Tavenner v. Cogan

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Tavenner v. Cogan

State: Ohio

Court: Ohio Southern District Court

Docket No: 2012-Ohio-2134

Case Date: 05/14/2012

Plaintiff: Tavenner

Defendant: Cogan

Preview:[Cite as Tavenner v. Cogan , 2012-Ohio-2134.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
AUGLAIZE COUNTY
JOY TAVENNER, ET AL.,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,                                             CASE NO.   2-11-26
v.
CARROLL COGAN, TRUSTEE, ET AL.,                                    O P I N I O N
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
Appeal from Auglaize County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 2010 CV 0422
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision:    May 14, 2012
APPEARANCES:
Derek A. Younkman   for Appellants
Glenn E. Wasielewski   for Appellee, Lancaster Colony Corp., and
Koneta Rubber, Inc.
Robert L. Berry   for Appellee, Carroll Cogan and June Cogan

Case No. 2-11-26
SHAW, P.J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellants Joy Tavenner and Tavenner Enterprises1 appeal
the October 20, 2011 judgment of the Auglaize County Court of Common Pleas
granting summary judgment for the defendant-appellees June Cogan (“Cogan”),
Lancaster Colony Corporation (“LCC”) and Koneta Rubber (“Koneta, Inc.”).
{¶2} The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows.   Cogan was the owner
of a building located at 500 Willipie Street, Wapakoneta Ohio, which was leased
to Koneta, Inc.   The lease commenced in December of 2000 and the building was
used for storage.   Tavenner Enterprises owned a building that attached to Cogan’s
storage building via the east wall, located at 505 South Park Street, Wapakoneta,
Ohio.   Tavenner Enterprises operated a nightclub in the building called City Side
Lounge.    The two buildings, City Side Lounge and the storage building, were
separated by an eight inch concrete block firewall.
{¶3} In the early morning hours of March  9,  2007 the Wapakoneta Fire
Department responded to a fire at Cogan’s building.    In fighting the fire, the
Wapakoneta Fire Department requested mutual aid from the Botkins, Buckland,
and Uniopolis Fire Departments which also responded to the scene.   During the
course of fighting the fire, two doors on the west end of City Side Lounge were
1 Joy Tavenner is/was admittedly the sole shareholder of Tavenner Enterprises.   The deposition of Joy
Tavenner, taken October 5-6, 2009, suggests that Tavenner Enterprises’ articles of incorporation may have
been cancelled as far back as July 26, 2007 due to failure to report corporate franchise tax.                   (Tr. at 173).
Further information on the corporation’s status is not included in the record and therefore we do not address
Tavenner Enterprises’ viability as a plaintiff.
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Case No. 2-11-26
forced open to expose and protect the firewall above the ceiling.   As a result of the
fire  and  the  firefighting  activities,  the  nightclub  sustained  smoke  and  water
damage to its interior and contents.
{¶4} The  State  Fire  Marshal  and  the  Wapakoneta  Fire  Department
determined  that  the  fire  originated  in  Cogan’s  building  but  were  unable  to
determine a cause.    City Side Lounge, had been insured, but prior to the fire,
coverage  was  cancelled  due  to  non-payment  of  the  insurance  premium.    The
company holding the mortgage on the property had, however, obtained coverage
sufficient to cover the outstanding balance of the mortgage.
{¶5} On  December  6,  2010  Tavenner  Enterprises,  along  with  its  sole
shareholder Joy Tavenner, filed a complaint against Cogan, Carroll Cogan, LCC
and Koneta, Inc. alleging that these defendants were negligent.2   Cogan filed her
answer to the complaint on December 27, 2010 as well as a suggestion of death on
behalf of Carroll Cogan.   Defendants LCC and Koneta, Inc. filed their answer
jointly on January 3, 2011.   A stipulation of partial dismissal was filed September
14, 2011 dismissing defendant Carroll Cogan due to the suggestion of death.
{¶6} Defendants  LCC  and  Koneta,  Inc.  filed  a  motion  for  summary
judgment on September 19, 2011 arguing that Tavenner and Tavenner Enterprises
2 Plaintiffs had originally filed a negligence action against the current named defendants, the responding
fire departments and Allied Environmental which cleaned at least part of the debris.   This suit resulted in
the  deposition  of  Joy  Tavenner  on  October  5-6,  2009.    Ultimately  that  earlier  case  was  voluntarily
dismissed on December 7, 2009 and was re-filed in its now current form.
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Case No. 2-11-26
were unable to establish all of the elements of negligence.   On October 3, 2011,
Cogan also filed a motion for summary judgment.   Cogan argued that her property
was regularly inspected by local fire officials and any deficiencies that were found
were promptly remedied.   She asserted that at no time had she ever been cited for
failing  to  have  a  sprinkler  system,  that  Tavenner  had  no  evidence  showing
otherwise, and therefore there was no showing of a duty or a breach.   Cogan relied
upon her own affidavit stating that her property was inspected yearly, as well as
“Fire Safety Evaluation” records she provided from 2003 and 2006.
{¶7} Tavenner  and  Tavenner  Enterprises  filed  their  response  to  the
defendants’ respective motions for summary judgment on October 4, 2011.   As
part of this response, Tavenner and Tavenner Enterprises referred to the affidavit
of a proposed expert, Jeffrey Spaulding, who alleged, inter alia, that defendants
were not in compliance with the Ohio Fire Code in that the building was not
equipped with an automatic sprinkler system and a monitoring system that would
notify the local fire department in case of fire.                                      (Doc. No. 35).   Spaulding also
averred that the “contents stored within the space * * * posed a significant risk to
the development and rapid spread of fire,” and that “[b]ased upon the [i]nventory *
* * the storage area” was “a high-hazard commodity storage area” that exceeded
storage area height limits, which required “a permit from the local code official.”
Id.
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Case No. 2-11-26
{¶8} On October 20, 2011, the Auglaize County Common Pleas Court filed
its Entry granting summary judgment on behalf of the defendants.    The court
reasoned that plaintiffs’ expert Spaulding was not a Fire Code Official within the
meaning of the Ohio Administrative Code (“OAC”) that was in place at the time
of this fire.                                                                                  “The  ‘Fire Code Official’ in the instant case would be either the
Wapakoneta Fire Chief or the State Fire Marshall or an assistant or designated
certified fire safety inspector.”                                                              (Doc. No.  44).    According to the trial court,
Spaulding was, therefore, not the appropriate person to make a determination that
defendants were not in compliance with the OAC.
{¶9} Moreover,  the  trial  court  found  that  “the  only evidence  presented
[wa]s that the owner and operator of the warehouse were not cited for, nor notified
in any way of, any violation of the Ohio Fire Code.   From the evidence filed, it
appears  that  parties  agree  that  the  fire  marshal  ruled  that  the  fire  was  of  an
unknown origin, and that there were no citations issued by the state fire marshal.”
Id.   Furthermore, the trial court noted that Cogan submitted documents showing
that fire code officials had inspected her building and that any deficiencies found
by inspections of her property were timely remedied.   Finally, the trial court found
that though plaintiffs alleged common law negligence in their complaint, they
relied  on  defendants’  alleged  breach  of  the  OAC  and  therefore  only  argued
negligence per se.
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Case No. 2-11-26
{¶10} Ultimately the trial court held that there were no genuine issues of
material  fact  when  construing  evidence  most  favorably  to  the  plaintiff,  that
reasonable  minds  could  come  to  but  one  conclusion  that  was  adverse  to  the
plaintiff, and that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
{¶11} It is from this judgment that Tavenner  and Tavenner  Enterprises
appeal asserting the following assignments of error for our review.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE  TRIAL  COURT  ERRED  TO  THE  PREJUDICE  OF
APPELLANTS BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE  TRIAL  COURT  ERRED  TO  THE  PREJUDICE  OF
APPELLANTS IN THAT GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL
FACT EXIST AND REASONABLE MINDS COULD COME
TO MORE THAN ONE CONCLUSION WHICH PRECLUDES
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE  TRIAL  COURT  ERRED  TO  THE  PREJUDICE  OF
APPELLANTS  IN  THAT  THE  NON-MOVING  PARTIES’
RESPONSE BY AFFIDVAIT AND OTHERWISE SET FORTH
SPECIFIC FACTS SHOWING THAT THERE IS A GENUINE
ISSUE FOR TRIAL. (SIC)
Standard of Review
{¶12} Initially, we note that an appellate court reviews a grant of summary
judgment de novo, without any deference to the trial court.   Sheely v. Sheely, 3d.
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Case No. 2-11-26
Dist.  No.                                                                                 2-10-38,                        2012-Ohio-43,  ¶  17  citing    Conley-Slowinski  v.  Superior
Spinning & Stamping Co., 128 Ohio App.3d 360, 363 (6th Dist. 1998).   A grant of
summary judgment will be affirmed only when the requirements of Civ.R. 56(C)
are met.   This requires the moving party to establish:                                    (1) that there are no genuine
issues of material fact, (2) that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law, and (3) that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that
conclusion is adverse to the non-moving party, said party being entitled to have
the evidence construed most strongly in his or her favor.   Civ.R. 56; see Horton v.
Harwick Chem. Corp., 73 Ohio St.3d 679, 1995-Ohio-286, at paragraph three of
the syllabus.
{¶13} The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of
identifying  the  basis  for  its  motion  in  order  to  allow  the  opposing  party  a
“meaningful opportunity to respond.”    Mitseff v. Wheeler,  38 Ohio St.3d  112
(1988) at syllabus.   The moving party also bears the burden of demonstrating the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to an essential element of the case.
Dresher v. Burt,  75 Ohio St.3d  280,  1996-Ohio-107.    Once the moving party
demonstrates that he is entitled to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the non-
moving party to produce evidence on any issue which that party bears the burden
of production at trial.   See Civ.R. 56(E).
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Case No. 2-11-26
{¶14} In ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court is not permitted to
weigh evidence or choose among reasonable inferences, rather, the court must
evaluate evidence, taking all permissible inferences and resolving questions of
credibility in favor of the non-moving party.    Jacobs v. Racevskis,  105 Ohio
App.3d 1, 7 (2nd Dist. 1995).   Additionally, Civ.R. 56(C) mandates that summary
judgment   shall   be   rendered   if   the   pleadings,   depositions,   answers   to
interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written
stipulations of fact show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Assignments of Error 1, 2 and 3
{¶15} For clarity of discussion we elect to address all three assignments of
error together as they are interrelated.   All three assignments of error raised by
Tavenner and Tavenner Enterprises essentially argue that summary judgment was
improperly awarded to the collective defendants because there was a genuine issue
of material fact.
{¶16} At the outset we note that this is not a case invoking negligence per
se.   The Supreme Court of Ohio held in Lang v. Holly Hill Motel, Inc, 122 Ohio
St.3d 120, 2009-Ohio-2495, that violation of an administrative regulation, unlike
the violation of a statute, does not create a per se finding of duty and breach of
duty.   Lang at ¶ 21; see also Chambers v. St. Mary’s School, 82 Ohio St.3d 563,
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Case No. 2-11-26
568                                                                                                           (1998).   The  Court  in  Lang  found  that  while  actual  violation  of  an
administrative code regulation could be some evidence of negligence, it did not
give rise to negligence per se.   Id.   Moreover, Tavenner and Tavenner Enterprises
alleged negligence in their complaint, not negligence per se.   Therefore, based
upon Ohio Supreme Court case law and the complaint of the plaintiffs, we conduct
our de novo review of these motions for summary judgment only in context of
negligence, not in the context of negligence per se.
{¶17} Proving negligence requires a showing of the existence of a duty, a
breach of that duty, and an injury proximately resulting therefrom.   Armstrong v.
Best Buy Company, Inc., 99 Ohio St.3d 79, 2003-Ohio-2573 ¶ 8.   Tavenner argues
that an affidavit filed by its proposed expert, Jeffrey Spaulding,3 establishes a
genuine issue of material fact that should have precluded summary judgment.
Based on his review of materials related to this case,4 Spaulding concluded that
3 According to his affidavit, Spaulding has professional experience working or supervising more than seven
hundred fire and explosion investigations across the United States.   He is currently an owner/investigator
for Spaulding & Associates LLC, a Fire Captain/Investigator for Middletown Fire Department, and a Fire
Fighting Academy Instructor for Butler Technology in Hamilton, Ohio
4 Spaulding averred that his affidavit in this case was made on
personal knowledge and experience after review of various items including but not
limited to:    Wapakoneta Fire Department Fire Incident Report dated March  9,
2007,  Ohio  State  Fire  Marshall  Incident  Report  dated  March  9,  2007,  Report
prepared  by  SEA,  Ltd.  Dated  April                                                                        30,       2007,  Report  prepared  by  O.C.A.
Consultants, Inc. dated March  22,  2007, photos, and documents produced by the
Defendants, June Cogan, Trustee, Lancaster Colony Corporation and/or Koneta
Rubber, Inc. (Koneta, Inc.), Plaintiffs, Joy Tavenner and Tavenner Enterprises, Inc.
furnished to me by Attorney Derek Younkman.   (Doc. No. 35).
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Case No. 2-11-26
“[Cogan’s] property located at  500 Willipie Street, Wapakoneta, Ohio did not
meet the minimum requirements of the 2005 Ohio Fire Code.”   (Doc. No. 35).
{¶18} The 2005 Ohio Fire Code was codified in OAC 1301:7-7-01.5   It was
an administrative regulation and therefore violation of said regulation would not
create negligence per se.   Any actual violation of the Ohio Fire Code would not
establish a duty and a breach of that duty.   The salient issue in this case is thus not
whether  the  defendants  were  in  violation  of  the  Ohio  Fire  Code,  but  rather,
whether Tavenner and Tavenner Enterprises have established any evidence that
the collective defendants were on reasonable notice that they had created a fire
hazard.     Therefore,  we  examine  Spaulding’s  affidavit  for  allegations  that
defendants created an unreasonable risk of fire that they were aware of.
{¶19} Spaulding averred the following to say there was an enhanced risk of
fire and/or damage on defendant’s property:
The 2005 Ohio Fire Code became effective on September 1, 2005
and  the  contents  stored  within  the  space  leased  by  Koneta
Rubber, Inc. posed a significant risk to the development and
rapid spread of fire.
Based upon the Inventory Cost Evaluation Report several of the
materials  stored  within  the  building  by  Koneta  Rubber,  Inc.
and/or  Lancaster  Colony  Corporation  are  listed  as  Class  A
Plastics by the 2005 Ohio Fire Code which in the percentage by
5 It has since been amended to its now-current form as the International Fire Code.   The 2005 Ohio Fire
Code was replaced effective July 1, 2007.
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Case No. 2-11-26
weight, caused the storage area to be considered a high-hazard
commodity storage area.
Due to the type and quantity of materials being stored within the
structure at the time of the fire, a permit from the local code
official would be required to continue use of the structure for
high-piled storage.
The  storage  area  leased  by  Koneta  Rubber,  Inc.  and/or
Lancaster Colony Corporation exceeded 2,500 square feet.
Pursuant to the 2005 Ohio Fire Code, any storage area exceeding
2,500  square  feet  would  also  require  the  installation  of  an
automatic sprinkler system to protect the property in the event
of a fire.
The installation of an automatic sprinkler  system would also
require a monitoring system to notify the local fire department
as soon as the automatic sprinkler system activated.
If a significant risk exists, then appropriate sections of the Ohio
Fire Code must be enforced regardless of when the hazard was
created or the Code in force at the time the hazard was created.
Additionally,  the  2005  Ohio  Fire  Code  states  if  an  occupant
creates   a   hazardous   condition(s),   it   is   the   occupant’s
responsibility to correct and abate those hazardous condition(s).
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Case No. 2-11-26
(Doc.  No.  35).    Finally,  Spaulding  averred  that  if  the  Ohio  Fire  Code  was
appropriately  complied  with  “this  fire  would  have  been  either  suppressed  or
contained to a limited area of damage with near-immediate notification being
made to the local fire department.”   Id.
{¶20} Spaulding thus bases most of his allegations that defendants breached
a duty in this case upon their non-compliance with the Ohio Fire Code.   However,
Spaulding does aver that there were significant risks on the property. Spaulding
argues that the materials stored in the building and the height that they were
stacked created significant risks.   However, even accepting all these things as true,
we find that there is no evidence that the collective defendants ever received any
type of notice that they were creating a fire hazard, nor is there any evidence that
the collective defendants ever acted unreasonably to breach any known duty with
respect to the storage or placement of any items or fire suppressant equipment
within their building.
{¶21} The record shows that Cogan had regular fire safety evaluations by
the Wapakoneta Fire Department and that Cogan corrected any problems of which
she was apprised.   Cogan averred that her building was “inspected approximately
yearly by the Wapakoneta Fire Department as part of a Fire Safety Evaluation.”
(Doc.  No.  33).    To  corroborate  this  fact,  Cogan  provided  two                   “Fire  Safety
Evaluation” sheets that had been undertaken on her property.    The first  “Fire
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Case No. 2-11-26
Safety Evaluation” included was conducted on March 10, 2003, and the second
was conducted on February 17,  2006 after the  2005 Ohio Fire Code went into
effect.                                                                                                  (Doc. No.  33).    In both of the evaluations, Cogan was cited for some
violations  of  the  Ohio  Fire  Code  which  included  a  need  to  service  fire
extinguishers, a need to repair/replace exit lights, a need to put a new battery into
emergency lighting, and a need to fix holes in the ceiling.   Id.   According to the
information  provided  in  the  record,  Cogan  promptly  fixed  all  of  the  issues,
providing receipts for the work that was done.   In the 2006 evaluation, Cogan had
fixed all violations within a month.6
{¶22} Importantly, neither of these evaluations shows that Cogan was cited
for any of the Ohio Fire Code violations that Spaulding alleged in his affidavit,
essentially  giving  her  an  affirmative  indication  that  she  was  otherwise  in
compliance with the code and that she was not creating an unreasonable risk of
harm.   Moreover, there is no indication given by the   people that were in charge of
issuing  citations  and  inspecting  Cogan’s  property  pursuant  to  former  OAC
1301:7:7-1 that there was any type of increased risk of harm due to the stacking of
materials above any given height or the lack of a sprinkler system.   There is no
evidence that defendants acted unreasonably or that they were informed of any
6 The evaluation date was February 17, 2006 and all violations were apparently fixed by March 6, 2006.
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Case No. 2-11-26
potential deficiency.   In this case there is no allegation of negligence in the cause
of the fire as the cause was undetermined.
{¶23} Tavenner and Tavenner Enterprises argue that perhaps the Fire Code
Officials conducting the evaluations in this case did not comply with the Ohio Fire
Code  and  that  this  in  and  of  itself  creates  a  genuine  issue  of  material  fact.
However, the undisputed facts of this case establish that the defendants had their
building regularly inspected and that they promptly remedied all problems.   Under
the circumstances, we find that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the
elements of duty and breach, reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion
based on the undisputed evidence, and that defendants are entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.   Therefore, we find that summary judgment was appropriately
granted in this case.
{¶24} For  the  foregoing  reasons,  we  find  Tavenner  and  Tavenner
Enterprises’ first, second and third assignments of error without merit and they are
overruled.
Judgment Affirmed
WILLAMOWSKI and ROGERS, J.J., concur.
/jlr
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