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FILED: March 17, 1999
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON
BANKAMERICA HOUSING SERVICES, a division of Bank of America, FSB, Appellant,
v.

P.D.N. & ASSOCIATES, INC., an
Oregon corporation,
Respondent.

(9609247CV; CA A102183) Appeal from Circuit Court, Grant County.
W.D. Cramer, Jr., Judge.
Argued and submitted January 5, 1999.
Stefan W. Farr argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Glenn H. Prohaska.
No appearance for respondent.
Before De Muniz, Presiding Judge, and Haselton and Linder, Judges.
LINDER, J.
Reversed and remanded for entry of judgment for plaintiff.
LINDER, J.
In this replevin action, plaintiff appeals from a judgment following a trial on stipulated facts. The trial court concluded that the manufactured structure in which plaintiff had a security interest was not subject to replevin because it became a fixture and because removal would damage the remaining structure. On appeal, plaintiff argues that the manufactured structure never lost its character as personal property because plaintiff's security interest was noted on the structure's certificate of title. We agree and, accordingly, reverse and remand for entry of judgment for plaintiff.
Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking to take possession of a manufactured structure in which plaintiff had already foreclosed its security interest. Defendant acknowledged in its answer that plaintiff had loaned money to defendant's tenants, Loran and Saralynn Leasy, for the purchase of a manufactured structure. By way of affirmative defense, however, defendant asserted that the structure had become a fixture of defendant's realty and that plaintiff's security interest was invalid.
The parties agreed to submit the matter on stipulated facts summarized as follows: Plaintiff has a perfected security interest in a manufactured home that was purchased by plaintiff's debtors and placed on the property that they leased from defendant. Thereafter, the debtors removed the tongue and wheels of the manufactured home, placed it on a foundation, knocked out a wall of an existing structure, and joined the two. The debtors stopped making payments to both plaintiff and defendant.
Both parties submitted written memoranda in which they asked the trial court to determine whether the home had become a fixture and whether plaintiff had a right to remove the home even though removal will leave a hole in the existing structure and will cause some damage. Plaintiff argued entitlement to replevin under General Electric Credit Corp. v. Nordmark, 68 Or App 541, 684 P2d 1, rev den 297 Or 601 (1984), in which, it contended, we held that a manufactured structure titled in Oregon remains personal property. Defendant argued that this case differs from Nordmark because defendant here obtained title "under a residential lease to fixtures annexed to a dwelling and/or chattels abandoned therein" and that Nordmark applies only to subsequent purchasers. The trial court found in favor of defendant. In a letter opinion, the court explained:
"I conclude that the mobile home has become a fixture and as to this defendant is not subject to replevin. *
* *
"The facts of this case most closely correlate to a construction lien situation, where notice must be given
to an owner of real property, who is not the purchaser, if the lender/contractor desires to obligate the
owner. Here the original seller of the mobile home should have determined where the mobile home was to
be situated. [Nordmark] misses the mark in this case."
(Emphasis in original.) On appeal, plaintiff reiterates the arguments made below and asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that Nordmark does not apply.(1) We begin by outlining our decision in that case.
In Nordmark, the debtor purchased a mobile home and, as part of an agreement, granted a security interest in the mobile home. Thereafter, the debtor installed the home on real property it owned, sold the property (with the home attached), and then defaulted on the loan. Nordmark, 68 Or App at 543. The secured party brought an action against the subsequent purchaser to foreclose its security interest in the home. Id. at 544. We concluded that, although the mobile home had been affixed to the land, the fixture filing provisions of ORS chapter 79 were inapplicable and the notation of plaintiff's security interest on the certificate of title perfected the security interest as to the subsequent purchaser. We therefore held that the secured party was entitled to foreclose its security interest. Id. at 546-47. The subsequent purchaser took the property subject to the secured party's interest.
Although Nordmark does not directly address the right to replevin or the rights of landlords vis-a-vis secured parties, it does involve an examination of the interaction between the fixture provisions of ORS chapter 79, and the then-existing versions of Oregon's certificate of title statutes, ORS 481.021 and 481.413. Those particular certificate of title provisions have since been repealed. Or Laws 1983, ch 338,

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