Murphy v. Reynoldsburg

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State: Ohio

Court: Supreme Court

Docket No: 1991-2023

Case Date: 12/11/1992

Plaintiff: Murphy

Defendant: Reynoldsburg

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Murphy, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. City of
Reynoldsburg et al.; Eby et al., Appellants and Cross-Appellees.

[Cite as Murphy v. Reynoldsburg (1992), Ohio
St.3d , 1992.]
Civil procedure -- Civ.R. 56(C) places mandatory duty on trial

court to thoroughly examine all appropriate materials

filed by parties before ruling on motion for summary

judgment -- Failure to comply constitutes reversible error.
Civ.R. 56(C) places a mandatory duty on a trial court to

thoroughly examine all appropriate materials filed by the

parties before ruling on a motion for summary judgment.

The failure of a trial court to comply with this

requirement constitutes reversible error.

(No. 91-2023 -- Submitted November 9, 1992 --
Decided December 11, 1992.)

Appeal and Cross-Appeal from the Court of Appeals for
Franklin County, No. 90AP-1296.

Gregory Murphy, appellee and cross-appellant, was arrested
by an officer of the Reynoldsburg Police Department on December
21, 1987. Murphy was charged with one count of aggravated drug
trafficking, and his trial ended in a hung jury. After the
trial court declared a mistrial, the state dismissed the case.

Subsequently, in 1989, Murphy became aware of allegations
that certain members of the Reynoldsburg police force were
performing their duties in a racially discriminatory manner.
An internal investigation conducted by the city's police
department revealed some evidence of the existence of a group
of officers known as the "SNAT" team. Various officers
indicated that the term SNAT stood for "Special Nigger Arrest
Team." Although the department ultimately concluded that use
of the acronym SNAT was merely inappropriate behavior, evidence
uncovered in the investigation was open to the interpretation
that some members of the police force were discriminating
against blacks, in an attempt to keep blacks out of the city.

After Murphy, who is black, learned of the possible
existence of SNAT, he filed an action on December 19, 1989 in
the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, contending that he
had been the victim of a SNAT arrest. Murphy claimed that he

was stopped without probable cause, and that racial
discrimination was behind the stop. Murphy named five
defendants in his complaint: appellants and cross-appellees,
Dean Eby and Scott Wagner, the officers involved in his arrest;
Jess Moore, the Reynoldsburg Police Chief; Robert McPherson,
the city's mayor; and the city of Reynoldsburg. Murphy sought
damages for violation of his civil rights under Section 1983,
Title 42, U.S.Code, and for conspiracy to violate his civil
rights under Section 1985(3), Title 42, U.S.Code.

Murphy and the defendants filed numerous depositions and
other evidence with the trial court. Defendants moved for
summary judgment, and the trial court scheduled a hearing to
consider defendants' motion. At the beginning of the hearing,
the trial court informed the parties that it had not read any
of the evidence submitted in support of, or in opposition to,
the motion. The trial court stated: "Let me be up front with
all of you. I haven't read your motion. I haven't read your
briefs. So, educate me." The attorneys for both sides went on
to argue their case before the trial court.

At the close of counsels' arguments, the trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants. The trial
court concluded the hearing by stating:

"What I am going to do, I am going to give you my
decision. I have listened carefully to everything that you
have said. And, the court finds that the motion for summary
judgment should be sustained in all of its ramifications, the
city of Reynoldsburg, the chief of police, the mayor, Officer
Eby, Officer Wagner.

"From what I have heard about what occurred out there,
this court finds that there was probable cause for an
investigatory stop. The defendant was arrested. He was
driving without a license.

"Very frankly, I am a little skeptical of the fact the
defendant was up here to get money that he claimed was owed to
him by somebody, and goes to a parking lot at the Ramada Inn in
order to retrieve his money, and that the police find cocaine
in the car.

"I am more inclined to believe that what he was doing up
here from Kentucky was selling cocaine. The motion for summary
judgment is sustained. * * *"

Murphy appealed the judgment of the trial court to the
court of appeals. In his first assignment of error, Murphy
argued that the trial court erred in not considering any of the
depositions or other materials filed by the parties regarding
the motion for summary judgment, and that the case should be
remanded to the trial court to rule on the motion after reading
the materials. The court of appeals recognized that Civ.R.
56(C) places a duty upon a trial court to consider all
appropriate materials in the record before ruling on a motion
for summary judgment. However, the appellate court overruled
the assignment of error, holding that any error was
non-prejudicial to Murphy because an appellate court reviewing
a grant of summary judgment gives no deference to the trial
court's decision. The court of appeals reasoned that it could
conduct its own examination of the record, and rule on the
motion based on that independent examination.

Consistent with its resolution of Murphy's first

assignment of error, the court of appeals did conduct its own
consideration of the materials submitted in support of, and in
opposition to, defendants' motion. The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment
in favor of Chief Moore, Mayor McPherson, and the city of
Reynoldsburg. The appellate court affirmed the grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendants Eby and Wagner in part, but
reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of those two
defendants on Murphy's Section 1985(3) claims, and remanded the
cause to the trial court for further proceedings.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the
allowance of a motion and cross-motion to certify the record.

Spater, Gittes, Schulte & Kolman, Alexander M. Spater and
Samuel Walters, for appellee and cross-appellant.

Matan & Smith and James D. Colner, for appellants and
cross-appellees.

Alice Robie Resnick, J. Civ.R. 56(C) places a clear duty
on a trial court to examine all appropriate materials filed by
the parties before it when ruling on a motion for summary
judgment. We find that the trial court's failure to comply
with the mandates of Civ.R. 56(C) in this case constitutes
reversible error. For the reasons which follow, we reverse the
judgment of the court of appeals and remand this cause to the
trial court.

Civ.R. 56(C) provides that, when a party moves for summary
judgment: "* * * Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith
if the pleading, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence in the
pending case, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely
filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be
considered except as stated in this rule. A summary judgment
shall not be rendered unless it appears from such evidence or
stipulation and only therefrom, that reasonable minds can come
to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the
party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made,
such party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation
construed most strongly in his favor. * * *"

"'Summary judgment is a procedural device to terminate
litigation and to avoid a formal trial where there is nothing
to try. It must be awarded with caution, resolving doubts and
construing evidence against the moving party, and granted only
when it appears from the evidentiary material that reasonable
minds can reach only an adverse conclusion as to the party
opposing the motion. * * *'" Norris v. Ohio Std. Oil Co.
(1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 1, 2, 24 O.O.3d 1, 2, 433 N.E.2d 615,

616. Recently, this court reiterated that, because summary
judgment is a procedural device to terminate litigation, it
must be awarded with caution. Doubts must be resolved in favor
of the non-moving party. Osborne v. Lyles (1992), 63 Ohio
St.3d 326, 333, 587 N.E.2d 825, 831.

The wording of Civ.R. 56(C) makes it clear that a trial
court must conscientiously examine all the evidence before it
when ruling on a summary judgment motion. At the hearing in

this case the trial court stated, "I haven't read your motion.
I haven't read your briefs. So, educate me." In addition to
the motions and other pleadings the parties filed the
depositions of numerous witnesses. Plaintiff alone filed in
excess of two thousand pages of deposition testimony. From the
statement of the trial judge it can readily be seen that the
trial court did not conduct even a cursory review of these
depositions. These depositions were crucial to a determination
whether genuine issues of material fact did exist in this
case. It is evident that this case arguably raised issues
beyond whether there was probable cause to stop plaintiff.
Only by conducting a thorough examination of the record could
the trial court properly rule on the Civ.R. 56 motion.
Specifically, one of plaintiff's claims was based on the
presence of a widespread custom of discrimination within the
city of Reynoldsburg's police force. Even though a particular
practice is not explicitly authorized by city officials, where
the practice is sufficiently persistent and widespread it may
constitute a custom that represents municipal policy. See
Matthias v. Bingley (C.A.5, 1990), 906 F.2d 1047, 1054, quoting
Webster v. Houston (C.A.5, 1984), 735 F.2d 838, 841. See,
also, McConney v. Houston (C.A.5, 1989), 863 F.2d 1180, 1184
("Sufficiently numerous prior incidents of police misconduct
*** may tend to prove a custom and accession to that custom by
the municipality's policymakers."). Hence, it becomes clear
that a thorough examination of all depositions and other
appropriate materials filed with the trial court was absolutely
necessary in order for it to determine whether plaintiff raised
a genuine issue of material fact regarding the presence of such
a policy or custom.

The court of appeals recognized that Civ.R. 56(C) imposes
an absolute duty upon a trial court to read and consider all
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written
admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written
stipulations of fact when ruling on a motion for summary
judgment. See Smith v. Hudson (C.A.6, 1979), 600 F.2d 60,
63-64. However, the court of appeals went on to hold that the
trial court's failure to comply with this duty was not
prejudicial to plaintiff. The court of appeals reasoned that,
in reviewing a grant of a motion for summary judgment, it was
required to apply the same standards as were applied by the
trial court. An appellate court (like a trial court) must
examine the record to determine whether there is any genuine
issue of material fact. An appellate court reviewing a trial
court's decision to grant a Civ.R. 56(C) motion must look at
the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party,
construing all doubt in favor of that party. The court of
appeals concluded that its independent consideration of the
record could, in effect, cure the trial court's failure to
examine the evidence. We cannot accept that conclusion. A
reviewing court, even though it must conduct its own
examination of the record, has a different focus than the trial
court. If the trial court does not consider all the evidence
before it, an appellate court does not sit as a reviewing
court, but, in effect, becomes a trial court. The clear
language of Civ.R. 56(C) prevents us from sanctioning the
interpretation given by the court of appeals.

The grant of a Civ.R. 56 motion terminates litigation
without giving the opposing party the benefit of a trial on the
merits. The requirements of the rule must be strictly
enforced. Compliance with the terms of Civ.R. 56(C) is of
fundamental importance at the trial court level, where the
initial examination of the evidence occurs, and where the
issues framing the litigation are shaped. When, as in the case
before us, a trial court does not examine the evidence
presented on the motion for summary judgment, but makes its
ruling entirely based on oral argument presented by the
parties, the trial court disregards the mandatory duties placed
upon it by Civ. R. 56(C). The rule mandates that the trial
court make the initial determination whether to award summary
judgment; the trial court's function cannot be replaced by an
"independent" review of an appellate court.

In conclusion, we hold that Civ.R. 56(C) places a
mandatory duty on a trial court to thoroughly examine all
appropriate materials filed by the parties before ruling on a
motion for summary judgment. The failure of a trial court to
comply with this requirement constitutes reversible error. We
remand this cause to the trial court to conduct a conscientious
examination of the record to determine whether summary judgment
is appropriate. The trial court should give no deference to
the review of the record already conducted by the court of
appeals, but should conduct its own examination of all
appropriate materials.

Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is
reversed, the opinion of the court of appeals is vacated, and
the cause is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Judgment reversed
and cause remanded.
Moyer, C.J., Sweeney, Holmes, Douglas and Wright, JJ.,
concur.

H. Brown, J., concurs separately.

Herbert R. Brown, J., concurring. I concur in the
reasoning by which the majority reverses the judgment of the
court of appeals and remands this case to the trial court.
However, I write to express my belief that the record before us
indicates triable issues on plaintiff's Section 1983 and 1985
claims.

The issue in the Section 1983 claim is not whether there
was probable cause to stop Murphy, but whether he was stopped
because he was black. In other words, if Murphy was white
would the police have stopped him? Was there evidence of
selective enforcement in Reynoldsburg? In my opinion, the
record contains enough evidence of selective enforcement to
preclude granting a summary judgment.

The United States Supreme Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins
(1886), 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220, recognized
that a law may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance,
yet violate a person's constitutional rights if it is applied
and administered with "an evil eye and an unequal hand." Id. at
373-374, 6 S.Ct. at 1073, 30 L.Ed. at 227. If the law is
selectively applied against a person by reason of race, the
constitutional violation can be redressed by the victim in a

civil action under Section 1983. Herrera v. Valentine (C.A.8,
1981), 653 F.2d 1220. However, in order for selective
enforcement to be unconstitutional discrimination it must be
"intentional or purposeful." Snowden v. Hughes (1944), 321

U.S. 1, 8, 64 S.Ct. 397, 401, 88 L.Ed. 497, 503.

If, for example, the police department had a policy of
stopping speeding cars only if they were going over 62 miles
per hour in a 55-miles-per-hour zone, but making an exception
for blacks who were pulled over at 57 miles per hour, that
would violate Section 1983. Though the crime of speeding was
committed by the driver clocked at 57 miles per hour, that
driver was still the victim of selective enforcement based on
race.

In the present case there is evidence which could support
a finding that the Reynoldsburg police intentionally stopped
blacks for infractions that would not have caused whites to be
stopped. Thus, even if there is evidence of probable cause for
a stop, that stop can constitute selective enforcement and be a
violation of Section 1983.

Whether, in the present case, there was a selective
enforcement which violated plaintiff's rights under Section
1983 is a question the trier of fact should decide.

Likewise, the evidence before the trial court, when
construed most strongly in plaintiff's favor, is sufficient to
prevent summary judgment on plaintiff's Section 1985 conspiracy
claim.

I believe this case should be remanded with instructions to proceed to trial on both the Section 1983 claim and the Section 1985 claim.

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