State ex rel. Auglaize Mercer Community Action Comm., Inc. v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm.

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State: Ohio

Court: Supreme Court

Docket No: 1995-0368

Case Date: 10/11/1995

Plaintiff: State ex rel. Auglaize Mercer Community Action Comm., Inc.

Defendant: Ohio Civ. Rights Comm.

Preview:The State ex rel. Auglaize Mercer Community Action Commission, Inc.,

Appellant, v. Ohio Civil Rights Commission, Appellee.

[Cite as State ex rel. Auglaize Mercer Community Action Comm., Inc. v. Ohio Civ.

Rights Comm. (1995),

Ohio St.3d

.]

Mandamus to compel Ohio Civil Rights Commission to hold an evidentiary hearing on attorney fees under R.C. 119.092 -- Writ denied, when. (No. 95-368 -- Submitted July 26, 1995 -- Decided October 11, 1995.)

Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 94APD06-802.

On April 27, 1990, J. Lee Grant filed a charge with appellee, Ohio Civil

Rights Commission ("commission"), alleging that appellant, Auglaize Mercer

Community Action Commission, Inc. ("AMCAC"), had engaged in unlawful

discriminatory practices.

AMCAC is a nonprofit corporation formed as a

community action commission pursuant to R.C. 122.69.

After the commission determined that there was probable cause to support

Grant's charge, and attempts at conciliation failed, the commission issued a

complaint. A hearing on the case was held before Franklin A. Martens, the Chief

Hearing Examiner of the commission. At the hearing, AMCAC was represented

by private counsel. Thereafter, the hearing examiner issued a report recommending

that the commission dismiss the complaint.

On June 14, 1993, AMCAC filed an "application for allowance of

compensation and reimbursement of expenses on behalf of attorney for the

respondent," purportedly in accordance with R.C. 119.092.

The commission

subsequently accepted the hearing examiner's recommendation and dismissed the

case. By letter dated February 18, 1994, AMCAC requested the hearing examiner

to schedule a hearing on its application for attorney fees under R.C. 119.092. The

hearing examiner responded by stating in a letter to AMCAC's counsel:

"The Hearing Unit no longer has jurisdiction over the above captioned case.

Our jurisdiction ended when the Commission adopted the Hearing Examiner's

Report.

"For your information, I am also not aware of any statutory authorization to

award fees and costs to a prevailing Respondent in an administrative proceeding

before the Commission.

"If you wish to pursue this matter further, I suggest you do so through

Commission counsel."

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After it became apparent that the commission would not hold a hearing on

AMCAC's request for attorney fees, AMCAC filed a complaint in the Court of

Appeals for Franklin County for a writ of mandamus compelling the commission

to hold a hearing pursuant to R.C. 119.092. The parties filed motions for summary

judgment and stipulations of fact. On January 19, 1995, the court of appeals

granted summary judgment in favor of respondent and denied the writ of

mandamus.

The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.

____________________

Benjamin F. Yale & Associates Co. and Benjamin F. Yale. for appellant.

Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Nancy Holland Myers,

Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

____________________

Per Curiam. In order to be entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling the

commission to hold an evidentiary hearing on attorney fees under R.C. 119.092,

AMCAC had to establish (1) a clear legal right to a hearing, (2) a corresponding

legal duty on the part of the commission to hold a hearing, and (3) the lack of an

adequate remedy at law. See State ex rel. Shimola v. Cleveland (1994), 70 Ohio

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St.3d 110, 112, 637 N.E.2d 325, 326. Further, Civ.R. 56(C) provides that before

summary judgment may be granted, it must be determined that (1) no genuine

issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it appears from the evidence that

reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing the evidence most

strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the

nonmoving party.

State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of

Edn.(1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 631 N.E.2d 150, 152.

The court of appeals granted summary judgment in favor of the commission

and denied the writ requested by AMCAC for the following reasons: (1) AMCAC

failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to a writ of mandamus compelling the

commission to conduct a hearing on AMCAC's request for reimbursement of

attorney fees because the commission is not an "agency" for purposes of R.C.

119.092; (2) AMCAC had an adequate remedy at law under R.C. 4112.06 to

review of the final order of the commission refusing to hold a hearing on

AMCAC's attorney-fees request; and (3) AMCAC was not entitled to attorney

fees because the commission did not initiate the charge of unlawful discriminatory

practices which was subsequently dismissed.

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AMCAC asserts in its first proposition of law that the court of appeals erred

in determining that it was not entitled to a writ of mandamus on the basis that the

commission is not an "agency" for purposes of R.C. 119.092.

R.C. 119.092 provides:

"(B)(1) Except as provided in divisions (B)(2) and (F) of this section, if an

agency conducts an adjudication hearing under this chapter, the prevailing

eligible party is entitled, upon filing a motion in accordance with this division, to

compensation for fees incurred by that party in connection with the hearing. ***

"(2) Upon the filing of a motion under this section, the request for the award

shall be reviewed by the referee or examiner who conducted the adjudication

hearing or, if none, by the agency involved. In the review, the referee, examiner,

or agency shall determine whether the fees incurred by the prevailing eligible

party exceeded one hundred dollars, whether the position of the agency in

initiating the matter in controversy was substantially justified, whether special

circumstances make an award unjust, and whether the prevailing eligible party

engaged in conduct during the course of the hearing that unduly and unreasonably

protracted the final resolution of the matter in controversy. The referee, examiner,

or agency shall issue a determination ***." (Emphasis added.)

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Initially, we note that AMCAC's prayer for relief was limited to a writ of

mandamus compelling the commission to hold a hearing on its request for attorney

fees under R.C. 119.092. AMCAC claims that "R.C. 119.092 clearly requires that

the Commission hold the hearing on attorney[] fees."

However, R.C. 119.092 does not require a hearing on the motion for

attorney fees. Instead, R.C. 119.092 requires only a "review" by the referee or

examiner who conducted the adjudication hearing. AMCAC cites no authority to

the contrary.

Therefore, although "it may be good practice to conduct an

evidentiary hearing on the [R.C. 119.092] motion for attorney fees," the

commission and/or its hearing examiner did not possess a clear legal duty to do so

even assuming, arguendo, that R.C. 119.092 is applicable to the commission's

proceedings. See Vierow & Lepp, Ohio Administrative Law Guide and Directory

(1994) 60, Section T 5.08(C).

Further, as the court of appeals correctly determined, the commission is not

an "agency" for purposes of R.C. 119.092. Under the Administrative Procedure

Act, R.C. Chapter 119, "agency" is defined in R.C. 119.01(A) to include (1)

agencies specifically named; (2) the "functions of any *** commission of the

government of the state specifically made subject to sections 119.01 to 119.13 of

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the Revised Code"; and (3) administrative agencies with the authority to issue,

revoke, suspend or cancel licenses. See Plumbers & Steamfitters Commt. v. Ohio

Civ. Rights Comm. (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 192, 193, 20 O.O.3d 200, 200-201; 421

N.E.2d 128, 129; State ex rel. Citizens for Van Meter v. Ohio Elections Comm.

(1992), 78 Ohio App.3d 289, 292-293, 604 N.E.2d 775, 777. As the parties

concede, the commission is neither an "agency" specifically enumerated in R.C.

119.01(A) nor an agency with licensing functions.

Accordingly, the parties dispute if the commission is an agency under R.C.

119.01(A) for purposes of an R.C. 119.092 motion for attorney fees under the

remaining definitional category, i.e., whether the functions of the commission

regarding the award of attorney fees under its enabling legislation, R.C. Chapter

4112, are made specifically subject to R.C. 119.092.

"In construing a statute, a court's paramount concern is the legislative intent

in enacting the statute. *** In determining legislative intent, the court first looks

to the language in the statute and the purpose to be accomplished." State v. S.R.

(1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 590, 594-595, 589 N.E.2d 1319, 1323. The literal language

of the pertinent statutes must be enforced whenever possible. Cablevision of the

Midwest v. Gross (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 541, 544, 639 N.E.2d 1154, 1156.

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Only R.C. 4112.05(G) and 4112.05(I) specifically subject the commission to

pertinent provisions of R.C. Chapter 119. Plumbers & Steamfitters, supra, 66

Ohio St.2d at 194, 20 O.O.3d at 201, 421 N.E.2d at 130. R.C. 4112.05(G) subjects

the commission to R.C. Chapter 119 provisions concerning the issuance of cease

and desist orders following the commission's determination that a respondent has

engaged in, or is engaging in any unlawful discriminatory practice.

R.C.

4112.05(I) subjects the commission to R.C. Chapter 119 provisions concerning

modifying or setting aside any finding or order made by the commission under

R.C. 4112.05.

Neither R.C. 4112.05(G) nor 4112.05(I) subjects the commission to R.C.

119.092 requirements concerning an award of attorney fees in connection with

adjudication hearings. Instead, R.C. Chapter 4112 provides an award of attorney

fees only if it finds an unlawful discriminatory practice pertaining to housing

under R.C. 4112.02(H). See R.C. 4112.05(G)(1).

AMCAC claims that R.C. 119.092 is a remedial statute which should be

liberally construed in its favor. R.C. 1.11; see, also, Collyer v. Broadview Dev.

Ctr. (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 445, 450, 611 N.E.2d 390, 393. However, "`[t]here

is no need to liberally construe a statute whose meaning is unequivocal and

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definite.'" See State ex rel. Solomon v. Police & Firemen's Disability & Pension

Fund Bd. of Trustees (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 62, 66, 647 N.E.2d 486, 489, quoting

Lake Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Ohio Ins. Guar. Assn. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 521, 525, 634

N.E.2d 611, 614. The meaning of R.C. 119.092 and its inapplicability to the

commission's proceedings against AMCAC are unambiguous under the pertinent

statutes. AMCAC's first proposition is meritless.

Therefore, the court of appeals did not err in granting summary judgment in

favor of the commission and denying the extraordinary relief requested by

AMCAC. Based on our disposition of AMCAC's first proposition of law, its

remaining propositions are moot.

Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and

COOK, JJ., concur.

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