S44606 State v. Johnsen

SUPREME COURT CASES

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State: Oregon

Docket No: CC96NB1336

Case Date: 07/24/1998

FILED: July 24, 1998

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,

Respondent on Review,

GLORIA JEAN JOHNSEN,

Petitioner on Review.

(CC 96NB1336; CA A95345; SC S44606)

On review from the Court of Appeals.*

Argued and submitted May 7, 1998.

Walter J. Ledesma, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review. With him on the brief was Sally L. Avera, Public Defender.

Kaye E. Sunderland, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for respondent on review. With her on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General.

Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen, Durham, and Leeson, Justices.**

LEESON, J.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

*Appeal from Coos County Circuit Court,

Paula M. Bechtold, Judge.

149 Or App 711, 945 P2d 1064 (1997).

**Kulongoski, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.

LEESON, J.

The issue in this criminal proceeding is whether payment of a civil penalty pursuant to ORS 30.875 is "satisfaction for the injury" for the purpose of ORS 135.703 et seq (civil compromise statutes).(1) The Court of Appeals held that such payment is not "satisfaction for the injury." State v. Johnsen, 149 Or App 711, 945 P2d 1064 (1997). We conclude that it is. Accordingly, we reverse the contrary decision of the Court of Appeals.

On September 23, 1996, the state filed an information charging defendant with the Class A misdemeanor of theft in the second degree, ORS 164.045, for allegedly stealing merchandise valued at $102.98 from a Fred Meyer store in Coos Bay. On October 17, defendant moved to dismiss the charge "on the grounds of a civil compromise." As evidence of "satisfaction for the injury" under the civil compromise statutes, defendant attached a copy of a receipt that she had received from a Fred Meyer employee stating: "Civil Penalty of $252.98 was paid in Full as of 10/2/96. Thank you."(2) Defendant did not request a hearing on her motion to dismiss, and the state did not file a response to that motion. On October 22, the trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss and entered a judgment of dismissal.(3)

On October 28, the state moved to set aside the judgment of dismissal, arguing that the trial court had granted defendant's motion to dismiss based on civil compromise "before checking with the DA's Office to see if we opposed such motion and thus require[d] a hearing on the matter." The state's affidavit explained:

"The State opposes dismissal of this case because there has been no civil compromise. Although Fred Meyer has exercised its right to civil damages under ORS 30.875, no civil compromise has been entered into. According to State v. Ha, 82 Or App 570 (1986) and State v. Reetz, 142 Or App 421 (1996), a defendant is not entitled to a dismissal under ORS 135.703 et seq upon making payment to a store under ORS 30.875."

The court scheduled oral argument for November 22 on the state's motion to set aside. On November 7, the state requested that the hearing date be moved to sometime before November 20, because the state desired "to preserve its right to an appeal" from the October 22 judgment. On November 12, the trial court denied the state's motion to change the hearing date and entered an order denying the state's motion to set aside the October 22 judgment of dismissal.

The state appealed from the judgment of dismissal. It argued that, under State v. Ha, 82 Or App 570, 728 P2d 932 (1986), rev den 302 Or 657 (1987), payment of a civil penalty is not sufficient evidence of satisfaction for the injury for the purpose of the civil compromise statutes. It also contended that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the state's motion to set aside the judgment, because the state was not accorded "a reasonable opportunity to respond and request oral argument" on defendant's motion to dismiss.

Defendant responded that, under State v. Dumond, 270 Or 854, 530 P2d 32 (1974), written acknowledgment of payment of a civil penalty under ORS 30.875 is sufficient evidence of satisfaction for the injury for the purpose of the civil compromise statutes. Defendant also argued that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the state's motion to set aside the judgment and that the state did not properly preserve its argument that it was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond to defendant's motion to dismiss.

The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court had committed an error apparent on the face of the record because, under Ha, "payment of a civil penalty, pursuant to ORS 30.875, is not, by itself, sufficient evidence of a civil compromise." Johnsen, 149 Or App at 715 (emphasis in original). The court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

The legal issue on review is whether payment of a civil penalty under ORS 30.875 is sufficient evidence of satisfaction for the purpose of the civil compromise statutes. Resolution of that issue is a matter of statutory construction. See PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (explaining statutory construction methodology). The starting point of our analysis is the text and context of the relevant civil compromise statutes. Id. at 610-11.

ORS 135.703(1) provides, in part:

"When a defendant is charged with a crime punishable as a misdemeanor for which the person injured by the act constituting the crime has a remedy by a civil action, the crime may be compromised, as provided in ORS 135.705 * * *."

ORS 135.705(1) provides, in part:

"If the person injured acknowledges in writing, at any time before trial on an accusatory instrument for the crime, that the person has received satisfaction for the injury, the court may, in its discretion, on payment of the costs and expenses incurred, order the accusatory instrument dismissed." (Emphasis added.)

The statutory requirements for a civil compromise are that (1) the crime is punishable as a misdemeanor, (2) a civil remedy exists to compensate the victim, (3) the victim acknowledges in writing before trial receipt of "satisfaction for the injury," and (4) the trial court exercises its discretion to dismiss the accusatory instrument on payment of the costs and expenses incurred.

In Dumond, this court interpreted the term "satisfaction" in ORS 135.705(1) to mean that "the injured party acknowledges in writing that he has received full payment of the amount stolen from him." Dumond, 270 Or at 858-59. Five years after Dumond, the legislature enacted ORS 30.875, which provides, in part:

"(1)(a) An adult * * * who takes possession of any merchandise displayed or offered for sale by any mercantile establishment * * * without the consent of the owner and with the intention of converting such merchandise * * * to the individual's own use without having paid the purchase price thereof, or who alters the price indicia of such merchandise, shall be civilly liable to the owner for actual damages, for a penalty to the owner in the amount of the retail value of the merchandise * * * not to exceed $500, and for an additional penalty to the owner of not less than $100 nor more than $250." (Emphasis added.)

The state contends that the interpretation of "satisfaction" in Dumond has no bearing on the resolution of this case because, when Dumond was decided, ORS 30.875 did not exist and adoption of that statute "chang[ed] the legislative landscape within which the meaning of [the civil compromise statutes] must be assessed." We disagree.

Enactment of ORS 30.875 gave merchants a new civil remedy to recover damages from shoplifters. That statute allows merchants to seek recovery of actual damages, a civil penalty in the amount of the retail value of the stolen goods up to $500, and an additional civil penalty in an amount between $100 and $250. When it enacted ORS 30.875, the legislature did not refer to the phrase, "satisfaction for the injury," in the civil compromise statutes; nor did it give any indication that, by enacting ORS 30.875, it intended to modify this court's interpretation of "satisfaction" in Dumond. In our view, enactment of ORS 30.875 did not affect the context of Dumond's interpretation of "satisfaction" in ORS 135.705, an interpretation that the state does not question separately. But see Holcomb v. Sunderland, 321 Or 99, 105, 894 P2d 457 (1995) (re-examination of prior statutory construction appropriate when all stated bases of prior construction either no longer applied or were no longer correct because of statutory revision). The interpretation of "satisfaction" in Dumond remains valid.

As this court held in Dumond, for the purpose of civil compromise, "satisfaction for the injury" consists of written acknowledgment from the victim of receipt of full payment of the amount stolen. The state concedes that payment of a civil penalty under ORS 30.875 necessarily includes full payment of the retail value of the stolen merchandise. It follows that written acknowledgment from the merchant that a shoplifter paid the civil penalty provided by ORS 30.875 is "satisfaction for the injury" for the purpose of the civil compromise statutes.

In this case, before defendant's trial on the accusatory instrument, the merchant gave written acknowledgment that it had received from defendant full payment of a civil penalty. That acknowledgment provided the trial court with evidence of "satisfaction for the injury" under ORS 135.705. The state does not argue that theft in the second degree is not punishable as a misdemeanor, that no civil remedy exists to compensate the victim in this case, or that defendant failed to pay the costs and expenses incurred. The first three requirements for civil compromise, described above, were satisfied in this case.

The state's next assignment of error is that the fourth requirement for civil compromise was not satisfied, because the trial court abused its discretion in entering a judgment of dismissal without giving the state an adequate opportunity to respond to defendant's motion to dismiss. As explained below, we conclude that the state did not preserve that argument for appeal.

The affidavit supporting the state's motion to set aside the judgment of dismissal stated that the trial court "signed defendant's motion to dismiss based on civil compromise before checking with the DA's Office to see if we opposed such motion and thus require[d] a hearing on the matter." The affidavit then stated that the state "did, in fact, oppose defendant's motion." Neither the state's motion nor its accompanying affidavit informed the trial court that the state believed that the court had denied the state a reasonable opportunity to respond to defendant's motion to dismiss. The state's contention that the trial court had a responsibility to "[check] with" the district attorney's office before ruling on defendant's motion is different from its argument on appeal that the trial court did not give it a reasonable opportunity to respond to that motion. Consequently, the latter argument was not preserved and we do not address it. ORAP 5.45(2).

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

1. The texts of the relevant statutes are set out below.

Return to previous location.

2. The parties agree that reference to "civil penalty" in that receipt is to the civil penalty provided for in ORS 30.875(1)(a).

Return to previous location.

3. UTCR 4.050 provides, in part:

"(1) There must be oral argument if requested by the moving party in the caption of the motion or by a responding party in the caption of a response."

We note that although there was a five-day period between defendant's motion and entry of the trial court's order, two of those days were Saturday and Sunday. At most, the state had only three working days to respond to defendant's motion.

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Filed: June 30, 2011 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON In Re: Complaint as to the Conduct of J. MARK LAWRENCE, Accused. (OSB 08-115; SC S058778) En Banc On review of the decision of a trial panel of the Disciplinary Board. Argued and submitted May 2, 2011. Paula Lawrence, McMinnville, argued and cause and filed the briefs for accused. Stacy Hankin, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Tigard, argued the cause and filed the brief for the Oregon State Bar. PER CURIAM The complaint is dismissed. PER CURIAM The issue in this lawyer disciplinary proceeding is whether the accused, by releasing a partial transcript of a juvenile hearing to the press, violated Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 8.4(a)(4), which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. A trial panel found the accused guilty of violating RPC 8.4(a)(4) and suspended him for 60 days. We review the decision of the trial panel de novo. ORS 9.536(2); BR 10.6. Because we conclude that

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the Bar failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the accused's conduct caused prejudice to the administration of justice, we dismiss the complaint. The facts are straightforward and largely undisputed. In 2007, the accused represented a juvenile male who, along with another male friend, allegedly had touched or swatted several female classmates on the buttocks and had danced in front of the females in a lascivious manner. The incident occurred at the students' middle school. After being informed of the youths' behavior, the vice principal and a police officer interviewed the victims. Based on those interviews, the accused's client and his friend were arrested by a McMinnville Police Officer on February 22, 2007. On February 23, the Yamhill County Juvenile Department filed a delinquency petition alleging that the accused's client had committed acts that, if done by an adult, would have constituted five counts of first-degree sexual abuse and five counts of third-degree sexual abuse. At an initial detention hearing that same day, the court ordered the youths to remain in custody. The events giving rise to this disciplinary action arose out of a second detention hearing held on February 27, 2007, before Judge John Collins. The accused called two of the victims to testify on behalf of his client. The female victims testified that the youths were their friends and that they did not find the youths to be threatening in any way. Regarding the alleged sexual abuse, the female victims testified that the touching or swatting was not sexual in nature but rather was mere horseplay. The victims also testified that they felt pressured by the vice principal and the police officer to make the touching sound hurtful and uncomfortable when it was not. By the second detention hearing, the case was receiving substantial media 2

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attention. Judge Collins allowed the press to attend the detention hearing, but prohibited the press from recording the proceedings. The parties dispute whether the judge prohibited only video recordings or also prohibited audio recordings.1 A number of newspaper and television stories reported the events and testimony at the hearing. After the hearing, the accused obtained a copy of the official audio recording of the hearing and had a partial transcript prepared that contained the victims' testimony. In March 2007, a reporter contacted the accused about the February 27 hearing. The reporter, who was not present at the hearing, expressed disbelief that the female victims had felt pressured by the vice principal and the police officer to make the youths' actions seem sexual. The accused offered to give the reporter a copy of the partial transcript when it was available. The accused believed that it would have been improper to give the reporter the official audio recording of the hearing but thought that the transcript could be released. The accused contacted Deborah Markham, the deputy district attorney handling the case, to see if she objected to releasing the transcript. Markham told the accused that she believed that the court would have to consent. The accused then released the transcript to the reporter without obtaining permission from Judge Collins. Deputy District Attorney Deborah Markham testified that Judge Collins prohibited video recording. Judge Collins testified that he might have prohibited the press from recording the detention hearing, but that he did not remember whether he did so or not. He did remember allowing video recording at a later hearing in the proceeding. The accused testified that Judge Collins prohibited video recording but that he could not remember if the judge prohibited audio recording.
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When Judge Collins learned that the transcript had been released -following news reports that cited the transcript -- he called a meeting with Markham and the accused and told them to release no other transcripts. The testimony from the accused, Markham, and Judge Collins differs regarding that meeting. The accused described the meeting as relaxed and said that Judge Collins had stated that the release of the transcript was permissible. Markham testified that Judge Collins was "very concerned" about the release of the transcript and that Judge Collins said that the accused's disclosure violated the law. Judge Collins testified that the accused did not get his consent to release the transcript, but that he was not sure if the accused needed to do so under the circumstances of the case, particularly given the presence of the press at the hearing. In Judge Collins's description, the meeting was not contentious; although he requested that the parties refrain from releasing any additional transcripts, he did not "feel like [he] needed to be firm" and so did not issue an order barring further releases. In April 2008, several months after the juvenile case was resolved, Tim Loewen, director of the Yamhill County Juvenile Department, reported the accused's action of releasing the transcript to the Bar. After investigating the matter, the Bar charged the accused with violating RPC 8.4(a)(4)2 by releasing to the press "information
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RPC 8.4(a) provides, in relevant part: "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: "* * * * * "(4) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of

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appearing in the record" of a juvenile case without court consent, in violation of ORS 419A.255(1) and (3).3 The Bar alleged that the accused had "usurped" Judge Collins's authority to control the proceeding by not seeking the court's consent before releasing the transcript, and thereby had caused prejudice to the administration of justice. In the proceeding before the trial panel, the accused argued that his release of the transcript did not violate ORS 419A.255 for each of three independent reasons: (1) the transcript that he had prepared was not a part of the record of the case and so was not subject to ORS 419A.255; (2) Judge Collins had consented to the release of the information contained in the transcript when he allowed the press to attend and report on

justice[.]"
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ORS 419A.255 provides, in relevant part:

"(1) The clerk of the court shall keep a record of each case, including therein the summons and other process, the petition and all other papers in the nature of pleadings, motions, orders of the court and other papers filed with the court, but excluding reports and other material relating to the child, ward, youth or youth offender's history and prognosis. The record of the case shall be withheld from public inspection but is open to inspection by the child, ward, youth, youth offender, parent, guardian, court appointed special advocate, surrogate or a person allowed to intervene in a proceeding involving the child, ward, youth or youth offender, and their attorneys. The attorneys are entitled to copies of the record of the case. "* * * * * "(3) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (7) of this section, no information appearing in the record of the case or in reports or other material relating to the child, ward, youth or youth offender's history or prognosis may be disclosed to any person not described in subsection (2) of this section without the consent of the court * * * ."

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the hearing; and (3) the information in the transcript could be released under ORS 419A.255(5)(b) and (d), which list certain exceptions to the confidentiality of juvenile records. Even assuming that he did violate ORS 419A.255, the accused asserted, he did not violate RPC 8.4(a)(4), because his conduct was not prejudicial to the administration of justice. That was so, according to the accused, because the defendant and the victims supported releasing the transcript and because the information contained in the transcript had already been made public as a result of the press attending and reporting on the hearing. Thus, in the accused's view, no harm -- actual or potential -- resulted from his conduct. The trial panel found by clear and convincing evidence that the accused had violated RPC 8.4(a)(4) and suspended the accused from the practice of law for 60 days. The trial panel first determined that ORS 419A.255(3) prohibited the accused from releasing the partial transcript to the press without the consent of the trial court and that the accused had violated the statute in doing so. With little discussion, the trial panel then found that the evidence that the accused had violated the statute also was sufficient to show prejudice to the administration of justice and thus that the accused had violated RPC 8.4(a)(4). The accused sought review in this court. To prove a violation of RPC 8.4(a)(4), the Bar must prove (1) that the accused lawyer's action or inaction was improper; (2) that the accused lawyer's conduct occurred during the course of a judicial proceeding; and (3) that the accused lawyer's conduct had or could have had a prejudicial effect upon the administration of justice. See In re Kluge, 335 Or 326, 345, 66 P3d 492 (2003) (citing In re Haws, 310 Or 741, 746-48, 6

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801 P2d 818 (1990)) (so stating for identically worded former DR 1-102(A)(4)). Because we find the issue to be dispositive, we begin by examining the third element -- whether the accused's conduct had or could have had a prejudicial effect on the administration of justice -- and assume, without deciding, that the accused's conduct violated ORS 419A.255(3) and otherwise satisfied the test set out in Kluge and Haws. Prejudice to the administration of justice "may arise from several acts that cause some harm or a single act that causes substantial harm to the administration of justice." Kluge, 335 Or at 345. This court has identified two components to the "administration" of justice: "1) The procedural functioning of the proceeding; and 2) the substantive interest of a party in the proceeding." Haws, 310 Or at 747. "A lawyer's conduct could have a prejudicial effect on either component or both." Id. The Bar argues that the accused's conduct, a single act, resulted in prejudice to the administration of justice because it had the potential to cause substantial harm to the procedural functioning of the court. The Bar asserts, "Substantial potential harm to the administration of justice occurs whenever a lawyer interferes in or usurps the court's ability to do its job in a proceeding pending before it." The Bar states that the accused "usurped" the court's authority by not seeking Judge Collins's consent prior to releasing the transcript. The Bar cites three disciplinary cases to support its position that the accused's conduct resulted in substantial potential harm to the administration of justice. First, in In re Eadie, 333 Or 42, 36 P3d 468 (2001), this court found a violation of former DR 1-102(A)(4) where the accused lawyer submitted a proposed order containing a 7

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misrepresentation that was intended to influence the judge in changing the trial date. Id. at 58. That conduct substantially harmed the procedural functioning of the court because it resulted in the judge acquiescing to a trial date preferred by the accused and made it necessary for the judge to resolve a dispute resulting from the accused's misrepresentation and to redraft an order. Id. Second, in In re Morris, 326 Or 493, 953 P2d 387 (1998), this court concluded that the accused lawyer had engaged in a single act of conduct that had the potential to cause substantial harm, either to the procedural functioning of the court or to the substantive interests of the parties, when she knowingly filed a notarized document that she had altered. Id. at 502-03. Third, in In re Thompson, 325 Or 467, 940 P2d 512 (1997), this court found a violation of former DR 1-102(A)(4) where the accused lawyer physically confronted a judge after receiving an adverse decision. That conduct caused substantial harm to the administration of justice because the accused's ex parte communication with the judge "unfairly attack[ed] the independence, integrity, and respect due a member of the judiciary." Id. at 475. The conduct also had the potential to cause substantial harm, because it could have influenced the judge to change her decision or to recuse herself from the case. Id. In each of the preceding cases, the accused lawyer engaged in conduct that had the potential to disrupt or to improperly influence the court's decision-making process, Thompson, 325 Or at 475; that created unnecessary work for the court, Eadie, 333 Or at 58; or that had the potential to mislead the court, Morris, 326 Or at 503. Moreover, in Eadie and Morris, the accused lawyers made knowing misrepresentations to the court. Similarly, in Kluge, the accused lawyer's conduct in knowingly filing an 8

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untimely motion to disqualify the trial judge and then failing to serve the motion on opposing counsel caused prejudice to "the procedural functioning of the judicial system by imposing a substantial burden upon both opposing counsel and [the trial judge] to undo the accused's actions." 335 Or at 346. In this case, the Bar has made no showing, as required by Kluge and Haws, that the accused's conduct harmed the procedural functioning of the judicial system, either by disrupting or improperly influencing the court's decision-making process or by creating unnecessary work or imposing a substantial burden on the court or the opposing party. Nor has the Bar shown that his conduct had the potential to result in any of the above. Certainly, Judge Collins did not testify that the accused's actions interfered with Judge Collins's conduct of the juvenile proceeding. Although the Bar correctly asserts that ORS 419A.255 gives the trial court control over the release of protected information in a juvenile record -- and, as noted, we assume without deciding that the accused acted improperly in not seeking the trial court's consent -- the Bar's theory fails to take into account the fact that the information contained in the partial transcript that the accused released was presented in open court and had already been reported by the press.4 It is difficult to see how the accused's release of the same information, in the context of this case, had the potential to cause any harm to the proceeding, much less substantial harm.

Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution grants members of the public, including the press, the right to attend juvenile hearings. State ex rel Oregonian Pub. Co. v. Deiz, 289 Or 277, 284-85, 613 P2d 23 (1980).

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See Kluge, 335 Or at 345 (prejudice to the administration of justice may arise from "several acts that cause some harm or a single act that causes substantial harm"). Indeed, the Bar makes no effort to show that the accused's conduct could have resulted in new information being made public or that the release of the partial transcript itself had any potential impact on the proceeding. In fact, after the press attended the hearing and the accused released the transcript, Judge Collins allowed members of the press to listen to the official audio recording of the hearing. Nevertheless, the Bar asserts that Judge Collins was sufficiently "concerned" about the release of the information to call the accused and Markham to his chambers to discuss the incident. The fact that Judge Collins was "concerned" and met with the accused and Markham does not, by itself, demonstrate the potential for substantial harm to the procedural functioning of the court. Judge Collins himself stated that, although "in a perfect world," he probably would not have wanted the transcript released, in the context of this case and the open court provision of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution, the release of the partial transcript was likely permissible without his consent because "if [the press is] * * * going to know the information and report the information, at least get it right." Judge Collins's testimony, then, does not demonstrate that the accused's conduct impacted the procedural functioning of the court, even if the accused's conduct was cause for "concern." Nor does the Bar offer any evidence to prove that the release of the partial transcript harmed the substantive interests of the accused's client, the victims, or the state. The accused released the transcript, with the support of his client, in response to an 10

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inquiry from the media and in order to respond to inaccuracies appearing in some media reports. The accused maintained the confidentiality of the victims' names in the transcript, referring to them by their initials, consistent with an earlier order by Judge Collins. In this proceeding, the accused also submitted letters from the two victims who testified (and their parents) that stated their support for the release of the partial transcript. Finally, there was no testimony from the Yamhill County Juvenile Department that the release of the partial transcript had any effect on its substantive interests or its ability to prosecute the case. The Bar appears, instead, to take the position that virtually any violation of a statute, rule, or court order that occurs during the course of a court proceeding and relates to the conduct or any procedural aspect of that proceeding necessarily is prejudicial to the administration of justice. The Bar asserts, in effect, that "substantial potential" harm is implicit in the accused's conduct. Our cases, however, require proof by clear and convincing evidence that an accused's conduct in a specific judicial proceeding caused actual or potential harm to the administration of justice and, when only one wrongful act is charged, that actual or potential harm must be "substantial." Kluge, 335 Or at 345; Haws, 310 Or at 748. Here, the Bar's evidence did not prove that substantial harm resulted or could have resulted from the accused's conduct. We conclude that the Bar has not proved by clear and convincing evidence that the accused violated RPC 8.4(a)(4). The accused's conduct did not result in such prejudice, because there is no evidence that the release of the partial transcript, which contained solely information already presented in open court and reported by the press, 11

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harmed the procedural functioning of the judicial system. Nor is there any evidence that the substantive rights of the accused's client, the other juvenile defendant, the victims, or the state were harmed. "Prejudice to the administration of justice" requires such a showing. Haws, 310 Or at 747-48. The complaint is dismissed.

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