Parrick v. Parrick

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Parrick v. Parrick

State: Ohio

Court: Ohio Southern District Court

Docket No: 2013-Ohio-422

Case Date: 02/11/2013

Plaintiff: Parrick

Defendant: Parrick

Preview:[Cite as Parrick v. Parrick, 2013-Ohio-422.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
HANCOCK COUNTY
JACQUELINE M. PARRICK AKA,
JACQUELINE M. SNYDER,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,                             CASE NO.   5-12-12
v.
PAUL A PARRICK,                                 O P I N I O N
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Hancock County Common Pleas Court
Domestic Relations Division
Trial Court No. 2009 DR 129
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision:   February 11, 2013
APPEARANCES:
William E. Clark  for Appellant
Ralph D. Russo    for Appellee

Case No. 5-12-12
WILLAMOWSKI, J.,
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Paul Parrick  (“Paul” or  “Father”) appeals the
judgment of the Hancock County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations
Division, denying his motion to modify child support payments made to Plaintiff-
Appellee, Jacqueline Parrick, nka Jacqueline Snyder (“Jacqueline” or “Mother”),
under an existing Illinois court order.   Paul contends that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to modify and in failing to apply Ohio law to modify a foreign
child support order; that it erred in calculating Jacqueline’s income; and, that the
trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over only one part of the foreign child
support order.   For the reasons set forth below, the judgment is affirmed.
{¶2} Paul and Jacqueline were married on May  17,  1990 and have two
children, Brittany (born in 1991) and Mikaela (born in 1995).   The parties were
divorced in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in Crawford County,
Illinois                                                                                 (hereinafter,  the   “Illinois  Court”)  in   1997.    The  Illinois  Court  named
Jacqueline  as  the  primary custodial  parent  of  the  two  children  and  Paul  was
ordered to pay child support.   Jacqueline and the children moved to Findlay, Ohio
in 1998.   Further proceedings in the Illinois Court resulted in a stipulation and
order filed November 17, 2000, whereby Paul was ordered to pay $480 biweekly
as support for both children.
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{¶3} Paul moved to Findlay, Ohio in 2005.   In 2008, while Jacqueline, Paul
and the children were all living in Findlay, Ohio, Paul filed a motion in the Illinois
Court seeking to hold Jacqueline in contempt of court for denial of visitation.
Shortly thereafter, Jacqueline filed a motion in the same proceeding to modify the
child support order, which had remained the same since 2000.
{¶4} On December  22,  2008, the parties entered into a  “stipulation and
agreement,” which was approved by the Illinois Court and filed on January 6,
2009.                                                                                                              This  stipulation  and  agreement  contained  provisions  to  address  the
visitation issues; it increased the amount of child support to $752 bi-weekly, plus a
percentage of any bonus Paul might receive; and, it provided that each parent
would pay a specified portion of Brittany’s college expenses, and also Mikaela’s
educational expenses if   she attended college.1   Child support for Brittany was to
terminate when she began college in September 2009.   At issue in the case before
us today is the portion of the order that provided for the payment of child support
for  Mikaela  after  Brittany’s  emancipation.    Paul,  who  was  represented  by an
attorney in the Illinois proceedings, agreed to pay  $537 biweekly support for
Mikaela, plus 20% of any net bonus received by him.
1 The Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act - 750 ILCS 5, Section 513, permits court orders
providing for payment of children’s educational expenses beyond the age of majority.    While college
expense  provisions  of  this  type  are  not  mandated  in  Ohio,  agreements  for  support  beyond  a  child’s
eighteenth birthday are permitted.   See   R.C. 3119.86(A)(1)(b).
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Case No. 5-12-12
{¶5} On April 1, 2009, less than three months after the filing of the January
6,  2009 order incorporating the parties’ stipulation and agreement, Paul filed a
motion to register the November  17,  2000 Illinois Court order in the Common
Pleas Court of Hancock County, and to modify the support order based on an
alleged change in circumstances.   The trial court registered the child support order
and  the  college  educational  expense  order  in  February  and  May  of              2010,
respectively.   On July 16, 2010, Paul filed an amended motion in the trial court
seeking a modification of the January 6, 2009 child support order as relating to
Mikaela “to reflect the parties current incomes which have changed substantially
since 2009 pursuant to Ohio law as both parties and the minor child now reside in
the state of Ohio and not in the state of Illinois.”                                    (R-48)   Paul also filed a motion
requesting termination of the existing wage withholding order directing payment
to Illinois and asking for the establishment of payment of support through the
Hancock County Child Support Enforcement Agency (“CSEA”).   (R-42)
{¶6} A hearing was held on Paul’s motions before a magistrate on October
7, 2010.     The magistrate acknowledged that the Illinois child support order had
been registered in Ohio and that Ohio law would allow for the modification of that
order if Ohio’s statutory requirements for modification were met.   However, the
magistrate found that there had been no substantial change of circumstances that
was not contemplated at the time of the issuance of the original child support order
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Case No. 5-12-12
and  recommended  that  Paul’s  request  for  a  modification  should  be  denied.
(05/03/2011 Mag. Dec.)
{¶7} The magistrate found that the only change in circumstances that had
occurred since  2008, when the parties negotiated the stipulated agreement, was
that Paul’s income had increased by about 15%.   Paul’s total gross income from
his employment at Marathon Oil had been $110,660 in 2008 ($12,000 of which
was  a  bonus  payment),  $126,526  in  2009  (including  a  $22,000  bonus),  and
$127,662 in  2010  (including a  $20,000 bonus).   Jacqueline, a registered nurse,
earned  $72,557 in  2008,  $68,090 in  2009, and anticipated earning  $73,000 in
2010.   Her income had essentially remained the same.
{¶8} Both parties filed objections to the magistrate’s decision and the trial
court remanded the matter to the magistrate for the limited purpose of ascertaining
Jacqueline’s actual income as defined by R.C. 3119.01 et seq.                           (R-66)   Paul had
submitted an exhibit showing significant deposits to Jacqueline’s bank accounts,
which he contended should have been included in Jacqueline’s income.                    (See
Defendant’s Exhibit 3)
{¶9} Following  a  hearing  on  this  matter  on  September                             2,                  2011,  the
magistrate found that Jacqueline’s actual income for 2010 was $73,418.06.   The
challenged  deposits  did  not  constitute  income  to  Jacqueline  and  were  mostly
expense  account  payments  from  her  employer  reimbursing  her  for  significant
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Case No. 5-12-12
travel expenses and other costs that were required for her to perform her job.   The
magistrate again found that there was no significant change of circumstances and
recommended that Paul’s motion for modification be denied.
{¶10} Paul again filed objections.   On January 12, 2012, a hearing was held
before  the  trial  court  judge  on  the  various  issues  that  had  been  raised.    On
February 6, 2012, the trial court filed a detailed decision discussing and analyzing
all nine objections that had been raised by Paul.   The trial court overruled all of
Paul’s objections with the exception of maintaining that Paul would continue to
pay his support through the Hancock County CSEA.   Jacqueline’s objections were
sustained.
{¶11} The trial court filed the final judgment entry on February 22, 2012,
finding  that  the  current  Illinois  Order  regarding  child  support  was                 “fair  and
reasonable” and ordered that Paul continue paying the child support as agreed in
the stipulation of January 2009.   The educational expense portion of the Illinois
Order was also to remain in full force and effect.   The trial court concluded by
stating:
The  Illinois  Order  and  all  provisions  contained  therein  continue
unmodified  and  in  full force  and  effect  by,  between  and  among
[Jacqueline],                                                                                [Paul]  and  their  children  as  set  forth  therein  and
although said Order is now registered in this state for enforcement
under Rev. Code Sec. 3115.40, the tribunal which issued the Illinois
Order retains continuing and exclusive jurisdiction over said Order
and this Court expressly declines to assume such jurisdiction.
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Case No. 5-12-12
(Feb. 22, 2012 J.E.)
{¶12} It is from this judgment that Paul now appeals, presenting the
following three assignments of error for our review.
First Assignment of Error
The Trial Court erred in denying Father’s motion to modify and
committed an abuse of discretion in failing to apply Ohio law in
the motion to modify a foreign order registered in Ohio
Second Assignment of Error
The Trial Court erred in excluding from Mother’s income so
called  reimbursement  of  business  expenses  that  included
unidentified amounts for her personal meals and after hours
drinks and an unsubstantiated mileage.
Third Assignment of Error
The Trial Court erred in modifying the Illinois order in part and
then holding  that  Illinois retains  exclusive jurisdiction  of  the
order.
{¶13} Paul’s assignments of error pertain to the trial court’s denial of his
motion to modify the Illinois Court’s child support order.   In the past, different
state laws for enforcing child-support orders contributed to a problem of relatively
low  levels  of  child-support  payments  in  interstate  cases  and  encouraged  a
disregard  of  court  orders,  resulting  in  hardships  for  the  children  who  needed
support.   Cruz v. Cumba-Ortiz, 116 Ohio St.3d 279, 2007-Ohio-6440, ¶ 18.   To
remedy these  problems,  Congress  enacted  the  federal  full-faith-and-credit  act,
Section 1738B, Title  28, U.S.Code, to establish national standards under which
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courts of various states were to determine their jurisdiction to issue child-support
orders and the effect to be given by each state to child-support orders issued by the
courts of other states.   Id. at ¶ 19.   The uniform support act sets forth rules for
identifying the controlling child-support order and determining which state has
“continuing, exclusive jurisdiction” over the order.    Id.; see R.C.  3115.07 and
3115.09.   Through these rules, the uniform support act aims at creating a system in
which only one valid support order is in effect at any one time.   All states have
adopted the uniform support act. Cruz at ¶ 19.   Ohio’s codification of the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”), originally adopted in 1998, is set forth
in Chapter 3115 of the Revised Code.
{¶14} R.C.                                                                              3115.07(D)  provides  that   “[a]  tribunal  of  this  state  shall
recognize the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of a tribunal of another state that
has issued a child support order pursuant to a law adopted by the other state that is
substantially similar to sections 3115.01 to 3115.59 of the Revised Code.”   The
Ohio Revised Code provides the means for registering and enforcing  “foreign”
support orders.   A support order or income withholding order of another state may
be registered in Ohio by following the procedures set forth in R.C. 3115.39 and
sending the required information and documents to the appropriate tribunal in this
state.   A registered support order is enforceable in the same manner and is subject
to the same procedures as an order issued by a court in this state.    See R.C.
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3115.40.   The purpose of the registration provision is to facilitate enforcement of
an order rendered in one state when the support obligor has moved to another
state.  Lyle v. Lyle, 2d Dist. No. 18418 (Jan. 26, 2001), 2001 WL 62539.
{¶15} The  new  state  in  which  an  order  is  registered  and  confirmed
generally does  not  have  the  authority to  modify the  order,  except  for  certain
specified situations.   See R.C. 3115.40 (“Except as provided in sections 3115.39 to
3115.51 of the Revised Code, a tribunal of this state shall recognize and enforce,
but may not modify, a registered order that has been confirmed if the issuing
tribunal had jurisdiction.”).   The state in which the order is registered may modify
the order if the parties no longer reside in the rendering state or if they consent to
the jurisdiction of the state of registration.   R.C. 3115.48.   Or, as in this case, R.C.
3115.50  provides  authority  for  Ohio  to  modify  an  order  in  a  registration
proceeding when all parties reside in this state and the child does not reside in the
issuing state.2
{¶16} In  the  limited  instances  where  modification  is  allowed,  the
modification of a registered support order “is subject to the same requirements,
procedures, and defenses that apply to the modification of an order issued by a
tribunal of this state and the order may be enforced and satisfied in the same
manner.”   R.C. 3115.48(B).   However, this state may not modify any aspect of the
2 “If all of the parties who are individuals reside in this state and the child does not reside in the issuing
state, a tribunal of this state has jurisdiction to enforce and to modify the issuing state’s child support order
in a proceeding to register that order. * * *”    R.C. 3115.50.
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order that was prohibited from modification under the law of the issuing state.
R.C.   3115.48(C)   And, “[o]n issuance of an order modifying a child support order
issued  in  another  state,  a  tribunal  of  this  state  becomes  the  tribunal  having
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.”   R.C. 3115.48(D).
{¶17} Trial courts are given broad discretion in determining whether to
modify existing child support orders.   Woloch v. Foster, 98 Ohio App.3d 806, 810
(2d Dist.1994).   Therefore, a trial court’s decision regarding a motion to modify a
child support order will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.   Pauly v.
Pauly, 80 Ohio St.3d 386, 390 (1997), citing Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142,
144 (1989).   An abuse of discretion is more than a mere error in judgment; rather,
it  suggests  that  a  decision  is  unreasonable,  arbitrary,  or  unconscionable.
Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).   An appellate court must
also give substantial deference to the trial court's findings of fact and will not
reverse those findings if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.   Polk
v. Polk, 188 Ohio App.3d 809, 2010-Ohio-3355, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.).
First Assignment of Error
{¶18} In the first assignment of error, Paul contends that R.C. 3119.79(A)
requires modification of a child support order if there has been a change of ten
percent in the amount of child support calculated according to the schedules set
forth in the revised code and applicable worksheets.   The Illinois Court’s child
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support order provided for Paul to pay $13,962 per year as support for Mikaela,
plus 20% of his bonus.   Utilizing the Ohio child support schedule and worksheets,
the  magistrate  computed  that  Paul’s  Ohio  child  support  obligation  would  be
calculated to be $9,290.88.   Because this “difference” amounted to more than a ten
percent reduction, Paul asserts that the trial court erred when it failed to modify
the support order and when it concluded that there was no substantial change in
circumstances that was not contemplated at the time the prior order was issued.
{¶19} We do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to
modify the parties’ agreed child support order.   The trial court did a thorough and
detailed analysis of all of the facts and issues and found at least three valid reasons
why the Illinois support order should not be modified.   We agree with the trial
court’s conclusions as explained in the  magistrate’s opinions, the trial court’s
decisions overruling Paul’s objections, and its final judgment entry.
{¶20} First, the trial court could find no case precedent holding that merely
moving a child support order from one jurisdiction to another amounted to a
significant  change  in  circumstances.    It  is  true  that  Illinois  child  support  is
computed utilizing different standards than Ohio, but this support order was based
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on the parties’ joint agreement.3   And, there was no evidence of any other change
in circumstances affecting the child’s needs or the parties’ ability to pay support
other than the fact that Paul’s income had increased.     Paul’s motion requesting a
modification only three months after the Illinois order was filed appears to be
based upon  “forum shopping” to lower his support obligation rather than any
actual change of circumstances.   Even the fact that all of the parties now resided in
Ohio did not constitute a change of circumstances, since they all had lived in Ohio
since 2005.
{¶21} However, in order to be thorough and to compare “apples to apples,”
the trial court completed the Ohio child support worksheets to calculate what
Paul’s support obligation would be for 2008, 2009, and 2010, based upon Ohio
law.   Although there was an increase from 2008 to  2009 and 2010 because of
Paul’s increased income, the differences in the support calculations between those
years did not result in a ten percent difference.    Therefore, utilizing the Ohio
worksheets  alone,  the  trial  court  concluded  that  there  was  not  a  change  in
circumstances substantial enough to require a modification of the child support
amount under R.C. 3119.79(A).   (May 3, 2011 Mag. Dec.)
3 There was no worksheet or calculation included with the Illinois Court’s order.   However, according to
Illinois compiled statute 750 IL CS 5/505, the guidelines for the minimum amount of support specifies
payment of 20% of the obligor’s income for one child and 28% of the obligor’s income for two children.
The custodial parent’s income is not computed in the guidelines, although it may be considered if the court
finds that the application of the guidelines would be inappropriate.   It appears that the parties’ stipulated
agreement took the Illinois guidelines into consideration.
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{¶22} And finally, the trial court noted that Paul’s support obligation would
not necessarily be lower under Ohio law.    The worksheet calculations are not
presumed to be the correct amount of child support when the parent’s combined
income is over $150,000, as in this case where the parents’ combined income for
2010 was over $200,000.   The worksheet calculations completed by the court were
based upon the Ohio child support schedule, which only provides guidelines for
incomes up to  $150,000.   See R.C.  3119.021.   R.C.  3119.04 directs that child
support be determined on a case-by-case basis when the parents combined income
is over $150,000.   The magistrate reviewed the record and stated:
The Illinois Court found that the Illinois Order was fair, just and
reasonable and in the best interests of the children.    There is no
evidence that [Paul] cannot comply with that existing child support
order.     Though the existing child support obligation is significantly
more than the amount calculated using Ohio’s child support schedule
and worksheet, it is not unconscionably more.   The existing child
support order is within the range of child support orders permitted in
Ohio.
(May 3, 2011 Mag. Dec.)
{¶23} Paul’s primary complaint on appeal was that the trial court erred in
requiring both a ten percent deviation in the amount of support owed pursuant to
R.C.                                                                                  3119.79(A)  and  a  finding  that  there  was   “a  substantial  change  of
circumstances that was not contemplated at the time of the issuance of the original
child support order or the last modification,” pursuant to the language in R.C.
3119.79(C).   He claims that a finding of a ten percent deviation in the amount of
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child support by itself is sufficient to require modification, citing to the Ninth
District Court of Appeals decision in Cook v. Cook, 143 Ohio App.3d 687, 690
(9th Dist.2001)
{¶24} We find several flaws in Paul’s reasoning.   First, the trial court in this
case did not find the ten percent deviation which would constitute a change of
circumstances  under  R.C.                                                                    3119.79(A)  when  it  did  an   “apples  to  apples”
comparison of the 2008, 2009 and 2010 computations utilizing Ohio law for all of
the figures.   A trial court has great discretion in determining the amount of child
support owed and, under the facts and circumstances of this particular case, we do
not find that the magistrate’s conclusions constituted an abuse of discretion.   And,
based upon the case-by-case analysis that is required when the parties’ incomes
exceed $150,000, the trial court found the current support order to be reasonable.
{¶25} And finally, we do not find the Ninth District’s decision in Cook v.
Cook  to  be  persuasive  for  several  reasons.     First,  the  facts  in  Cook  are
distinguishable and there were additional changes of circumstances in Cook that
are not present in this case.  See id.      In Cook, the prior child support order that the
father sought to modify had been filed more than two years earlier, not within the
previous three months as in this case.    The prior support order in Cook also
included graduated increases premised upon anticipated increased bonus income.
Subsequently, the father lost his job.   Although he obtained new employment, his
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income did not include a bonus and the anticipated increased bonus income did
not materialize.  Id.   In contrast, Paul’s income in this case increased.
{¶26} In addition to the facts differentiating Cook from this case, this Court
has consistently held that the modification of a child support order based upon an
agreement of the parties to deviate from the standard schedule4 requires that the
court find that there must be a substantial change of circumstances that was not
contemplated at the time of the original agreement.   See, e.g. Adams v. Adams, 3d
Dist. No.  14-12-03,  2012-Ohio-5131; Adams v. Sirmans,  3d Dist. No.  5-08-02,
2008-Ohio-5400;  Steggeman  v.  Steggeman,  3d  Dist.  No.  8-06-23,  2007-Ohio-
5482; Bonner v. Bonner, 3d Dist. No. 14-05-26, 2005-Ohio-6173.   This is true
whether the previous agreement was from another state, as in Adams v. Sirmans,
or was based upon an agreement in Ohio, as in Adams v. Adams.   Otherwise, a
party entering into an agreement whereby the child support payments deviate more
than  ten  percent  from  the  statutory  child  support  schedules,  could  then
immediately file for modification under R.C. 3119.79(A), rendering the agreement
moot and meaningless.   That is exactly what occurred in this case, wherein Paul
4 Paul also cites to our decision in Green v. Tarkington, 3d Dist. 10-10-02, 2010-Ohio-2165, as support for
the proposition that  parties  do not need  to  meet the requirements  of both R.C.  3119.79(A) and  (C).
However, Green did not involve any agreement between the parties deviating from the standard schedule.
There certainly are instances  where the ten percent deviation from the recalculated  amount  “shall be
considered by the court as a change of circumstance substantial enough to require a modification of the
child support amount.”   See R.C. 3119.79(A).   There are also situations where a change of circumstances
that was not contemplated at the time of the issuance of the original child support order provides an
independent basis for permitting modification of an existing child support order.   See Karales v. Karales,
10th Dist. No.  05AP-856,  2006-Ohio-2963,  ¶  15.    Such was the case in Green, where the amount of
parenting time changed substantially, and that change was not foreseen at the time the court ordered the
original child support payments (which was not based upon an agreement of the parties).
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filed for modification of the agreed order only eighty-five days after the agreement
and stipulation was filed.
{¶27} In Adams v. Sirmans, involving a Georgia court’s child support order
which was later registered in Ohio, we held that there was no substantial change in
circumstances that had not been contemplated at the time of the issuance of the
child support order.
In this case, the parties negotiated a settlement agreement which they
voluntarily entered and submitted to the Georgia court. The court
then adopted the agreement as part of its decree. The parties both
testified that at the time of the agreement, it was contemplated that
they would eventually be moving back to Ohio as they both have
family here. * * * Additionally, it was reasonable to anticipate that
the parties could remarry, have additional children, and change jobs.
* * * Although these are changes in circumstances, they are not of
the type  that  would  not be  contemplated  at the  time  the  parties
entered   into   their   negotiated   separation   agreement.   The
“circumstances  surrounding  the  ten  per  cent  deviation  were
‘contemplated  at  the  time  of  the  issuance  of  the  child  support
order.’”   Bonner, supra at ¶ 15.
Sirmans at  ¶  11.    See, also, Adams v. Adams,  ¶¶  22-30  (containing a detailed
synopsis  and  analysis  of  this  Court’s  decisions  in  Sirmans,  Bonner,  and
Steggeman).
{¶28} Based on all of the above, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it denied Paul’s motion to modify the Illinois Court’s child support order.
The first assignment of error is overruled.
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Second Assignment of Error
{¶29} In his second assignment of error, Paul complains that the trial court
erred when it found that the expense reimbursement payments from Jacqueline’s
employer should not be included as income.    Paul contends that there was no
evidence that the $.30 a mile she received for business travel was not excessive
when there was no evidence as to her actual expenses in operating her vehicle.   He
further objected to the introduction of additional evidence that Jacqueline offered
at the hearing to explain her deposits and reimbursements.
{¶30} After reviewing the magistrate’s decision dated May 3, 2011 (R-56),
the trial court remanded the matter to the magistrate to hear additional evidence
concerning Jacqueline’s income, specifically, various deposits which she made
into her checking account as enumerated in Paul’s Defendant’s Exhibit 3.   The
magistrate held that $17,179.99 of Jacqueline’s additional deposits should not be
included  in  her  income  as  they  were  reimbursement  of  employee  business
expenses, including $.30 a mile for the 28,306 miles Jacqueline drove during the
year for her job.   Other amounts were “a refund from a Mediator, a back child
support check, a state income tax refund, a transfer of a mutual fund, personal
medical expense reimbursements, and payments received from Paul in compliance
with the Illinois Court’s orders * * *.”   (Oct. 19, 2011 Mag. Dec., R-73)
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{¶31} For purposes of calculating child support, “gross income” is defined
at R.C. 3119.01(C)(7).   None of the expenses that Paul challenges are classified as
income.    Paul seems to suggest that Jacqueline’s expenses meet the criteria of
“self-generated income” or “gross receipts received” under R.C. 3119.01(C)(13)
which states that self-generated income “includes expense reimbursements or in-
kind  payments  received  by a  parent  from  self  employment  *  *  *    including
company  cars,  free  housing,  reimbursed  meals,  and  other  benefits,  if  the
reimbursements are significant and reduce personal living expenses.”
{¶32} However, Jacqueline was not self-employed.   She was at all times an
employee of three different skilled care facilities since 2004, either as a clinical
liaison or a community liaison.    In each of these positions, she worked with
doctors, nurses and hospitals in a certain geographical territory.   It was her job to
travel extensively to the health care providers’ facilities in her territory to organize
functions, make presentations, and usually provide meals and refreshments as part
of her job to market her employers’ services.   She was not an owner, partner,
shareholder  or  anything  but  an  employee  of  these  businesses.     The  only
compensation she received appeared on her W-2 forms and was reported on her
federal income taxes.   The trial court’s decision to use the income figures from
these W-2 and tax records to derive her income was supported by the record.
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{¶33} Jacqueline’s  expense  reimbursements  from  her  employers  were
merely repaying her for the money that she had spent, as required by her job.
Under the facts in this case, it was not necessary for her to prove that the $.30 per
mile  reimbursement  did  not  significantly reduce  her  personal  living  expenses
pursuant to R.C.    R.C.  3119.01(C)(13).    In addition to Jacqueline’s testimony
concerning mileage allowances, she produced a copy of the IRS table of “Standard
Mileage Rates.”   It appears as if the magistrate took judicial notice that the IRS
reimbursement rate for mileage in 2009 was $.55 per mile.   The trial court was
entitled to take judicial notice of this information in support of its comment that a
business  mileage  reimbursement  of  $.30  per  mile  was  “not  excessive.”    See
Evid.R. 201(B).
{¶34} Paul also takes exception to the trial court remanding the matter back
to  the  magistrate  for  additional  evidence  concerning  Jacqueline’s  income.
However,  the  trial  court  clearly has  discretion  under  Civ.R.  53(D)(4)  to  take
additional  evidence  before  ruling  on  objections.    Even  without  the  additional
evidence, Jacqueline  testified in the initial  hearing that  the deposits listed  on
Paul’s Exhibit  3 were expense reimbursement to her from her employer.    The
additional evidence she provided concerning these deposits were to rebut Paul’s
assertion that they were additional income.
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{¶35} There was competent, credible evidence in the record to support the
magistrate’s  determination  that  the  additional  deposits  to  Jacqueline’s  bank
account  did  not  constitute                                                             “income.”     And,  even  if  Jacqueline’s  expense
reimbursements had been counted as income, we do not find that they would have
made a difference in creating a significant change of circumstances that was not
contemplated at the time of the parties’ agreement and stipulation.   The second
assignment of error is overruled.
Third Assignment of Error
{¶36} Paul’s final assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred when
it ordered that jurisdiction over the child support order would remain with the
Illinois Court, but yet his payments would be through the Hancock County CSEA.
Paul claims that this order is inconsistent.   He asserts that by ordering the terms of
the payments, the court has “modified” the order, and thus, Ohio should become
the state having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.    See R.C.  3115.48(D)  (“on
issuance of an order modifying a child support order issued in another state, a
tribunal  of  this  state  becomes  the  tribunal  having  continuing,  exclusive
jurisdiction.”).
{¶37} It seems somewhat incongruent that Paul filed the motion, on June 3,
2010  (R-42),  requesting  that  wage-withholding  be  done  through  the  Hancock
County CSEA, yet now he complains because the trial court granted his motion.
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Case No. 5-12-12
We  find  no  support  for  Paul’s  assertion  that  ordering  payment  through  the
Hancock County CSEA constituted a “modification” of the order requiring Ohio
to assume continuing jurisdiction for all matters.
{¶38} The Illinois Court order did not require that Paul’s child support
payments be made to any particular person or agency.   It simply stated that there
would be a new wage support order.   Even assuming the payment of child support
through the Hancock county CSEA would be a different procedure than what was
previously taking place, it is a minor administrative type of change and is not a
substantive modification of the existing child support order that would constitute a
basis for Ohio to assume complete jurisdiction over this matter.
{¶39} The purpose of the registration provision under R.C. 3115.40 is to
facilitate enforcement of an order rendered in one state when the support obligor
has moved to another state.   In other words, when an obligor moves from State A,
any support order entered by that state may be registered and enforced in the
obligor's new state of residence.   The mere registration for enforcement purposes
does not constitute a modification, as the statute itself distinguishes between the
two purposes.   R.C. 3115.40 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
A registered order issued in another state that is confirmed * * * is
enforceable  in  the  same  manner  and  is  subject  to  the  same
procedures as an order issued by a tribunal of this state. * * * [A]
tribunal  of  this  state  shall  recognize  and  enforce,  but  may  not
modify, a registered order that has been confirmed if the issuing
tribunal had jurisdiction.
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Case No. 5-12-12
(Emphasis added)   R.C. 3115.40.
{¶40} R.C.  3125.10 states that  “each county shall have a child support
enforcement agency.”   Among the powers and duties assigned to these agencies,
“[e]ach child support enforcement agency shall be responsible in the county it
serves for the enforcement of support orders and shall perform all administrative
duties related to the enforcement of any support order.”                                    (Emphasis added.)   R.C.
2125.11.     A trial court may exercise jurisdiction over a divorce decree or child
support order for the purpose of enforcing, but not altering, the decree or order.
Soltis v. Soltis,  9th Dist. No.  24396,  2009-Ohio-2226,  ¶  8.   See, also, Lyles v.
Lyles,  supra  (concluding  that  “the  purpose  of  the  registration  provision  is  to
facilitate enforcement of an order rendered in one state when the support obligor
has moved to another state.)
{¶41} The  enforcement  of  the  child  support  by  utilizing  the  Hancock
County CSEA to collect Paul’s payroll withholding deductions did not constitute a
modification  which  would  confer  continuing,  exclusive  jurisdiction  upon  any
tribunal in Ohio.   Paul’s third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶42} Having found no error prejudicial to  the Appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
ROGERS and SHAW, J.J., concur.
/jlr
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