Thrasher v. Watts

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Thrasher v. Watts

State: Ohio

Court: Ohio Southern District Court

Docket No: 2013-Ohio-2581

Case Date: 06/21/2013

Plaintiff: State

Defendant: Yambrisak

Preview:[Cite as State v. Yambrisak, 2013-Ohio-1406.]
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUDGES:
STATE OF OHIO                                                                              :                     Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J.
                                                                                           :                     Hon. W. Scott Gwin J.
                                                Plaintiff-Appellee                         :                     Hon. John W. Wise, J.
:
-vs-                                            :
                                                :                                          Case No. 2012-CA-50
BYRON YAMBRISAK                                 :
:
Defendant-Appellant                             :                                          O P I N I O N
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                        Criminal appeal from the Richland County
                                                Court of Common Pleas, Case No.
                                                2011CR0651
JUDGMENT:                                       Vacated and Remanded
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                         April 5, 2013
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee                          For Defendant-Appellant
JILL COCHRAN                                    R. PAUL CUSHION, II.
38 South Park Street                            75 Public Square, Ste. 1111
Mansfield, OH   44902                           Cleveland, OH   44113

[Cite as State v. Yambrisak, 2013-Ohio-1406.]
Gwin, J.,
{¶1}   Appellant Byron Yambrisak appeals his conviction in the Richland County
Court of Common Pleas on one count of retaliation against a public servant or witness,
a felony of the third degree in violation of R.C. 2921.05(A) and one count of intimidation
of a public servant a felony of the third degree in violation of R.C. 2921.03(A).
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2}   In the late morning of July 15, 2011, Detective Pat Smith of the Richland
County Sherriff’s Department was called to MedCentral Hospital to investigate a child
victim of rape. Detective Smith was in plain clothes and driving an unmarked vehicle;
however she did have her service revolver holstered on her right hip. She left the
hospital a few minutes before 1:00 p.m. Detective Smith testified that she had parked
her unmarked vehicle in the parking lot located on Glessner Avenue, across from the
hospital. As she prepared to cross the street at the pedestrian crosswalk, a small green
vehicle sped through the crosswalk.
{¶3}   Detective Smith crossed at the crosswalk towards the parking lot. As she
approached her vehicle, Detective Smith was hailed by an old acquaintance, Vernessa
Bond, who happened to be parked near Detective Smith's vehicle. The two engaged in
a casual conversation. While the two conversed, the little green vehicle drove by again.
The male passenger began yelling racial slurs towards Detective Smith and Ms. Bond,
both of whom are African-American. The verbal tirade included phrases such as "I hate
you, you fucking nigger. You black bitch, I'm going to fuck you up."
{¶4}   The vehicle proceeded on towards Glessner Avenue as the two women
continued their conversation. The vehicle returned and stopped on Lind Avenue, close

Richland County, Case No. 2012-CA-50                                                                  3
to where the women were parked. The occupant began yelling racial slurs again this
time including, "Do you like talking to young girls about sex? Do you like talking to
prostitutes  about  sex?  I  hate  you,  you  fucking  nigger,  I'm  going  to  fuck  you  up.”
Detective Smith took two steps towards the vehicle to see if she could identify the
occupant. Detective Smith then testified that she yelled, "I know who you are, Byron
Yambrisak, you need to be on your way." The vehicle immediately sped away. Detective
Smith immediately called dispatch on her cell phone to report the incident, prior to
returning to her vehicle.
{¶5}   At  the  sheriff’s  department,  Detective  Smith  reported  the  incident  to
second in command, Major Fortney. She was instructed to make a written statement
and Major Fortney contacted the Mansfield Police Department to send an officer over to
take a report as the incident occurred in their jurisdiction.
{¶6}   Because  of  the  incident,  Detective  Smith  attempted  to  obtain  a  civil
stalking protection order against Yambrisak based on the singular event that occurred
on July 15, 2011. The civil stalking protection order was denied.
{¶7}   On May 10, 2011, the Richland County Grand Jury returned an indictment
charging Yambrisak with one count Retaliation pursuant to R.C.2921.05 (A) and one
count of Intimidation pursuant to R.C.  2921.03(A). The basis for the indictment was
presented during Yambrisak’s jury trial.
{¶8}   At trial, the state presented evidence that in 2009, during the course of her
duties as a detective, Detective Smith investigated an allegation that Yambrisak was
trying  to  hire  someone  to  kill  his  ex-girlfriend,  a  prostitute  by  the  name  of  Gillisa

Richland County, Case No. 2012-CA-50                                                                          4
Morgan.1 As a result, Yambrisak was eventually charged with aggravated menacing and
menacing by stalking. Yambrisak was arrested on the warrant on May 20, 2009 and
Detective Smith appeared at the jail and served him with the complaint. The Mansfield
Law Director later dismissed the aggravated menacing and menacing by stalking case.
{¶9}   By Detective Smith's own admission, between October 2009 and July 15,
2011, she had absolutely no contact with Yambrisak.
{¶10}  The jury found the Yambrisak guilty on both counts. On June 11, 2012, the
trial  court  sentenced  Yambrisak  to  a  term  of  incarceration  of  three  years  on  the
retaliation count. The trial court further sentenced him to three years of community
control  on  this  charge.  Likewise,  the  intimidation  charge,  the  trial  court  sentenced
Yambrisak  to  a  maximum  term  of  three  years  of  incarceration  and  three  years  of
community control on this count to begin on release from prison on the prior count.
Assignments of Error
{¶11}  Yambrisak raises seven assignments of error,
{¶12}  “I. AN "UNLAWFUL THREAT OF HARM" IS REQUIRED UNDER THE
RETALIATION STATUTE, SET FORTH IN ORC §2921.05, AND THE INTIMIDATION
STATUTE, SET FORTH IN ORC  §2921.03, AND IS SATISFIED ONLY WHEN THE
VERY MAKING OF THE THREAT OF HARM IS ITSELF UNLAWFUL BECAUSE IT
VIOLATES  ESTABLISHED  CRIMINAL  OR  CIVIL  LAW,  AND  THIS  "UNLAWFUL
THREAT" MUST CONNOTE MORE THAN A BENIGN THREAT FOR PURPOSES OF
THE RETALIATION STATUTE, AND THE INTIMIDATION STATUTE AS THE THREAT
1 Yambrisak raised as his second assignment of error that the length and detail into which the
prosecutor was permitted to delve into the unproven allegations of the 2009 incident was prejudicial error.
While we express our concern that those details  were not necessary to prove any element of either
offense, in light of out disposition of the assignments under consideration, we need not address this
concern in the present case.

Richland County, Case No. 2012-CA-50                                        5
MUST  COMMUNICATE  TO  A  PERSON  THAT  A  PARTICULAR  CONSEQUENCE
MUST FOLLOW FOR SOME SPECIFIED ACTION TAKEN.
{¶13}  “II. IT IS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO PERMIT THE INTRODUCTION OF
INFORMATION  RELATED  TO  A  PRIOR  POLICE  INVESTIGATION  OF  THE
APPELLANT-DEFENDANT,  WHEN  NO  FORMAL  CHARGES  OR  COURT  ACTION
WERE  BROUGHT  AGAINST  THE  APPELLANT-DEFENDANT  RESULTING  FROM
THE   POLICE   INVESTIGATIONS,   AND   WHEN   THE   BASIS   FOR   THE
INVESTIGATIONS INVOLVED SPURIOUS ALLEGATIONS THAT THE APPELLANT-
DEFENDANT  WAS  ALLEGED  TO  HAVE  HIRED  A  "HIT  MAN"  TO  KILL  HIS
"PROSTITUTE  GIRLFRIEND",  AS  THESE  ALLEGATIONS  WERE  UNPROVEN,
IRRELEVANT  AND  FAR  MORE  PREJUDICIAL  THAN  PROBATIVE,  AND  THEIR
IMPACT   UPON   THE   PROCEEDINGS   TAINTED   THE   ENTIRE   TRIAL,   AND
SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICED THE APPELLANT-DEFENDANT IN THE EYES OF
THE JURY.
{¶14}  “III.  WHEN  A  CITIZEN  CRITICIZES  OR  CHASTISES  A  POLICE
OFFICER AND USES VITUPERATIVE AND VITRIOLIC WORDS, NO MATTER HOW
DISTASTEFUL THOSE WORDS MAY BE, SUCH METRIC AND/OR CRITICISM IS
PROTECTED SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND MAY NEVER BE CENSORED OR SUBJECT TO CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION.
{¶15}  “IV.  THE  TRIAL  COURT  ERRED  IN  DENYING  THE  APPELLANT-
DEFENDANT'S  REQUEST  FOR  A  JURY  INSTRUCTION  THAT  SET  FORTH  THE
FIRST  AMENDMENT  LAW  RELATED  TO  PROTECTED  SPEECH,  INTER  ALIA,

Richland County, Case No. 2012-CA-50                                       6
WHEN THE BASIS OF THE CHARGES AGAINST THE APPELLANT-DEFENDANT
WERE BASED UPON WORDS ALONE.
{¶16}  “V.   THE   TRIAL   COURT   ABUSED   ITS   DISCRETION   WHEN
SENTENCING THE APPELLANT-DEFENDANT TO THE MAXIMUM INCARCERATION
PERIOD OF THREE (3) YEARS ON BOTH LOW-LEVEL FELONIES OF THE THIRD
DEGREE, WHEN THE APPELLANT-DEFENDANT HAD NEVER BEEN CONVICTED
OF ANY PRIOR FELONY IN HIS LIFE, AND WHERE THE MANDATES OF ORC
§2929.11(A)   DICTATE   THAT   THE   OVERRIDING   PURPOSES   OF   FELONY
SENTENCING ARE TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC AND TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER
USING   THE   MINIMUM   SANCTIONS   THAT   THE   COURT   DETERMINES
ACCOMPLISH  THOSE  PURPOSES  WITHOUT  IMPOSING  AN  UNNECESSARY
BURDEN ON STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT RESOURCES .
{¶17}  “VI.    THERE WAS  INSUFFICIENT  EVIDENCE  PRESENTED BY THE
STATE OF OHIO RELEVANT TO BOTH THE RETALIATION AND THE INTIMIDATION
CONVICTION TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION, WHEN THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE
PRODUCED  THAT  A  PUBLIC  SERVANT  WAS,  PRIOR  TO  OR  DURING  TRIAL,
INVOLVED  IN  A  COURT  PROCEEDING  WHEN  THE  ALLEGED  RETALIATION
AND/OR INTIMIDATION CHARGED OCCURRED.
{¶18}  “VII. WITHOUT PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE
CONDUCT OF THE OFFENDER HAD A FACTUAL NEXUS TO THE UNDERLING
CHARGES THAT RESULTED IN A COURT PROCEEDING, NO CONVICTION ON
CHARGES OF EITHER RETALIATION OR INTIMIDATION MAY BE HAD.”

Richland County, Case No. 2012-CA-50                                                            7
I, VI & VII
{¶19}  In his first, sixth and seventh assignments of error, Yambrisak essentially
challenges the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence.
{¶20}  Because  we  find  the  issues  raised  in  these  assignments  of  error  are
closely  related  for  ease  of  discussion  we  shall  address  the  assignments  of  error
together.
{¶21}  Our  review  of  the  constitutional  sufficiency  of  evidence  to  support  a
criminal conviction is governed by Jackson v. Virginia,  443 U.S.  307,  319,  99 S.Ct.
2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), which requires a court of appeals to determine whether
“after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id.; see also McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 130 S.Ct. 665, 673, 175 L.Ed.2d
582(2010)  (reaffirming this standard); State v. Fry,  125 Ohio St.3d  163,  926 N.E.2d
1239, 2010-Ohio-1017, ¶ 146; State v. Clay, 187 Ohio App.3d 633, 933 N.E.2d 296,
2010-Ohio-2720, ¶ 68.
{¶22}  Weight of the evidence addresses the evidence's effect of inducing belief.
State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386-387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), superseded
by constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated by State v. Smith, 80 Ohio
St.3d  89,  684  N.E.2d  668,  1997-Ohio-355.  Weight  of  the  evidence  concerns  “the
inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one
side of the issue rather than the other. It indicates clearly to the jury that the party
having the burden of proof will be entitled to their verdict, if, on weighing the evidence in
their minds, they shall find the greater amount of credible evidence sustains the issue

Richland County, Case No. 2012-CA-50                                                                 8
which is to be established before them. Weight is not a question of mathematics, but
depends on its effect in inducing belief.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541,
quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990) at 1594.
{¶23}  When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis
that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a
“’thirteenth  juror’”  and  disagrees  with  the  fact  finder’s  resolution  of  the  conflicting
testimony. Id. at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102
S.Ct.                                                                                                2211,  72  L.Ed.2d  652  (1982).  However,  an  appellate  court  may  not  merely
substitute its view for that of the jury, but must find that “‘the jury clearly lost its way and
created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and
a new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting State v.
Martin,                                                                                              20  Ohio  App.3d                                                                     172,   175,   485  N.E.2d   717,   720-721(1st  Dist.   1983).
Accordingly, reversal on manifest weight grounds is reserved for “‘the exceptional case
in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Id.
{¶24}  “[I]n determining whether the judgment below is manifestly against the
weight  of  the  evidence,  every  reasonable  intendment  and  every  reasonable
presumption must be made in favor of the judgment and the finding of facts. * * *
{¶25}                                                                                                “If  the  evidence  is  susceptible  of  more  than  one  construction,  the
reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict
and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment.”
Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984), fn.
3, quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review, Section 60, at 191-192 (1978).

Richland County, Case No. 2012-CA-50                                                     9
{¶26}  In the case at bar, Yambrisak was charged with retaliation against a public
servant or witness. The language of the indictment which reads,
(A) No person, knowingly and by force or by unlawful threat of harm
to any person or property, shall attempt to influence, intimidate, or hinder a
public servant, a party official, or an attorney or witness involved in a civil
action or proceeding in the discharge of the duties of the public servant,
party official, attorney, or witness.
{¶27}                                                                                    “A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is aware
that his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain
nature.  A  person  has  knowledge  of  circumstances  when  he  is  aware  that  such
circumstances probably exist.” R.C. 2901.22(B).
{¶28}  Yambrisak was also charged with retaliation. R.C. 2912.05 provides,
(A) No person, purposely and by force or by unlawful threat of harm
to any person or property, shall retaliate against a public servant, a party
official, or an attorney or witness who was involved in a civil or criminal
action or proceeding because the public servant, party official, attorney, or
witness discharged the duties of the public servant, party official, attorney,
or witness.
{¶29}  R.C. 2901.22 Culpable mental states, provides:
(A) A  person acts  purposely  when  it  is  his  specific  intention  to
cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition
against  conduct  of  a  certain  nature,  regardless  of  what  the  offender

Richland County, Case No. 2012-CA-50                                                             10
intends to accomplish thereby, it is his specific intention to engage in
conduct of that nature.
{¶30}  According to R.C. 2921.01(B)(1), the term “public servant” includes within
its definition a “public official.” The latter term is defined as “any elected or appointed
officer, or employee, or agent of the state or any political subdivision, whether in a
temporary or permanent capacity, and includes, but is not limited to, legislators, judges,
and law enforcement officers.” R.C. 2921.01(A).
{¶31}  Both intimidation and retaliation require that the state prove beyond a
reasonable doubt an “unlawful threat of harm.” The Supreme Court of Ohio suggested
that, to be unlawful, the threat itself must violate a predicate offense. State v. Cress, 112
Ohio St.3d 72, 858 N.E.2d 341, 2006-Ohio-6501, ¶43.(Construing the “unlawful threat
of harm” element of R.C. 2912.04(B), attempt to intimidate victim, witness or attorney for
being  a  witness)  The  court  held  “that  the  statutory  language  in  R.C.                  2921.04(B),
proscribing intimidation by an ‘unlawful threat of harm,’ is satisfied only when the very
making of the threat is itself unlawful because it violates established criminal or civil
law.” Id. at ¶ 42, 858 N.E.2d 341. The court held that the threat itself, not the threatened
conduct,  must  be  unlawful.  Id.  at  ¶  38,  858  N.E.2d  341.  As  the  “threat  of  harm”
language of R.C. 2921.03 is identical to the language construed by the Court in Kress,
we find the Supreme Court’s analysis to be persuasive in a case involving intimidation
under R.C. 2921.03(A).
{¶32}  In this case, the only evidence of an alleged unlawful threat of harm are
the following statements,

Richland County, Case No. 2012-CA-50                                                             11
I hate you, you fucking nigger. You black bitch, I’m going to fuck
you up.
Do you like talking to young girls about sex? Do you like talking to
prostitutes about sex? I hate you, you fucking nigger. I’m going to fuck you
up.
1T. at 145-146. Yambrisak does not deny that he made these statements or that he
directed the statements to Detective Smith.
{¶33}  In  and  of  themselves  the  majority  of  statements  are  not  threatening.
Statements such as “I hate you,” “Do you like talking to young girls about sex? Do you
like talking to prostitutes about sex?”; “You black bitch”; and “I hate you, you fucking
nigger” did not make an unlawful threat of harm toward Smith. Although contemptible
and debauched, the substance of the “threats” were statements of Yambrisak’s feelings
and opinions.
{¶34}  The more vexing problem is posed by Yambrisak’s use of the terms, “I’m
going to fuck you up.” As the Supreme Court of Ohio has noted, “[t]he most intimidating
threat of all may be an indefinite one (‘You'll be sorry’).” State v. Cress, 112 Ohio St.3d
72,                                                                                              858  N.E.2d   341,   2006-Ohio-6501,¶   37.  The  words  chosen  are  themselves
ambiguous  and  did  not  mention  a  particular  criminal  act  or  give  other  particulars.
However, when taken in the context of Yambrisak’s other rants the statement can take
on a more troubling tone.

Richland County, Case No. 2012-CA-50                                                             12
{¶35}  A second consideration is what did Yambrisak intend to convey by his
tirade. To constitute retaliation Yambrisak must have had a specific intention to cause a
certain result. In the case at bar, Detective Smith did investigate Yambrisak in 2009.
{¶36}  The trial court in State v. Fuqua, 3rd Dist. No. 6-02-01, 2002-Ohio-4697
noted that “witness” includes those who see or hear an event as well as those who
testify in court about it. Id. at  ¶  9. The trial court also noted that  “[t]he duties of a
‘witness'  include not only the  act  of  testifying but  all  of  the  preliminary aspects of
becoming formally involved in the process of identification and case preparation.” Id. at
¶  10  (emphasis  added).  The  appellate  court  agreed  and  concluded  that  retaliation
applies even if the witness never had to testify against the defendant. Id. at ¶ 20.
{¶37}  We find the above-quoted reasoning persuasive. However, in the case at
bar, in order to convict Yambrisak of retaliation, the evidence must prove that any threat
of unlawful harm be directed at Detective Smith because of her prior involvement with
him in 1999.
{¶38}  We find under the facts of this case that this “nexus” between Yambrisak
and  Detective  Smith  is  lacking.  Detective  Smith  testified  that  her  involvement  with
Yambrisak  in                                                                                    2009  was  uneventful.  No  threats,  accusations  or  problems  ensued
between her investigation of the allegations and serving the arrest warrant in October
2009 and her chance meeting him on July 15, 2011. Those charges were dismissed in
their entirety by  the  prosecuting attorney.  In  addition,  the  occurrence  in  July  2011
happened in broad daylight in full view of not only Deputy Smith’s acquaintance, but
also other persons in and around the street. Once identified, Yambrisak sped away.

Richland County, Case No. 2012-CA-50                                                            13
{¶39}  We  find  based  upon  all  the  surrounding  circumstances,  Yambrisak’s
words were too unequivocal, unconditional, not immediate and not specific enough to
convey to Detective Smith that he was retaliating for her involvement with him two years
earlier.
{¶40}  We  find  there  was  insufficient  evidence  in  the  record  that  Yambrisak
purposefully or unlawfully threatened Detective Smith in retaliation for her involvement
with his 1999 criminal matter.
{¶41}  Likewise, we find insufficient evidence in the record to find that Yambrisak
attempted to influence, intimidate, or hinder Deputy Smith in the discharge of her duty.
Nothing Yambrisak did or said on July 15, 2011 was in any way related to or hindered
Detective Smith in the discharge of her duties. Her duties in the 2009 case against him
were completed and no charges were ever prosecuted. Yambrisak’s words were too
unequivocal,  unconditional,  not  immediate  and  not  specific  enough  to  convey  to
Detective  Smith  that  Yambrisak  was  attempting  to  influence,  intimidate,  or  hinder
Deputy Smith in the discharge of her duties.
{¶42}  We  find  there  was  insufficient  evidence  in  the  record  to  find  that
Yambrisak knowingly by unlawful threat of harm was attempting to influence, intimidate,
or hinder Detective Smith in the discharge of her duties.
{¶43}  Appellant’s first, sixth and seventh assignments of error are sustained.
Section 3(B) (2), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 2953.07, give an appellate
court  the  power  to  affirm,  reverse,  or  modify  the  judgment  of  an  inferior  court.
Accordingly, the convictions and sentences are vacated, and this case is remanded for
the trial court to enter judgments of acquittal on all counts.

Richland County, Case No. 2012-CA-50                                                      14
{¶44} In light of our disposition of the first, sixth and seventh assignments of
error, we find Yambrisak’s second, third, fourth and fifth assignments of error to be
moot.
{¶45}  The judgment of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas is reversed.
Pursuant to Section 3(B) (2), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 2953.07, the
convictions and sentences convictions are vacated, and this case is remanded for the
trial court to enter judgments of acquittal on all counts.
By Gwin, J.,
Delaney, P.J., and
Wise, J., concur
HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
HON. JOHN W. WISE
WSG:clw 0304

[Cite as State v. Yambrisak, 2013-Ohio-1406.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO                                                                               :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee                                                                          :
:
:
-vs-                                                                                        :   JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
BYRON YAMBRISAK                                                                             :
:
:
Defendant-Appellant                                                                         :   CASE NO. 2012-CA-50
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the judgment of
the Richland County Court of Common Pleas is reversed. Pursuant to Section 3(B) (2),
Article IV of the Ohio Constitution and R.C. 2953.07, the convictions and sentences are
vacated, and this case is remanded for the trial court to enter judgments of acquittal on
all counts.   Costs to Appellee.
HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
HON. JOHN W. WISE

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