Williams v. Collins

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Williams v. Collins

State: Ohio

Court: Ohio Southern District Court

Docket No: 2011-Ohio-3029

Case Date: 06/21/2011

Plaintiff: Williams

Defendant: Collins

Preview:[Cite as Williams v. Collins, 2011-Ohio-3029.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Randolph Williams, Jr. et al.,                                                                 :
Plaintiffs-Appellants,                                                                         :
                                                                                                                                     No. 10AP-1012
v.                                                                                             :                                     (C.P.C. No. 09CVH-10-15054)
Terry J. Collins et al.,                                                                       :                                     (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Defendants-Appellees.                                                                          :
D    E    C    I    S    I    O    N
Rendered on June 21, 2011
Randolph Williams, Jr., pro se.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Peter L. Jamison,
for appellees.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
FRENCH, J.
{¶1}   Plaintiff-appellant,  Randolph  Williams,  Jr.                                          ("Williams"),  appeals  the
judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, which granted summary
judgment  in  favor  of  defendants-appellees,  Terry  J.  Collins,  Director  of  the  Ohio
Department  of  Rehabilitation  and  Correction                                                ("ODRC"),  Deb  Timmerman-Cooper,
Warden  of  the  London  Correctional  Institution                                             ("LCI"),  and  Russ  Parrish,  Unit

No. 10AP-1012                                                                                  2
Management Administrator of LCI (collectively, "appellees").   Because the trial court did
not err, we affirm.
{¶2}   Williams and two other inmates of LCI, Martin Holloman and Ako Thomas,
filed a complaint against appellees on October 7, 2009.   In it, the plaintiffs alleged that
they  were  subjected  to  cruel  and  unusual  punishment  in  violation  of  the  Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.   Specifically, they alleged that appellees
had deprived them of state-issued soap within the inmate housing units.
{¶3}   According to the complaint, appellees began depriving inmates of state-
issued soap on or about June 5,  2009, when a memo issued by Parrish stated that
ODRC would no longer provide soap to the inmate population.    After receiving the
memo, three inmates filed grievances with ODRC's chief inspector, Gary Croft, who
granted them, in part, and directed that soap be placed in inmate common areas.
Croft's decision was dated July 9,  2009.    When soap had not been returned to the
common  areas  by  July 13,  2009,  Holloman  sent  a  communication  to  Timmerman-
Cooper.     Parrish  responded  that  the  common  areas  would  be  receiving  soap
dispensers, which were on order.   Thereafter, inmates were informed that soap would
only be provided in common areas of the institution, not in inmate housing units.   For
relief,  the  complaint  sought  a  declaration  that  the  Eighth  Amendment  and  ODRC
policies require appellees to provide all inmates with soap in the "inmate housing units
common areas" at LCI.   They also sought an injunction to the same effect.
{¶4}   On  November 12,                                                                        2009,  appellees  moved  to  dismiss  the  complaint.
Appellees contended that the complaint had not stated a claim on which relief could be
granted because the plaintiffs had not alleged any resulting pain or harm and had not

No. 10AP-1012                                                                                    3
met  standards  for  alleging  a  claim  under  the  Eighth  Amendment.    Appellees  also
contended that the plaintiffs had failed to comply with mandatory filing requirements.
{¶5}   On March 5, 2010, the trial court granted appellees' motion to dismiss only
as to Holloman and Thomas because they had not met filing requirements.   The trial
court denied appellees' motion as to Williams because appellees had failed to state their
grounds with particularity.   Thereafter, appellees answered.
{¶6}   On July 14, 2010, appellees moved for summary judgment on Williams'
claim  under the  Eighth  Amendment.    They contended that  (1) the  issue  was  moot
because soap dispensers had been installed in all inmate housing bathrooms, and
(2) Williams' claims were not enough to show cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment.   They attached the affidavit of Timmerman-Cooper, who stated that
LCI had adopted a new policy, which provided inmates with access to free soap in all
common areas and bathrooms.   She also stated that inmates could purchase soap from
the LCI commissary.   Inmates who could not afford soap were entitled to obtain it for
free or on credit.
{¶7}   In response, Williams argued that the issue was not moot because LCI
does not always keep soap in the new dispensers.    Four affidavits supported this
contention.    Williams  also  argued  that  the  claims  were  sufficient  under  the  Eighth
Amendment.
{¶8}   On July 14,  2010, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
appellees.    The  court  concluded  that  reasonable  minds  could  only  conclude  that
appellees  had  not  shown  deliberate  indifference  to  inmates'  hygiene  needs,  and
therefore, Williams was not entitled to relief under the Eighth Amendment.   The court

No. 10AP-1012                                                                                    4
noted that, while Williams had presented evidence that disputed Timmerman-Cooper's
statement that soap was available in inmate showers and bathrooms, there was no
dispute that soap was otherwise available to inmates through the commissary.
{¶9}   Williams filed a timely appeal, and he raises the following assignment of
error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING [APPELLEES']
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN MATERIAL
ISSUES OF FACT WERE STILL IN DISPUTE REGARDING
WHETHER                                                                                          [APPELLEES]    HAD    VIOLATED    THE
APPELLANT'S    RIGHTS    AGAINST    CRUEL    AND
[UNUSUAL]    PUNISHMENT    UNDER    THE    EIGHTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
{¶10}  We review a summary judgment de novo.   Koos v. Cent. Ohio Cellular,
Inc.  (1994),  94 Ohio App.3d  579,  588, citing Brown v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Commrs.
(1993),  87 Ohio App.3d  704,  711.    When an appellate court reviews a trial court's
disposition of a summary judgment motion, it applies the same standard as the trial
court  and  conducts  an  independent  review,  without  deference  to  the  trial  court's
determination.   Maust v. Bank One Columbus, N.A. (1992), 83 Ohio App.3d 103, 107;
Brown at  711.   We must affirm the trial court's judgment if any grounds the movant
raised in the trial court support it.   Coventry Twp. v. Ecker (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 38,
41-42.
{¶11}  Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits,
transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."   Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate

No. 10AP-1012                                                                                     5
only under the following circumstances: (1) no genuine issue of material fact remains to
be  litigated;                                                                                    (2)  the  moving  party  is  entitled  to  judgment  as  a  matter  of  law;  and
(3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the non-moving party, reasonable
minds can come to but one conclusion, that conclusion being adverse to the non-
moving party.   Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66.
{¶12}  "[T]he moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial
court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record before the
trial court which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material
element of the nonmoving party's claim."   Dresher v. Burt,  75 Ohio St.3d  280,  292,
1996-Ohio-107.   Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-movant must
set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial.   Id. at 293.   Because
summary judgment is a procedural device to terminate litigation, courts should award it
cautiously  after  resolving  all  doubts  in  favor  of  the  non-moving  party.    Murphy  v.
Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 358-59, 1992-Ohio-95, quoting Norris v. Ohio Std. Oil
Co. (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 1, 2.
{¶13}  The  Eighth  Amendment,  which  applies  to  the  states  through  the  Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the infliction of "cruel and
unusual punishments" on individuals convicted of crimes.    U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
Prison officials may violate the Eighth Amendment when they deprive an inmate of "the
minimal civilized measure of life's necessities."   Rhodes v. Chapman (1981), 452 U.S.
337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399.   To prove a violation of the Eighth Amendment, an
inmate  must  show both  an  objective  element—that  the  deprivation  was  sufficiently

No. 10AP-1012                                                                                   6
serious—and  an  objective  element—that  a  prison  official  acted  with  deliberate
indifference.   Farmer v. Brennan (1994), 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970.
{¶14}  "A prison that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including adequate
medical care, is incompatible with the concept of human dignity and has no place in
civilized  society."    Brown  v.  Plata                                                        (May 23,  2011),  ___  U.S.  ___,  131  S.Ct.  1910.
Nevertheless, "the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons * * *,
which  house  persons  convicted  of  serious  crimes,  cannot  be  free  of  discomfort."
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349, 101 S.Ct. at 2400.   Restrictive or even harsh conditions are
"part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society."   Id.,
452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399.
{¶15}  At issue here is the alleged deprivation of a single hygiene item, soap.
Where the deprivation of hygiene items was temporary, courts have concluded that the
plaintiff did not satisfy the sufficiently-serious component.   See, e.g., Harris v. Fleming,
(C.A.7, 1988), 839 F.2d 1232, 1235-36 (no constitutional violation where prison officials
failed to provide prisoner with toilet paper for five days, and with soap, toothbrush, and
toothpaste for ten days); McNatt v. Unit Mgr. Parker, No. 3:96CV1397, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20468, 2000 WL 307000 (D.Conn. Jan.18, 2000), affirmed, 11 Fed. Appx. 30
(C.A.2,                                                                                         2001)                                                  (no  constitutional  violation  where  inmates endured,  among  other
deprivations, no toiletries or clothing for six days).   Compare Flanory v. Bonn (C.A.6,
2010), 604 F.3d 249 (holding that inmate had stated an Eighth-Amendment claim where
prison officials deprived him access to toothpaste for 337 days).
{¶16}  At  best, Williams  has  alleged  a  temporary  deprivation  of  an  essential
hygiene item.   In his complaint, Williams alleged that prison officials stopped providing

No. 10AP-1012                                                                                       7
state-issued soap, but he did not allege that he was without soap for any period of time
or that any harm resulted.   In his affidavit, he stated that prison officials failed to fill the
liquid soap dispensers in the housing unit bathroom from June to July 2010, generally
failed to fill the dispensers on a regular basis, and have never supplied soap in the
shower areas.                                                                                       (The other inmate affidavits were identical.)   Again, however, Williams
does not state in his affidavit that he has been without soap for any period of time or
that harm has occurred.   In her affidavit, Timmerman-Cooper stated that, under the new
policy, soap is available for purchase at the commissary at a cost of $.55 to $2.54 and
that LCI will provide soap to inmates unable to afford it.   Williams provided no evidence
to  counter  appellees'  evidence  showing  that  he  has  access  to  soap  from  the
commissary, whether for purchase or otherwise.
{¶17}  Even  viewing  all  of  the  evidence  most  strongly  in  favor  of  Williams,
reasonable minds could only conclude that he has access to soap and may have
suffered, at worst, a temporary deprivation of free soap with no ill effects.   Williams has
failed to show that the alleged injury is sufficiently serious to support a claim for cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.   Having concluded that Williams
cannot meet the objective, or sufficiently serious, prong of the applicable, two-part test,
we need not consider the subjective, or deliberate indifference, prong.
{¶18}  For these reasons, we overrule Williams' assignment of error.   We affirm
the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
BROWN and TYACK, JJ., concur.

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