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Supreme Court
No. 2007-106-M.P.
(04-6055)
(04-460)
City of Pawtucket                                                     :
v.                                                                    :
Michael Pimental.                                                     :
NOTICE:    This  opinion  is  subject  to  formal  revision  before
publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to
notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250
Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 222-
3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published.




Supreme Court
No. 2007-106-M.P.
(04-6055)
(04-460)
City of Pawtucket                                                                                    :
v.                                                                                                   :
Michael Pimental.                                                                                    :
Present: Williams, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Suttell, and Robinson, JJ.
O P I N I O N
Justice Suttell, for the Court.   We issued a writ of certiorari to review a decision by the
Appellate Division of the Workers’ Compensation Court  (Appellate Division) upholding the
reduction  of  Michael  Pimental’s  workers’  compensation  benefits  under  G.L.                    1956
§ 28-33-18(b).1    The Appellate Division affirmed the trial judge’s ruling that the partially
incapacitated  employee’s  refusal  to  undergo  surgery  that  had  a  reasonable  likelihood  of
improving  his  condition  was  an  insufficient  reason  for  forestalling  a                       “maximum  medical
improvement”  (MMI) determination and the attendant reduction of benefits.2    Mr. Pimental
1 General Laws 1956 § 28-33-18(b) provides in pertinent part:
“[W]here an employee’s condition has reached maximum medical
improvement and the incapacity for work resulting from the injury
is partial, while the incapacity for work resulting from the injury is
partial, the employer shall pay the injured employee a weekly
compensation  equal  to  seventy  percent                                                            (70%)  of  the  weekly
compensation rate as set forth in subsection (a) of this section. The
court  may,  in  its  discretion,  take  into  consideration  the
performance of the employee’s duty to actively seek employment
in scheduling the implementation of the reduction.”
2 General Laws 1956 § 28-29-2(8) provides:
“‘Maximum medical improvement’ means a point in time
when any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
as  a  result  of  injury  has  become  stable  and  when  no  further
treatment  is  reasonably  expected  to  materially  improve  the
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seeks reversal of the final decrees entered by the Appellate Division, contending that, because he
was a candidate for further surgery, he had not reached “maximum medical improvement.” He
also argues that the trial judge violated his due-process rights when the trial judge reduced his
benefits before holding a full trial on the merits of the initial MMI determination.   For the
reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the final decrees of the Appellate Division.
I
Facts and Procedural History
Mr. Pimental suffered a herniated disk while performing his duties as a sanitation
engineer for the City of Pawtucket (the city).   On June 20, 2001, he entered into an agreement
with his employer in which he began receiving workers’ compensation benefits for partial
incapacity.   Mr. Pimental underwent back surgery performed by Samuel Greenblatt, M.D. on
December 6, 2001, and he received total disability benefits during a recovery period that lasted
approximately ten months.   On October 8, 2002, the Workers’ Compensation Court determined
that his condition had improved to partial disability and his benefits were reduced accordingly.
The surgery was, by all accounts, unsuccessful and a subsequent MRI revealed a large recurrent
disk herniation.   Discouraged by his lack of improvement, Mr. Pimental delayed undergoing a
second recommended surgery while he sought a second opinion from Mark A. Palumbo, M.D.
Doctor Palumbo also recommended surgery but cautioned that “surgical treatment would likely
provide [Pimental] with only partial relief of his long term symptomology.”  Based on the results
condition. Neither the need for future medical maintenance nor the
possibility  of  improvement  or  deterioration  resulting  from  the
passage of time and not from the ordinary course of the disabling
condition,  nor  the  continuation  of  a  pre-existing  condition
precludes a finding of maximum medical improvement.   A finding
of maximum medical improvement by the workers’ compensation
court  may  be  reviewed  only  where  it  is  established  that  an
employee’s condition has substantially deteriorated or improved.”
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of his first surgery and the invasive nature of the recommended procedure, Mr. Pimental declined
to undergo a second surgery to relieve his back pain.   Mr. Pimental also attempted physical
therapy but discontinued the treatment after two sessions because he felt it made his condition
worse.
On January 20, 2004, the city petitioned the Workers’ Compensation Court for a review
of Mr. Pimental’s status, contending that he had attained “maximum medical improvement.”   On
August 3, 2004, a trial judge entered a pretrial order finding that Mr. Pimental had reached MMI,
and the employee timely filed a claim for trial.3   On September 10, 2004, the city filed a second
petition seeking a 30 percent reduction of Mr. Pimental’s benefits in accordance with § 28-33-
18(b).   The trial judge entered a pretrial order reducing Mr. Pimental’s benefits to 70 percent on
October 7, 2004.  He delayed the effective date of that order, however, until March 1, 2005.
On March 2, 2005, Mr. Pimental filed a motion to dismiss the city’s petition to reduce his
benefits,  arguing  that  the  petition  was  filed  prematurely  because  the  determination  of  his
maximum-medical-improvement status had yet to be heard at trial and thus had not ripened into
a final decree.  The trial judge denied the motion to dismiss on March 10, 2005.
3 General Laws 1956 § 28-35-20(c) states:
“At the pretrial conference, the judge shall make every
effort to resolve any controversies or to plan for any subsequent
trial  of  the  case.  The  judge  shall  render  a  pretrial  order
immediately at the close of the pretrial conference. The pretrial
order shall be set forth in a simplified manner on forms prescribed
by the workers’ compensation court. It may reflect any agreements
reached between the parties, but shall grant or deny, in whole or in
part, the relief sought by the petitioner. The pretrial order shall be
effective upon entry. Any payments ordered by it including, but
not  limited  to,  weekly  benefits,  medical  expenses,  costs,  and
attorneys’ fees, shall be paid within fourteen (14) days of the entry
of the order.”
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After a consolidated trial on both the MMI and benefits-reduction petitions, the trial
judge affirmed both pretrial orders on May 4, 2005.   The trial judge relied on the deposition
testimony of James E. McLennan, M.D., who had examined Mr. Pimental on behalf of his
insurer  and  concluded  that  he  had  attained                                                       “maximum  medical  improvement.”    Doctor
McLennan examined Mr. Pimental in October  2002 and again more than a year later, in
December 2003, and noted that his condition had not improved.   He described defendant as
“only mildly disabled,” and stated that he thought surgery to remove protruding disk material
that was aggravating Mr. Pimental’s nerve might improve his condition.   Doctor McLennan
testified, however, that in the absence of such surgery, it was unreasonable to expect his
condition to improve.   Thus, as a result of Mr. Pimental’s continued refusal to accept surgery, it
was his opinion that Mr. Pimental had reached “maximum medical improvement.”
Mr. Pimental also testified at the trial and conceded that he had decided not to have a
second surgery because he felt the first operation had actually worsened his condition.   He also
admitted that he had not sought employment since his injury and that he was collecting Social
Security disability benefits.
On March 19, 2007, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision.   The court
declined to reverse its established position, first articulated in Robin Rug v. Manteiga, W.C.C.
No. 93-4363 (App. Div. Aug. 16, 1994), that the mere possibility of improvement, when the
employee refuses to undergo the recommended surgical procedure, does not preclude a finding
of MMI. City of Pawtucket v. Pimental, W.C.C. 04-6055, W.C.C. 04-460, at *3 (App. Div. Mar.
19, 2007).   It held that “[t]o adopt the employee’s position that a surgical candidate can never be
found to have reached MMI, would create a special protected class of injured workers who, by
their own decisions not to have the surgery, can remove themselves from certain provisions of
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the Workers’ Compensation Act.” Id. at *8.  The Appellate Division also rejected Mr. Pimental’s
contention that the trial court erred in not dismissing the city’s petition to reduce its workers’
compensation payment before the MMI issue had been heard on the merits at a trial.   The
Appellate Division noted that the relevant statute plainly states that pretrial orders are effective
upon entry and reasoned that allowing the trial judge to reduce payments while an appeal was
pending was consistent with the General Assembly’s purpose of providing prompt relief to
parties in workers’ compensation disputes.   Final decrees were entered on March 19, 2007.
Thereafter, Mr. Pimental filed a timely petition for writ of certiorari,4 which we granted on
September 20, 2007.
II
Standard of Review
Upon a petition for certiorari, we review a decree of the Appellate Division for any error
of law or equity pursuant to § 28-35-30. Rison v. Air Filter Systems, Inc., 707 A.2d 675, 678
(R.I. 1998).   Our review on certiorari “is limited to examining the record to determine if an error
of law has been committed.” Matter of Falstaff Brewing Corp. Re: Narragansett Brewery Fire,
637 A.2d 1047, 1049 (R.I. 1994).                                                                       “We do not weigh the evidence presented below, but rather
inspect the record to determine if any legally competent evidence exists therein to support the
findings made by the trial justice.” City of Providence v. S & J 351, Inc., 693 A.2d 665, 667 (R.I.
1997); see also Gregson v. Packings & Insulations Corp., 708 A.2d 533, 535 (R.I. 1998).   We
review de novo, however, questions of statutory construction. Rison, 707 A.2d at 678.
4 Any person aggrieved by a final decree of the Appellate Division may petition the Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari within twenty days from the entry of the final decree. Section
28-35-29(a).
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III
Discussion
A.  The “Maximum Medical Improvement” Determination
The central issue in this case is whether a partially injured employee may be found to
have attained “maximum medical improvement” when he refuses to undergo surgery that has
been recommended to improve his condition.                                                         “Maximum medical improvement” as defined by
statute is “a point in time when any medically determinable physical or mental impairment as a
result of injury has become stable and when no further treatment is reasonably expected to
materially improve the condition.” G.L. 1956 § 28-29-2(8).
Mr. Pimental contends that by omitting the word “surgery” from this definition, “the
Legislature must have intended that injured  [e]mployee’s  [sic] who are surgical candidates
cannot be found to be at a point of maximum medical improvement.”   Because surgery can
reasonably be expected to improve one’s condition, he argues, surgical candidates are shielded
from a finding of MMI.   He further contends that such a construction remains faithful to the
remedial and benevolent purpose of the Workers’ Compensation Act.    The city argues in
opposition that the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language does not preclude a
finding of MMI for injured employees who decline to undergo recommended surgery.
This Court reviews de novo questions of statutory interpretation. Rison, 707 A.2d at 678.
In so doing we strive to establish and to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Howard
Union of Teachers v. State, 478 A.2d 563, 565 (R.I. 1984). “This is accomplished from an
examination of the language, nature, and object of the statute. * * * Additionally, we must give
to the words in a statute their plain and ordinary meaning, unless a contrary interpretation is
apparent.” Id.
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The Appellate Division has twice had occasion to consider the statutory language at issue
in this case.   In Robin Rug v. Manteiga, W.C.C. No.  93-4363  (App. Div. Aug.  16,  1994),
medical evidence indicated that the employee’s condition had reached a plateau and that there
would be no improvement absent surgery, which the employee refused. Id. at  *2-3.    The
Appellate Division upheld a finding of MMI by the trial judge and rejected the employee’s
argument that the possibility of surgery prevented an MMI determination. Id. at *3.   If that view
were  accepted,  the  Appellate  Division  reasoned,                                                 “any  employee  by  refusing  surgery
notwithstanding his or her condition could prevent the ultimate finding of maximum medical
improvement.” Id.   One member of the three-judge panel dissented however. Id. at *3-4. He
argued that a finding of MMI was inappropriate in light of medical evidence that surgery would
improve  the  employee’s  condition,  stating  that  the  majority’s  decision  would                “chill  the
employee’s right to refuse intrusive major surgery.” Id. at *4.
In 1995, the Appellate Division reviewed a trial judge’s determination that an injured
employee had not reached MMI because medical experts indicated that the employee would
benefit from knee replacement surgery. Providence College v. Gemma, W.C.C. No. 95-1493, at
*2-3 (App. Div. Aug. 19, 1996).   The evidence indicated that the employee’s condition had
reached a plateau and that he had refused to undergo the recommended procedure. Id. at *2.  The
Appellate Division overturned the trial judge’s decision, however, reasoning that “an employee
could circumvent a finding of maximum medical improvement by simply refusing surgery.” Id.
at *3.
It is our opinion that the Appellate Division’s well-established construction of § 28-29-
2(8)                                                                                                 “maximum  medical  improvement”  is  correct  and  consistent  with  the  purpose  of  the
Workers’ Compensation Act.                                                                           “Maximum medical improvement” is not a determination that the
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employee’s condition will never improve or decline, nor does it preclude the possibility of future
medical interventions entitling the employee to review his MMI status when his “condition has
substantially deteriorated or improved.” Section  28-29-2(8).    Rather, the designation merely
identifies the point at which an employee’s physical or mental impairment has stabilized and
further treatment is not reasonably expected to materially improve his condition.   The mere
possibility that surgery might improve Mr. Pimental’s condition does not preclude a finding that
he has reached MMI when his refusal to undergo the sole treatment that each of his examining
physicians recommended ensures that his condition has, in all reasonable likelihood, become
stable.   Mr. Pimental has determined the limits of his own recovery and must, therefore, accept
the determination that he has attained maximum medical improvement.   We concur with the
Appellate Division that by refusing the surgery his impairment had become stable and no further
treatment was reasonably expected to improve his condition.
Furthermore, we are not persuaded by Mr. Pimental’s argument that such a construction
places him in the position of “having to choose between his physical well-being, versus his, and
his family’s, financial well-being.”   Mr. Pimental is free to choose whether to have surgery and,
given his poor prognosis and relatively minor impairment, we have no reason to doubt the
reasonableness or sincerity of his decision.  The mandatory 30 percent reduction of benefits upon
attainment of MMI, however, is not a punitive measure; rather it seeks to adjust the worker’s
benefits once the recovery period has come to an end.5   The General Assembly clearly has
expressed its desire that partially injured workers be encouraged to return to the work force when
they have reached maximum recovery.    It is not our place to question the wisdom of that
5 In K-Mart v. Whitney, 710 A.2d 667, 669 (R.I. 1998), we noted that an earlier version of this
statute granted wide discretion to the trial judges in reducing benefits when the employee made a
“good  faith”  effort  to  find  employment.    In  subsequent  legislation,  however,  the  General
Assembly limited the trial judge’s discretion solely to the implementation of the reduction.
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judgment.   Mr. Pimental continued to receive workers’ compensation benefits but, as his active
recovery period had come to an end, he was entitled to only the reduced benefits specified in
§ 28-33-18(b).   We do not believe Mr. Pimental was ensnared in the catch-226 situation that he
implies.
We also share the Appellate Division’s concern that adopting Mr. Pimental’s reasoning
would allow “an employee [to] circumvent a finding of maximum medical improvement by
simply refusing surgery.” Providence College, W.C.C. No. 95-1493 at *3.   We do not believe
that the General Assembly could have intended such a result.   “[I]t is this [C]ourt’s responsibility
in interpreting a legislative enactment to determine and effectuate the Legislature’s intent and to
attribute to the enactment the meaning most consistent with its policies or obvious purposes.”
Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 633, 637 (R.I. 1987).   We previously have recognized, in Lombardo
v. Atkinson-Kiewit, 746 A.2d 679, 682 (R.I. 2000), that the General Assembly enacted sweeping
reforms in 1992 to the Workers’ Compensation Act to “eliminate waste and unnecessary costs”
and to  “swiftly and fairly make appropriate adjustments for employees who are capable of
employment.” P.L. 1992, ch. 31, § 1.  Prior to 1992, § 28-33-18(b)   provided   that                     “if                                            the
employee proves that he or she has attempted in good faith to obtain employment suitable to his
or her limitations and has been unsuccessful, then partial incapacity shall not be reduced.” P.L.
1990, ch. 332, art. IV, § 28.   The post-1992 revision now requires a 30 percent reduction of
benefits upon a determination of maximum medical improvement and reduces the trial judge’s
discretion to the timing of that reduction.   This constriction of the court’s discretionary authority
is  consistent  with  the  General  Assembly’s  goal                                                     “to  swiftly  and  fairly  make  appropriate
6  The term  “catch-22” derives from a Joseph Heller novel by the same name.    Although
somewhat difficult to define precisely, it generally refers to a paradoxical rule which creates an
illogical or senseless situation in which one is faced with two equally undesirable alternatives.
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adjustments for employees who are capable of employment” and “to motivate return to gainful
employment in the work force.” Section 28-29-1.2(a)(7).   Given the General Assembly’s clear
mandate to deter waste and abuse, we believe allowing an employee to delay a finding of MMI
by refusing to undergo a recommended treatment would frustrate the purpose of the Workers’
Compensation Act.
B.  The Pretrial Order Reducing Benefits
Mr. Pimental also ascribes error to the trial judge’s denial of his motion to dismiss the
city’s petition to reduce his benefits to 70 percent, thereby allowing the pretrial order of October
7, 2004, to remain in effect.   He argues that the reduction of his benefits before he had an
opportunity for a full hearing on the issue of “maximum medical improvement,” constitutes a
deprivation of his due-process rights.   His argument calls into question the adequacy of the
pretrial procedures of the Workers’ Compensation Court.    We had occasion to review the
constitutionality of a substantially similar pretrial procedure in John J. Orr & Sons, Inc. v. Waite,
479 A.2d 721, 723 (R.I. 1984), in which we adopted the three-part test articulated by the United
States Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).   Although we decided
Waite before the Workers’ Compensation Commission became the Workers’ Compensation
Court, it remains controlling.7   In Waite, 479 A.2d at 723-24 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335),
we identified three factors to be considered in determining whether the pretrial procedure
violated due process: “(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action, (2) the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used and the possible
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, and (3) the government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
7 See G.L. 1956 § 28-30-21 (“Wherever in the general or public laws there appear the words,
‘workers’ compensation commission’ it shall read ‘workers’ compensation court.’”).
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substitute procedural requirements would entail.”    When state action threatens to deprive a
qualified  person  of  benefits  to  which  he  is  statutorily  entitled,  due  process  concerns  are
implicated. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-62 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits
implicated due process).
The “pretrial conference” section of the Workers’ Compensation Act allows both parties
to submit medical evidence and other documentary evidence, to be represented by counsel at the
preliminary hearing, and to submit written arguments in favor of or against the proposed order.8
The judge may, at his or her discretion, enter a preliminary order that “shall be effective upon
entry.” Section 28-35-20(c).   On the specific issue of reduction of benefits under § 28-33-18(b),
the trial judge may delay the implementation of the order after considering the employee’s
efforts to actively seek employment.
Mr. Pimental argues that the reduction of his benefits before he had the opportunity to
fully litigate the MMI determination was a denial of due process.   We first must evaluate the
private interest at stake in the proceeding.   Mr. Pimental’s sole interest appears to be the receipt
of unreduced workers’ compensation benefits until he could be heard at trial.   Significantly, the
trial judge did not make the October 7, 2004 pretrial reduction order effective until March 1,
8 Section 28-35-20(a)-(b) provides:
“(a) Before any case shall proceed to a trial, the judge shall
conduct a mandatory pretrial conference within twenty-one (21)
days of the date of filing with a view to expediting the case and
reducing the issues in dispute to a minimum, notice of which shall
be sent by the administrator to the parties or to their attorneys of
record.   The conference shall be informal and no oral testimony
shall be offered or taken.   Any statement then made by either party
shall in the absence of agreement be without prejudice, but any
agreement then made shall be binding.
“(b) Within a reasonable time of receipt, all medical reports
and documentary evidence which the parties possess and which the
parties intend to present as evidence at the pretrial conference shall
be provided to the opposing party.”
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2005, a delay of nearly five months.   This interregnum afforded Mr. Pimental ample opportunity
to perform his  “duty to actively seek employment.” Section  28-33-18(b).    Additionally, in
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340, the Court emphasized that the availability of retroactive relief was a
strong mitigating factor; we have subsequently applied that reasoning to workers’ compensation
decisions. Waite,                                                                                   479  A.2d at  724  (“the availability of retroactive relief is a factor to be
considered in assessing the potential injury”).   In the case at hand, we are satisfied that “the
degree and duration of the possible deprivation [did] not rise, in and of itself, to the level of
denial of due process.” Id. at 725.
We next consider  “the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.   Here, we must distinguish between the initial MMI
order and the order reducing benefits.   A “maximum medical improvement” determination, as
the term indicates, is primarily a medical evaluation.   The Mathews Court distinguished the
probative value of oral testimony during a Social Security Administration medical assessment of
a person’s disability from the Court’s earlier discussion in Goldberg of the high value of live
testimony before terminating welfare benefits. Compare Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 269 (holding that
because welfare benefits often rest on matters of credibility and veracity, “written submissions
are a wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision”), with Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343 (holding that a
disability assessment is a “more sharply focused and easily documented decision than the typical
determination of welfare entitlement”).   A “maximum medical improvement” decision probably
will be grounded in the same type of  “routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports by
physician specialists” that the Mathews Court determined would not benefit from allowing oral
testimony. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 404 (1971)).
Requiring oral testimony at the preliminary hearing will not appreciably reduce the risk of
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erroneous decision-making, as an employee’s credibility is not at issue. Mathews, 424 U.S. at
344.
Moreover, as we observed in Waite, 479 A.2d at 725, § 28-35-20 “provides for a hearing
at which both parties are entitled to be represented by counsel.   The statute also provides for the
submission of medical reports and other documentary evidence.”  It is clear to us, as it was to the
Waite Court, that “the procedures provided for in § 28-35-20 are both fair and reliable.” Waite,
479  A.2d at  725.    A pretrial order becomes effective upon entry under the provisions of
§ 28-35-20(c).   Thus, once the pretrial order determining that Mr. Pimental had reached MMI
was entered, the trial judge was required to reduce his benefits in accordance with the mandatory
language of § 28-33-18(b) upon petition of the city.
As previously noted, however, the latter statute expressly permits a trial judge to delay
implementation of the reduction in benefits by considering the employee’s efforts to actively
seek alternative employment.  This determination assuredly implicates the employee’s credibility
and seemingly would be aided by allowing the employee to testify before his benefits are
reduced.   Nevertheless, we are convinced that within the context of Mr. Pimental’s case the
probable value of any additional procedural safeguards was very slight.   We first observe that
under § 28-33-18(b) the consideration of an employee’s efforts to seek employment, as well as
the timing of any reduction in benefits, is fully entrusted to the discretion of the trial judge.
Additionally, in this case, the trial judge exercised his discretion in favor of Mr. Pimental by
delaying implementation of the pretrial order for a period of nearly five months.9
Finally, we must weigh the public interest, including the state’s interest in administrative
efficiency.    As we noted in Waite,  479 A.2d at  725, a clear policy goal of the Workers’
9 In light of Mr. Pimental’s subsequent testimony at trial that he had not sought employment
since his injury, this five-month deferral proved to be most generous.
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Compensation  Act  is  the  promotion  of                                                              “expeditious  resolution  of  workers’  compensation
disputes.”10   We are mindful that requiring a pre-termination hearing before the modification of
workers’ compensation benefits would delay the resolution of many disputes, often to the
detriment  of  injured  workers  seeking  immediate  benefits,  and  would  likely  make  the
administration of workers’ compensation benefits more costly to the taxpayers of Rhode Island.
The express purpose of the mandatory pretrial conference is “to expedit[e] the case and reduc[e]
the issues in dispute to a minimum.” Section 28-35-20(a).
The clear policy behind this laudatory purpose is to promote the “expeditious resolution
of workers’ compensation disputes,” see Waite, 479 A.2d at 725, a factor that weighs heavily in
the balancing calculus set forth in Mathews and Waite.   After considering this three-part test,
therefore, we hold that the pretrial procedures employed in Mr. Pimental’s case did not violate
his due-process rights.
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the final decrees of the Appellate
Division.  The papers in the case shall be remanded to the Workers’ Compensation Court.
10 We further note, however, that in John J. Orr & Sons, Inc. v. Waite, 479 A.2d 721, 725 (R.I.
1984), we were discussing the state’s interest in rapidly securing benefits for legitimately injured
workers rather than promptly relieving employers of their obligations under the statute.
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COVER SHEET
TITLE OF CASE:   CITY OF PAWTUCKET V. MICHAEL PIMENTAL
DOCKET SHEET NO :       SU-07-0106
COURT:                                                           Supreme Court
DATE OPINION FILED:   December 15, 2008
Appeal from
SOURCE OF APPEAL:    Workers Compensation Court                  County:    Providence
JUDGE FROM OTHER COURT:      Associate Justice George T. Salem
JUSTICES:                                                        Williams, CJ., Goldberg, Flaherty, Suttell, and Robinson, JJ.
WRITTEN BY:      Justice Paul A. Suttell
ATTORNEYS:
For Plaintiff:                                                   Kevin Reall
ATTORNEYS:
For Defendant:    Alfredo T. Conte

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