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Filed: September 20, 2012 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON M. K. F., Respondent on Review, v. HECTOR S. MIRAMONTES, Petitioner on Review. (CC 0510408; CA A138024; SC S058847) En Banc On review from the Court of Appeals.* Argued and submitted March 6, 2012. Andy Simrin, Andy Simrin PC, Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review. Lorena M. Reynolds, The Reynolds Law Firm PC, Corvallis, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. Cody Hoesly, Larkins Vacura LLP, Portland, filed a brief for amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association. Judy C. Lucas, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed a brief for amicus curiae State of Oregon. With her on the brief were John R. Kroger, Attorney General, and Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General. WALTERS, J. The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. *Appeal from Benton County Circuit Court, David B. Connell, Judge. 236 Or App 381, 236 P3d 782 (2010).

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WALTERS, J. In this case, we decide that, in an action under ORS 30.866 in which a plaintiff seeks both a stalking protective order and a judgment for compensatory money damages, the parties are entitled to a jury trial on the claim for money damages. Plaintiff1 filed a petition under ORS 30.866,2 alleging that defendant had engaged in knowing and repeated unwanted sexual contact with her in the two years preceding the filing of the petition and that that contact had caused plaintiff reasonable apprehension regarding her safety. Plaintiff claimed that she was entitled to three forms of relief: a stalking protective order enjoining defendant from engaging in certain conduct; an award of compensatory damages for lost sick and annual leave, lost wages, and counseling expenses; and an award of reasonable attorney fees. Defendant asserted that he was entitled to a jury trial on plaintiff's claim for compensatory money damages. The trial court disagreed and conducted the trial on all three claims without a jury. The court found in favor of plaintiff, issued a stalking protective order, entered a general judgment for compensatory damages in the amount of $42,347.78, and entered a supplemental judgment for reasonable attorney fees. Plaintiff filed this case in the trial court. In that court, she referred to herself as the "petitioner" and to Miramontes as the "respondent." The parties have continued to use those references in the appeal process. However, because Miramontes is the party who filed the petition for review in this court and is also, therefore, a "petitioner," we choose to proceed differently. To avoid confusion, and in accordance with ORS 30.866, which refers to the party seeking damages under ORS 30.866 as the "plaintiff," we will refer, in the course of this opinion, to the initial plaintiff as "plaintiff" and to Miramontes as defendant.
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We set out relevant parts of ORS 30.866 later in this opinion. 1

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Defendant appealed, raising three assignments of error, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court discussed only defendant's first assignment of error -- that the trial court had erred when it conducted the trial on plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages without a jury. M. K. F. v. Miramontes, 236 Or App 381, 383, 236 P3d 782 (2010).3 The court held that defendant had neither a statutory nor a constitutional right to a jury trial. The court reasoned that the text of ORS 30.866 contains "no reference that conveys any kind of indication that the legislature intended to confer a right to a jury trial." Id. at 385. In the absence of such a clear legislative intent, the court considered whether the Oregon Constitution confers that right. The court stated that the relevant constitutional provisions applied only to "'those classes of cases in which the right [to a jury trial] was customary at the time the [Oregon] [C]onstitution was adopted or in cases of like nature.'" Id. at 386 (quoting McDowell Welding & Pipefitting v. US Gypsum Co., 345 Or 272, 279, 193 P3d 9 (2008)) (alterations in original). The court concluded that this case does not fall within those classes of cases; a civil action for stalking did not exist when the Oregon Constitution was adopted, and it is "not merely an assault or battery claim by another name." Id. at 389. We allowed defendant's petition for review, and we, too, discuss only the first issue that he raises -- whether he had a right to a jury trial on plaintiff's claim for compensatory money damages.4 For the reasons that follow, we reverse the decision of

The Court of Appeals affirmed the other two assignments of error without discussion. M. K. F. v. Miramontes, 236 Or App 381, 383, 236 P3d 782 (2010).
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We reject without discussion defendant's second assignment of error -- that 2

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the Court of Appeals on that issue and the judgment of the circuit court on plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages and remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings. Defendant rests his argument that he had a right to jury trial on plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages on Article I, section 17, and Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution. However, our decisional paradigm requires us first to consider whether the stalking statute itself guarantees defendant a jury trial on that claim. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tualatin Tire & Auto, 322 Or 406, 414, 908 P2d 300 (1995), modified on recons, 325 Or 46, 932 P2d 1141 (1997) (requiring resolution of statutory issue before constitutional issue in deciding existence of right to jury trial). We therefore turn to that question. ORS 30.866, Oregon's civil stalking statute, provides, in part: "(1) A person may bring a civil action in a circuit court for a court's stalking protective order or for damages, or both, against a person if: "(a) The person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly engages in repeated and unwanted contact with the other person or a member of that person's immediate family or household thereby alarming or coercing the other person; "(b) It is objectively reasonable for a person in the victim's situation to have been alarmed or coerced by the contact; and "(c) The repeated and unwanted contact causes the victim reasonable apprehension regarding the personal safety of the victim or a member of the victim's immediate family or household. _____________________ the trial court erred in issuing a stalking protective order because there was insufficient evidence under ORS 30.866 that defendant had engaged in two or more unwanted contacts, each of which were alarming or coercive.

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"(2) At the time the petition is filed, the court, upon a finding of probable cause based on the allegations in the petition, shall enter a temporary court's stalking protective order that may include, but is not limited to, all contact listed in ORS 163.730. * * * "(3)(a) At the hearing, whether or not the respondent appears, the court may continue the hearing for up to 30 days or may proceed to enter a court's stalking protective order and take other action as provided in ORS 163.738. "* * * * * "(4) The plaintiff may recover: "(a) Both special and general damages, including damages for emotional distress; "(b) Punitive damages; and "(c) Reasonable attorney fees and costs. "* * * * * "(8) The remedy provided by this section is in addition to any other remedy, civil or criminal, provided by law for the conduct giving rise to the claim. "(9) No filing fee, service fee or hearing fee shall be charged for a proceeding under this section if a court's stalking order is the only relief sought." Nothing in the wording of that statute expressly grants a right to a jury trial. Nor are we aware of any statutory context suggesting that the legislature intended to grant a right to jury trial to parties to a stalking damages claim. In Goodyear, this court held that an express grant of a right to trial by jury is not necessary, as long as a legislative intent to provide one is clear. 322 Or at 415. The Oregon Trial Lawyers Association (OTLA), appearing as an amicus curiae in this proceeding, proffers legislative history that it contends provides that clear demonstration

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of legislative intent. OTLA argues that the legislative history shows that the legislature intended stalking damages claims to be treated the same as other civil damages claims, which, in turn, suggests that the legislature intended stalking damages claims to be tried to a jury. OTLA points to the fact that the bill that ultimately became ORS 30.866 originally exempted all petitioners from filing fee requirements. Senate Bill (SB) 833 (1993). One legislator complained that petitioners seeking only civil damages for stalking should not be relieved of the usual expenses in pursuing a civil damages action. Tape Recording, Senate Committee on Judiciary, SB 833, May 4, 1993, Tape 140, Side A (statement of Senator Bob Shoemaker); Tape Recording, Senate Committee on Judiciary, SB 833, May 5, 1993, Tape 143, Side A (statement of Senator Bob Shoemaker). Thereafter, the bill was amended, and, as enacted, ORS 30.866(9) provides that "[n]o filing fee, service fee or hearing fee shall be charged for a proceeding under this section if a court's stalking order is the only relief sought." As a consequence of that amendment, parties pursuing claims for money damages in a stalking case were not relieved of the obligation to pay the statutory fees. According to OTLA, because stalking damages claims are treated like ordinary civil damages claims when it comes to statutory fees, and ordinary civil damages claims are tried to juries, it is reasonable to infer that the legislature intended for stalking damages claims also to be tried to juries. That chain of inferences does not lead us to the conclusion that OTLA wishes us to draw. Although the legislature may have contemplated that, like most civil damage claims, a stalking damages claim would be tried to a jury, the legislature did not express that intent. The legislature plainly did decide that a party seeking only a stalking 5

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protective order would not have to pay filing fees, while a party seeking additional relief, such as money damages, would. However, the most that we can draw from the legislative history is that it, like the statute, is silent as to whether the legislature intended to confer a right to jury trial in a stalking damages claim. We therefore turn to whether the Oregon Constitution requires a jury trial of plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages. Article I, section 17, provides that, "[i]n all civil cases the right of Trial by Jury shall remain inviolate." Article VII (Amended), section 3, provides, in part, that, "[i]n actions at law, where the value in controversy shall exceed $750, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." Defendant argues that plaintiff filed a civil case that included a legal claim in which the value in controversy exceeded $750. Therefore, defendant asserts, he is entitled to a jury trial on that legal claim. Plaintiff counters with two related but alternative arguments, both of which are based on this court's pronouncement in State v. 1920 Studebaker Touring Car et al., 120 Or 254, 263, 251 P 701 (1927), that the right to a jury trial in a civil case is guaranteed not only in those cases in which the right was customary at the time the constitution was adopted, "but is to be extended to cases of like nature as they may hereafter arise." The first is that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial on a claim under ORS 30.866, because it is a newly created statutory claim, providing entirely new remedies, and, therefore, it is not "of like nature" to any claim known at common law and triable to a jury then. The second is that, even if the constitutional right to jury trial can attach to a newly created statutory claim with no historical antecedent in the common 6

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law, it does not attach to this claim, because a claim under ORS 30.866 is, in essence, a claim in equity. Plaintiff contends that the constitutional right to a jury trial does not extend to equitable claims, because, at the time of the Oregon Constitution's adoption in 1857, those claims would have been tried to the court without a jury. We begin with the constitutional provisions that provide a right to jury trial. As noted, Article I, section 17, provides that the right to a jury trial shall remain inviolate in "all civil cases," and Article VII (Amended), section 3, provides a right to jury trial in "actions at law, where the value in controversy shall exceed $750." (Emphases added.) In 1927, in Studebaker, the court considered the reach of those phrases and rejected the argument that no right to a jury trial attaches to a claim unless there was a firmly established common-law right to a jury trial for that claim in 1857.5 In that case, the court considered the constitutionality of a statute that had been enacted in 1923 and that created a new proceeding in rem against property used in violation of law. That statute prohibited the use of a car to transport liquor and provided for the forfeiture of any car used for that purpose. Under the statute, the matter was to be adjudicated by a judge rather than by a jury. The owner of the forfeited property contended that that procedure violated her constitutional right to a jury trial. In resolving that issue, the court rejected the contention that, because the forfeiture statute at issue was enacted after the adoption

Article I, section 17, was included in the Oregon Constitution when it was adopted in 1857. Article VII (Amended), section 3, was adopted when the constitution was amended in 1910. Because this case does not turn on the difference in those two provisions or the dates on which they were adopted, we simplify our discussion by referencing only the earlier date -- 1857.

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of the constitution, the legislature was free to dispose of cases under it in any way it saw fit: "It is argued that these proceedings concern matters in respect to prohibitory laws enacted since the adoption of the Constitution, and for that reason are not within the guarantee of the Constitution, and that controversies concerning violations of them may be disposed of by the courts in any manner the legislature sees fit to adopt. The answer to this contention is, that the constitutional right of trial by jury is not to be narrowly construed, and is not limited strictly to those cases in which it had existed before the adoption of the Constitution, but is to be extended to cases of like nature as they may hereafter arise." Id. at 263. Thus, the court in Studebaker held that the relevant inquiry is not whether a newly created statutory claim existed at common law, but whether, because of its nature, it falls "within the guarantee of the Constitution" to a jury trial. Id. The cases that followed Studebaker also looked beyond the "new" status of a claim, and they began to flesh out what kind of case, because of its "nature," requires a jury trial. In In re Idleman's Commitment, 146 Or 13, 27 P2d 305 (1933), for example, the court held that a newly created statutory proceeding to require the estate and/or relatives of "insane and feeble-minded persons" to reimburse the state for the cost of their care and maintenance did not carry a right to jury trial. The court observed that such a proceeding and such an obligation did not exist at common law, but it did not rely on that observation in holding that the statute did not violate the defendant's constitutional right to jury trial. Rather, the court noted that proceedings to determine lunacy and appoint guardians for incompetents were tried to the court at common law and that it had held that probate proceedings were not "civil cases" within the contemplation of the constitutional jury trial provision. Id. at 29-30. The court concluded that it was evident 8

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that, "in proceedings of the character now before us[,] trial by jury was not available at the time of the enactment of our constitution." Id. at 30; accord Mallatt v. Luihn et al., 206 Or 678, 695, 294 P2d 871 (1956) (statute directing that proceeding to require relatives to contribute to the state's support of "needy persons" proceed as a suit in equity did not violate right to jury trial, because facts involved in such proceeding were not triable by jury at time of adoption of constitution). In Molodyh v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 304 Or 290, 744 P2d 992 (1987), this court followed a similar analysis to conclude that the plaintiff was constitutionally entitled to a jury trial. The statute at issue in Molodyh provided for appraisal, in lieu of a jury trial, to determine the amount of an insured's damages in a contract action on an insurance policy. The court observed that, in contract actions, juries had traditionally determined whether a breach of contract had occurred and the consequent amount of damages to be awarded. Id. at 296. Because the court could find neither legislative antecedent nor case law to support the defendants' argument for "an historical exception" for appraisals, it held that, "as long as this form of dispute is tried as an action at law, a jury trial is required." Id. at 297. Plaintiff contends that this court has consistently held that there is no right to a jury trial for newly created statutory claims that provide new, previously unavailable, remedies. Plaintiff cites a number of cases for our consideration, but, in all but four of those cases, the claims at issue either were recognized and triable to a court at common law or, like those considered in In re Idleman's Commitment and Mallatt, were of such a

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nature that they would have been tried to the court at common law.6 Three of the remaining cases merit further discussion.7 The first of those is Cornelison v. Seabold, 254 Or 401, 460 P2d 1009 (1969). In that case, an employee who had been injured at work when a water tank then under construction fell on him sued his employer and the designers of the tank. The defendants filed supplemental answers, alleging that the employee's sole remedy was that provided by the workers' compensation statute. The workers' compensation statute provided, among other things, that the question whether a particular injury was covered

Kendall v. Post, 8 Or 141 (1879), was an eminent domain action, in which property was taken for public use. The court held that the common law never had granted a right to jury trial in such cases. In Dean v. Willamette Bridge Co., 22 Or 167, 29 P 440 (1892), the court held that a statute directing the court, without a jury, to assess damages in cases of default was constitutional, because, at common law, there was no right to jury trial in default proceedings. Moore Mill & Lbr. Co. v. Foster, 216 Or 204, 336 P2d 39 (1959) was another eminent domain case, but it involved a new statutory use of the power. There, the court again held that a jury trial was not employed at common law in proceedings in eminent domain. In State ex rel Hathaway v. Hart, 300 Or 231, 708 P2d 1137 (1985), a statute provided for criminal contempt proceedings for restraining order violations to be tried to a court without a jury. The court held that there was no constitutional right to a jury trial in such a case, because restraining orders, although unknown at common law, were analogous to traditional injunctions, and, historically, courts could punish violations of such orders through contempt proceedings, which, by the time the Oregon Constitution was adopted, were disposed of without jury trials. Finally, McDowell, 345 Or 272, involved a contract claim in which the plaintiff sought specific performance and the defendant asserted an affirmative defense that was also equitable in nature. The court held that there was no right to jury trial of those equitable claims because they would have been tried to a court at common law. We do not discuss one case that plaintiff cites that does involve a claim of a nature that would have required a jury trial at common law, because it is a Court of Appeals case that is not binding on this court. Voth v. State of Oregon, 190 Or App 154, 78 P3d 565 (2003). The Court of Appeals in Voth held that there was no right to a jury trial in a tort action brought by an inmate against the state because, at common law, the state would have been immune from such claims entirely. 10
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under that scheme was itself an issue triable to a court without a jury. The employee contended that that provision violated his constitutional right to a jury trial because the overall claim was, in essence, one for damages for personal injuries.8 The court acknowledged that a claim for personal injuries was "known to the common law" and at common law would have been tried to a jury, but, after observing that workers' compensation is a creation of the legislature and not the common law, the court concluded that "it should be the nature of the particular issue in the proceeding, rather than that of the entire proceeding, which should dictate whether this issue is to be tried with or without a jury." Id. at 406. The "particular issue" that the supplemental answers presented and on which the plaintiff claimed a right to jury trial was a preliminary question of law -whether the workers' compensation statute applied to the employee's claim and provided his sole remedy. Given that questions of law generally are the province of judges and not of juries, Glaze v. Whitley, 5 Or 164, 168 (1874) (so stating), it is not surprising that the court in Cornelison decided that the employee did not have a constitutional right to have a jury decide the legal question at issue in that case. Although plaintiff reads Cornelison as holding that there is no right to a jury trial for claims that did not exist at common law, the court, in fact, was quite clear that it was focusing not on the nature of the overall The employee in Cornelison did not contend that, if his injury were covered by the workers' compensation statutes, then he had a right to have a jury, rather than an administrative law judge, decide his claim for the compensation that those statutes provide. Instead, the only issue before the court in that case was whether the employee was entitled to a jury trial on the narrow issue of whether his injury was covered by those statutes.
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claim but on the nature of the particular issue presented. 254 Or at 406. To read Cornelison as plaintiff suggests would create a conflict between Cornelison and Studebaker, which the court in Cornelison cited but did not overrule. 254 Or at 405-06. Because Studebaker holds that the right to jury trial is not limited to claims that were cognizable at common law, Cornelison is properly understood as standing only for the narrow proposition that a statute that permits a court to decide the preliminary legal question of the applicability of the procedure that it creates is not unconstitutional. The other two cases that plaintiff cites and that merit further discussion are Greist v. Phillips, 322 Or 281, 906 P2d 789 (1995), and Hughes v. PeaceHealth, 344 Or 142, 178 P3d 225 (2008). Both Greist and Hughes are cases in which the plaintiffs sought damages for the wrongful death of decedents. The question presented in those cases was the constitutionality of a statute that limited the damages that the plaintiffs could recover. In Greist, the plaintiff argued that application of the statutory damages cap violated her right to a jury trial as provided in Article I, section 17, and Article VII (Amended), section 3. The plaintiff reasoned that the right to a jury trial means that the jury must decide the facts, including the amount of damages to be awarded. The plaintiff acknowledged that a wrongful death action was not cognizable at common law, but argued that a wrongful death action is "of like nature" to a personal injury action, to which a right to a jury trial clearly attaches. The court in Greist held that, even if the plaintiff were correct in that regard, the statutory damages cap still would be constitutional, because, "[w]hen Article I, section 17, and the constitution were adopted, a jury's 12

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determination of the amount of damages to be awarded in tort actions was not protected from judicial alteration." 322 Or at 294. In Hughes, the court reconsidered that rationale. The court acknowledged that it had erred in its understanding of the extent of a court's authority, in 1857, to modify a damage award, but nevertheless adhered to the result that it had reached in Greist. The court explained that, in 1857, there was no common-law rule that defined the elements of a claim for wrongful death or the damages that were recoverable in such an action. Therefore, the court held, the legislature retained the authority to define the right to recover for wrongful death, including the authority to establish the nature and amount of the damages that were recoverable. Hughes, 344 Or at 156. Thus, the court concluded, "Because the common law does not, and did not in 1857, recognize a right to unlimited damages in wrongful death actions, the only relevant source of substantive law respecting damages is the statutory law, which expressly places a cap on noneconomic damages. Thus, any right to a jury trial that plaintiff might have under Article I, section 17, cannot confer a right to a jury award of a kind or amount of damages that is contrary to that statutory law." Id. at 156-57 (first emphasis added, second emphasis in original). With regard to the right to jury trial, the court specifically noted that the parties had tried their case to a jury and that it was not deciding the "separate question" of whether they were constitutionally entitled to do so.9 Id. at 156 n 12. The parties in Greist also had tried their case to a jury and had not raised the issue of whether the The court also observed that, as far as it was aware, wrongful death actions in Oregon always have been tried to a jury. Hughes, 344 Or at 156 n 12.
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constitution entitled them to do so. Therefore, neither Greist nor Hughes stands for the proposition that there is no right to a jury trial in a statutory action that did not exist at common law. In summary, our cases do not support plaintiff's argument that newly created statutory claims that provide new remedies necessarily are not "of like nature" to any claim known at common law and, for that reason, are not triable to a jury. We therefore reject that argument. The question still remains, however, whether plaintiff's claim for damages in her civil stalking case is "of like nature" to claims that were triable to a jury at common law. The parties appear to agree that, if plaintiff had sought only money damages under ORS 30.866 -- that is, had she not combined her claim for money damages with a claim for a stalking protective order -- then her claim would have been at law and the right to jury trial would have attached. We concur. A claim seeking only monetary compensation for injuries inflicted is an "action at law," and the constitution, by its terms, preserves the right to jury trial for such legal claims. See Fleischner v. Citizens' Real Estate & Inv. Co., 25 Or 119, 130, 35 P 174 (1893) (where the complaint is for compensation for injury caused, the remedy is an action at law); Carey v. Hays, 243 Or 73, 77, 409 P2d 899 (1966) (claim is at law if relief sought is a certain sum of money); Molodyh, 304 Or at 297 (contract dispute tried as action at law requires jury trial); Thompson v. Coughlin, 329 Or 630, 637-38, 997 P2d 191 (2000) (right to jury trial attaches to legal claim for specified sum of money). Of course, plaintiff in this case also sought a stalking protective order, a 14

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form of injunctive relief, which is equitable in nature. See Swett v. Bradbury, 335 Or 378, 386, 387, 67 P3d 391 (2003) (injunction is equitable remedy). Plaintiff asserts, and defendant agrees, that if plaintiff had sought only injunctive relief, her claim would have been equitable in nature, and the constitution would not provide a right to jury trial. Again we concur. There is no right to jury trial of equitable claims. McDowell, 345 Or at 284-86. The problem that this case presents and that plaintiff addresses in her second argument is whether the right to jury trial attaches in a case in which a party seeks both legal and equitable relief. Plaintiff argues that her claim under ORS 30.866 is, in essence, a claim in equity and is, therefore, not "of like nature" to claims to which the right of jury trial attached at common law. Plaintiff contends that, because the legislature adopted ORS 30.866 to prevent and enjoin acts of stalking, all claims that a plaintiff files pursuant to that statute are essentially equitable in nature. Said another way, plaintiff contends that the overall "gist" of this case is equitable, and there is no constitutional right to jury trial of any part of it. Defendant argues that the correct mode of analysis is not to determine the overall "gist" of plaintiff's claim but to separately determine the nature of each claim or request for relief. According to defendant, plaintiff's equitable claim or request for equitable relief may be tried to the court, but her legal claim or request for legal relief must be tried to a jury. To analyze the parties' arguments, we find it helpful to understand the origins of the distinction between law and equity and the procedural differences to which 15

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that distinction gave rise. The law/equity dichotomy is rooted in the separate development of the common law courts and the chancery court in England. As early as 1250, the English Chancellor began to provide litigants with assistance because of the inflexibility of the rules and procedures used by the existing English common law courts. By 1600, that practice developed into an entirely separate equity court, which applied a separate body of substantive law permitting more flexible remedies. Because of that differing function, the chancery court developed a completely different procedural system. Frederic R. Merrill, Abolishing Procedural Distinctions Between Actions At Law and Suits in Equity; Right to Jury Trial, ORCP 2, in Oregon Law Institute, 1980 Civil Procedure Rules 224 (1979). Under that procedural system, the chancery court decided the cases over which it had jurisdiction without a jury. Robert Wyness Millar, Civil Procedure in the Trial Court in Historical Perspective 23-26 (1952). In America, some English colonies (and, later, states) also set up separate courts of law and equity, while others had one court with two different "sides" and two different sets of procedures. "All retained a fairly clear distinction between law and equity. This was required by the fact that the common law system of forms of action could not function without the separation, and common law procedure was so technical that it was inappropriate for equity." Merrill, Abolishing Procedural Distinctions at 224. After the American Revolution, federal law did not provide for separate courts of law and courts of chancery, but made a distinction between the law and equity "sides" of the court. Millar, Civil Procedure at 39. When the question arose in both federal and state courts as to whether the 16

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constitutional right to jury trial10 applied to cases brought in the equity courts or on the equity "side" of the courts, the United States Supreme Court and the supreme courts of many states held that it did not. Dan B. Dobbs, 1 Dobbs' Law of Remedies

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