S054267 State v. Ramirez

SUPREME COURT CASES

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State: Oregon

Docket No: none

Case Date: 12/13/2007

FILED: December 13, 2007

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,

Petitioner on Review,

ANASTACIO RAMIREZ,

Respondent on Review.

(CC C030767CR; CA A123657; SC S054267)

On review from the Court of Appeals.*

Argued and submitted May 2, 2007.

Jonathan H. Fussner, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review. With him on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.

Jamesa J. Drake, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. With her on the brief was Peter Gartlan, Chief Defender, Legal Services Division, Office of Public Defense Services.

Before De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Balmer, Kistler, and Walters, Justices.**

GILLETTE, J.

The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of defendant's remaining assignments of error.

*Appeal from Washington County Circuit Court, Mark Gardner, Judge. 205 Or App 113, 133 P3d 343, adh'd to on recons, 207 Or App 1, 139 P3d 981 (2006).

**Linder, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

GILLETTE, J.

This criminal case is the latest in a series of cases that reflect the efforts of the Court of Appeals and of this court to understand, follow, and apply the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 US 466, 120 S Ct 2348, 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 US 296, 124 S Ct 2531, 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004). In those cases, the Court held that a criminal defendant has a right under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, virtually all facts legally essential to the sentence that a defendant receives. (1) No one at this point is quarreling respecting the meaning or scope of the Apprendi/Blakely rule. However, the parties are at odds over whether, on the facts of this case, an arguable Apprendi/Blakely violation that was not brought to the trial court's attention at the time that it occurred nonetheless is (or could be) "an error of law apparent on the face of the record" (i.e., "plain error"), (2) as that phrase is used in ORAP 5.45(1). (3) The Court of Appeals determined that an Apprendi/Blakely violation was present in this case, resulting in defendant receiving a sentence in excess of that authorized by law. The court further determined that the error was plain. State v. Ramirez, 205 Or App 113, 123-25, 133 P3d 343, adh'd to on recons, 207 Or App 1, 139 P3d 981 (2006). The court then went on to hold that defendant's conviction should be reversed, stating: "The state has no valid interest in requiring defendant to serve an unlawful sentence; for defendant, * * * [on the other hand,] a significant liberty interest is at stake." Id. at 125. We allowed the state's petition for review to consider whether the Court of Appeals properly applied the rule of ORAP 5.45(1) respecting plain errors. We now hold that the Court of Appeals erred in considering the claimed error.

The procedural facts relevant to the legal issue before us are undisputed; it is their legal significance that causes debate. Defendant accosted a woman outside the building where she worked. He placed a handgun to her head and threatened to kill her. Defendant then ordered the victim onto her hands and knees, shot her in the head, and ran off. The victim survived, but lost her right eye and suffered other injuries. Defendant was charged with attempted murder, first-degree assault, and unlawful use of a weapon. He invoked his right to a jury trial, and a jury ultimately found him guilty on all counts. (4) At the conclusion of that part of the trial, the court thanked the jurors for their time and effort and discharged them. Defendant did not object to that procedure. Neither, however, did he at that time execute a written waiver of jury trial respecting the fact-finding process that was yet to come.

The court then conducted a sentencing hearing without a jury. At the conclusion of that hearing, the court made factual findings to support an "upward departure" sentence for the first-degree assault conviction, i.e., a sentence of greater length than that which, under existing sentencing guidelines, could be imposed solely by virtue of the jury's verdict finding defendant guilty of that offense. Specifically, the court found that the defendant caused permanent injury to the victim, that the victim was particularly vulnerable, and that defendant was persistently involved in criminal activities. The court also stated that, in its view, any of the findings, standing alone, justified an upward departure sentence. Defendant did not object on the record to having those departure facts determined by the trial judge rather than by the jury. The court then imposed an upward departure sentence on the assault conviction, ordered that that sentence be served consecutively with the sentence imposed on defendant's attempted murder conviction, ordered that defendant's sentence on the unlawful use of a weapon conviction be served consecutive to the other two sentences, and denied defendant eligibility either for early release or sentence reduction programs.

Defendant appealed his sentences to the Court of Appeals. There, he argued that, under Blakely, the trial court erred in imposing a departure sentence based on facts that he did not admit and that had not been found by a jury. (5) Defendant acknowledged that he had not made that argument in the trial court, but contended that the Court of Appeals should consider the matter as plain error under ORAP 5.45(1).

The Court of Appeals began by reviewing this court's case law explaining the procedure that an appellate court should follow before reaching an inadequately preserved or inadequately raised claim of error. It noted that our cases have identified three criteria that must be met for a claim of error to be considered plain error:

"'(1) [The claimed error] is an error of law; (2) the [claimed] error is obvious, not reasonably in dispute; and (3) it appears on the face of the record, i.e., the reviewing court need [not] go outside the record to identify the error or choose between competing inferences, and the facts constituting the error must be irrefutable.'"

Ramirez, 205 Or App at 115-16 (quoting State v. Reyes-Camarena, 330 Or 431, 435, 7 P3d 522 (2000), which, in turn, cites Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 381-82, 823 P2d 956 (1991)).

The Court of Appeals then extensively reviewed this court's recent decision in State v. Gornick, 340 Or 160, 130 P3d 780 (2006), a case in which a defendant, after waiving his right to a jury trial and being convicted by a trial court, claimed that the trial court committed plain error at sentencing by imposing an upward departure sentence based on aggravating facts that the trial court found. The Court of Appeals concluded that this court rejected that plain error argument in Gornick, because we believed that it was permissible to infer, from the fact that the defendant had waived his right to a jury trial respecting his guilt and had not objected when the trial court found departure facts, that the defendant did not wish to assert any right that he may have had to have a jury determine those departure facts. Ramirez, 205 Or App at 118-22. The Court of Appeals then stated, with respect to this court's decision in Gornick:

"Gornick stands for the proposition that, if we are able to draw at least two inferences from the defendant's failure to object, one of which suggests that the trial court erred and another of which suggests that the trial court did not err, then the error is not 'plain' within the meaning of ORAP 5.45(1). It further seems fair to say that Gornick holds that, on the facts of that case -- in which the defendant waived a jury trial and expressly consented to the trial court's authority to impose the maximum sentence -- multiple inferences could be drawn from the defendant's failure to object to the trial court making aggravation findings. One of those inferences was that the defendant did not waive his right to a jury trial as to the departure sentence facts, in which case the trial court erred. A second of those inferences was that the defendant did waive his right to a jury trial as to those facts, in which case the trial court did not err. We do not read Gornick broadly to hold that, in all cases in which a defendant failed to object to the trial court's departure findings, we cannot properly conclude that the trial court plainly erred in violation of Blakely and Apprendi. Whether the trial court committed plain error will depend on the facts of each case."

Ramirez, 205 Or App at 123 (emphasis in original).

Turning to the present case, the Court of Appeals distinguished the facts from those in Gornick. The court emphasized that, in the present case, defendant had not waived his right to a jury before trial and had never expressly consented to the trial court's authority to proceed without the aid of a jury to find facts to support a departure sentence; neither had defendant admitted those departure facts. From that procedural history, the Court of Appeals concluded that, unlike in Gornick, it could not infer that defendant intended to forgo his right to have a jury determine whether departure factors were present in the case. It followed, the court held, that no competing inferences arose out of defendant's failure to object when the trial court made those findings. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court committed plain error when it made those findings itself and relied on them to impose a departure sentence. Ramirez, 205 Or App at 124-25. The court then elected to exercise its discretion to address that error, citing the interests of the parties and the gravity of the error. Having done so, the Court of Appeals vacated defendant's sentence and remanded the case to the trial court. Id. at 125. We allowed the state's petition for review. (6)

In reviewing the Court of Appeals' determination to consider the error at issue as plain error, we ordinarily would approach the matter using the same two-step analysis that we employed in Gornick. First, we would consider the three "plain error" criteria set out in Ailes (was the claimed error one of law, was it obvious and not reasonably in dispute, does it appear on the face of the record without requiring the court to choose between competing inferences). Next, we would determine whether, assuming that the Ailes inquiry discloses a "plain" error, the appellate court properly exercised its discretion to consider that error. Gornick, 340 Or at 166.

That ordinary line of inquiry immediately presents us with two choices in this case. The first choice would be to omit any discussion of the first step of the plain error analysis because, if we are of the view that the Court of Appeals erred in the manner in which it dealt with the second step of the plain error analysis (and we are of that view), there is no need to address the first step.

This court could, if it chose, nonetheless undertake to review the Court of Appeals' approach to the first half of the analysis. Under that analysis, it could be argued, inter alia, that, having had a jury trial respecting guilt, defendant needed to speak up when the trial judge thereafter dismissed the jury without submitting the alleged departure factors to them if, as he now claims, defendant in fact was opposed to the trial court following that procedure. On the other hand, that argument, although interesting, may not arise again in future cases because the legislature has seen fit to enact a statutory procedure governing the issue. Or Laws 2005, ch 463, §§ 1-7, compiled as a note at ORS chapter 136 (2005); see also Or Laws 2007, ch 16, § 1 (repealing Oregon Laws 2005, chapter 463, section 20, which provided for sunset of sections one through seven on January 2, 2008). In this case, we think that it is more expeditious to assume that the judge's act in dismissing the jury was error and to move directly to the second half of the Ailes analysis, viz., a determination whether the Court of Appeals properly exercised its discretion to review the alleged error. We turn to that inquiry.

Respecting that issue, the Court of Appeals reasoned:

"Considering the interests of the parties and the gravity of the error, we conclude that it is appropriate [to reach it]. The state has no valid interest in requiring defendant to serve an unlawful sentence; for defendant, however, a significant liberty interest is at stake."

205 Or App at 125 (emphasis added). That sentiment notwithstanding, however, we think that even a brief consideration of defendant's Sixth Amendment claim in the context of the facts of this case establishes that the Court of Appeals erred in exercising its discretion to reach that claim.

As noted, the trial court explained that it would have imposed an enhanced sentence in this case based solely on its finding that the victim suffered a permanent injury as a result of defendant's crimes. See OAR 213-008-0002(1)(b)(I) (listing "permanent injury to the victim" as a basis for imposing a departure sentence). The undisputed evidence in the record on that issue is that the victim lost her right eye as a result of being shot in the head. That loss unquestionably is permanent.

In light of those facts, consideration of the competing "interests of the parties" -- the factor on which the Court of Appeals relied -- leads to precisely the opposite conclusion from the one that the Court of Appeals reached. If, as the record reveals, there is no legitimate debate that the victim suffered a permanent injury as a result of the shooting, then defendant's interest in a second hearing is minimal, if not nonexistent: A second hearing would only confirm that the departure sentence was warranted. The state, for its part, has a significant interest in avoiding a second, unnecessary sentencing hearing. Viewed in that light, the competing interests of the parties establish that this was not an appropriate case in which to consider defendant's unpreserved error.

The Court of Appeals also relied, in choosing to exercise its discretion, on the "gravity of the [trial court's] error." Again, viewed in context, the failure to submit the question whether the victim sustained a permanent injury to a jury can hardly be described as grave. On this record, no reasonable factfinder (whether a judge or a jury) could conclude anything other than that the victim suffered a permanent injury. Once again, this consideration does not support the Court of Appeals' discretionary choice.

Furthermore, this court has listed a number of other factors that bear on whether an appellate court should exercise its discretion to reach an unpreserved error. Ailes, 312 Or at 382 n 6. One of those factors, "the ends of justice in the particular case," requires a court to consider whether, in the context of an individual case, reaching the unpreserved error would advance the ends of justice. When, as in this case, the evidence on a sentencing factor is overwhelming, it would not advance the ends of justice to remand for an unnecessary hearing.

Finally, there is the court's assertion that the state "has no valid interest in requiring defendant to serve an unlawful sentence." Although that rationale has a nice ring to it, it makes little real-world sense in cases like the present one, in which the record all but demands imposition of precisely the sentences that the trial court elected to impose. That factor does not, on the facts of this case, justify the Court of Appeals' exercise of discretion. See also State v. Fults, ___ Or ___, ___ P3d ___ (decided this date) (further elaborating on limited utility of the "no valid interest" rationale).

It follows from the foregoing considerations that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion and, therefore, erred in considering the allegedly plain error committed by the trial court. The Court of Appeals decision to do so is reversed.

The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of defendant's remaining assignments of error.

1. More specifically, the Court held in Apprendi that,

"[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."

530 US at 490. In Blakely, the Court clarified its ruling, making clear that, by the phrase "statutory maximum," the Court meant the "maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." Blakely, 542 US at 303 (emphasis in original).

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2. We hereafter use the phrase "plain error" in order to spare the reader endless repetition of the phrase, "an error of law apparent on the face of the record."

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3. ORAP 5.45(1) provides, in part:

"No matter claimed as error will be considered on appeal unless the claimed error was preserved in the lower court and assigned as error in the opening brief * * *, provided that the appellate court may consider an error of law apparent on the face of the record."

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4. At trial and at sentencing, defendant never disputed that someone shot the victim and caused her to lose sight in her right eye. The only dispute that he raised was whether he was the person who shot her. The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant caused that injury when it convicted him of attempted murder and first-degree assault.

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5. Defendant also assigned error to the trial court's imposition of a consecutive sentence on the unlawful use of a weapon conviction, and to the trial court's decision denying him eligibility for "good time" credits. The Court of Appeals did not separately discuss those claims of error but remanded the entire case to the trial court for resentencing. Ramirez, 205 Or App at 125. Consistent with that approach, the state's petition for review and our own discussion of the case focus only on the departure sentence issue.

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6. Before turning to the state's challenge, we briefly address an argument that the defendant raised, for the first time, in his brief on the merits in this court. Defendant argues that, in addition to any other error that the trial court might have made, the trial court committed plain error by failing to employ the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof to its departure factor findings. Defendant observes that the court did not state on the record that it found those factors "beyond a reasonable doubt." According to defendant, because case law at the time of the sentencing hearing permitted sentencing courts to employ a lesser standard than "beyond a reasonable doubt" in finding the departure factors, this court cannot reasonably infer that the trial court in this case found those facts beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover (according to defendant), a defendant never can be presumed to have waived the reasonable doubt standard of proof and, therefore, the error is plain. Whatever the merits of defendant's argument, we do not reach them here. As noted, defendant not only failed to raise his point in the trial court, he also failed to raise it in the Court of Appeals. Defendant's argument simply comes too late to be entitled to discussion now. We focus on the errors that defendant did raise in the Court of Appeals and that that court elected to consider.

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Filed: June 30, 2011 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON In Re: Complaint as to the Conduct of J. MARK LAWRENCE, Accused. (OSB 08-115; SC S058778) En Banc On review of the decision of a trial panel of the Disciplinary Board. Argued and submitted May 2, 2011. Paula Lawrence, McMinnville, argued and cause and filed the briefs for accused. Stacy Hankin, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Tigard, argued the cause and filed the brief for the Oregon State Bar. PER CURIAM The complaint is dismissed. PER CURIAM The issue in this lawyer disciplinary proceeding is whether the accused, by releasing a partial transcript of a juvenile hearing to the press, violated Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 8.4(a)(4), which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. A trial panel found the accused guilty of violating RPC 8.4(a)(4) and suspended him for 60 days. We review the decision of the trial panel de novo. ORS 9.536(2); BR 10.6. Because we conclude that

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the Bar failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the accused's conduct caused prejudice to the administration of justice, we dismiss the complaint. The facts are straightforward and largely undisputed. In 2007, the accused represented a juvenile male who, along with another male friend, allegedly had touched or swatted several female classmates on the buttocks and had danced in front of the females in a lascivious manner. The incident occurred at the students' middle school. After being informed of the youths' behavior, the vice principal and a police officer interviewed the victims. Based on those interviews, the accused's client and his friend were arrested by a McMinnville Police Officer on February 22, 2007. On February 23, the Yamhill County Juvenile Department filed a delinquency petition alleging that the accused's client had committed acts that, if done by an adult, would have constituted five counts of first-degree sexual abuse and five counts of third-degree sexual abuse. At an initial detention hearing that same day, the court ordered the youths to remain in custody. The events giving rise to this disciplinary action arose out of a second detention hearing held on February 27, 2007, before Judge John Collins. The accused called two of the victims to testify on behalf of his client. The female victims testified that the youths were their friends and that they did not find the youths to be threatening in any way. Regarding the alleged sexual abuse, the female victims testified that the touching or swatting was not sexual in nature but rather was mere horseplay. The victims also testified that they felt pressured by the vice principal and the police officer to make the touching sound hurtful and uncomfortable when it was not. By the second detention hearing, the case was receiving substantial media 2

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attention. Judge Collins allowed the press to attend the detention hearing, but prohibited the press from recording the proceedings. The parties dispute whether the judge prohibited only video recordings or also prohibited audio recordings.1 A number of newspaper and television stories reported the events and testimony at the hearing. After the hearing, the accused obtained a copy of the official audio recording of the hearing and had a partial transcript prepared that contained the victims' testimony. In March 2007, a reporter contacted the accused about the February 27 hearing. The reporter, who was not present at the hearing, expressed disbelief that the female victims had felt pressured by the vice principal and the police officer to make the youths' actions seem sexual. The accused offered to give the reporter a copy of the partial transcript when it was available. The accused believed that it would have been improper to give the reporter the official audio recording of the hearing but thought that the transcript could be released. The accused contacted Deborah Markham, the deputy district attorney handling the case, to see if she objected to releasing the transcript. Markham told the accused that she believed that the court would have to consent. The accused then released the transcript to the reporter without obtaining permission from Judge Collins. Deputy District Attorney Deborah Markham testified that Judge Collins prohibited video recording. Judge Collins testified that he might have prohibited the press from recording the detention hearing, but that he did not remember whether he did so or not. He did remember allowing video recording at a later hearing in the proceeding. The accused testified that Judge Collins prohibited video recording but that he could not remember if the judge prohibited audio recording.
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When Judge Collins learned that the transcript had been released -following news reports that cited the transcript -- he called a meeting with Markham and the accused and told them to release no other transcripts. The testimony from the accused, Markham, and Judge Collins differs regarding that meeting. The accused described the meeting as relaxed and said that Judge Collins had stated that the release of the transcript was permissible. Markham testified that Judge Collins was "very concerned" about the release of the transcript and that Judge Collins said that the accused's disclosure violated the law. Judge Collins testified that the accused did not get his consent to release the transcript, but that he was not sure if the accused needed to do so under the circumstances of the case, particularly given the presence of the press at the hearing. In Judge Collins's description, the meeting was not contentious; although he requested that the parties refrain from releasing any additional transcripts, he did not "feel like [he] needed to be firm" and so did not issue an order barring further releases. In April 2008, several months after the juvenile case was resolved, Tim Loewen, director of the Yamhill County Juvenile Department, reported the accused's action of releasing the transcript to the Bar. After investigating the matter, the Bar charged the accused with violating RPC 8.4(a)(4)2 by releasing to the press "information
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RPC 8.4(a) provides, in relevant part: "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: "* * * * * "(4) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of

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appearing in the record" of a juvenile case without court consent, in violation of ORS 419A.255(1) and (3).3 The Bar alleged that the accused had "usurped" Judge Collins's authority to control the proceeding by not seeking the court's consent before releasing the transcript, and thereby had caused prejudice to the administration of justice. In the proceeding before the trial panel, the accused argued that his release of the transcript did not violate ORS 419A.255 for each of three independent reasons: (1) the transcript that he had prepared was not a part of the record of the case and so was not subject to ORS 419A.255; (2) Judge Collins had consented to the release of the information contained in the transcript when he allowed the press to attend and report on

justice[.]"
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ORS 419A.255 provides, in relevant part:

"(1) The clerk of the court shall keep a record of each case, including therein the summons and other process, the petition and all other papers in the nature of pleadings, motions, orders of the court and other papers filed with the court, but excluding reports and other material relating to the child, ward, youth or youth offender's history and prognosis. The record of the case shall be withheld from public inspection but is open to inspection by the child, ward, youth, youth offender, parent, guardian, court appointed special advocate, surrogate or a person allowed to intervene in a proceeding involving the child, ward, youth or youth offender, and their attorneys. The attorneys are entitled to copies of the record of the case. "* * * * * "(3) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (7) of this section, no information appearing in the record of the case or in reports or other material relating to the child, ward, youth or youth offender's history or prognosis may be disclosed to any person not described in subsection (2) of this section without the consent of the court * * * ."

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the hearing; and (3) the information in the transcript could be released under ORS 419A.255(5)(b) and (d), which list certain exceptions to the confidentiality of juvenile records. Even assuming that he did violate ORS 419A.255, the accused asserted, he did not violate RPC 8.4(a)(4), because his conduct was not prejudicial to the administration of justice. That was so, according to the accused, because the defendant and the victims supported releasing the transcript and because the information contained in the transcript had already been made public as a result of the press attending and reporting on the hearing. Thus, in the accused's view, no harm -- actual or potential -- resulted from his conduct. The trial panel found by clear and convincing evidence that the accused had violated RPC 8.4(a)(4) and suspended the accused from the practice of law for 60 days. The trial panel first determined that ORS 419A.255(3) prohibited the accused from releasing the partial transcript to the press without the consent of the trial court and that the accused had violated the statute in doing so. With little discussion, the trial panel then found that the evidence that the accused had violated the statute also was sufficient to show prejudice to the administration of justice and thus that the accused had violated RPC 8.4(a)(4). The accused sought review in this court. To prove a violation of RPC 8.4(a)(4), the Bar must prove (1) that the accused lawyer's action or inaction was improper; (2) that the accused lawyer's conduct occurred during the course of a judicial proceeding; and (3) that the accused lawyer's conduct had or could have had a prejudicial effect upon the administration of justice. See In re Kluge, 335 Or 326, 345, 66 P3d 492 (2003) (citing In re Haws, 310 Or 741, 746-48, 6

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801 P2d 818 (1990)) (so stating for identically worded former DR 1-102(A)(4)). Because we find the issue to be dispositive, we begin by examining the third element -- whether the accused's conduct had or could have had a prejudicial effect on the administration of justice -- and assume, without deciding, that the accused's conduct violated ORS 419A.255(3) and otherwise satisfied the test set out in Kluge and Haws. Prejudice to the administration of justice "may arise from several acts that cause some harm or a single act that causes substantial harm to the administration of justice." Kluge, 335 Or at 345. This court has identified two components to the "administration" of justice: "1) The procedural functioning of the proceeding; and 2) the substantive interest of a party in the proceeding." Haws, 310 Or at 747. "A lawyer's conduct could have a prejudicial effect on either component or both." Id. The Bar argues that the accused's conduct, a single act, resulted in prejudice to the administration of justice because it had the potential to cause substantial harm to the procedural functioning of the court. The Bar asserts, "Substantial potential harm to the administration of justice occurs whenever a lawyer interferes in or usurps the court's ability to do its job in a proceeding pending before it." The Bar states that the accused "usurped" the court's authority by not seeking Judge Collins's consent prior to releasing the transcript. The Bar cites three disciplinary cases to support its position that the accused's conduct resulted in substantial potential harm to the administration of justice. First, in In re Eadie, 333 Or 42, 36 P3d 468 (2001), this court found a violation of former DR 1-102(A)(4) where the accused lawyer submitted a proposed order containing a 7

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misrepresentation that was intended to influence the judge in changing the trial date. Id. at 58. That conduct substantially harmed the procedural functioning of the court because it resulted in the judge acquiescing to a trial date preferred by the accused and made it necessary for the judge to resolve a dispute resulting from the accused's misrepresentation and to redraft an order. Id. Second, in In re Morris, 326 Or 493, 953 P2d 387 (1998), this court concluded that the accused lawyer had engaged in a single act of conduct that had the potential to cause substantial harm, either to the procedural functioning of the court or to the substantive interests of the parties, when she knowingly filed a notarized document that she had altered. Id. at 502-03. Third, in In re Thompson, 325 Or 467, 940 P2d 512 (1997), this court found a violation of former DR 1-102(A)(4) where the accused lawyer physically confronted a judge after receiving an adverse decision. That conduct caused substantial harm to the administration of justice because the accused's ex parte communication with the judge "unfairly attack[ed] the independence, integrity, and respect due a member of the judiciary." Id. at 475. The conduct also had the potential to cause substantial harm, because it could have influenced the judge to change her decision or to recuse herself from the case. Id. In each of the preceding cases, the accused lawyer engaged in conduct that had the potential to disrupt or to improperly influence the court's decision-making process, Thompson, 325 Or at 475; that created unnecessary work for the court, Eadie, 333 Or at 58; or that had the potential to mislead the court, Morris, 326 Or at 503. Moreover, in Eadie and Morris, the accused lawyers made knowing misrepresentations to the court. Similarly, in Kluge, the accused lawyer's conduct in knowingly filing an 8

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untimely motion to disqualify the trial judge and then failing to serve the motion on opposing counsel caused prejudice to "the procedural functioning of the judicial system by imposing a substantial burden upon both opposing counsel and [the trial judge] to undo the accused's actions." 335 Or at 346. In this case, the Bar has made no showing, as required by Kluge and Haws, that the accused's conduct harmed the procedural functioning of the judicial system, either by disrupting or improperly influencing the court's decision-making process or by creating unnecessary work or imposing a substantial burden on the court or the opposing party. Nor has the Bar shown that his conduct had the potential to result in any of the above. Certainly, Judge Collins did not testify that the accused's actions interfered with Judge Collins's conduct of the juvenile proceeding. Although the Bar correctly asserts that ORS 419A.255 gives the trial court control over the release of protected information in a juvenile record -- and, as noted, we assume without deciding that the accused acted improperly in not seeking the trial court's consent -- the Bar's theory fails to take into account the fact that the information contained in the partial transcript that the accused released was presented in open court and had already been reported by the press.4 It is difficult to see how the accused's release of the same information, in the context of this case, had the potential to cause any harm to the proceeding, much less substantial harm.

Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution grants members of the public, including the press, the right to attend juvenile hearings. State ex rel Oregonian Pub. Co. v. Deiz, 289 Or 277, 284-85, 613 P2d 23 (1980).

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See Kluge, 335 Or at 345 (prejudice to the administration of justice may arise from "several acts that cause some harm or a single act that causes substantial harm"). Indeed, the Bar makes no effort to show that the accused's conduct could have resulted in new information being made public or that the release of the partial transcript itself had any potential impact on the proceeding. In fact, after the press attended the hearing and the accused released the transcript, Judge Collins allowed members of the press to listen to the official audio recording of the hearing. Nevertheless, the Bar asserts that Judge Collins was sufficiently "concerned" about the release of the information to call the accused and Markham to his chambers to discuss the incident. The fact that Judge Collins was "concerned" and met with the accused and Markham does not, by itself, demonstrate the potential for substantial harm to the procedural functioning of the court. Judge Collins himself stated that, although "in a perfect world," he probably would not have wanted the transcript released, in the context of this case and the open court provision of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution, the release of the partial transcript was likely permissible without his consent because "if [the press is] * * * going to know the information and report the information, at least get it right." Judge Collins's testimony, then, does not demonstrate that the accused's conduct impacted the procedural functioning of the court, even if the accused's conduct was cause for "concern." Nor does the Bar offer any evidence to prove that the release of the partial transcript harmed the substantive interests of the accused's client, the victims, or the state. The accused released the transcript, with the support of his client, in response to an 10

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inquiry from the media and in order to respond to inaccuracies appearing in some media reports. The accused maintained the confidentiality of the victims' names in the transcript, referring to them by their initials, consistent with an earlier order by Judge Collins. In this proceeding, the accused also submitted letters from the two victims who testified (and their parents) that stated their support for the release of the partial transcript. Finally, there was no testimony from the Yamhill County Juvenile Department that the release of the partial transcript had any effect on its substantive interests or its ability to prosecute the case. The Bar appears, instead, to take the position that virtually any violation of a statute, rule, or court order that occurs during the course of a court proceeding and relates to the conduct or any procedural aspect of that proceeding necessarily is prejudicial to the administration of justice. The Bar asserts, in effect, that "substantial potential" harm is implicit in the accused's conduct. Our cases, however, require proof by clear and convincing evidence that an accused's conduct in a specific judicial proceeding caused actual or potential harm to the administration of justice and, when only one wrongful act is charged, that actual or potential harm must be "substantial." Kluge, 335 Or at 345; Haws, 310 Or at 748. Here, the Bar's evidence did not prove that substantial harm resulted or could have resulted from the accused's conduct. We conclude that the Bar has not proved by clear and convincing evidence that the accused violated RPC 8.4(a)(4). The accused's conduct did not result in such prejudice, because there is no evidence that the release of the partial transcript, which contained solely information already presented in open court and reported by the press, 11

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harmed the procedural functioning of the judicial system. Nor is there any evidence that the substantive rights of the accused's client, the other juvenile defendant, the victims, or the state were harmed. "Prejudice to the administration of justice" requires such a showing. Haws, 310 Or at 747-48. The complaint is dismissed.

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