Large v. Heartland-Lansing

SUPREME COURT CASES

Laws-info.com » Cases » Ohio » 7th District Court of Appeals » 2013 » Large v. Heartland-Lansing

State: Ohio

Court: Ohio Southern District Court

Docket No: 2013-Ohio-2877

Case Date: 06/24/2013

Plaintiff: Large

Defendant: Heartland-Lansing

Preview:[Cite as Large v. Heartland-Lansing, 2013-Ohio-2877.]
STATE OF OHIO, BELMONT COUNTY
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
SEVENTH DISTRICT
EDWARD W. LARGE, INDIVIDUALLY                           )                            CASE NO. 12 BE 7
AND AS EXECUTOR OF THE                                  )
ESTATE OF MARY RUTH LARGE                               )
)
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE                                      )
)
VS.                                                     )                            OPINION
)
HEARTLAND-LANSING OF                                    )
BRIDGEPORT OHIO, LLC, et al.                            )
)
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS                                   )
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS:                                                            Civil Appeal from the Court of Common
Pleas of Belmont County, Ohio
Case No. 10 CV 307
JUDGMENT:                                               Affirmed.
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee:                                 Atty. Christopher J. Regan
Atty. Jeremy M. McGraw
Bordas & Bordas, PLLC
1358 National Road
Wheeling, WV   26003
For Defendant-Appellant:                                Atty. G. Brenda Coeyi
Buckingham Doolittle & Burroughs, LLP
4518 Fulton Road, NW
Canton, OH   44718
JUDGES:
Hon. Cheryl L. Waite
Hon. Gene Donofrio
Hon. Joseph J. Vukovich
Dated:   June 24, 2013

[Cite as Large v. Heartland-Lansing, 2013-Ohio-2877.]
WAITE, J.
{¶1}   Appellee, Edward W. Large, filed a wrongful death suit over the death
of his wife, Mary Ruth Large.   The alleged cause of death was an infection resulting
from pressure ulcers the deceased developed while in Appellant’s care.   Appellant,
Heartland-Lansing,  a  nursing  home,  appeals  the  trial  court’s  decision  to  allow
discovery  of  a  licensing  report  and  survey  materials  generated  by  the  Ohio
Department of Health around the time the decedent was residing in the facility.   This
material collected by the Ohio Department of Health was to be provided to the facility
itself, not the quality assurance committee specifically, in accordance with applicable
state and federal law.   Appellant contends that these materials are protected by the
peer review privilege because Appellant’s quality assurance committee may have
analyzed them.   Appellant also contends that licensing report documents are subject
to an additional privilege under R.C. 3721.02(E)(1).   Materials generated by the Ohio
Department of Health and provided to a covered facility do not become privileged
merely because they may have been analyzed by a peer review committee.   No new
privilege  is  created  by  R.C.                                                           3721.02(E)(1).    The  trial  court  was  correct  in  its
determination that the material is discoverable.   The judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.
Factual and Procedural History
{¶2}   In July of  2009, Mary Ruth Large, the deceased, entered Heartland-
Lansing as a patient.   She died on October  10,  2009.   She was survived by her
husband,  Appellee  Edward  W.  Large,  who  was  later  appointed  executor  of  her
estate.   The underlying suit was filed by Appellee, both in his individual capacity and

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as executor.    Appellee named Appellant and various employees in his suit, and
alleged negligence or deliberate failure to exercise reasonable care with regard to the
decedent, including:                                                                            “failing to provide care * * * failing to follow [the] instructions of
the plan of care * * * failing to take appropriate action to prevent infection; in failing to
take appropriate action to prevent the development of pressure sores; * * * failing to
provide adequate staffing; [and] in failing to properly train and supervise the persons
responsible for failing to provide medical care to Mrs. Large.”                                 (6/30/10 Complaint,
¶11.)
{¶3}   Answers were filed by various parties and an amended complaint was
also filed.   Discovery was undertaken by Appellee.   Appellant complied with some of
the discovery requests and the parties were able to resolve others.   Disagreements
over remaining questions were set for a hearing.    The trial court’s ruling can be
broken into two parts.   Part one involved discovery material that were to be set for an
in-camera inspection before final determination was made as to their discoverability.
This  ruling  was  not  appealed.    Part  two  involves  the  court’s  decision  as  to  the
material relative to discovery requests numbered 20 and 36.   Request number 20
sought “all complaint reports or surveys of resident opinion at the Heartland facility
during the  three  years  prior to  October  10,  2009.”    Request  number  36  sought
“copies  of  any  reviews  that  were  conducted  by  HCFA                                      (Health  Care  Financing
Administration) or other governmental agencies at your facility from 2008 to 2009.”
(Appellant’s Brf., pp. 3-4.)   Appellant did identify as responsive to this request an
Ohio Department of Health licensing report and survey documents, but claimed that
these documents were privileged.

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{¶4}   The  trial  court  held  a  telephonic  hearing  on  October                           20,   2011
concerning the discovery requests.   On January 11, 2012, the trial court issued a
decision ordering Appellant to comply with requests 20 and 36 and to produce the
licensing report and survey materials.   Appellant filed a timely appeal from this order.
Argument and Law
{¶5}   Appellant identifies four assignments of error on the first page of its
brief and presents five issues for review on the second.   Appellant does not include
or discuss the assignments of error in the body of the argument.   Instead, Appellant’s
brief is organized around the five issues proposed for review.   The first and second
issues, as well as the first, third and fourth assignments of error, collectively argue
that inspection reports prepared by the state department of health are privileged, that
the trial court erred in ordering discovery of privileged material, and erred in finding
that  a  statutory  disclosure  requirement  waived  the  statutory  privilege.     These
arguments  will  be  considered together  in an  analysis  as  to the application  R.C.
3721.02(E)(1)  allegedly  has  to  the  material  the  trial  court  ordered  Appellant  to
produce, under the heading of Appellant’s first assignment of error.
{¶6}   The remaining assignment of error and issue three challenge the trial
court’s decision to allow the discovery of family and patient complaint reports.   The
analysis  of  these  arguments  focuses  on  the  trial  court’s  decision  pertaining  to
complaint reports and will be addressed under the heading of Appellant’s second
assignment of error.
{¶7}   Resolution  of  the  first,  second  and  third  assignments  of  error  also
resolve the various sub-issues raised by Appellant.

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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
The  trial  court  erred  in  ordering  Heartland-Lansing  to  produce
inspection reports prepared by the Ohio Department of Health.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3
The  trial  court  erred  when  it  ordered  Heartland-Lansing  to  produce
inspection reports prepared by the Ohio Department of Health and the
family/patient complaint reports without first conducting an in-camera
inspection of the documents.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4
The trial court erred in finding that the inspection reports prepared by
the Ohio Department of Health and the family/patient complaint reports
were relevant.
Issues Presented for Review
I.   UNDER R.C.  3721.02, INSPECTION REPORTS OF A NURSING
HOME  THAT  ARE  PREPARED  BY  THE  OHIO  DEPARTMENT  OF
HEALTH “SHALL NOT BE USED IN ANY COURT IN ANY ACTION OR
PROCEEDING * * *.”   DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ALLOWING
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE  TO  USE  THOSE  REPORTS  THROUGH
DISCOVERY IN PREPARING THEIR CASE AGAINST HEARTLAND-
LANSING?

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II.                                                                                       DID  THE  TRIAL  COURT  ERR  IN  CONCLUDING  THAT
HEARTLAND-LANSING  WAIVED  THE  STATUTORY  PRIVILEGES
GOVERNING THE OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH INSPECTION
REPORTS   BY   MAKING   THE   REPORTS   AVAILABLE   FOR
INSPECTION  BY  PROSPECTIVE  RESIDENTS  OF  THE  NURSING
HOME AS REQUIRED BY R.C. 3721.021.
IV.                                                                                       IS  THE  TRIAL  COURT  REQUIRED  TO  CONDUCT  AN  IN
CAMERA  INSPECTION  OF  PRIVILEGED  DOCUMENTS  BEFORE
ORDERING THEIR DISCOVERY?
V.   UNDER Civ.R.  26(B)(1),  “[P]ARTIES MAY OBTAIN DISCOVERY
REGARDING   ANY   MATTER,   NOT   PRIVILEGED,   WHICH   IS
RELEVANT  TO  THE  SUBJECT  MATTER  INVOLVED  IN  THE
PENDING ACTION * * *.”   DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING
THAT   THE   OHIO   DEPARTMENT   OF   HEALTH   INSPECTION
REPORTS  AND  THE  FAMILY/PATIENT  COMPLAINT  REPORTS
WERE RELEVANT IN THIS MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE ACTION?
{¶8}   Although  Appellant  identifies  four  assignments  of  error,  its  brief  is
instead structured in five sections headed by its issues presented for review.   Again,
due to the unusual organization of Appellant’s brief, in this section we will address
arguments raised under Appellant’s first, third, and fourth assignments of error and
Appellant’s I, II, IV & V issues presented for review.

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{¶9}   Appellant  argues  that  inspection  reports  prepared  by  the  Ohio
Department  of  Health  are  privileged  pursuant  to  R.C.  3721.02(E)(1).    Appellant
further contends that the trial court’s finding that it waived the privilege by making the
information  available  as  required  by  federal  statute  was  error,  and  the  order  to
produce the material was an abuse of discretion.   We note that R.C. 3721.02(E)(1)
was amended by Am.Sub.H.B. 487, effective September 10, 2012, and the relevant
language now appears in  3721.02(F)(1).    Although the language of new section
(F)(1) is identical to the language of old section (E)(1), in our analysis we will use the
pre-September 2012 version of the statute.
{¶10}  Civil discovery of all relevant, unprivileged information is encouraged by
“Ohio policy [which] favors the fullest opportunity to complete discovery.”   Stegawski
v. Cleveland Anesthesia Group, Inc., 37 Ohio App.3d 78, 85, 523 N.E.2d 902 (1987).
Civ.R. 26(B)(1) provides:
Parties  may  obtain  discovery  regarding  any  matter,  not  privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action * *
*  It  is  not  ground  for  objection  that  the  information  sought  will  be
inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
The test for relevancy under Civ.R. 26 “is much broader than the test to be utilized at
trial. It is only irrelevant by the discovery test when the information sought will not
reasonably lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”   State ex rel. Fisher v.
Rose  Chevrolet,  82  Ohio  App.3d  520,  523,  612  N.E.2d  782,  784  (1992),  citing
Icenhower v. Icenhower, Franklin App. No. 75AP-93 (10th Dist.1975).

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{¶11}  The trial court has inherent power to control discovery.   Civ.R. 26(C);
State ex rel. Pfeiffer v. Common Pleas Court, 13 Ohio St.2d 133, 235 N.E.2d 232
(1968); State ex rel. Grandview Hosp. Ctr. v. Gorman, 51 Ohio St.3d 94, 554 N.E.2d
1297 (1990).   A trial court’s decisions concerning discovery will not be disturbed on
review absent an abuse of discretion.   State ex rel. The V Companies v. Marshall, 81
Ohio St.3d 467, 469, 692 N.E.2d 198, 200-201 (1998).   Abuse of discretion connotes
more than an error of judgment; it implies that the court's attitude was unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unconscionable.   Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450
N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶12}  “When applying the abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court is
not free to merely substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.”   In re Jane Doe 1,
57 Ohio St.3d 135,  137-138,  566 N.E.2d 1181  (1991).                                            “The term discretion itself
involves the idea of choice, of  an exercise of the will, of  a determination made
between competing considerations.   In order to have an  ‘abuse’ in reaching such
determination, the result must be so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic
that it evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of
judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or
bias.”   Huffman v. Hair Surgeon, Inc. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 83, 87, 19 OBR 123,
126-127, 482 N.E.2d 1248, 1252.
{¶13}  While  a  discovery  ruling  is  ordinarily  examined  for  an  abuse  of
discretion,  the  real  issue  in  question  here  is  the  trial  court’s  interpretation  and
application of R.C. 3721.02(E)(1).                                                                “[A]n appellate court considers an appeal from a
trial court's interpretation and application of a statute de novo.”   State v. Standen, 173

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Ohio App.3d 324, 328, 2007-Ohio-5477, 878 N.E.2d 657, ¶7.   Hence, the meaning
and application of R.C. 3721.02(E)(1) to the material before us comes to this Court
de novo.    Compare, Huntsman v. Aultman Hosp.,  5th Dist. No.  2006 CA  00331,
2008-Ohio-2554, ¶50 (holding that “the confidentiality of information pursuant to R.C.
2305.252 is one of law” to be reviewed de novo); also Smith v. Manor Care of Canton
Inc., 5th Dist. Nos. 2005-CA-00100, 2005-CA-00160, 2005-CA-00162, and 2005-CA-
00174, 2006-Ohio-1182, ¶22, and Giusti v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 178 Ohio App.3d
53, 2008-Ohio-4333, 896 N.E.2d 769.   The Supreme Court of Ohio has concluded
that the issue of whether information sought under this statute is confidential and
privileged from disclosure is a question of law that is to be reviewed de novo.   Med.
Mut. of Ohio v. Schlotterer, 122 Ohio St.3d 181, 2009-Ohio-2496, 909 N.E.2d 1237,
at ¶13 and Roe v. Planned Parenthood Southwest Ohio Region, 122 Ohio St.3d 399,
2009-Ohio-2973,  912 N.E.2d  61,  ¶29.   While interpretation and application of the
relevant  statute is  conducted  in  a de novo  review,  any question  concerning the
propriety of the trial court’s decisions as they relate to the facts of the matter before
us is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.   Marshall, supra.
(A)   R.C. 3721.02(E)(1)
{¶14}  Appellant argues that R.C. 3721.02(E)(1) confers a complete statutory
privilege on inspection reports prepared by the Ohio Department of Health and, thus,
that the documents ordered to be produced are not discoverable.
{¶15}  Appellant’s argument is a matter of first impression.   No court in Ohio
has found that a privilege exists based on this statute, and the language of the
statute itself does not include the words “privilege” or “discovery.”

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{¶16}  R.C. 3721.02(E)(1) provides:
Except  as  otherwise  provided  in  this  section,  the  results  of  an
inspection  or  investigation  of  a  home  that  is  conducted  under  this
section, including any statement of deficiencies and all findings and
deficiencies cited in the statement on the basis of the inspection or
investigation, shall be used solely to determine the home’s compliance
with this chapter or another chapter of the Revised Code in any action
or proceeding other than an action commenced under division  (I) of
section 3721.17 of the Revised Code.   Those results of an inspection or
investigation  that  statement  of  deficiencies,  and  the  findings  and
deficiencies cited in that statement shall not be used in any court or in
any  action  or  proceeding  that  is  pending  in  any  court  and  are  not
admissible in evidence in any action or proceeding unless that action or
proceeding is an appeal of an action by the department of health under
this chapter or is an action by any department or agency of the state to
enforce this chapter or another chapter of the Revised Code.
{¶17}  Appellant  contends  that  the  language  of  the  statute  establishes  a
privilege protecting licensing reports from discovery.    Both parties agree that the
statute prevents the reports from being admitted at trial.   Although the statute clearly
states  that  these  reports  are  inadmissible,  the  statute  nevertheless  allows  the
information to be used “in any action or proceeding” so long as it is used “solely to
determine the home’s compliance with this chapter or another chapter of the Revised
Code.”     R.C.                                                                             3721.02(E)(1).   The  statute  excludes  grievance  or  complaint

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proceedings under R.C. 3721.17 from “any action or proceeding,” and then specifies
that  an  inspection  report                                                              “shall  not  be  used  in  any  court  or  in  any  action  or
proceeding that is pending in any court and are not admissible in evidence in any
action or proceeding.”   R.C. 3721.02(E)(1).   It is unclear how a report could be used
as evidence of compliance, but nevertheless be inadmissible.    It is clear that the
statute makes no mention of discovery or privilege.
{¶18}  Appellant  contends  that  this  statute  should  be  interpreted  in  the
broadest possible sense and that a privilege is imputed in the phrase “shall not be
used in any court or in any action or proceeding that is pending in any court.”   R.C.
3721.02(E)(1).   Although no court has ruled on the meaning of the language in R.C.
3721.02(E)(1), the Ninth and Tenth District Courts of Appeals have interpreted this
exact language, which also appears in R.C. 4141.21.   On review of R.C. 4141.21,
these districts have held that the language  “does not confer a privilege; rather, it
contains an evidence exclusion provision.”   Pasanovic v. American General Finance,
Inc., 10th Dist. No. 92AP-651, 1992 WL 229517, *2 (September 17, 1992); also Daff
v. Associated Bldg. Suppliers, Inc., 9th Dist. No. 23396, 2007-Ohio-3238; and Curry
v. Stumps,  10th Dist. No.  80AP-146,  1980 WL  353675,  *4  (September  9,  1980):
“While the General Assembly in R.C. 4141.21 did make certain restrictions upon use
of information supplied to the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, it did not provide
for an absolute privilege with respect thereto.”
{¶19}  No court has found that R.C. 3721.02, or the most analogous statute
that  contains  identical  language,  R.C.                                                4141.21,  creates  a  statutory  privilege
protecting inspection reports from discovery.   When the legislature does create an

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absolute privilege, it does so explicitly.   Examples of absolute statutory privileges of
the type Appellant claims R.C. 3721.02(E)(1) creates share common characteristics:
they are unambiguously identified as privileges and they explicitly define how the
privilege may be asserted or defeated.   The best example of statutory language that
creates  a  privilege  is  R.C.                                                             2317.02.                              The  statute  is  entitled   “[p]rivileged
communications”  and  addresses  the  attorney  client,  physician  patient,  counselor
patient, and marital privileges.   Each privilege is specifically identified as such and
includes the various limitations and exceptions allowing disclosure when disputes
arise out of the privileged relationship.
{¶20}  Similarly, in the context of health care institutions, where the legislature
has seen fit to make proceedings confidential and exempt information from discovery,
it has done so unambiguously.   R.C. 2305.252, titled “[c]onfidentiality of peer review
committee proceedings and records,” provides:                                               “Proceedings and records within the
scope of a peer review committee of a health care entity shall be held in confidence
and shall not be subject to discovery or introduction in evidence in any civil action
against a health care entity or health care provider.”   There are nevertheless, as is
generally the case, exceptions to this exemption:
Information, documents, or records otherwise available from original
sources are not to be construed as being unavailable for discovery or
for  use  in  any  civil  action  merely  because  they  were  produced  or
presented  during  proceedings  of  a  peer  review  committee,  but  the
information, documents, or records are available only from the original

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sources  and  cannot  be  obtained  from  the  peer  review  committee’s
proceedings or records.
R.C. 2305.252.   Other statutes exempting material from discovery are equally direct.
R.C.  3701.9311,  titled                                                                     “[e]xemption  from  subpoena  or  discovery;  inadmissibility,”
provides:                                                                                    “Information, data, and records collected for use and maintained by, * * *
the Ohio violent death reporting system shall not be subject to subpoena or discovery
while in the possession of the system or admissible in any * * * civil proceeding.”
{¶21}  Not  only  does  R.C.                                                                 3721.02(E)(1)  omit  any  of  the  language  the
legislature uses to create a privilege or to forbid discovery, in the very next section of
this statute the legislature requires that the exact information Appellant claims is
privileged is to be made available to the public.   R.C. 3721.021 provides:
Every person who operates a home  *  *  * shall have available in the
home for review by prospective patients and residents, their guardians,
or other persons assisting in their placement, each inspection report
completed pursuant to section  3721.02  *  *  * and each statement of
deficiencies and plan of correction completed and made available to the
public  under  Titles  XVIII  and  XIX  of  the  ‘Social  Security  Act’  *  *  *
including  such  reports  that  result  from  life  safety  code  and  health
inspections   during   the   preceding   three   years,   and   shall   post
prominently within the home a notice of this requirement.
While statutory privileges frequently include exceptions, a survey of privilege statutes
does not reveal any other instance in which material meets the requirements of a

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statutory privilege but is simultaneously required by statute to be made available to
the public at all times.   Appellant has not provided any example of a privilege that
operates  in  this  manner,  nor  has  Appellant  identified  any  legal  support  for  its
arguments beyond its bald assertions that this Court should adopt Appellant’s self-
serving interpretation of the statute.
{¶22}  Appellant’s reliance on a 1930 decision from the Third District, State ex
rel. Justice v. Thomas, 35 Ohio App. 250, 172 N.E. 397 (1930), which addresses
principles of interpretation where portions of a statute conflict, is unfounded.   There is
no statutory conflict in this instance.   State ex rel. Jones v. Conrad, 92 Ohio St.3d
389, 750 N.E.2d 583 (July 25, 2001).                                                          “In such a case, we do not resort to rules of
interpretation  in  an  attempt  to  discern  what  the  General  Assembly  could  have
conclusively meant or intended in * * * a particular statute—we rely only on what the
General Assembly has actually said.”                                                          (Citation omitted).   Id. at 342.     No conflict
between statutes exists here and no additional analysis is necessary to give the plain
language of the statute its plain meaning:   that the material sought cannot be entered
into evidence or used in court, but is nevertheless discoverable, because the General
Assembly did not choose to explicitly restrict discovery or create a privilege.
{¶23}  Materials that may be accessed in discovery are not limited to only
admissible  evidence.    Civ.R.                                                               26(B)(1)                                            (“[i]t  is  not  ground  for  objection  that  the
information sought will be inadmissible at the trial.”).   Discovery encompasses “any
matter, not privileged” and extends to the  “existence, description, nature, custody,
condition and location of any books, documents, electronically stored information, or
other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of

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any discoverable matter” and will necessarily include a broad range of materials and
information that are not otherwise admissible as evidence.   Civ.R. 26(B)(1).
{¶24}  R.C. 3721.02(E)(1) does not create a privilege.   It is an exclusionary
provision that prevents the admission of department of health licensing inspection
reports into evidence in a trial.   Licensing reports are discoverable, however, to the
extent allowed by the Civil Rules; that is, where they are  “relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action” and appear “reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence” despite the fact that they are not, themselves,
admissible.   Civ.R. 26(B)(1).
{¶25}  Appellant also complains of the trial court’s reference to R.C. 3721.021
as  evidence  that  any  privilege  ostensibly  created  by  R.C.                            3721.021(E)(1)  is
destroyed,  and  contends  that  compelled  disclosure  does  not  destroy  privilege.
Appellant’s  argument  would  only  be  relevant  if  the  material  is  privileged.    As
discussed,  the  language  of  the  statute  does  not  confer  privilege.    Because  the
material is not privileged, the trial court erred in finding that some privilege was
destroyed by the disclosure required by R.C. 3721.01.   This error in reasoning does
not alter our determination that the court’s order allowing discovery of the inspection
materials was correct, albeit for other reasons.
(B)   Relevance
{¶26}  In addition to arguments concerning privilege, Appellant also contends
that the licensing report is not relevant to the subject matter of the action.   Appellee
has alleged negligence in the treatment of Mary Ruth Large, who is now deceased.
Mrs. Large apparently died as a result of complications from pressure ulcers that are

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alleged to have developed while she was in Appellant’s care.   In Appellant’s fourth
assignment of error, which appears in the body of its brief as the fifth issue for review,
it contends that the trial court’s decision to require production of the reports was
erroneous because licensing reports are not sufficiently probative of negligence to
establish liability.
{¶27}  Appellant cites a variety of cases from several state courts outside of
Ohio for the proposition that federal standards for licensing facilities or certifying them
for participation in federal programs do not sufficiently establish the standard of care
to  determine  that  violations  of  those  standards  amounts  to  negligence  per  se.
Appellant emphasizes in particular the lack of testimony from a medical expert in a
Texas case in which the plaintiff’s theory of recovery was negligence per se due to a
state report that was specifically critical of the treatment the decedent received at the
defendant facility.    Using the Ohio negligence standard, which is the reasonable
person  standard,  Appellant  contends  Appellee  has  pleaded  the  elements  of
negligence per se, and asserts that Ohio law does not mandate negligence per se for
violations of R.C. 3721.
{¶28}  Appellant’s basic argument is that Appellee is not entitled to discovery
material if that material, standing alone, cannot conclusively prove negligence.   This
argument can be seen as both tardy and premature, however.    If, as Appellant
contends,  Appellee  has  filed  a  claim  that  has  no  hope  of  recovery  on  its  face,
Appellant’s remedy was to file a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, which should have been filed
prior to any responsive pleading.   While this argument may be intended to support a
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, it is not relevant to the discovery process and it is certainly

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not properly before this Court in an appeal seeking relief from a discovery order.   In
this sense, Appellant’s argument can be seen as tardy.   However, Appellant seems
to argue that Appellee has properly filed his complaint but the material he now seeks
in discovery is not sufficient to prove Appellee’s claims in court.   This does not affect
the relevancy of the materials sought, but instead focuses on the ultimate sufficiency
of the evidence.   Sufficiency of the evidence is an issue for the fact finder when
making a final disposition of  the case, not an issue for either a trial court or a
reviewing court when ruling on discovery.   The rules of discovery specifically allow, to
a  certain  extent,  a                                                                            “fishing  expedition.”    In  this  sense,  Appellant’s  argument  is
premature.
{¶29}  None of the arguments raised by Appellant identify either an error of
law or an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to allow discovery of the
inspection  reports.    Appellant  is  mistaking  the  issue  of  admissibility  at  trial  for
relevance in discovery.   Relevance, in discovery terms, means only that the material
sought “relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim
or defense of any other party.”   Civ.R. 26(B)(1).   The fact that the material may not be
admissible at trial is not a bar to discovery.   Civ.R. 26(B)(1) (“[i]t is not ground for
objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial.”).
{¶30}  Appellee has pleaded in his complaint the elements of multiple claims,
including negligence.   The trial court found that the condition of the facility prior to,
during, and after the decedent’s death is relevant to that claim.   Appellant has not
identified a defect in the trial court’s reasoning as to the relevance of the conditions in
the facility in this case.   The trial court has further decided that licensing reports may

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provide information concerning conditions in the facility that may lead to the discovery
of relevant evidence concerning those conditions.    Accordingly, the court ordered
Appellant to produce the reports.   Appellant has failed to raise any argument that
actually addresses Civ.R. 26.   No statutory or common law privilege applies to the
disputed material.   Because inspection reports from the Ohio Department of Health
are  not  privileged,  no  in-camera  inspection  of  the  reports  is  necessary.    In  the
absence of any privilege excluding the material and any indication of an abuse of
discretion, Appellant’s issues for review I, II, IV & V are without merit, and its first,
third,  and  fourth  assignments  of  error  are  overruled.    The  trial  court’s  decision
ordering the production of licensing inspection reports is affirmed.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
The  trial  court  erred  in  ordering  Heartland-Lansing  to  produce
family/patient complaint reports.
Issue Presented for Review
III.                                                                                            UNDER R.C.  2305.24,  “INFORMATION, DATA, REPORTS, OR
RECORDS   MADE   AVAILABLE”   TO   HEARTLAND-LANSING'S
QUALITY  ASSURANCE  COMMITTEE  IS                                                               “CONFIDENTIAL  AND
SHALL  BE  USED  BY  THE  COMMITTEE  AND  THE  COMMITTEE
MEMBERS ONLY IN THE EXERCISE OF THE PROPER FUNCTIONS
OF THE COMMITTEE.”   DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN HOLDING
THAT  OHIO  DEPARTMENT  OF  HEALTH  INSPECTION  REPORTS
AND FAMILY/PATIENT COMPLAINT REPORTS, WHICH HAD BEEN

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MADE  AVAILABLE  TO  THE  QUALITY  ASSURANCE  COMMITTEE,
WERE   DISCOVERABLE   BY   PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE   IN   THIS
MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE ACTION?
{¶31}  Appellant’s second assignment of error purports to address only “family
and/or patient complaint reports,” however the body of Appellant’s argument under its
heading “III” contends that both Ohio Department of Health inspection reports and
family/patient complaint reports should be protected from discovery by R.C. 2305.24
and R.C. 2305.252.   With the exception of a brief quote from R.C. 2305.24, all of
Appellant’s substantive argument on the issue solely addresses R.C. 2305.252.   The
applicability of R.C.  2305.252 will be addressed in detail below.    However, as a
preliminary matter, R.C. 2305.24 pertains to a health facility’s peer review committee.
It charges members of a peer review committee with maintaining the integrity of
personal medical information to the same degree a physician would be responsible
for such information.   The statute protects the privacy of the individuals to whom the
information  pertains,  and  requires  committee  members  to  protect  and  use  the
information appropriately:
Any information, data, reports, or records made available to a quality
assurance committee or utilization committee of a hospital or long-term
care facility or of any not-for-profit health care corporation that is a
member of the hospital or long-term care facility or of which the hospital
or long-term care facility is a member are confidential and shall be used
by the committee and the committee members only in the exercise of
the proper functions of the committee.   Any information, data, reports,

-19-
or records made available to a utilization committee of a state or local
medical  society  composed  of  doctors  of  medicine  or  doctors  of
osteopathic  medicine  are  confidential  and  shall  be  used  by  the
committee  and  the  committee  members  only in  the  exercise  of  the
proper functions of the committee.   A right of action similar to that a
patient  may  have  against  an  attending  physician  for  misuse  of
information, data, reports, or records arising out of the physician-patient
relationship  shall  accrue  against  a  member  of  a  quality  assurance
committee or utilization committee for misuse of any information, data,
reports,  or  records  furnished  to  the  committee  by  an  attending
physician.   No physician, institution, hospital, or long-term care facility
furnishing information, data, reports, or records to a committee with
respect to any patient examined or treated by the physician or confined
in the institution, hospital, or long-term care facility shall, by reason of
the furnishing, be deemed liable in damages to any person, or be held
to answer for betrayal of a professional confidence within the meaning
and intent of section 4731.22 of the Revised Code.
R.C. 2305.24.
{¶32}  The   confidentiality   requirement   of   R.C.                                     2305.24   clarifies   the
responsibilities of physicians and committee members with regard to the information
in its possession and establishes penalties for a breach of that duty.   This is not the
statute that creates what is commonly referred to as the “peer review privilege.”   This
section does not create a privilege and does not address discovery.   Appellee is not

-20-
seeking information directly from committee members.   Because Appellant does not
explain what application it believes the statute may have to this matter, and because
the  statute  appears facially inapplicable,  we  will limit  our analysis  to  Appellant’s
actual arguments,  which  address  R.C.  2305.252.    Appellant’s  misleading use  of
language from R.C. 2305.24 in its reply brief describes material that is confidential
and that committee members may not disclose, but does not contain the language of
the peer review privilege, which appears in R.C. 2305.252.
{¶33}  A peer review committee, as defined by statute, is a committee within a
hospital  or  other  qualifying  provider  of  health  care  that                             “[c]onducts  professional
credentialing or quality review activities involving the competence of, professional
conduct  of,  or  quality  of  care  provided  by  health  care  providers.”                  R.C.
2305.25(E)(1)(a).    The  “peer review privilege” originates in R.C.  2305.252, which
provides, “[p]roceedings and records within the scope of a peer review committee * *
* shall be held in confidence and shall not be subject to discovery or introduction in
evidence in any civil action against a health care entity or * * * provider * * * arising
out of matters that are the subject of evaluation and review by the * * * committee.”
The provisions that allows records to be excluded under the peer review privilege
also allows:                                                                                  “Information * * * otherwise available from original sources [is] not to be
construed as being unavailable for discovery or for use in any civil action merely
because  [it  was]  produced  or  presented  during  proceedings  of  a  peer  review
committee * * *.”   The statute clearly provides that such information is “available only
from the original sources and cannot be obtained from the peer review committee's
proceedings or records.”   Witnesses who  “provide[  ] information to a peer review

-21-
committee  *  *  * cannot be asked about the individual's testimony before the peer
review committee, information the individual provided to the peer review committee,
or any opinion the individual formed as a result of  the peer review committee's
activities.”   R.C. 2305.252.
{¶34}  Various Ohio appellate courts have described the purpose of the statute
as protecting the “the integrity of the peer-review process” to allow for “immediate”
improvements in “the quality of health care” due to the particular need in the health
care profession for “immediate remedial measures.”   Gates v. Brewer, 2 Ohio App.3d
347, 349, 442 N.E.2d 72 (10th Dist.1981) “we find that a legislator could rationally
believe  that  by conferring a  privilege  from discovery upon  the  proceedings  of  a
medical disciplinary committee the quality of   public health care would increase * * *
placing a blanket of confidentiality * * * has provided for a manner in which a hospital
or medical association may take remedial measures for the improvement of the care
and treatment of patients.”   Notwithstanding this stated purpose, “[t]he peer-review
privilege is not a generalized cloak of secrecy over the entire peer-review process.”
Giusti, supra, at ¶14.                                                                     “If all materials viewed and utilized by review committees were
deemed  undiscoverable,  a  hospital  could  never  be  held  accountable  for  any
negligent act within the purview of the committee.”   Huntsman v. Aultman Hosp., 5th
Dist. No. 2006 CA 00331, 2008-Ohio-2554, ¶47.
{¶35}  The records and proceedings of the peer review committee are not
coextensive with all of the records of the facility in which the committee operates.
The fact that copies of certain material may have been provided to a committee does
not extend the protection afforded committee proceedings, and committee generated

-22-
records, to material generated outside of the committee.   Bansal v. Mt. Carmel Health
Sys., Inc., 10th Dist. No. 09AP-351, 2009-Ohio-6845, ¶17, “* * * we conclude that
documents sought from a health care entity are peer review records if the health care
entity proves that those documents were created by and/or exclusively for a peer
review committee.   See, e.g. Selby at ¶15-25 (holding that EKG discrepancy reports
were not privileged peer review documents because the health care entity used the
reports for patient care, and not necessarily for peer review purposes).”                    “If a health
care entity itself is the original source, it cannot shield documents from disclosure just
by circulating them during peer review proceedings.”   Id. at ¶16, fn. 3.
{¶36}  Where  “information,  documents,  or  records”  are  otherwise  available
from original sources, which may include the records of the facility itself, they “are not
to be construed as being unavailable for discovery or for use in any civil action
merely because they were produced or presented during proceedings of  a peer
review committee.”   R.C. 2305.252, compare Giusti, supra, at ¶18:                           “Information that
may be of a type that usually makes up a peer review committee file is not protected
by R.C. 2305.252 just because it usually makes up a peer review committee file.”
The statute simply directs that documents, information, or records, which originate
outside the peer review committee must be obtained “only from the original sources
and cannot be obtained from the peer review committee’s proceedings or records.”
R.C. 2305.252.
{¶37}  The responsibilities of a party asserting a privilege are long established
in the principles of Ohio law:   privileges, “being in derogation of the common law,
must be strictly construed.”   Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 428, 72 N.E.2d 245

-23-
(1947).    The party claiming privilege has the burden of proving that the privilege
applies to the requested information.   Waldmann v. Waldmann, 48 Ohio St.2d 176,
178,                                                                                           358  N.E.2d   521  (1976).     The  plain  language  of  R.C.   2305.252  shields
information from discovery and use at trial in “civil action[s] * * * arising out of matters
that are the subject of evaluation and review by the * * * committee.”   R.C. 2305.252.
A party claiming the peer review privilege, at “a bare minimum,” must show that a
peer review committee existed and that it actually investigated the incident.   Smith v.
Manor Care of Canton Inc., 5th Dist. Nos. 2005-CA-00100, 2005-CA-00160, 2005-
CA-00162, and 2005-CA-00174, 2006-Ohio-1182, ¶61.
{¶38}  Appellant must, as the party asserting a privilege, satisfy its burden to
demonstrate  the  existence  of  a  privilege  relevant  to  the  documents  it  seeks  to
protect.   In so doing Appellant “must provide evidence as to the specific documents
requested, not generalities regarding the types of documents usually contained in a
peer-review committee’s records.”   Smith v. Cleveland Clinic, 197 Ohio App.3d 524,
2011-Ohio-6648, 968 N.E.2d 41, ¶15 (8th Dist.).   The steps Appellant must take were
briefly outlined by the Ninth District Court of Appeals in Ward v. Summa Health Care,
184 Ohio App.3d 254, 2009-Ohio-4839, 920 N.E.2d 421 (9th Dist.) and begin with
establishing that  a  peer review committee was in  existence  and  that  the facility
actually  investigated  the  incident  or  incidents  that  the  disputed  documents  or
information reference.   A broad assertion that the committee may rely on a particular
type of document or information, if the document was not generated by or under the
direction of the committee, is insufficient.   For the privilege to attach, the committee
must have used or relied on the specific document or information the facility seeks to

-24-
exclude, and the particular document or information must not be something that is
simultaneously available to employees of the facility in the course of their duties
separate and apart from any peer review responsibilities.   Bansal, supra.
{¶39}  Appellant’s apparent belief that the peer review privilege for documents
maintained by a peer review committee extends to all documents maintained by a
health care facility is incorrect.   Documents that may be provided to a peer review
committee, but were not originally prepared exclusively for the committee and are
also accessible to staff of the facility in their capacities as employees or managers of
the facility, separate and apart from any role on a review committee, are not in any
way protected by the privilege.   The privilege attaches only to the files maintained by
and for the committee, not to all files in a facility.    Bansal, supra; Selby v. Fort
Hamilton Hosp., 12th Dist. No. 2007-05-126, 2007-Ohio-2413.
{¶40}  Although Appellant has provided an affidavit from its licensed nursing
home  administrator  attesting  to  the  existence  of  a  quality  assurance  committee,
Appellant has failed to identify what it terms “family/resident complaints” with anything
approaching  particularity.     Appellant  has  similarly  failed  to  identify  any  actual
investigation  of  the  incident  or  incidents  that  may  be  described  in  the  material.
Appellant suggests in its brief that  “complaints” are used  “during the normal and
ordinary course of the committee’s proceedings.”                                                (Appellant’s Brf., p. 17.)   However,
the affidavit Appellant cites as the basis of its privilege claim contains no reference to
“family/patient  complaints.”                                                                   The  affidavit  instead  states  generally:   “In  the
performance of its duties, the Quality Assurance Committee analyzed the following
documents:    Ohio  Department  of  Health  survey  results,  OSCAR  reports,  quality

-25-
indicator  reports,  and  all  other  materials  associated  with  the  survey  process.”
(DeAngelo Aff., ¶5.)   More importantly, the affidavit offered by Appellant also clearly
indicates that the material was not generated by or at the request of the committee.
Appellee did not seek documents directly from any peer review committee.   Appellant
has failed to assert any peer review privilege with regard to the documents described
as  patient/family  complaints.    The  affidavit  intended  to  support  privilege  instead
conclusively establishes that the documents were not generated by or under the
direction of a committee whose activities are protected by the statutory privilege.
{¶41}  Appellee contends, and Appellant does not dispute, that the complaints
Appellant seeks to protect are survey documents generated by the Ohio Department
of Health, apparently pursuant to R.C. 5111.39 and related provisions.   Ohio code
sections                                                                                       5111.39,   3721.021  and   3721.022  all  incorporate  the  relevant  federal
statutory and regulatory law concerning surveys:
The  department  shall  conduct  surveys  in  accordance  with  the
regulations, guidelines, and procedures issued by the United States
secretary of health and human services under Titles XVIII and XIX of
the  ‘Social Security Act,’  49 Stat.  620  (1935),  42  U.S.C.A.  301,  as
amended, sections 5111.40 to 5111.42 of the Revised Code, and rules
adopted under section 3721.022 of the Revised Code.
R.C. 5111.39(C).   Assuming arguendo that the documents Appellant now seeks to
protect were collected by the state during the survey process, they were required to
be provided directly to the director of the facility, not to the peer review panel.            42
CFR 488.325.   In addition to providing the materials to the covered facility, the state

-26-
and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) make these materials
available to the public fourteen days after providing them to the facility:
The disclosing agency must make available to the public, upon the
public’s request, information concerning all surveys and certifications * *
* including statements of deficiencies, separate listings of any isolated
deficiencies  that  constitute  no  actual  harm,  with  the  potential  for
minimal  harm,  and  plans  of  correction  (which  contain  any  provider
response to the deficiency statement) within  14 calendar days after
each item is made available to the facility.
42 CFR 488.325(d).   Any suggestion of a chilling effect or the need for confidentiality
to attach to survey documents as a policy concern is illusory.   The United States
Code  sections  applicable  to  survey  documents  and  complaint  reports  further
demonstrate the broad nature of the disclosure requirements placed on the exact
material Appellant seeks to exclude:
(C)  Availability  of  survey,  certification,  and  complaint  investigation
reports -- A nursing facility must -
(i)  have  reports  with  respect  to  any  surveys,  certifications,  and
complaint  investigations  made  respecting  the  facility  during  the                       3
preceding years available for any individual to review upon request;
42 USC 1396r(d)(1)(V) [sic] (Pub. L. 111-148, Title VI, §6101).   The clear intent of the
federal law controlling the survey process is openness.   This information is legally
required to be publicly available from multiple sources including the facility itself.   No

-27-
peer review privilege attaches to documents generated by the state during the survey
process because they are not generated by or for the committee.   The facility, which
is required by law to be provided with survey results, may be required to produce
these documents in discovery without disturbing the confidentiality that attaches to
peer review proceedings and records.   The documents in no way reflect the decision
making process of the committee and are provided to the facility itself for use by
employees, separate and apart from any committee responsibility.
{¶42}  Appellant’s reliance on Huntsman, supra, is misplaced.  While Appellant
does accurately quote the principles espoused by the Huntsman court, Appellant’s
attempt to apply the logic of that decision to the material at issue here is misleading.
In Huntsman, the trial court, applying a prior version of the peer review privilege
statute, ordered the health care facility to produce a list of the documents contained
in a physician’s credentialing file that were available from original sources.   The Fifth
District  found  that  the  statute  prohibited  any  disclosure  of  the  contents  of  the
credentialing file compiled by the peer review committee, and that the trial court could
not compel the facility to compile a list of the documents included in the credentialing
file.
{¶43}  Huntsman stands for the proposition that the statute prevents a court
from requiring a facility to provide a list of documents that could be found from other,
original sources, utilizing a peer review committee document to do so.    In other
words, a facility cannot be forced to divulge the information contained in a peer
review committee file.   In the matter before us the trial court did not compel any
disclosure of Appellant’s peer review files.   Instead it was Appellant who voluntarily

-28-
disclosed the fact that its quality assurance committee may have analyzed material
Appellee sought; material sought not from the committee, but directly from the facility,
itself.                                                                                      Survey  materials  may  not  be  obtained  directly  from  the  records  of  the
committee, but it is clear these same documents are available in the facility from
other sources.   As Appellee suggested during oral argument, documents that are
otherwise discoverable do not become privileged merely because they have been
dipped in the waters of a peer review committee file.   So long as Appellee does not
seek these documents directly from the committee, or seek any committee work
product involving the documents, Appellee is entitled to discovery of the documents.
{¶44}  Appellant is similarly mistaken in identifying Tenan v. Huston, 165 Ohio
App.3d 185, 2006-Ohio-131, 845 N.E.2d 549 (11th Dist.) and Hammond v. Ruf, 9th
Dist.  No.                                                                                   22109,  2004-Ohio-6273  in  support  of  the  proposition  that  documents
produced by a state agency are privileged because copies of the documents have
been provided to a quality assurance committee.   In both Ruf and Tenan a party
sought discovery of information from a physician’s credentialing file and the trial court
erroneously applied the prior version of the statute to allow disclosure from the file
itself.    In both cases the reviewing court found that the applicable version of the
statute precluded the production of material directly from the privileged file.   While it
is true that material contained in the file is privileged, and that a facility cannot be
compelled to reveal the contents of the file, material that a facility obtained and
possesses  separate and  apart from  committee  proceedings  is  not  privileged.    If
Appellant is asserting it has transferred all copies of these documents to committee
files and no longer possesses them in the facility separately from committee files, it

-29-
has done so to no avail, as it is required to keep these on file and may not in this
fashion prevent public access or to thwart discovery in this matter.
{¶45}  Appellant’s arguments concerning the quality of information provided to
a quality assurance committee, or to state employees, have no logical application to
these documents which are already required to be made public.   Appellant’s citations
to decisions from various states interpreting their own statutes offers no insight into
the motivations of the Ohio legislature or the language of Ohio statutes.   Appellant’s
contention that facilities should be able to conceal the results of state surveys and
complaints is refuted by the clear policy of openness espoused by federal and state
disclosure laws.
{¶46}  Appellant has failed to properly invoke the peer review privilege with
regard to any complaint reports included in survey materials collected by the Ohio
Department of Health.   The results of surveys conducted by the Ohio Department of
Health pursuant to state and federal obligations are not subject to the peer review
privilege and are discoverable from other files of a covered facility.   Appellant’s third
issue  for  review  is  without  merit  and  Appellant’s  second  assignment  of  error  is
overruled.
Conclusion
{¶47}  Ohio Department of Health inspection reports are not privileged.   Ohio
Health Department survey documents produced pursuant to federal and state law do
not directly reflect the operations of a quality assurance committee.   The documents
are not subject to the peer review privilege.   Even if copies of the surveys have been
analyzed by a quality assurance committee, a facility may be compelled to produce

-30-
them.   Documents in a heath care facility’s files that are provided to and accessible
by employees or used by the facility and its employees in the course of operations do
not  become  privileged  simply  when  copies  are  provided  to  a  quality  assurance
committee.   Documents provided to and used by employees of a facility separate and
apart from any duties for a peer review or quality assurance committee member are
discoverable from the facility to the extent that they are not subject to any other
properly invoked privilege.   The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Donofrio, J., concurs.
Vukovich, J., concurs.

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