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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENC PLANTATIONS
SUPERIOR COURT                                                                                                   KENT, SC.
                                                                                    (FILED:  October 28, 2011)
DANNY BROWN                                                                         :
                                                                                    :                            KM-2000-323
v.                                                                                  :                            (K1-1993-0598)
:
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND                                                               :
DECISION
THUNBERG, J. This motion is before the Court for decision upon the State‟s
Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Law § 10-9-1.8, the appellant‟s “Motion
to Be Heard on Post-Conviction Issues that were not Addressed on the Order” filed
May 18, 2009.
Standard of Review
The applicable post-conviction relief statute, § 10-9.1-8, provides that
“[a]ll grounds for relief available to an applicant at the
time  he  or  she  commences  a  proceeding  under  this
chapter  must  be  raised  in  his  or  her  original,  or  a
supplemental  or  amended,  application.    Any  ground
finally  adjudicated  or  not  so  raised,  or  knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding
that resulted in the conviction or sentence or in any other
proceeding the applicant has taken to secure relief, may
not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the
court finds that in the interests of justice the applicant
should be permitted to assert such a ground for relief.”
G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-8.




Travel of the Case
Danny Brown (hereinafter “Brown”) was convicted, in 1994, by a jury of
three counts of first degree sexual abuse and three counts of first degree child
molestation.                                                                            He  was  subsequently  sentenced  concurrently  to  forty  years
imprisonment,  twenty  years  to  serve  and  twenty  years  suspended  without
probation.   In April of 2000, Brown filed an application for post-conviction relief,
alleging, in pertinent part, ineffective assistance of trial counsel resulting in a
deprivation of his constitutional right to a fair trial.    In                          2003, Brown‟s court
appointed Shatney1 attorney filed a “no merit” memorandum indicating that “she
did not believe [trial counsel‟s] performance met the standard necessary to carry a
successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”   Brown v. State, 964 A.2d
516, 523 (R.I. 2009).
Thereafter, Brown proceeded pro se before this Court, and he presented
evidence in a series of hearings.   This Court granted Brown‟s petition on the basis
of its opinion that trial counsel was, indeed, ineffective.   The honorable Supreme
Court, in the aforementioned case, thoroughly and comprehensively reviewed this
Court‟s decision, vacated the order granting Brown‟s relief and reinstated the
judgment of conviction.  Brown, 964 A.2d at 526.
1 See Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000).
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Brown then proceeded to file numerous motions and memoranda before this
Court styled as  “Motion to be Heard on Post-Conviction Issues that were not
Addressed  at  the  Original  Hearing  before  the  Honorable  Justice  Thunberg.”
(Def.‟s Mem., “Face Sheet” filed on June 9, 2010, at 1.)   In the accompanying
“memorandum,” appellant states as follows:
Under the Rhode Island State Statute 10-9.1-7, an Order
is not final until “each [sic] issue presented is addressed.
The Petitioner not knowing the law on this matter did not
realize  the  complications  that  this  would  create  to
exhaust his constitutional issues at the State Level [sic].
He Can not [sic] argue the Prosecutorial Misconduct that
was argued at the Post-Conviction.    He can not  [sic]
argue that he was not allowed to cross-examine Pastor
Janiak about Lewis Carpenter in which the Petitioner was
also a witness against her that was not argued at the
direct appeal [sic].   About not being allowed to cross-
examine  Janiak  and  Judith  about  when  the  Law
enforcement  authorities  were  contacted                                            [sic].                                                                     Not
addressed  when  trying  to  cross-examine Janiak  about
when or if Janiak knew if the Alleged victim sought
counseling  [sic].    And not addressed if the Statute of
Limitations were Time Barred in this Case [sic].”
(Def.‟s Mem. at 1.)
The appellant also filed a “Motion to Amend Parole Violation,” alleging that “the
Parole Board violated [his] U.S. Constitutional Amendments 1, 5, and 14, when
denying parole because the Petitioner is challenging his illegal conviction in the
court.”                                                                              (Def.‟s Memo., filed December 2, 2010, at 1).  Brown‟s original petition
for post-conviction relief was assigned to this Court by then Presiding Justice
Joseph F. Rodgers, Jr., on May 16, 2001.
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Over the course of approximately ten and one-half years, the Court has
developed an intricate familiarity with every pertinent aspect of Brown‟s trial,
post-conviction relief proceedings, and all of the attendant issues raised by Brown.
The Court discerns no novelty in the appellant‟s purported “newly-raised” issues.
In addition to presenting a plethora of filings, Brown has been afforded a full and
fair opportunity to present oral argument to the Court on said issues and, indeed, he
has done so on several occasions.    The Court concurs, unreservedly, with the
State‟s assertion that these issues “[i]n truth * * * are simply re-arguments of old
allegations or new arguments regarding issues that were clearly arguable in his
original application on KM 00-323.”                                                     (Pl.‟s Mem. in Support of its Motion to
Dismiss at 3.)   Our Supreme Court has stated that § 10-9.1-8‟s “„judgment on the
merits in the first case not only is conclusive with regard to the issues that were
actually determined but also precludes reconsideration of all other issues that might
have been raised in the prior proceeding.‟”  Ramirez v. State, 933 A.2d 1110, 1112
(R.I.  2007)  (citing Figueroa v. State,  897 A.2d  55,  56-57  (R.I. 2006)  (quoting
Carillo v. Moran, 463 A.2d 178, 182 (R.I. 1983)).
Conclusion
The factual, legal, and procedural unfolding of Brown‟s case over the past
ten years, and this Court‟s cognizance of the same, provides a meaningful context
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with which to evaluate Brown‟s present entreaty.   A thorough review of the case‟s
history, as well as a careful consideration of the instant controversy compels this
Court to grant the State‟s Motion to Dismiss.   Counsel for the State shall prepare
an order in conformance with this decision.
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Rhode Island Law