back, which they refused.
Subsequently, Jones obtained two estimates regarding how much it would cost to fix the
vehicle; one was $1,814.46, and the other was $2,166.98.    Jones decided that it was not
worth fixing.    He parked the vehicle and stopped paying on it.1
{¶7}    Jones  asserted  that  defendants  committed                                               “a  multitude  of  statutory
violations.”    He stated that defendants failed to give him a “complete and properly filled
out” buyers guide prior to purchasing the vehicle.    He further stated that defendants
charged him illegal fees in selling the vehicle, failed to provide him a complete security
agreement, charged him a 15 percent late charge, stated the incorrect mileage, sold the
1According to defendant’s reply to Jones’s brief in support of damages, Jones
paid a total of $3,475 toward the purchase price before he stopped paying.

vehicle to him without proper title, failed to provide him with the title until 43 days after
he purchased it, and operated under a fictitious name.
{¶8}    The  trial  court  granted  Jones’s  summary  judgment  motion  in  part  and
denied it in part.    It found the following:
(1) On Jones’s first claim for relief, the trial court found that defendants violated
16 C.F.R. 455.3(a), the Used Motor Vehicle Trade Regulation rule, because it found that
defendants failed to provide the requisite information on the window form of the used
vehicle; specifically, the name and address of the dealership, and contact information for
reporting complaints.
(2) On Jones’s fifth claim for relief, the trial court found that defendants violated
R.C.  1317.06, contracting for illegal late fees, because the sales contract with Jones
provided that he would be charged a late fee if he made a payment more than three days
late; the law prohibits charging a late fee if the payment is less than ten days late.
(3) On Jones’s ninth claim for relief, the trial court found that defendants violated
R.C. 4505.181(A)(2), selling the vehicle without title or authority, because defendants
entered into the bill of sale with Jones on November  24,  2010, before they actually
possessed the title to the vehicle.
(4) On Jones’s tenth claim for relief, the trial court found that defendants violated
R.C. 4505.181(B)(1), for failing to obtain title in Jones’s name within 40 days of the bill
of sale; Jones received the title in his name 43 days after he purchased the vehicle.

{¶9}    The trial court denied Jones’s summary judgment motion on his remaining
eight claims, finding that genuine issues of material fact remained.
{¶10}     Subsequent  to  the  trial  court’s  judgment  granting  Jones’s  summary
judgment in part, Jones dismissed his remaining claims with prejudice and requested a
hearing on damages and attorney fees.
{¶11} The parties subsequently agreed for the trial court to decide the issue of
damages on the submission of their briefs.    After considering both parties’ briefs, the
trial court awarded Jones $200 in statutory damages on his first claim, $200 in statutory
damages on his fifth claim, $200 in statutory damages on his ninth claim, and $200 in
statutory damages on his tenth claim.    The court further awarded Jones $18,309.71 in
reasonable attorney fees and costs associated with the case.    It is from this judgment that
Jones appeals, raising his three assignments of errors.
{¶12} Although Jones raises three assignments of error, he essentially raises the
same issue in all of them.    Jones even states later in his brief that he “only finds error in
that the trial court did not award the express remedy provided in R.C. 4505.181(B)[1],
rescission and refund of the full purchase price of the vehicle to  [him].”    We must
therefore determine whether the trial court erred when it did not award Jones rescission
and refund of the full purchase price of the vehicle under R.C. 4505.181(B)(1).
Standard of Review
{¶13} Generally, an appellate court applies an abuse of discretion standard when
reviewing a trial court’s award of damages.    Roberts v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.,

75 Ohio St.3d 630, 634, 665 N.E.2d 664 (1996).    But “[a]n appellate court applies a de
novo standard of review of a lower court’s interpretation and application of a statute.”
Siegfried v. Farmers Ins. of Columbus, Inc., 187 Ohio App.3d 710, 2010-Ohio-1173, 933
N.E.2d 815, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.).    In interpreting statutes, a reviewing court should make
every effort to “‘give effect to each word, phrase and clause.’”    Boley v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 125 Ohio St.3d 510, 2010-Ohio-2550, 929 N.E.2d 448, ¶ 21, quoting State
ex rel. Myers v. Bd. of Edn. of Rural School Dist. of Spencer Twp., Lucas Cty., 95 Ohio
St. 367, 373, 116 N.E. 516 (1917).    Further, “statutes must be construed, if possible, to
operate sensibly and not to accomplish foolish results.”    State ex rel. Saltsman v. Burton,
154 Ohio St. 262, 268, 95 N.E.2d 377 (1950).    A court’s primary concern in statutory
construction is the legislative intent in the statute’s enactment, which is normally found in
the words and phrases of the statute, read in context according to standard rules of
grammar and common usage.    State ex rel. Mager v. State Teachers Retirement Sys. of
Ohio, 123 Ohio St.3d 195, 2009-Ohio-4908, 915 N.E.2d 320, ¶ 14.
R.C. 4505.181(B)(1)
{¶14}  At  the  time  Jones  purchased  his  vehicle  from  defendants,  the  relevant
portion of R.C. 4505.181 provided:
(B) If a retail purchaser purchases a motor vehicle  *  *  * for which the
dealer, pursuant to and in accordance with division (A) of this section, does
not have a certificate of title issued in the name of the dealer at the time of
the  sale,  the  retail  purchaser  has  an  unconditional  right  to  rescind  the
transaction and the dealer has an obligation to refund to the retail purchaser
the full purchase price of the vehicle, if one of the following applies:

(1) The dealer fails, on or before the fortieth day following the date of the
sale, to obtain a title in the name of the retail purchaser.
If any of the circumstances described in divisions  (B)(1) to  (4) of  this
section applies, a retail purchaser or the retail purchaser’s representative
shall notify the dealer and afford the dealer the opportunity to comply with
the  dealer’s  obligation  to  refund  the  full  purchase  price  of  the  motor
vehicle.[2]    Nothing in this division shall be construed as prohibiting the
dealer and the retail purchaser or their representatives from negotiating a
compromise resolution that is satisfactory to both parties.
{¶15} In its judgment entry on damages, the trial court determined that Jones
“waived  his  right  to  demand  rescission  of  the  transaction  and a refund for the  full
purchase price of the vehicle,” because he did not do so within a reasonable time.    The
trial court found that because Jones received title to the vehicle on January 6, 2011, but
did not demand rescission and refund until July 1, 2011, “such delayed demand is not
reasonable.”    The trial court further found that Jones “suffered no actual damages from
defendants’ failure to provide title to [him] within 40 days of purchase” because Jones did
not attempt to transfer the vehicle within that time, and he had full possession and control
of the vehicle from the time of purchase.
{¶16} Jones argues that the trial court’s reliance on the one case it cited to in
support of its decision denying Jones the remedy he requested, Anousheh v. Planet Ford,
Inc., 2d Dist. Nos. 21960 and 21967, 2007-Ohio-4543, was misplaced.    In Anousheh, the
2The statute was amended on September 29, 2011, in H.B. 1, and now provides that the retail
purchaser must notify the dealer of his or her intent to rescind the contract no “later than sixty days
from the date the motor vehicle is titled in the name of the retail purchaser.”    R.C. 4505.181(C)(1).

court reasoned that although Planet Ford had wrongly displayed a vehicle for sale before
it actually had title to the vehicle, Planet Ford “remedied the problem by immediately
providing title to the Anoushehs, as permitted by R.C. 4505.181(B)(1),” and “[t]hus, the
Anoushehs suffered no actual damages.”    Id. at ¶ 22.
{¶17} We agree with Jones that the Second District’s comments regarding R.C.
4505.181(B)(1)  were  not  on  point,  because  the  issue  raised  in  Anousheh  involved
erroneous jury instructions.    Id. at ¶ 13.    We also agree that the case does not support
the trial court’s reasoning because Planet Ford “immediately” provided the title, unlike
defendants in this case.    Although the Second District did not explain how many days
“immediately” included, we find that 43 days is not “immediate.”
{¶18} Nonetheless, we agree with the trial court that Jones waived his right to
demand rescission and a full refund.    Jones had title to his used vehicle as of January 6,
2011, which was within 43 days of purchasing it.    Although this was three days later
than the statute allows, he did not demand rescission and a full refund until July 1, 2011
— almost six months later — after “the car utterly failed to operate” and he decided that it
was not worth repairing.    As the trial court stated, “there [was] no direct, incidental, or
consequential relation between defendants’ failure to provide [Jones] title to the vehicle
within 40 days of the sale and [Jones’s] demand for rescission and refund of the vehicle
six  months  after  title  was  transferred.”    This  was  certainly  not  the  intent  of  the
legislature when it enacted R.C. 4505.181(B)(1).

{¶19} The remaining consumer protection statutes that Jones cites to, claiming
they support his arguments that he should be entitled to rescind his purchase and receive a
full refund, have nothing to do with R.C. 4505.181 and are therefore not applicable.
{¶20} Accordingly, Jones’s three assignments of error are overruled.
{¶21} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MARY J. BOYLE, PRESIDING JUDGE
KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., and
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR

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