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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS PROVIDENCE, SC. (Filed: November 9, 2011) SUPERIOR COURT

DAWN L. HUNTLEY

V. STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS, LINCOLN CHAFEE, GOVERNOR; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, PETER KILMARTIN, ATTORNEY GENERAL; RHODE ISLAND OFFICE OF THE GENERAL TREASURER, GINA RAIMONDO, TREASURER; PATRICK LYNCH, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY; GERALD COYNE, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY; AND ALAN GOULART, IN HIS INDIVDUAL CAPACITY

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C.A. No. PC 2011-0558

DECISION GIBNEY, J. Before this Court is a Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and a Motion for Summary Judgment, pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 56, arising out of an employment discrimination claim brought by Plaintiff Dawn L. Huntley ("Plaintiff") against Defendants State of Rhode Island, Lincoln Chafee, Governor, Rhode Island Office of the Attorney General, Peter Kilmartin, Attorney General, Rhode Island Office of the General Treasurer, Gina Raimondo, Treasurer, and Patrick Lynch, Gerald Coyne, and Alan Goulart, in their individual capacities, (cumulatively, "Defendants").1 Defendants seek a dismissal of

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Plaintiff's original Complaint named the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Rhode Island Office of the Attorney General, Rhode Island Office of the General Treasurer, and Attorney General Patrick Lynch, as parties to the underlying action. Plaintiff amended her Complaint on March 24, 2011, adding Lincoln Chafee, Governor, Peter Kilmartin, Attorney

Plaintiff's underlying Complaint or, in the alternative, judgment as a matter of law, based upon the doctrine of res judicata. I Facts & Travel Plaintiff, a fifty-four year old African-American woman who resides in Cranston, Rhode Island, accepted a position as a prosecutor with the Rhode Island Office of the Attorney General in 1999. Plaintiff claims that while employed by the Office of the Attorney General, she was repeatedly given positive performance reviews and described as "honest and professional," "a reliable and trustworthy prosecutor," and a "rising star." Plaintiff claims that she received numerous commendations from judges and colleagues attesting to her exceptional professional abilities. However, Plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to a pattern and practice of unlawful and discriminatory treatment, that she was subjected to inappropriate and offensive remarks regarding her sex and race, and that she was denied promotions, raises, and training opportunities given to her colleagues. Regarding her lack of promotions, pay raises, and training opportunities, Plaintiff alleges that she was given "absurd, contradictory, and transparently unlawful reasons for her treatment." One such example was being labeled by her supervisors as "antisocial." Plaintiff supports this contention by claiming that during a Christmas party in 2005, Defendant Goulart told her that she was antisocial because she refused to drink alcoholic beverages with several of her colleagues while she was supervising an intern during a time when court was in session. Plaintiff further states that after she refused to participate in the conduct of driving home while intoxicated, she was told by Defendant Goulart that her antisocial behavior was causing her career issues. General, Gina Raimondo, Treasurer, and Gerald Coyne and Alan Goulart, in their individual capacities, and named Patrick Lynch in his individual capacity instead of as Attorney General. 2

Throughout her employment, Plaintiff claims that she was forced to endure various bigoted and offensive remarks by coworkers and supervisors. After discovering that she was being considered for a position as a Rhode Island District Court Judge, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Goulart, her supervisor, stated that he believed the process for selecting judges was "fucked up and unfair" and that Plaintiff would probably get the position because "she is black." Plaintiff, who was raised in South Bronx, New York, also alleges that Defendant Goulart told her she lives "in the ghetto," and after Plaintiff introduced Defendant Goulart to an intern from an inner city school, Goulart asked whether the intern was going to teach Plaintiff how to "roll a joint." Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Goulart told her that she was "just like [his] wife" because she always complained. As a result of the alleged discrimination, Plaintiff, in the summer of 2006, inquired about the procedure for filing an internal grievance. In July 2006, after meeting with Defendant Coyne regarding the alleged discrimination, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Coyne attempted to "intimidate" Plaintiff out of filing a grievance by warning her that such act would lead to an uncomfortable working environment at the Attorney General's Office. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Coyne informed her that all past grievances were deemed unfounded and that people would become defensive if she accused them of discriminating. Defendant Coyne stated that the reason for Plaintiff's treatment was poor job performance, not discrimination. After Plaintiff's meeting with Defendant Coyne, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Goulart called her into his office and accused her of "attacking him" through the statements to Defendant Coyne and stated that he "did not like it." Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an internal grievance in

August of 2006, which was deemed unfounded. On or about March 24, 2008, Plaintiff was given a case scheduled for trial during what had previously been scheduled as her vacation. Plaintiff brought this matter to the attention of 3

Defendant Goulart. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Goulart told her that she had no right to question him, threw his pen across the room, rushed toward Plaintiff, threateningly informed Plaintiff that she was "a bitch," and stated that this matter was "going nowhere just like the complaint [grievance]." Plaintiff claims that Defendant Goulart threatened her by stating that she was "all done," that he would "see to it," and that he was going to "get" her. On July 7, 2008, after returning from a medical leave, Plaintiff was informed that she was being terminated and that she served at the pleasure of the Attorney General Patrick Lynch. Plaintiff filed a charge with the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights on November 7, 2008 and received a Right to Sue from said agency on November 3, 2010, which provided that, if Plaintiff intended to sue, she must do so within ninety days from the date of the notice; otherwise, her right to sue would be lost. Prior to issuance of the Right to Sue letter, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island on April 30, 2010, naming as defendants Gerald Coyne, Alan Goulart, and the Rhode Island Attorney General's Office, among others. Four months later, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against Attorney General Patrick Lynch, the Rhode Island Attorney General's Office, and the State of Rhode Island. The defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss this Amended Complaint, and it was granted with no objection by Plaintiff. Judgment was entered on October 4, 2010. In the instant case, Plaintiff filed the underlying Complaint on January 31, 2011, alleging employment discrimination pursuant to the Fair Employment Practices Act, the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act, and the Rhode Island Whistleblowers' Protection Act. On March 24, 2011, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint to add Lincoln Chafee, Governor, Peter Kilmartin, Attorney General, Gina Raimondo, Treasurer, and Patrick Lynch, Gerald Coyne, and Alan Goulart, in their individual capacities, as parties to the action.

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II Standard of Review 12(b)(6), Motion to Dismiss "The sole function of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint." Palazzo v. Alves, 944 A.2d 144, 149 (R.I. 2008) (quoting R.I. Affiliate, ACLU, Inc. v. Bernasconi, 557 A.2d 1232, 1232 (R.I. 1989)). Current Rhode Island law simply requires that granting "a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is appropriate `when it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief from the defendant under any set of facts that could be proven in support of the plaintiff's claim.'" Barrette, 966 A.2d at 1234. "But unless amendment could avail the plaintiff nothing, the order of dismissal should usually be with leave to amend." Robert B. Kent et al., Rhode Island Civil and Appellate Procedure,

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