Filed: April 17, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re: Complaint as to the Conduct of
LISA D. NUSS,
Accused.
(OSB 00-93; SC S48966)
On review of the decision of a trial panel of the Disciplinary Board.
Argued and submitted May 14, 2002.
Wayne Mackeson, Birmingham & Mackeson, LLP, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for the accused.
Jeffrey D. Sapiro, Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego, argued the cause and filed the brief for the Oregon State Bar.
Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs, De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.*
PER CURIAM
Complaint dismissed.
*Leeson, J., resigned January 31, 2003, and did not participate in the decision of this case.
PER CURIAM
In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon State Bar (Bar) alleged that the accused committed a "misdemeanor involving moral turpitude," subjecting her to discipline under ORS 9.527(2), because she had pleaded guilty to one count of harassment under ORS 166.065(1)(a)(A). A trial panel of the Disciplinary Board agreed with the Bar and imposed a public reprimand. The accused sought review of the trial panel's decision under ORS 9.536(1) and Bar Rule of Procedure (BR) 10.3, contending that that type of harassment is not a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude under ORS 9.527(2). We review de novo. ORS 9.536(3); BR 10.6. We disagree with the trial panel's application of ORS 9.527(2) and dismiss the complaint.
The facts are undisputed. On February 22, 2000, the accused pleaded guilty to one count of harassment under ORS 166.065(1)(a)(A). ORS 166.065 provides, in part, as follows:
"(1) A person commits the crime of harassment if the person intentionally:
"(a) Harasses or annoys another person by:
"(A) Subjecting such other person to offensive physical contact * **[.]
"* * * * *
"(3) Harassment is a Class B misdemeanor."
The Bar subsequently initiated a disciplinary proceeding in which it charged the accused with violating ORS 9.527(2). That statute provides, in part, that this court may discipline a member of the Bar when:
"[t]he member has been convicted in any jurisdiction of an offense which is a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude or a felony under the laws of this state, or is punishable by death or imprisonment under the laws of the United States, in any of which cases the record of the conviction shall be conclusive evidence[.]"
The Bar asked that the accused be publicly reprimanded.
The accused and the Bar agreed that the trial panel should determine whether the accused's misdemeanor involved moral turpitude by "reference to the nature and elements of the crime and without consideration of the specific circumstances of [the] case." See In re Chase, 299 Or 391, 399, 702 P2d 1082 (1985) (so stating). The parties disagreed, however, on whether the Chase court's definition of moral turpitude under ORS 9.527(2) would reach a violation of ORS 166.065(1)(a)(A). The Bar contended that, under Chase, a misdemeanor involves moral turpitude if the crime has the element of intent or knowledge, and also involves, as in this instance, "harm to a specific victim." Id. at 402. The Bar further contended that a violation of ORS 166.065(1)(a)(A) met both those requirements. (1)
The accused agreed that, under Chase, all misdemeanors involving moral turpitude must have either intent or knowledge as an element of the crime. The accused argued, however, that Chase did not make "harm to a specific victim" one of the additional factors necessary to conclude that a misdemeanor involves moral turpitude. Chase, the accused contended, held only that "[c]rimes involving violence against another person are * * * classed as moral turpitude offenses." Id. at 401 (emphasis added). The accused argued that a violation of ORS 166.065(1)(a)(A) did not qualify as a crime of violence and so was not a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude under ORS 9.527(2).
The trial panel determined that a violation of ORS 166.065(1) involves both intent and harm to a specific victim and, thus, was a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. It concluded that the appropriate disciplinary sanction was a public reprimand.
We turn to the text of ORS 9.527(2) to determine what the legislature meant by the phrase "moral turpitude." We do so because, strictly speaking, the Chase court's characterization of the "harm to a specific victim" category of misdemeanors involving moral turpitude -- the only category arguably applicable here -- was dictum. Chase dealt with what sometimes is called a "victimless" crime. The only thing that the Chase court needed to decide was that that category of moral turpitude reached, at most, only crimes that involved a victim (and thus caused "harm to a specific victim"). Having determined that even the outer boundaries of moral turpitude did not reach the crime at issue, the Chase court did not determine whether the boundaries were any narrower. That can be seen in the way that the Chase court continually expanded the scope of that particular category of cases involving moral turpitude: It started with a single federal case holding that voluntary, unjustifiable homicide involved moral turpitude, 299 Or at 401 (citing De Lucia v. Flagg, 297 F2d 58 (7th Cir 1961), cert den, 369 US 837, 82 S Ct 867, 7 L Ed 2d 843 (1962)); (2) broadly recharacterized that category, without any discussion, as "[c]rimes involving violence against another person," id.; and then recharacterized the category again, even more broadly, as "harm to a specific victim," id. at 402.
In interpreting a statute, we begin with the text and context of the statute, giving words of common usage their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-11, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). If a term has a well-defined legal meaning, however, then we give it that meaning. Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 78, 948 P2d 722 (1997).
This court first defined "moral turpitude" over one hundred years ago. In Ex parte Mason, 29 Or 18, 43 P 651 (1896), this court, interpreting the predecessor to ORS 9.527(2), (3) quoted with approval the following definition of moral turpitude:
"'[A]n act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man.'"
Id. at 21 (quoting Martin L. Newell, The Law of Defamation, Libel and Slander ch VI,